Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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A group of nine tenured professors at a public Kansas university were terminated after the Kansas Board of Regents (KBOR) temporarily amended its policy, citing COVID-19-related financial pressures. The amendment permitted universities to suspend or terminate tenured faculty without the usual protections, including hearings or proof of financial exigency. ESU administrators drafted a framework for implementing these terminations, which KBOR approved. The professors received termination letters referencing general financial concerns, but allegedly lacking specific reasons. The professors claimed ESU was not facing financial exigency, and that their terminations were motivated by their political activities and beliefs. All nine appealed through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH); six had their terminations reversed and three had them affirmed. Litigation ensued, with the professors asserting constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including due process, liberty, association, and equal protection claims.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss most claims, finding that qualified immunity did not bar them. It ruled the professors had adequately alleged deprivation of a property interest in continued employment without due process and allowed other constitutional claims to proceed. The court dismissed liberty interest claims against KBOR and some administrators where no statements were attributed to them, but denied dismissal for others allegedly involved in drafting termination letters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the appeal at the motion-to-dismiss stage, adopting facts as alleged. It held that the professors had a state-created property interest in tenure and that the process used to terminate their employment plausibly violated clearly established procedural due process rights. The court affirmed denial of dismissal for procedural due process and related conspiracy claims, but reversed as to substantive due process claims, finding no clearly established violation. It also reversed denial of dismissal for liberty, association, equal protection, and conspiracy claims against KBOR and certain administrators, instructing the district court to dismiss those claims, while leaving claims against the university president intact. View "Miracle v. Hush" on Justia Law

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A man serving a life sentence for terrorism-related convictions at a federal prison in Colorado, who is severely disabled with both arms amputated above the elbow and vision loss in one eye, filed suit against several federal officials. He alleged violations of his federal constitutional and statutory rights stemming from his conditions of confinement and medical care while incarcerated. His claims included inadequate dental and medical care, denial of a medical diet, lack of proper prosthetics, and insufficient accommodation for his disabilities.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed most claims on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Some claims were dismissed as moot or for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while others, including his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, were dismissed for failure to state a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court also found his Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim challenging his placement at the prison was time-barred. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice and then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff could not pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under the APA because he failed to allege a final agency action and sued individual officers rather than the agency or officials in their official capacities. The court also held that his Bivens claim for deliberate indifference arose in a new context and was foreclosed due to the existence of the Bureau of Prisons’ administrative remedies. The appellate court further found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and ruled that the plaintiff had waived his challenge to deposition transcript fees by failing to object before the magistrate judge. View "Mostafa v. Blanche" on Justia Law

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A woman named Melissa asked a police officer to accompany her to a residence so she could retrieve her belongings. She told the officer, Chance Avery, that Christopher, who was at the residence, was drunk, mean, had threatened her, and had been drinking. When they arrived, Melissa entered the home and began collecting her things while Avery waited in the hallway. Christopher, holding a baseball bat at his side, entered the house, loudly asking where the police were. Avery immediately drew his gun and ordered Christopher to drop the bat. Christopher said he would comply, but after about 11 seconds and after taking a single step in Avery’s general direction without raising or swinging the bat, Avery shot Christopher three times, killing him.The special administrator of Christopher’s estate, Vision Bank, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, asserting that Avery used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Avery sought summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The court found that, based on the facts a reasonable jury could conclude, Avery’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that, under the facts a reasonable jury could find, Avery’s use of force was objectively unreasonable and violated Christopher’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court found that prior Tenth Circuit precedent made it clear that an officer may not use deadly force against a person holding a bat but making no hostile or aggressive motions. Therefore, Avery was not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Vision Bank v. Avery" on Justia Law

