Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an enhanced (327-month) sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on convictions for arson; first-degree wanton endangerment; trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana; and first-degree rape. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement in 2012. Sargent filed his first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2014, claiming that it was error for the court, rather than a jury, to enhance his sentence based on his convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States. The district court denied the motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In a second motion, Sargent cited Johnson v. United States (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague. Sargent claimed that the district court ruled that his conviction for wanton endangerment fell within the residual clause and that his conviction for arson has been reversed and cannot qualify as a predicate offense. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider the petition, concluding that Sargent had made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” View "In re: Sargent" on Justia Law

J.G.’s mother, Gohl, enrolled J.G. (age 3) in the Webster School Moderate Cognitive Impairment Program. During the year, his teacher,Turbiak, a 12-year special education teacher, faced criticism that she was overly harsh. It was reported that she pushed on children’s shoulders, once force-fed a gagging and crying student, and lifted children by one arm. During a meeting with Principal Moore, Turbiak admitted that she was “stressed out.” Although Moore told Turbiak not to do so, Turbiak called a meeting to find out who had complained. Turbiak’s co-workers returned to Moore, fearing retaliation. Turbiak was sent home for a few days and warned to be more professional, or face disciplinary action. The letter did not accuse Turbiak of abusing students. For four months, no one reported any problems. Then a social worker saw Turbiak “grab [J.G.] by the top of his head and jerk it back quite aggressively.” Turbiak claimed she was using a “redirecting” technique to focus J.G.’s attention after he threw a toy. A special education teacher familiar with this technique thought this sounded reasonable and returned Turbiak to her classroom. After a subsequent investigation, the district placed Turbiak on administrative leave. Gohl sued on J.G.’s behalf. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants; Gohl did not sufficiently allege violation of the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. View "Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Ballard and France were framed during Operation Turnaround, a corrupt investigation into the Mansfield, Ohio drug trade by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO). The federal government prosecuted Ballard and France for allegedly selling drugs to law-enforcement officials and confidential informant, Bray. After Operation Turnaround ended, however, Bray admitted that he used his friends to act as “stand-ins” for the drug buys and intentionally misidentified them to frame Ballard and France. Ballard and France then sued Bray, DEA Special Agent Lucas, RCSO officers, and the County of Richland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ballard and France failed to produce evidence showing that the officers personally violated their constitutional rights. In addition, the officers relied on eyewitness identifications of Ballard and France by Agent Lucas and indictments from a federal grand jury for probable cause; Ballard and France failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants should have doubted that there was probable cause. View "France v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In 2000, Hill was arrested, following an undercover investigation into drug-trafficking activities between Baltimore and Charleston. Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a), and was sentenced under the then-mandatory 2001 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Hill had two prior felony convictions, a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault, and was sentenced as a career offender (USSG 4B1.1) to 300 months of imprisonment, which was affirmed. Hill has brought several challenges to his sentence. In 2014, Hill filed a section 2241 habeas corpus petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision and the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent Royal decision, to argue that his “second-degree assault conviction no longer qualifies as a ