Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Kenya Watkins, a Black woman, was employed by Genesh, Inc., d/b/a Burger King, from August 2014 to August 2015. She alleged that her manager verbally, physically, and sexually harassed her, including forcing her into a freezer, groping her, simulating sex with her, and stating she would not be promoted unless she had sex with him. Watkins filed an employment discrimination charge with the Kansas Human Rights Commission and the EEOC in early 2016. In December 2018, she alleged that Genesh admonished her then-employer, Church’s Chicken, for hiring her, leading to a second EEOC charge in 2019.In August 2019, Watkins sued Genesh in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding her allegations did not plausibly support racial harassment. The court noted that Watkins had pending EEOC charges and could file her Title VII claims once the EEOC proceedings concluded. In July 2021, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2019 charge, which Watkins did not pursue. In April 2022, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter for her 2016 charge, leading Watkins to file a second lawsuit in July 2022, raising claims under Title VII and other statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed Watkins’s 2022 complaint as untimely. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. The court held that Watkins’s Title VII claims were precluded by the final judgment in her 2019 lawsuit, as both suits arose from the same employment relationship. The court reaffirmed that the absence of a right-to-sue letter did not deprive Watkins of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her Title VII claims in the initial suit. View "Watkins v. Genesh" on Justia Law

Clifton White, the plaintiff, claimed that officials from the New Mexico Corrections Department unlawfully detained him beyond his release date. White argued that his sentence for violating probation was wrongfully entered and that he informed the prison officials of this error. Despite acknowledging the potential mistake, the officials continued to detain him based on a facially valid court order.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico reviewed the case and denied the prison officials' motion to dismiss, which was based on qualified immunity. The district court concluded that it was clearly established law that prison officials violate constitutional rights when they continue to imprison individuals without a lawful basis or are deliberately indifferent to such a prospect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that no controlling Tenth Circuit law clearly established that prison officials act unlawfully when they rely on a facially valid judicial sentencing order, even if they believe the order was made in error. The court emphasized that prison officials are not required to ignore or correct a judicial sentencing order if they suspect it is flawed. The proper recourse for a defendant who disagrees with a judicial order is to appeal through the state or federal judicial process. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the law was not clearly established that the prison officials' conduct in this case was unconstitutional. View "White v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Patrick Harmon was stopped by Salt Lake City police officer Kris Smith for a traffic violation while riding a bicycle. Harmon provided a false name, but Officer Smith identified him and discovered an active felony warrant. When Officer Smith attempted to arrest Harmon, he fled. Officers Clinton Fox and Scott Robinson joined the chase. The officers reported seeing Harmon reach towards his waist or pocket and heard him mention cutting or stabbing. Officer Fox claimed he saw Harmon holding a knife and shot him three times from five to seven feet away. Officer Smith, who was about fifteen feet away, fired his taser. Harmon died from the gunshots, and a knife was found near his right arm.Harmon's estate and his children sued Officer Fox and Salt Lake City for excessive force. The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the case, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to Officer Fox and Salt Lake City, concluding that any factfinder would determine Harmon was holding a knife and that the shooting was reasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether Harmon brandished a knife or threatened the officers. The court noted that the video evidence did not clearly show a knife, and Officer Smith testified he did not see a knife. The court concluded that a factfinder could reasonably find that Harmon did not pose an imminent threat, making the use of deadly force unreasonable. The court held that Officer Fox was not entitled to qualified immunity and reversed the summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Harmon v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

A police officer, Mathew Grashorn, shot a dog named Herkimer after responding to a business owner's call about a truck in a parking lot after hours. Upon arrival, Officer Grashorn saw the truck and two dogs, Bubba and Herkimer. Bubba initially ran towards the officer but returned to his owner when called. Herkimer then emerged and ran towards the officer, who shot the dog when it was a few feet away. Herkimer was later euthanized due to the injuries.The plaintiffs, Wendy Love and Jay Hamm, sued Officer Grashorn for violating the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that Herkimer did not pose an immediate danger, and thus the shooting could be a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court upheld the district court's denial of summary judgment, agreeing that a jury could find no immediate danger and that the officer had time to consider non-lethal options. The court emphasized that common sense and case law clearly establish that shooting a pet dog without an immediate threat constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. The court also rejected the officer's argument that a reasonable mistake about the danger would grant him qualified immunity, as the district court's factual conclusions suggested the mistake was unreasonable. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, denying qualified immunity to Officer Grashorn. View "Love v. Grashorn" on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