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Several plaintiffs, including the founder of a religious group called Singularism, used psilocybin as part of their religious ceremonies in Utah, where the drug is classified as a controlled substance. Authorities seized a large quantity of psilocybin from them and notified Singularism’s landlord that the drug use constituted a nuisance. Shortly after, the plaintiffs initiated a state lawsuit, which was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The federal court issued a temporary restraining order requiring the return of seized items and, after state authorities filed criminal charges, enjoined state prosecution against the religious leader to prevent a potential First Amendment violation.On appeal, the state authorities argued that the federal district court should have abstained from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine, and that prosecution did not violate the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to abstain de novo and found the requirements for abstention were satisfied. The court concluded that the state authorities had not waived the abstention argument through their litigation conduct. The plaintiffs failed to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith, was harassing, or created a threat of irreparable injury, as required for exceptions to abstention.On the merits, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in finding a likely First Amendment violation. The court found Utah law’s regulatory scheme for secular, supervised medical use of psilocybin was not comparable to the unsupervised religious use, and thus did not treat secular activity more favorably than religious activity. The court vacated the injunction and the denial of the motion to dismiss as to preferential treatment for secular use, remanding the issue of individualized exemptions for further district court proceedings, and dismissed the appeal regarding the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jensen v. Utah County" on Justia Law

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In November 2022, Anderson Aldrich entered Club Q, an LGBTQIA+ nightclub in Colorado Springs, and shot patrons, killing five people and injuring twenty-five others. Survivors and families of victims sued multiple defendants: the El Paso County Board of County Commissioners, the Sheriff, and Club Q’s owners and associated entities. Against the County Defendants, plaintiffs raised federal substantive due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging county policies prevented law enforcement from seeking emergency protection orders (ERPOs), thereby increasing vulnerability to private violence. Against Club Q Defendants, plaintiffs brought claims under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA), as well as negligence and wrongful-death claims, alleging inadequate security and safety measures.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss all federal claims, finding plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged affirmative danger-creating conduct required under the state-created-danger theory. The court also dismissed the CPLA claims against Club Q Defendants due to lack of causation, but denied dismissal of negligence and wrongful-death claims, reasoning the exclusivity of the CPLA was a fact-intensive issue not suitable for resolution at the pleading stage. Once federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state claims and entered judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims, holding plaintiffs failed to allege that county conduct placed them at immediate risk, thus not satisfying the affirmative-conduct requirement. The court also affirmed dismissal of the CPLA claims, concluding Aldrich’s actions were the predominant cause of injury under Colorado law. However, it reversed the district court’s denial of dismissal for negligence and wrongful-death claims, holding the CPLA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries arising from Club Q’s conditions and precludes those common-law claims. View "Vance v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

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Three female student-athletes at a public university in New Mexico alleged that the university was deliberately indifferent under Title IX to their reports of sexual abuse by the husband of their basketball coach. The husband, while not officially employed by the university, provided unauthorized “biomechanics” treatments to student-athletes, including the plaintiffs, sometimes on campus and later at his home. The head coach, his wife, allegedly required players with injuries to see him for treatment, and if they objected, questioned the seriousness of their injuries. Incidents of inappropriate touching and sexual assault were reported by the plaintiffs and other students during these treatments.Reports of misconduct began surfacing in spring 2022, first to the head athletic trainer, who raised concerns with the university’s Athletic Director. However, reports were not always relayed to appropriate officials, sometimes due to lack of Title IX training. When allegations of sexual misconduct became known, the university’s main response was to attempt to formalize the husband’s volunteer status rather than to investigate or prohibit further contact. Only months later, after more reports and an internal meeting, did the university ban him from campus and instruct coaches not to refer players to him, at which point the assaults ceased.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment to the university, finding it lacked sufficient control over the husband for Title IX liability to attach, and that there was no official policy of deliberate indifference. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo and held that, while there was no evidence of an official policy of deliberate indifference, the university had sufficient practical control over the husband and the context of the abuse to potentially incur Title IX liability. The Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe 1 v. Eastern New Mexico University Board of Regents" on Justia Law

