Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant was stopped by police officers in Aurora, Colorado, for speeding. During the stop, the officers observed the defendant make a dramatic movement toward the passenger side of his vehicle, to the extent that he was no longer visible to them. The officers recognized the defendant as a member of a local violent gang and learned from him that he was on parole for robbery. After asking the defendant to exit the vehicle and conducting a pat-down that revealed no weapons, the officers searched the passenger seat area and found a firearm. The defendant was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm evidence, which argued that the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed and dangerous, based on his furtive movement, gang affiliation, and parole status for a violent crime. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances. The court held that the combination of the defendant’s dramatic movement, his recognized gang membership, and his parole for robbery provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, justifying the protective vehicle search under the officer safety exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), finding it foreclosed by circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. McGregor" on Justia Law

Several healthcare employees in Colorado, including those at the University of Colorado Hospital Authority and South Denver Cardiology Associates, were terminated after refusing to comply with their employers’ COVID-19 vaccination mandates. These mandates, implemented in 2021, required employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The plaintiffs declined vaccination and did not seek exemptions, resulting in their dismissal.Following their terminations, the plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, asserting nearly identical claims. They alleged violations of statutory, constitutional, and contractual rights, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state-law breach of contract and tort claims, and an implied private right of action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds such as sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. The district courts dismissed all claims, finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled any viable legal theory. The courts also denied the plaintiffs’ requests to amend their complaints after judgment was entered.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that none of the statutes cited by the plaintiffs—including the Emergency Use Authorization statute, the PREP Act, and 10 U.S.C. § 980—unambiguously conferred individual rights enforceable under § 1983. The court also found that the constitutional claims, including those based on due process and equal protection, were not adequately pled and that the breach of contract claim was waived for lack of argument. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ judgments, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and that the lower courts did not abuse their discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Timken v. South Denver Cardiology Associates" on Justia Law

A former employee of an Oklahoma-based aviation training company alleged that his one-year employment contract was not renewed because he is a disabled veteran and because he complained to human resources about his supervisor’s disparaging comments regarding his disability. The employee, a Marine veteran with a high VA disability rating, worked as a Loadmaster Instructor in Kuwait. During his tenure, he disclosed his disability status for affirmative action purposes and later informed his supervisor and a co-worker when his rating increased. After this disclosure, his supervisor made inappropriate remarks about the disability system and the employee’s status, which led to a complaint and a subsequent reprimand of the supervisor. The employee’s FAA flight certificate expired shortly before his contract ended, and he received a negative performance appraisal from his immediate supervisor. The company’s higher management, who were responsible for contract renewal decisions, cited subpar job performance and the lapse of the flight certificate as reasons for not renewing the contract.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the employee failed to present sufficient evidence that the stated reasons for non-renewal were pretextual under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or that the decision was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus. The court also held that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) does not protect against discrimination based solely on disability status, but rather on military service itself.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the employee did not create a triable issue of fact under the “cat’s paw” theory linking a supervisor’s alleged bias to the ultimate decisionmakers. The court also confirmed that USERRA does not extend to claims of discrimination based solely on disability status. View "Sellman v. Aviation Training Consulting" on Justia Law

A man was accused of picking up a woman in El Paso, Texas, under the pretense of giving her a ride, then driving her across state lines to his home in Anthony, New Mexico, where he violently sexually assaulted her. The woman testified that she was handcuffed, physically assaulted, and raped multiple times before escaping at a stoplight in El Paso and seeking help. The defendant’s adopted daughter also testified that he had sexually assaulted her repeatedly when she was a minor and again as an adult.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico indicted the defendant for kidnapping and transporting an individual across state lines with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. At trial, the defendant argued that the encounter with the woman was consensual and related to commercial sex, and he sought to introduce evidence of her prior prostitution to support his consent defense. The district court excluded this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412, finding it irrelevant to consent. The court also allowed the adopted daughter’s testimony under Rule 413, concluding that her allegations of prior sexual assault by the defendant were admissible and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The court held that excluding evidence of the victim’s prior prostitution did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights, as such evidence is not probative of consent under established precedent. The court also affirmed the admission of the adopted daughter’s testimony, holding that Rule 413 applies based on the conduct underlying the charges, not the statutory elements, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403. The court further found that the defendant had waived arguments regarding limitations on cross-examination of the adopted daughter. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

Jeffery Krueger died following a traffic stop in Oklahoma initiated by Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office deputies. The stop began when deputies suspected Mr. Krueger of minor traffic violations and possible intoxication. After Mr. Krueger stopped his car in a turn lane, deputies forcibly removed him from his vehicle, allegedly pulling him by his hair, slamming his head on the pavement, and repeatedly using tasers as they attempted to handcuff him. Additional law enforcement officers arrived and, according to the plaintiffs, either participated directly or failed to intervene as Mr. Krueger, now handcuffed and prone, was further restrained with leg shackles and a hobble tie. Mr. Krueger stopped breathing at the scene and was later pronounced dead at a hospital.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma reviewed the case after the plaintiffs, Mr. Krueger’s parents and estate representatives, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendants, including deputies and police officers, moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment for most defendants, finding that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there were sufficient grounds to show clearly established constitutional violations. The court found material disputes regarding the amount and duration of force used, including the number of taser applications and the nature of the prone restraint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find the defendants used excessive force both in the initial removal and restraint of Mr. Krueger and in the prolonged prone restraint after he was subdued. The court also held that the failure to intervene in the use of excessive force was clearly established as a constitutional violation. The district court’s orders denying summary judgment were affirmed. View "Krueger v. Phillips" on Justia Law

