Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who has a disability, took the New Mexico bar exam in February 2020 and was approved for testing accommodations. She alleged that these accommodations were not properly provided during the exam. Subsequently, she initiated legal action, amending her complaint multiple times before any defendant appeared. The third amended complaint asserted claims under Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and other federal and state laws.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed all claims. Specifically, it dismissed claims against the National Conference of Bar Examiners (the National Conference) for lack of personal jurisdiction, and permitted amendment of the complaint only to allow a Title III ADA claim against the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners (the State Board). The district court later dismissed the Title III claim against the State Board on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. It also granted summary judgment to the State Board on the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding the Board did not receive federal funds, and denied the plaintiff’s requests for additional discovery as insufficient under Rule 56(d).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiff had not properly preserved her entitlement to jurisdictional discovery regarding the National Conference, nor did she adequately request or specify discovery that could alter the personal jurisdiction determination. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying additional discovery on the Rehabilitation Act claim, as the plaintiff failed to meet procedural requirements. Finally, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the State Board was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from Title III ADA claims and that the plaintiff failed to show any waiver or valid abrogation of immunity. The judgment below was affirmed. View "Spann v. National Conference of Bar Examiners" on Justia Law

A group of individuals traveling through Kansas were stopped by Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) troopers while driving on interstate highways, primarily I-70. In each instance, the drivers and passengers were from out of state, often driving to or from Colorado, and were stopped for alleged traffic violations. After the initial traffic stop was concluded, troopers used a tactic known as the “Kansas Two-Step”—they would briefly disengage, then reinitiate conversation in an attempt to gain consent for further questioning or searches. These stops often led to extended detentions and searches, but no contraband was discovered. The troopers testified that they considered the drivers’ out-of-state status, travel to or from Colorado, and other factors in developing reasonable suspicion.The individuals sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and their constitutional right to travel. Some plaintiffs also brought damages claims, resulting in jury verdicts in their favor. For their claims for injunctive relief, the district court conducted a bench trial and found that KHP had a pattern and practice of targeting out-of-state drivers and using the Two-Step in a manner violating the Fourth Amendment. The court granted a permanent injunction, requiring changes in KHP’s training, documentation, consent procedures, and supervision.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing for injunctive relief and whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because there was a substantial risk they would be stopped again and that KHP had a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit found that the injunction was overly broad regarding the use of a driver’s state of origin and the Two-Step tactic. The court affirmed the injunction in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shaw v. Smith" on Justia Law

A Kansas man was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a woman, Kathleen, but was acquitted of killing her husband, Carl. After spending twelve years in prison, he was exonerated when evidence emerged showing Kathleen had killed both herself and her husband, framing him for the crime. The exonerated man died shortly after his release. His widow, as executor of his estate, filed a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the police during the investigation that led to his conviction. Specifically, the claims against the two lead detectives included fabrication and suppression of evidence (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II).The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the detectives’ motion for summary judgment on both counts, rejecting their assertion of qualified immunity. The district court found that a jury could conclude the detectives withheld material exculpatory evidence, failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, and fabricated inculpatory evidence. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine the detectives acted at least recklessly, and that clear legal precedent established the officers’ obligations. The district court further denied summary judgment to the Unified Government (the detectives’ employer) on municipal liability claims, because those claims depended on the detectives’ alleged constitutional violations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the legal questions related to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on both counts, concluding the estate’s claims were supported by controlling law and sufficient factual allegations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction, since it did not independently resolve the underlying constitutional claims. View "Coones v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Early in the morning, a security guard at a hotel in Oklahoma City called 911 to report an unauthorized individual, Dawawn McCoy, refusing to leave a guest’s room and appearing unable to walk. Sergeant Cassidy of the Oklahoma City Police Department responded, found McCoy noncompliant and apparently under the influence, and requested medical evaluation. After medical personnel determined McCoy did not need immediate attention and he refused care, police were instructed to arrest him for trespassing. Cassidy called for additional officers, and together the officers attempted to handcuff McCoy, who resisted physically by pulling his hands in and kicking. The officers used pepper spray and a taser to subdue him. Once handcuffed, McCoy was rolled onto his stomach and restrained further. For approximately ninety seconds, according to the district court’s findings, McCoy had stopped resisting but officers continued to apply force by holding a knee on his back and pressing his legs upward. McCoy stopped responding verbally and showed signs of medical distress. Officers later attempted resuscitation and administered Narcan, but McCoy died six days later in the hospital.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, LaQuita Bruner, as administrator of McCoy’s estate, brought suit against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference claim but denied it as to the excessive force claim, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude excessive force was used after McCoy was subdued.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court held that, based on the facts found by the district court, the officers’ continued use of force after McCoy was subdued was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bruner v. Cassidy" on Justia Law

