Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In 1992, Messinger was murdered while working at a convenience store overnight. Hill surrendered and provided information, with which police obtained a search warrant for Carter’s apartment, where they recovered the murder weapon. During a recorded interview, Carter eventually admitted that he was the shooter. Carter was a heavy user of crack cocaine; Hill was his supplier. He admitted that he, Hill, and another had robbed “a lot” of drug dealers that evening. Carter maintained that he did not aim at Messinger, but fired a shot to scare her. Carter was referred to specialists. The evaluations indicated “malingering to avoid prosecution.” At sentencing, the defense's mitigation expert, Dr. Chiappone,spoke of trauma that Carter had experienced during childhood, but also mentioned his drug use, abuse of women, interest in violence, and animal cruelty. Jurors indicated that they could not hear the witness and later requested a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony, which was denied. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied post-conviction relief; the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. In 1999, after filing a federal habeas petition, Carter unsuccessfully returned to state court, under Ohio R. App. 26(B). Carter filed another unsuccessful 26(B) application in 2000. In 2003, Carter filed another state petition, arguing that he was mentally retarded. After a remand, Carter voluntarily dismissed that petition in 2005. In 2013, following a remand, the federal district court denied a stay to allow Carter to introduce new evidence in state court and denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments related to counsel’s eliciting unfavorable testimony from a mitigation expert and failure to call Carter's mother as a witness during the penalty phase and failure to insist that the jury receive a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

During a 2002 cocaine sale, Thomas held a handgun to Burdette's head and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him three times in the chest, then fled. Burdette later died. In 2004, Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In 2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. Thomas unsuccessfully moved to vacate on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under Ky.R.Crim.P. 11.42(3), which requires that the movant “state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.” In 2009, Thomas again sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he had recently discovered evidence (Burdette’s funeral program) that could have been used to impeach testimony. The court denied Thomas’s filing on the merits; as to his Rule 11.42 motion, the court held that the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce evidence had not prejudiced Thomas; as to his Rule 60.02 motion, the court held that Thomas’s allegations did not justify relief. In 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. The district court dismissed his federal application, concluding that Thomas’s 2009 motion did not toll the federal habeas statute of limitations because it was “not properly filed.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether an application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed does not depend whether its claims are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Thomas’s 60.02 motion was rejected on the merits, not because it failed to comply with rules governing filings, and was “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law

In 1998, Stansell pleaded guilty to sex-related felonies. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to 20 years to life in prison; his direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2002, a federal district court denied his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. In 2013, Stansell returned to state court, seeking to vacate the portion of his sentence that designated him a “sexually violent predator.” A state appeals court affirmed denial of his petition, but ruled that the trial court had erred when, during Stansell’s original sentencing, it failed to impose a term of post-release control, and remanded “for the limited purpose of properly advising and imposing upon Stansell the requisite period of postrelease control.” The trial court imposed five years of post-release control with specific conditions. Stansell then returned to federal court, seeking authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), again claiming that the state court violated his due process rights when it classified him as a sexually violent predator during his original sentencing. The Third Circuit held that the petition was not subject to the limits imposed on a “second or successive” petition and transferred the matter to the district court for consideration as an initial petition. View "In re: Stansell" on Justia Law

Binno, a legally blind individual, unsuccessfully applied for admission to law schools. He then filed suit against the American Bar Association (ABA), under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that his lack of success was due to a discriminatory admissions test “mandated” by the ABA. Thar examination, the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) is used by nearly all U.S. law schools. Binno claimed that the LSAT's questions have a discriminatory effect on the blind and visually impaired because a quarter of those questions “require spatial reasoning and visual diagramming for successful completion.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, concluding that Binno does not have standing to sue the ABA because his injury was not caused by the ABA and because it is unlikely that his injury would be redressed by a favorable decision against the ABA. The LSAT is written, administered, and scored by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC), which is not part of the ABA. The LSAC provides ADA accommodations (42 U.S.C. 12189) for persons with disabilities who wish to take the LSAT. The law schools to which he applied, not the ABA, determine what weight, if any, to give Binno’s LSAT score. View "Binno v. Am. Bar Ass'n" on Justia Law

A 2012 event at Allegan High School was intended to educate the public about House Bill 4769, which aimed to limit foreign law’s influence in Michigan. The organizers wanted to warn citizens about the “internal threat to America posed by radical Muslims” and “the dangers ... of Sharia law.” The District agreed to rent the organizers a room. They paid the customary $90 fee. Objectors wrote a letter arguing that the speaker, Saleem, was a purveyor of hatred and asked the district to rescind its permission. The School received calls expressing the same view; the event received local press coverage. Shortly before the event began, an unidentified woman approached the police, claiming that Saleem had a $25 million bounty on his head. Saleem’s body guard discounted the threat. The event began. When it was underway, authorities shut it down. The organizers allege that people were allowed to stay in the building for 30-45 minutes and that Saleem remained inside without law enforcement surveillance. The organizers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against the city, for lack of evidence of an applicable municipal policy or custom, and reversed and remanded an order allowing the school district to withdraw its Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer to stipulate to judgment of $500. View "Agema v. City of Allegan" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

Lee, now 47, moved to the U.S. from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived here legally ever since. After completing high school, he became a successful Memphis restaurateur. He also became a small-time drug dealer, and, in 2009, following a sting operation, he was charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The case against him was very strong. Lee’s attorney advised him to plead guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee, unlike his parents, never became an American citizen. His lawyer incorrectly assured him that he would not be subject to deportation. Possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute is an “aggravated felony,” rendering Lee deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lee moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the Strickland v. Washington test, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. A claimant’s ties to the U.S. should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice. Lee had no bona fide defense, not even a weak one, so despite his very strong ties to the U.S., he cannot show prejudice. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law