Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Michigan has offered “straight-party” voting since 1891. Previous attempts to eliminate straight-party voting were defeated by referendum. In 2015, the Michigan legislature passed PA 268, eliminating straight-party voting and appropriating $5 million to purchase voting equipment to implement the change. Because PA 268 includes an appropriation, it cannot be repealed by referendum. Opponents alleged that PA 268 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132. Plaintiffs’ expert report prepared by a demographer and former U.S. Census Bureau Regional Information Specialist, included a statistical analysis demonstrating “that African Americans are more likely to use the straight party voting option and that its elimination will disproportionately affect African-American voters.”The plaintiffs attached declarations from county election administrators, indicating that the elimination of straight-party voting would cause a demonstrable increase in wait times for voting. The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their ADA claim, but were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act claims. The Sixth Circuit denied an emergency motion for a stay of the injunction, stating that the case does not involve the potential disruption of complicated election administration procedures on the eve of Election Day; denying the request for a stay here will merely require Michigan to use the same straight-party procedure that it has used since 1891. View "Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Deputy Swoap, in his police cruiser near Bowling Green, saw an oncoming car with only one operational headlight. Swoap followed and switched on his overhead lights. Getz did not stop. Swoap followed Getz into a driveway (Getz’s home). Getz circled around and drove back in Swoap’s direction, stopping directly in front of the cruiser. As Swoap was radioing dispatch, Getz backed up to drive around Swoap’s cruiser. Swoap moved the cruiser, stood in the driveway, and repeatedly yelled for Getz to stop. Eventually, Swoap drew his sidearm. Getz complied. Once Getz was out of the car, Swoap holstered his gun. Getz told Swoap to “get the fuck off his property.” and “Do you know who I am?” Swoap informed Getz repeatedly that he was not free to leave, but Getz got back in his car. Swoap called for backup and reached into the car. Getz resisted. Swoap pulled Getz from the car, stated that he was under arrest, and ordered Getz to put his hands behind his back. Getz refused, stating he was going inside the house. Swoap performed a hip-check to unbalance Getz, gain control, and handcuff him. Getz continued to resist. Swoap finally handcuffed Getz, but did not check for tightness. Getz’s daughter and another officer arrived. Accounts differ from that point. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Getz’s excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, agreeing that Swoap was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Getz v. Swoap" on Justia Law

Puckett retired from the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) Division of Police in 2009, after 36 years of service; Vance retired from the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services in 2010, after 24 years of service. Both (plaintiffs) are members of the LFUCG Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, governed by the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund Act, KRS 67A.360-67A.690. As members of the Fund, plaintiffs receive service retirement annuities under the Act with cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The Act has been amended several times. After 2013 legislation reduced the COLA, plaintiffs sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming violations of the Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs had no such contractual right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have no property right in a particular COLA. The legislation had a rational basis: When it amended the Act, the Kentucky General Assembly explained the need to keep the Fund financially sound and resolve its financial difficulties. View "Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2008, Holbrook was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year statute of limitations began to run when his conviction became final in August 2010, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In May 2011, 269 days into that period, Holbrook moved for relief from judgment in state court. The trial court denied the motion. Holbrook sought leave to appeal, which the Michigan Court of Appeals denied on November 8, 2012. Michigan court rules allowed Holbrook until January 3, 2013 to seek leave to appeal. Holbrook filed his application four days after the deadline. The Michigan Supreme Court denied it as untimely on January 11. No later than March 18, 2013, Holbrook filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed Holbrook’s petition as untimely, “[b]ecause [Holbrook] did not timely seek leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, the tolling of the limitations period ended when the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal on November 8, 2012,” rather than continuing for the 56-day period to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Holbrook’s federal habeas petition was timely filed because AEDPA’s one-year limitations period was tolled during the period in which he could have, but did not, appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals’ denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Holbrook v. Curtin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Patrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. The district court determined that he qualified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Guidelines based on his prior Tennessee convictions for a controlled substance offense, reckless aggravated assault, and evading arrest, and sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment. The district court denied Patrick’s first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In 2010, Patrick filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that his conviction for reckless aggravated assault no longer qualified as a crime of violence under a 2008 Supreme Court decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of that petition, but subsequently granted permission to file a second or successive section 2255 petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court noted that its decision was based on the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in an Eleventh Circuit decision that found that Court’s 2015 holding (Johnson) inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The pending decision will presumably resolve questions related to retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law regarding the Guidelines; the court transferred the case to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending the Court’s decision. View "In re: Patrick" on Justia Law

