Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Stansell pleaded guilty to sex-related felonies. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison; his direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2002, a federal district court denied his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. In 2013, Stansell returned to state court, seeking to vacate the portion of his sentence that designated him a “sexually violent predator.” A state appeals court affirmed denial of his petition, but ruled that the trial court had erred when, during Stansell’s original sentencing, it failed to impose a term of post-release control, and remanded “for the limited purpose of properly advising and imposing upon Stansell the requisite period of postrelease control.” The trial court imposed five years of post-release control with specific conditions. Stansell then returned to federal court, seeking authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), again claiming that the state court violated his due process rights when it classified him as a sexually violent predator during his original sentencing. The Third Circuit held that the petition was not subject to the limits imposed on a “second or successive” petition and transferred the matter to the district court for consideration as an initial petition. View "In re: Stansell" on Justia Law

Binno, a legally blind individual, unsuccessfully applied for admission to law schools. He then filed suit against the American Bar Association (ABA), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that his lack of success was due to a discriminatory admissions test “mandated” by the ABA. Thar examination, the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) is used by nearly all U.S. law schools. Binno claimed that the LSAT's questions have a discriminatory effect on the blind and visually impaired because a quarter of those questions “require spatial reasoning and visual diagramming for successful completion.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, concluding that Binno does not have standing to sue the ABA because his injury was not caused by the ABA and because it is unlikely that his injury would be redressed by a favorable decision against the ABA. The LSAT is written, administered, and scored by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which is not part of the ABA. The LSAC provides ADA accommodations (42 U.S.C. 12189) for persons with disabilities who wish to take the LSAT. The law schools to which he applied, not the ABA, determine what weight, if any, to give Binno’s LSAT score. View "Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n" on Justia Law

A 2012 event at Allegan High School was intended to educate the public about House Bill 4769, which aimed to limit foreign law’s influence in Michigan. The organizers wanted to warn citizens about the “internal threat to America posed by radical Muslims” and “the dangers ... of Sharia law.” The District agreed to rent the organizers a room. They paid the customary $90 fee. Objectors wrote a letter arguing that the speaker, Saleem, was a purveyor of hatred and asked the district to rescind its permission. The School received calls expressing the same view; the event received local press coverage. Shortly before the event began, an unidentified woman approached the police, claiming that Saleem had a $25 million bounty on his head. Saleem’s body guard discounted the threat. The event began. When it was underway, authorities shut it down. The organizers allege that people were allowed to stay in the building for 30-45 minutes and that Saleem remained inside without law enforcement surveillance. The organizers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the city, for lack of evidence of an applicable municipal policy or custom, and reversed and remanded an order allowing the school district to withdraw its Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer to stipulate to judgment of $500. View "Agema v. City of Allegan" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

Lee, now 47, moved to the U.S. from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived here legally ever since. After completing high school, he became a successful Memphis restaurateur. He also became a small-time drug dealer, and, in 2009, following a sting operation, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The case against him was very strong. Lee’s attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee, unlike his parents, never became an American citizen. His lawyer incorrectly assured him that he would not be subject to deportation. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute is an “aggravated felony,” rendering Lee deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lee moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the Strickland v. Washington test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. A claimant’s ties to the U.S. should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. Lee had no bona fide defense, not even a weak one, so despite his very strong ties to the U.S., he cannot show prejudice. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Ohio “exotic dancers” who have been arrested on charges ranging from prostitution to drug distribution to assault to witness intimidation, alleged that court clerks in Mahoning County issued arrest warrants that violate the Warrant Clause. To satisfy this clause, a neutral and detached magistrate must independently determine that probable cause exists after weighing the evidence supplied by the police. They claim that the sole “evidence” that the clerks received in their cases “consist[ed] only of the officer[s’] [bare] conclusion[s] that the accused committed the offense[s].” They also argued that clerks lack the constitutional power to issue warrants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. While they were correct in asserting that the warrants lacked probable cause, the plaintiffs never alleged that the officers arrested them without probable cause—the key allegation needed to show an unconstitutional arrest under the Fourth Amendment. View "Graves v. Mahoning County" on Justia Law

Inmate Koprowski was cleaning a fry hood in the prison's food-service area when he fell off a ladder and landed on his back. Koprowski lost feeling in his legs for several minutes and experienced severe pain when he stood up. He had difficulty walking for several days; intense pain persisted even while lying down. Koprowski alleges that medical staff treated his injuries as minor and temporary, thereby causing him unnecessary pain and further aggravating his condition, by delaying x-rays and refusing to perform an MRI, which would have shown that he had broken his back. Koprowski also claims that prison staff denied him access to specialized care, surgery, and ambulatory aids. Koprowski brought a “Bivens” suit against prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference. The court dismissed, finding that the Inmate Accident Compensation Act, 18 U.S.C. 4126(c), a workers’ compensation scheme for federal prisoners injured during the course of their prison employment, is the exclusive vehicle by which a federal inmate may receive compensation for injuries suffered during the course of prison employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The IACA does not displace this otherwise available claim just because the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred in the context of prison employment. View "Koprowski v. Baker" on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law

Horvath died after being beaten and stabbed by his cellmate, Gillespie, inside the mental-health ward of Michigan’s Wayne County Jail. Richko, as representative of Horvath’s estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, claiming that Wayne County and jail personnel were deliberately indifferent to Horvath’s safety. Richko alleged that the defendants knew or should have known about Gillespie’s dangerous and violent propensities and disregarded the risk by allowing Gillespie to be placed in Horvath’s cell and failing to adequately respond to the ensuing assault. The district court denied summary judgment to all of the defendants. The individual defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Faced with competing circumstantial evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that jail personnel were aware of the risk and did in fact hear Gillespie’s assault on Horvath and elected not to respond. View "Richko v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Smith and Johnston divorced; they had two daughters Tiffany, aged 9-11 and Jasmine, 13-15 years old. In March 2012, police entered, purportedly at the invitation of a guest, after child services reported that Smith was possibly intoxicated and unable to care for her children. Another time, Johnston called 9-1-1 after Tiffany told him, by telephone, that a man was in Smith’s house and was making her uncomfortable. Tiffany opened the door and stated that her mother and the unknown man were in an upstairs bedroom. Smith disputes the officers’ assertion that they were visibly drunk and did not comply with repeated requests to leave the bedroom. The officers arrested Smith for obstructing official business. The criminal charge was later dropped. At a later date, Tiffany called 9-1-1, saying that her mother had threatened to kill her; officers mediated the dispute and left. On another date, Johnston took his daughter to a police station, where he showed a bruise on her head. Tiffany reported that Smith had struck her several times. Smith denied hitting Tiffany, who changed her story. Smith, an attorney, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to claims of an unlawful entry in March 2012, and an unlawful arrest following Johnston’s 9-1-1 call, but otherwise affirmed dismissal. View "Smith v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law