David Knellinger and Robert Storey discovered that the state of Colorado had taken possession of their property under the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (RUUPA). They filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Colorado's unclaimed property scheme violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation and did not provide them with notice or compensation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court found that Knellinger and Storey failed to sufficiently allege ownership of the property at issue, partly because they did not file an administrative claim to establish ownership as required by RUUPA. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' equitable claims, concluding that § 1983 provided an adequate basis for obtaining just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief. The appellate court held that Knellinger and Storey had plausibly alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation, which is sufficient to confer standing. The court emphasized that property owners need not file administrative claims with Colorado before suing for just compensation under the Takings Clause. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' equitable claims, as § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for obtaining just compensation.The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' damages claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Knellinger v. Young" on Justia Law

Stacie Culp and Stephanie Peters, both servers at Remington of Montrose Golf Club, LLC, alleged they were sexually harassed by bartender Jason DeSalvo. They filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) for sexual harassment and retaliation. Remington's management conducted a limited investigation, resulting in DeSalvo's suspension and demotion. Culp claimed her hours were reduced in retaliation, leading to her resignation. Peters alleged inadequate investigation and retaliation, including being scheduled to work with DeSalvo post-suspension, leading to her departure.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment for Remington on Peters's retaliation claim but allowed other claims to proceed to trial. The jury found against Peters on her remaining claims and returned inconsistent special verdicts on Culp's claims, awarding her punitive damages under Title VII despite finding no violation of her rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on Peters's retaliation claim, holding that neither the inadequate investigation nor the scheduling with DeSalvo constituted materially adverse actions. However, the court found the jury's verdict on Culp's claims irreconcilably inconsistent and vacated the verdict, remanding for a new trial on her harassment and retaliation claims. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings, noting that objections to the admission of certain evidence were not properly preserved for appeal. View "Culp v. Remington of Montrose Golf Club" on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff Tyler Luethje, who filed a § 1983 complaint against Defendants Travis Kyle and Scott Kelly, both employed by the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. On February 11, 2022, the deputies responded to a 911 call about a broken window at Luethje’s residence. Upon arrival, they sent a police canine, Sig, into the house without announcing themselves. Sig bit Luethje, who was in bed, and continued to bite him while the deputies questioned him. Luethje was then handcuffed and taken to the hospital. He was not charged with any crime.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case and denied the deputies' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court held that the deputies violated Luethje’s Fourth Amendment rights regarding unlawful entry and search, unlawful arrest, and excessive force. The court found that the law clearly established these rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the deputies’ actions violated Luethje’s constitutional rights and that these rights were clearly established. The court found that the deputies lacked an objectively reasonable belief in an ongoing emergency to justify the warrantless entry, did not have probable cause for the arrest, and used excessive force by allowing the canine to continue biting Luethje after he was subdued. View "Luethje v. Kyle" on Justia Law

Charles Warner was convicted in federal district court in New Mexico for being a felon in possession of a firearm and dealing in firearms without a license. Warner appealed his conviction on four grounds: he argued that he was not prohibited from owning firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), that his suppression challenge regarding evidence seized at his house was improperly denied, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of dealing in firearms without a license, and that the number of firearms in his possession was improperly counted.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Warner's pre-trial motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge and his motion to suppress evidence seized from his computers. At trial, Warner testified that he knew he was a convicted felon but did not know he was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. The jury convicted Warner on both counts. At sentencing, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms, based on expert testimony, and sentenced Warner to 33 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Warner is a "prohibited person" under § 922(g) because he has two prior state-law felony convictions for which he could have been sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment and has not had all of his civil rights restored. The court also rejected Warner's constitutional challenge to § 922(g), holding that it is foreclosed by recent Tenth Circuit precedent. The court found that any alleged error in the denial of Warner's suppression motion was harmless because none of the evidence Warner sought to suppress was used in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Warner of dealing in firearms without a license and affirmed the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for possessing between 25 and 99 firearms. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Warner's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Warner" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs created a Facebook page to discuss school-related matters in the Los Lunas School District. The Superintendent, Dana Sanders, found the page problematic and took actions including investigating the page, discussing it with others, filing a trademark for the school district's name, and issuing cease-and-desist letters demanding the page be deleted. The plaintiffs felt their First Amendment rights were being stifled and sued Sanders and the Los Lunas School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico denied Sanders's motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that Sanders's actions were retaliatory, speech-chilling, and legally frivolous, thus violating the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Sanders appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and agreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Sanders was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs had shown Sanders's conduct violated their constitutional rights and that the right was clearly established at the time of Sanders's actions. The court referenced a prior Tenth Circuit case, Beedle v. Wilson, which established that government actors violate the First Amendment when they threaten frivolous legal actions in retaliation for protected speech. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Sanders's motion for summary judgment. View "Tachias v. Sanders" on Justia Law