Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs, Ohio “exotic dancers” who have been arrested on charges ranging from prostitution to drug distribution to assault to witness intimidation, alleged that court clerks in Mahoning County issued arrest warrants that violate the Warrant Clause. To satisfy this clause, a neutral and detached magistrate must independently determine that probable cause exists after weighing the evidence supplied by the police. They claim that the sole “evidence” that the clerks received in their cases “consist[ed] only of the officer[s’] [bare] conclusion[s] that the accused committed the offense[s].” They also argued that clerks lack the constitutional power to issue warrants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. While they were correct in asserting that the warrants lacked probable cause, the plaintiffs never alleged that the officers arrested them without probable cause—the key allegation needed to show an unconstitutional arrest under the Fourth Amendment. View "Graves v. Mahoning County" on Justia Law

Inmate Koprowski was cleaning a fry hood in the prison's food-service area when he fell off a ladder and landed on his back. Koprowski lost feeling in his legs for several minutes and experienced severe pain when he stood up. He had difficulty walking for several days; intense pain persisted even while lying down. Koprowski alleges that medical staff treated his injuries as minor and temporary, thereby causing him unnecessary pain and further aggravating his condition, by delaying x-rays and refusing to perform an MRI, which would have shown that he had broken his back. Koprowski also claims that prison staff denied him access to specialized care, surgery, and ambulatory aids. Koprowski brought a “Bivens” suit against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference. The court dismissed, finding that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. 4126(c), a workers’ compensation scheme for federal prisoners injured during the course of their prison employment, is the exclusive vehicle by which a federal inmate may receive compensation for injuries suffered during the course of prison employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The IACA does not displace this otherwise available claim just because the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred in the context of prison employment. View "Koprowski v. Baker" on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Horvath died after being beaten and stabbed by his cellmate, Gillespie, inside the mental-health ward of Michigan’s Wayne County Jail. Richko, as representative of Horvath’s estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, claiming that Wayne County and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Horvath’s safety. Richko alleged that the defendants knew or should have known about Gillespie’s dangerous and violent propensities and disregarded the risk by allowing Gillespie to be placed in Horvath’s cell and failing to adequately respond to the ensuing assault. The district court denied summary judgment to all of the defendants. The individual defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Faced with competing circumstantial evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that jail personnel were aware of the risk and did in fact hear Gillespie’s assault on Horvath and elected not to respond. View "Richko v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Smith and Johnston divorced; they had two daughters Tiffany, aged 9-11 and Jasmine, 13-15 years old. In March 2012, police entered, purportedly at the invitation of a guest, after child services reported that Smith was possibly intoxicated and unable to care for her children. Another time, Johnston called 9-1-1 after Tiffany told him, by telephone, that a man was in Smith’s house and was making her uncomfortable. Tiffany opened the door and stated that her mother and the unknown man were in an upstairs bedroom. Smith disputes the officers’ assertion that they were visibly drunk and did not comply with repeated requests to leave the bedroom. The officers arrested Smith for obstructing official business. The criminal charge was later dropped. At a later date, Tiffany called 9-1-1, saying that her mother had threatened to kill her; officers mediated the dispute and left. On another date, Johnston took his daughter to a police station, where he showed a bruise on her head. Tiffany reported that Smith had struck her several times. Smith denied hitting Tiffany, who changed her story. Smith, an attorney, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to claims of an unlawful entry in March 2012, and an unlawful arrest following Johnston’s 9-1-1 call, but otherwise affirmed dismissal. View "Smith v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Memphis Officers Dunaway and McMillen were at the Northside Market. Vanterpool, a black male, pulled up to the gas pumps, driving a purple 1993 Caprice. He attempted to pump gas, but the pump was turned off. He went inside and spoke to the clerk. He returned and began pumping gas. The officers also exited the Market. Dunaway, looking toward the pumps, made a call on his cellular phone to Officer Brooks, who stated that the purple Chevrolet was the vehicle he had followed the day before and had expired tags, not registered to that vehicle. Brooks had lost sight of the vehicle. Vanterpool finished pumping gas. The officers approached. Vanterpool began driving away. McMillen jumped in front of Vanterpool’s vehicle with his gun drawn. The officers fired seven shots into the vehicle, which stopped across from the Market. Vanterpool died as a result of the shooting. His estate sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging a link between the Department's deficient policies and customs and the violation of Vanterpool’s constitutional rights. The court denied a motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claim, concluding that the complaint alleged facts supporting that MPD Director Armstrong “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the qualified immunity defense. View "Peatross v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

DS attended Rutledge School, 2010-2012 as a seventh and eighth grader, where he was was involved in several verbal and physical altercations with other students. DS and his mother repeatedly complained to school officials that other students were bullying DS. School officials investigated these complaints, disciplined the students found culpable, and took other proactive measures such as placing DS in different classes from his alleged harassers. Despite these efforts, DS continued to have problems with other students, culminating in an attack in the school bathroom that led DS to transfer to another school. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and deprivation of DS’s constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no evidence concerning how the defendants treated other students—male or female, heterosexual or homosexual—who similarly complained about bullying. “The law does not require that [defendants] . . . have a pleasant demeanor” in responding to harassment, but only that they respond to it in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable; the defendants acted on DS’s complaints. There was no state-created danger, nor any special duty to protect. View "Stiles v. Grainger County, Tenn." on Justia Law

DS attended Rutledge School, 2010-2012 as a seventh and eighth grader, where he was was involved in several verbal and physical altercations with other students. DS and his mother repeatedly complained to school officials that other students were bullying DS. School officials investigated these complaints, disciplined the students found culpable, and took other proactive measures such as placing DS in different classes from his alleged harassers. Despite these efforts, DS continued to have problems with other students, culminating in an attack in the school bathroom that led DS to transfer to another school. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and deprivation of DS’s constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was no evidence concerning how the defendants treated other students—male or female, heterosexual or homosexual—who similarly complained about bullying. “The law does not require that [defendants] . . . have a pleasant demeanor” in responding to harassment, but only that they respond to it in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable; the defendants acted on DS’s complaints. There was no state-created danger, nor any special duty to protect. View "Stiles v. Grainger County, Tenn." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams’s kidnapping conviction, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. In 2003, Adams filed an unsuccessful state petition for post-conviction relief. In 2006, Adams filed a federal habeas petition, challenging the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. In 2013, the district court denied Adams’s motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another challenge to Ohio’s lethal injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief after holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding in Glossip v. Gross. The court rejected arguments that requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial and that Ohio’s lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the stun belt inflicted no harm, was unknown to the jury, and was necessary because Adams had threatened bodily harm and posed a risk for escape, View "Adams v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Witham claims she was fired from her position as a Louisville hotel general manager because she sought workers’ compensation after sustaining injuries on the job during a confrontation with a non-guest visitor to the hotel lobby. The hotel claims it fired her because she engaged in a heated verbal exchange with that man, followed by a physical confrontation. Video footage of the incident validated the company’s version of what happened, including Witham’s taunting of the man and attempt to block his retreat. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the hotel. View "Witham v. Intown Suites Louisville NE" on Justia Law