Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the government charged him with selling cocaine, Christopher hired a lawyer. Christopher later claimed that, over the course of the representation, the lawyer used cocaine with Christopher more than 20 times, including several times immediately before court hearings. The government had considerable evidence: recordings of 10 phone calls in which he negotiated purchases of the drug and testimony from the leader of the conspiracy and another coconspirator that Christopher had bought the drug for resale. It had already convicted many of Christopher’s co-conspirators based on similar evidence. Three months after being convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, without having appealed, Christopher filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing that his attorney’s behaviour caused him to forgo a favorable plea deal, with a sentence of 30-37 months. After a remand for a hearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The trial judge did not clearly err in finding defense counsel “credible” while finding Christopher’s credibility “very much undercut.” The court thought the attorney was prepared and rendered effective counsel; the record permits that conclusion. View "Christopher v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000, Embry pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. In calculating his sentencing range, the court treated him as a career offender based on prior convictions for robbery and wanton endangerment, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. In 2016, he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). The court of appeals may authorize a successive motion to vacate a sentence or conviction if the inmate “makes a prima facie showing” that his proposed claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Embry relied on the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson decision, later made retroactive, which voided for vagueness the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Johnson was sentenced under an identically worded clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court to be held in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court’s decision (next term) in Beckles v. United States. The court noted “respectable constitutional arguments that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the advisory Guidelines.” View "In re: Embry" on Justia Law

On April 28, 2010, Thompson was driving his car erratically on a two-lane Tennessee highway. After nearly colliding head-on with City of Lebanon Police Officer McKinley, Thompson sped away. McKinley gave chase, later joined by Officer McDannald. After approximately six minutes of high-speed driving, Thompson swerved, spun 360 degrees, and ran off the road into a ditch. McKinley ran toward Thompson’s crashed car and fired one round. McDannald then aimed at Thompson’s car and fired 13 rounds. The shooting ended within 19 seconds of the crash. Thompson sat behind the wheel of his vehicle the entire time and did not make any threatening moves. Thompson died at the scene, from gunshot wounds. In his estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the city summary judgment on Thompson’s claims of failure to screen, train, supervise, investigate, and discipline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a jury believed the plaintiff’s asserted facts, it could find that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing into Thompson’s vehicle and person violated his Fourth Amendment rights “when Thompson had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence.” View "Thompson v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Bickerstaff, a private investigator for Ohio criminal-defense law firms, was conducting an investigation on behalf of a defendant accused of breaking into the Harris house. After speaking with Harris, Bickerstaff received a phone call from Detective Lucarelli, telling her to discontinue her contacts with Harris. Bickerstaff claimed that Lucarelli was involved in a “personal and/or sexual relationship” with Harris, and with other female crime victims, based upon text messages and photos that Bickerstaff alleges were sent from Lucarelli’s cell phone. Bickerstaff alleged that Lucarelli’s supervisor and a fellow detective were aware of Lucarelli’s “improper relationships” and received sexually explicit pictures of and text messages concerning the victims from Lucarelli. Harris had filed a complaint, attached to a report prepared by Lucarelli, indicating that Harris had originally agreed to an interview but later felt harassed by Bickerstaff’s repeated calls and unannounced visit. Bickerstaff was indicted for intimidating a crime victim or witness and for telecommunications harassment. The charges were dismissed the following month.The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Bickerstaff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, retaliation, supervisory liability, municipal liability, civil conspiracy, and reckless, wanton, or willful conduct, calling the allegations “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” not sufficient to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli" on Justia Law