After the government charged him with selling cocaine, Christopher hired a lawyer. Christopher later claimed that, over the course of the representation, the lawyer used cocaine with Christopher more than 20 times, including several times immediately before court hearings. The government had considerable evidence: recordings of 10 phone calls in which he negotiated purchases of the drug and testimony from the leader of the conspiracy and another coconspirator that Christopher had bought the drug for resale. It had already convicted many of Christopher’s co-conspirators based on similar evidence. Three months after being convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison, without having appealed, Christopher filed a section 2255 motion to vacate, arguing that his attorney’s behaviour caused him to forgo a favorable plea deal, with a sentence of 30-37 months. After a remand for a hearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The trial judge did not clearly err in finding defense counsel “credible” while finding Christopher’s credibility “very much undercut.” The court thought the attorney was prepared and rendered effective counsel; the record permits that conclusion. View "Christopher v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000, Embry pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. In calculating his sentencing range, the court treated him as a career offender based on prior convictions for robbery and wanton endangerment, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. In 2016, he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3). The court of appeals may authorize a successive motion to vacate a sentence or conviction if the inmate “makes a prima facie showing” that his proposed claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Embry relied on the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson decision, later made retroactive, which voided for vagueness the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Johnson was sentenced under an identically worded clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion and transferred the case to the district court to be held in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court’s decision (next term) in Beckles v. United States. The court noted “respectable constitutional arguments that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the advisory Guidelines.” View "In re: Embry" on Justia Law

On April 28, 2010, Thompson was driving his car erratically on a two-lane Tennessee highway. After nearly colliding head-on with City of Lebanon Police Officer McKinley, Thompson sped away. McKinley gave chase, later joined by Officer McDannald. After approximately six minutes of high-speed driving, Thompson swerved, spun 360 degrees, and ran off the road into a ditch. McKinley ran toward Thompson’s crashed car and fired one round. McDannald then aimed at Thompson’s car and fired 13 rounds. The shooting ended within 19 seconds of the crash. Thompson sat behind the wheel of his vehicle the entire time and did not make any threatening moves. Thompson died at the scene, from gunshot wounds. In his estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the city summary judgment on Thompson’s claims of failure to screen, train, supervise, investigate, and discipline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a jury believed the plaintiff’s asserted facts, it could find that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing into Thompson’s vehicle and person violated his Fourth Amendment rights “when Thompson had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence.” View "Thompson v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

In 1999, Brinkley robbed the diner where he worked at gunpoint. In jail, Brinkley, then 32, said he would get his 18 year-old girlfriend, Smith, to post his bond, that he would skip town, and that “I’m going to kill that bitch [Smith].” Smith posted the bond. After skipping his pretrial hearing, Brinkley strangled Smith, slit her throat, stole her ATM card, and used Smith’s phone to call the bus terminal. Cameras recorded Brinkley wearing Smith’s coat and trying to withdraw cash 16 times. Smith’s mother found her body. Officers found bloody footprints that matched Brinkley’s size-15 Nike shoes and a bogus note, written in Brinkley’s handwriting (bearing his thumbprint). Officers arrested Brinkley at his mother’s residence, wearing Smith’s coat and the size-15 Nike shoes. Two different teams of appointed attorneys found Brinkley extremely difficult to work with. A jury found Brinkley guilty, with death-penalty specifications. The defense elicited testimony from Brinkley’s sister, aunts, and mother. The jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and recommended the death penalty. Brinkley spoke at length on his own behalf, . The court imposed a death sentence. Ohio court rejected direct appeals and post-conviction petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance during the penalty phase, and a challenge to a limitation imposed on cross-examination of a prosecution witness. View "Brinkley v. Houk" on Justia Law

Bickerstaff, a private investigator for Ohio criminal-defense law firms, was conducting an investigation on behalf of a defendant accused of breaking into the Harris house. After speaking with Harris, Bickerstaff received a phone call from Detective Lucarelli, telling her to discontinue her contacts with Harris. Bickerstaff claimed that Lucarelli was involved in a “personal and/or sexual relationship” with Harris, and with other female crime victims, based upon text messages and photos that Bickerstaff alleges were sent from Lucarelli’s cell phone. Bickerstaff alleged that Lucarelli’s supervisor and a fellow detective were aware of Lucarelli’s “improper relationships” and received sexually explicit pictures of and text messages concerning the victims from Lucarelli. Harris had filed a complaint, attached to a report prepared by Lucarelli, indicating that Harris had originally agreed to an interview but later felt harassed by Bickerstaff’s repeated calls and unannounced visit. Bickerstaff was indicted for intimidating a crime victim or witness and for telecommunications harassment. The charges were dismissed the following month.The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Bickerstaff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, retaliation, supervisory liability, municipal liability, civil conspiracy, and reckless, wanton, or willful conduct, calling the allegations “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” not sufficient to survive the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli" on Justia Law