A female firefighter with a long and decorated career in the Salt Lake City Fire Department alleged that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her sex and subjected her to a hostile work environment. She claimed that her male supervisors made derogatory comments about women, held her to different standards than male colleagues, and retaliated against her for complaining about sexist behavior. Over several years, she was passed over for promotions, reassigned to less prestigious roles, and eventually demoted. She filed multiple complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and appealed her demotion to the Salt Lake City Civil Services Commission, which ultimately reversed the demotion, finding that the reasons given for it were unsupported and appeared to be manufactured.The United States District Court for the District of Utah denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which sought qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for sex discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants, who were her supervisors, appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The City also sought pendent appellate jurisdiction over the denial of its own summary judgment motion, but the appellate court declined to exercise such jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as to the sex discrimination claim for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the defendants had not properly raised qualified immunity on that claim in the district court. The court also dismissed most of the appeal regarding the hostile work environment claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review factual disputes and evidentiary rulings at this interlocutory stage. However, the court vacated the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the hostile work environment claim and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a more thorough analysis of whether the law was clearly established as to each defendant’s specific conduct. View "Ellis v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law

In 2021, Ralph Marcus Hardy, an inmate at Adams County Detention Facility (ACDF) in Colorado, fell from his wheelchair and suffered serious injuries. Despite his repeated requests for medical attention, jail officials allegedly ignored his pleas. Hardy claims that Detention Specialist Daniel DeHerrera ignored emergency distress signals from his cell, and Deputy Dennis Rabie, who later found Hardy in pain, also failed to provide medical assistance.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. Deputy Rabie and Detention Specialist DeHerrera moved to dismiss Hardy’s claims, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, finding that Hardy plausibly alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Hardy sufficiently alleged that both Deputy Rabie and Detention Specialist DeHerrera acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The court found that Hardy’s constitutional rights were violated and that these rights were clearly established at the time of the incident. The court concluded that both defendants were aware of Hardy’s serious medical needs and failed to take reasonable measures to address them, thus denying them qualified immunity. View "Hardy v. Rabie" on Justia Law

Robin Niceta, a former caseworker with the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, was assigned to investigate allegations of child abuse against Paul Berryman. Niceta allegedly made false statements during the investigation and custody proceedings, which led to the removal of Berryman’s daughters from his custody for a year and a half. After the Berrymans regained custody, they sued Niceta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her conduct violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Niceta’s motion to dismiss the claim, rejecting her assertions of qualified immunity and absolute testimonial immunity for statements made at a custody hearing. Niceta then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court that Niceta was not entitled to qualified immunity because she failed to adequately raise the defense. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court regarding absolute testimonial immunity. The court held that Niceta is entitled to absolute immunity for statements made during her testimony at the custody hearing but not for statements made outside of that hearing.The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether any of the Berrymans’ claims could survive without considering Niceta’s testimonial statements made at the custody hearing. View "Berryman v. Niceta" on Justia Law

Cedric Lofton, a seventeen-year-old juvenile, died while in the custody of the Juvenile Intake Assessment Center (JIAC) in Sedgwick County, Kansas. Lofton, experiencing a mental health crisis, was placed in a prone restraint by JIAC officers for over forty minutes, leading to his death from cardiac arrest. Marquan Teetz, representing Lofton's estate, filed a § 1983 action against the officers, alleging excessive force.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claims, finding disputes of material fact. Specifically, the court noted that surveillance footage, although lacking audio, could support Teetz's version of events that Lofton had stopped resisting, making the continued use of force potentially excessive.The officers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that the district court's finding of a factual dispute was "blatantly contradicted" by the record and that the court failed to properly analyze whether the law clearly established that their use of force was unconstitutional.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the use of a prolonged prone restraint on a subdued suspect constitutes excessive force. The court emphasized that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Teetz, showed that Lofton was no longer resisting at some point during the restraint. The court also held that it was clearly established law that applying pressure to a suspect's back while in a prone position after being subdued is unconstitutional due to the significant risk of asphyxiation and death. Thus, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Teetz v. Stepien" on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff Craig Gabaldon, who was stopped by New Mexico State Police Officer Kevin Smith for multiple traffic violations, including improper merging, speeding, and failing to use a turn signal. During the stop, Officer Smith detected signs of intoxication and arrested Gabaldon after a struggle, during which a loaded gun was found on Gabaldon. Officer Kurtis Ward assisted in the arrest. Gabaldon filed a civil action alleging constitutional violations and state-law claims, asserting that the stop was motivated by his affiliation with the Bandidos Motorcycle Club.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted Defendants' motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, as Gabaldon had returned his Bandidos gear to the club, which likely destroyed it. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Gabaldon's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity and finding reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and probable cause for the arrest. Gabaldon's affidavit, which contradicted his deposition testimony, was struck down as a sham affidavit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the spoliation motion or in striking Gabaldon's affidavit. The appellate court agreed that the affidavit was an attempt to create a sham fact issue, as it contradicted Gabaldon's earlier deposition testimony without new evidence. The court also upheld the summary judgment, finding that Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to stop Gabaldon based on observed traffic violations. The appellate court concluded that the district court's rulings were correct and affirmed the judgment. View "Gabaldon v. New Mexico State Police" on Justia Law