In 2007, Harper, then 70 years old and partially paralyzed, allowed McKinney to move into his Michigan home in exchange for chores. On October 22, 2009, Harper's caregiver left the men by themselves. McKinney shot Harper at point-blank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper’s van. Police arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. Officers searched the van and discovered two handguns, including the one used to kill Harper, and Harper’s wallet. After reading McKinney his Miranda rights, officers asked for “his side of the story.” McKinney replied: Well if you don’t mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever. The officer stated: Well that’s fine, but like I said. McKinney said, “We can talk over all the other circumstances” and proceeded to confess. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first-degree murder after his videotaped confession was played at trial. A federal district court conditionally granted McKinney’s habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the district court failed to show the requisite deference to state court decisions on habeas review. The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of established federal law. View "McKinney v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

In 1996 (Free Press I), the Sixth Circuit held that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requires government agencies to honor requests for the booking photographs of criminal defendants who have appeared in court during ongoing proceedings. Despite that holding, the U.S. Marshals Service denied the Free Press’s 2012 request for the booking photographs of Detroit-area police officers indicted on federal charges. The district court, bound by Free Press I, granted summary judgment to the newspaper in the ensuing lawsuit. A Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in 2015, while urging the full court to reconsider the merits of Free Press I. The court subsequently reversed, overruling Free Press I. FOIA Exemption 7(C) protects a non-trivial privacy interest in keeping “personal facts away from the public eye.” Individuals do not forfeit their interest in maintaining control over information that has been made public in some form. Criminal defendants do not forfeit their interest in controlling private information while their cases remain pending. View "Detroit Free Press v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

In 1992, Messinger was murdered while working at a convenience store overnight. Hill surrendered and provided information, with which police obtained a search warrant for Carter’s apartment, where they recovered the murder weapon. During a recorded interview, Carter eventually admitted that he was the shooter. Carter was a heavy user of crack cocaine; Hill was his supplier. He admitted that he, Hill, and another had robbed “a lot” of drug dealers that evening. Carter maintained that he did not aim at Messinger, but fired a shot to scare her. Carter was referred to specialists. The evaluations indicated “malingering to avoid prosecution.” At sentencing, the defense's mitigation expert, Dr. Chiappone,spoke of trauma that Carter had experienced during childhood, but also mentioned his drug use, abuse of women, interest in violence, and animal cruelty. Jurors indicated that they could not hear the witness and later requested a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony, which was denied. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Carter’s conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. State courts denied post-conviction relief; the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. In 1999, after filing a federal habeas petition, Carter unsuccessfully returned to state court, under Ohio R. App. 26(B). Carter filed another unsuccessful 26(B) application in 2000. In 2003, Carter filed another state petition, arguing that he was mentally retarded. After a remand, Carter voluntarily dismissed that petition in 2005. In 2013, following a remand, the federal district court denied a stay to allow Carter to introduce new evidence in state court and denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments related to counsel’s eliciting unfavorable testimony from a mitigation expert and failure to call Carter's mother as a witness during the penalty phase and failure to insist that the jury receive a transcript of Chiappone’s testimony. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

During a 2002 cocaine sale, Thomas held a handgun to Burdette's head and demanded the cocaine. When Burdette refused, Thomas shot him three times in the chest, then fled. Burdette later died. In 2004, Thomas was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. In 2006, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. Thomas unsuccessfully moved to vacate on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel under Ky.R.Crim.P. 11.42(3), which requires that the movant “state all grounds for holding the sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.” In 2009, Thomas again sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he had recently discovered evidence (Burdette’s funeral program) that could have been used to impeach testimony. The court denied Thomas’s filing on the merits; as to his Rule 11.42 motion, the court held that the prosecution’s alleged failure to produce evidence had not prejudiced Thomas; as to his Rule 60.02 motion, the court held that Thomas’s allegations did not justify relief. In 2013, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied review. The district court dismissed his federal application, concluding that Thomas’s 2009 motion did not toll the federal habeas statute of limitations because it was “not properly filed.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether an application for state post-conviction relief was properly filed does not depend whether its claims are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Thomas’s 60.02 motion was rejected on the merits, not because it failed to comply with rules governing filings, and was “properly filed” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). View "Thomas v. Meko" on Justia Law