During a shopping trip at Walmart, William Montgomery was stopped by a store employee and subsequently by Officer Armando Cruz, who suspected shoplifting after Montgomery declined to show a receipt. Officer Cruz directed Montgomery to raise his hands, handcuffed him, and proceeded to search his pockets. Without conducting a pat-down, Officer Cruz reached into Montgomery’s pockets, removing a prescription bottle and a wallet, and looked for Montgomery’s driver’s license. Montgomery was detained briefly, but Walmart employees determined he had paid for the items and he was released.Montgomery filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that Officer Cruz violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his pockets and wallet without proper justification. Officer Cruz moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his actions did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that factual disputes existed regarding whether Officer Cruz had patted Montgomery down before reaching into his pockets and whether Montgomery had consented to the search of his wallet.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that, accepting the district court’s factual conclusions, Officer Cruz’s search of Montgomery’s pockets without a pat-down or arrest constituted a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the subsequent search of Montgomery’s wallet was not justified by consent, as any statement made by Montgomery after the illegal search could not retroactively legitimize the search. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Cruz. View "Montgomery v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Max and Peggy Lancaster transferred approximately $3.8 million in property to a family LLC owned by their adult children, receiving a promissory note and other loan-related documents in exchange. They subsequently applied for Medicaid benefits in Oklahoma but were found ineligible due to their financial resources exceeding Medicaid’s asset limit. The Lancasters challenged this determination in federal court, arguing that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and the Oklahoma Health Care Authority violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act, which requires prompt provision of benefits to eligible individuals. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the Agencies’ asset calculation was erroneous and deprived them of a federally protected right.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted the Agencies’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the promissory note received from the LLC was a countable resource under state law and not a bona fide loan. As a result, the court concluded the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits because their assets exceeded the threshold set by law. The Lancasters appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, which clarified the standard for determining whether provisions of the Medicaid Act confer individually enforceable rights under § 1983. The Tenth Circuit held that, under Medina, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does not clearly and unambiguously confer a private right enforceable via § 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Lancasters’ claims, holding that there is no individually enforceable right under § 1396a(a)(8) for the purposes of this lawsuit. View "Lancaster v. Cartmell" on Justia Law

A detainee, Kongchi Justin Thao, died by suicide while being temporarily held at a county jail facility in Oklahoma during a transfer to a federal facility in California. Upon arrival, Mr. Thao was placed in a holding pod for short-term inmates. After attempting to leave the pod, he was restrained, handcuffed, and, while being transported, was tased by an officer before being isolated in a shower cell (Cell 126) with no camera. Over the next hour and a half, Mr. Thao repeatedly cried out for help, expressed suicidal ideation, and asked to be killed. Officers told him to be quiet but did not intervene further. Mr. Thao was later found hanging in the cell and died as a result.The decedent’s estate, through his brother as special administrator, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Grady County Criminal Justice Authority (GCCJA), alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment for excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to GCCJA on both claims. The district court found that the facility had not been deliberately indifferent, reasoning there was evidence of training for officers on suicide risks and inmate supervision, and that the GCCJA’s written use-of-force policy was not plainly unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for GCCJA regarding the excessive force claim, holding that the written taser policy was facially constitutional and that liability could not attach to the county for an officer’s violation of that policy. However, the appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact about whether officers had adequate training to detect suicide risks in inmates like Mr. Thao. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the inadequate medical care claim. View "Thao v. Grady County Criminal Justice Authority" on Justia Law

Bartlesville, Oklahoma police officers responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Willis Gay Jr., who reported his son Thomas Gay was behaving erratically and possibly under the influence of drugs. Willis informed the officers that Thomas was unarmed but had made furtive movements toward his back pocket. Upon entering the home, the officers observed Thomas holding an innocuous object and appearing disoriented. Officer Lewis immediately pointed his Taser at Thomas and, after a single command, tased him. Officer Pitts drew her firearm. Thomas retreated into a bedroom, where Officer Lewis tased him again, but the Taser failed to incapacitate him. A brief struggle ensued, and as Thomas moved toward the bedroom door, making a motion toward his back pocket, Officer Pitts shot him twice, resulting in his death within minutes of the officers’ arrival.The Estate of Thomas Gay sued the officers in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the motion, finding that disputed facts could allow a reasonable jury to conclude the officers violated Thomas’s clearly established constitutional rights. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Thomas was unarmed and not holding any object when shot, and that the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the district court’s factual determinations, as the record did not blatantly contradict those findings and no legal error was committed. The court further held that, under clearly established law, the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, precluding qualified immunity. View "Burke v. Pitts" on Justia Law

Late one night in Santa Fe, New Mexico, Jason Roybal led police officers on a low-speed chase in a stolen car. After stopping, Roybal leaned out of his vehicle and fired a BB gun at the officers. The officers responded by firing their guns. Roybal then exited his car, dropped the BB gun, and fled on foot toward a civilian-occupied vehicle. The officers shot and killed Roybal as he was running away. The personal representative of Roybal’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, specifically claiming that Roybal was unarmed and fleeing when he was shot.The case was initially filed in New Mexico state court, then removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting qualified immunity and arguing that the complaint omitted key facts, such as Roybal firing a BB gun and running toward an occupied car. They also asked the district court to consider dash- and body-camera footage. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that it could not consider the videos at this stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly refused to consider the video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Roybal’s clearly established right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the officers’ conduct was not justified by the circumstances described, and the right at issue was clearly established by precedent. View "Fuqua v. Santa Fe County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Mary Timmins worked as general counsel and litigation counsel for the Green Mountain Water and Sanitation District in Colorado. During her employment, she discovered that certain members of the District’s Board were engaging in conduct she believed to be corrupt and potentially unlawful, including violating open meetings laws, improperly communicating with a state-employed attorney, and destroying public records relevant to ongoing litigation. After repeatedly warning the Board internally without effect, Timmins disclosed her concerns to reporters and private citizens, alleging that the Board members were acting against the interests of the District and its residents. She was subsequently terminated from her position.Timmins filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the District and three Board members, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. The district court dismissed her claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made pursuant to her official duties as a public employee. The court reasoned that her statements to the press and private citizens were essentially identical to those made in her official capacity and stemmed from her work responsibilities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Tenth Circuit held that Timmins’s speech to reporters and private citizens was not made pursuant to her official duties, as her job did not ordinarily require her to make such disclosures outside the chain of command. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Timmins’s amended complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for affirmance at this stage. View "Timmins v. Plotkin" on Justia Law