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A woman was arrested and searched by Colorado Springs police officers in the parking lot of a motel where she lived, following her involvement in assisting an overdose victim and recording the police response. The officers claimed she was disruptive and failed to comply with commands to leave the scene, while she maintained she was cooperative and was wrongfully arrested. After her acquittal of the municipal charge, she brought a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for unlawful arrest and search, seeking damages including for emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado addressed extensive disputes during discovery. The plaintiff had deleted social media videos of her later police encounters, as well as records and messages related to the arrest. The court sanctioned her and her attorneys with a monetary penalty and gave adverse-inference jury instructions, directing the jury to presume that she regularly disrupted police business and profited from posting such videos. At trial, over her objection, the court admitted more than twenty clips from her unrelated copwatching videos, which portrayed her berating officers and threatening lawsuits. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the unrelated videos and by issuing an adverse-inference instruction that invited improper propensity reasoning, thereby unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff before the jury and depriving her of a fair trial. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment for the officers and remanded the case for a new trial. However, it affirmed the monetary sanction against the plaintiff and her attorneys for discovery violations. View "Cronick v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

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Wilford Deweese, a 67-year-old man from Florida, was traveling through Manitou Springs, Colorado, when he became involved in an altercation at a bar. After being refused service at two establishments, Deweese returned to the first bar to retrieve his belongings, leading to an argument with the bartender and a patron. During this confrontation, Deweese attempted to show a gun, prompting someone to call 911. Police located him in a nearby courtyard. Over roughly twenty minutes, officers repeatedly ordered Deweese to surrender, but he did not comply. After warning him, officers released a police canine to subdue him. As Deweese drew his firearm to shoot the dog, officers responded with gunfire, resulting in his death.Following these events, Deweese’s estate filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the officers, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment for excessive force and related claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers invoked qualified immunity, arguing that their conduct did not violate clearly established law. The district court agreed, granting their motion to dismiss the federal claims on the grounds that any constitutional violation was not clearly established at the time. The court declined jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff failed to identify Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent, or a consensus of authority from other circuits, that would have clearly established the unconstitutionality of the officers’ conduct under the particular circumstances present. The court further found that the situation did not rise to an obvious or egregious constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the officers. View "Estate of Deweese v. Hancock" on Justia Law

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A member of the Choctaw Tribe was arrested by a police officer from the Duncan Police Department after the officer responded to a report of a suspicious individual at a store located within the boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation. The officer, who was cross-commissioned by both the city and the tribe, conducted field sobriety tests, arrested the individual, and read him Oklahoma’s Implied Consent Test Request. The arrestee was booked on state criminal charges, but it was later discovered during booking that he was a tribal member and the alleged offenses occurred in Indian country, rendering Oklahoma courts without jurisdiction. The officer then filed tribal charges, which were eventually dismissed.Following these events, the individual filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and state-law claims for false arrest and unlawful detention. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officer acted under tribal, not state, authority and thus the § 1983 claim failed. The court also dismissed the state-law claims for the same reason.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court’s ruling was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law. The appellate court explained that a state officer may detain a suspect before conclusively determining tribal status, and that acting in excess of authority may still constitute action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the officer ultimately satisfied the color-of-law requirement. The court also reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, since that decision depended on the mistaken analysis of the federal claim. View "Walden v. The City of Duncan, Oklahoma" on Justia Law

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A group of young activists in Oklahoma City participated in racial-justice protests in the summer of 2020. During one incident, they were involved in a confrontation with a police officer near a permitted mural painting. The activists were later charged under Oklahoma’s riot-related statutes, with allegations that they surrounded a patrol car, yelled threats and expletives, and confined the officer briefly. Several of the plaintiffs pleaded guilty to lesser misdemeanor charges, while one had charges dismissed after proving non-involvement.The activists subsequently filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against state and county officials, challenging the constitutionality of Oklahoma Statutes, title 21, section 1311 (the Riot Statute). They argued the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment and unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the statute. The district court denied their request, construing the statute to include intent elements based on Oklahoma case law, and found plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. Because of unsettled state law questions, the Tenth Circuit certified questions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which clarified that the Riot Statute requires a showing of willfulness and a common intent to use or threaten violence, but does not require proof of recklessness. Relying on this construction, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on their facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "Terry v. Drummond" on Justia Law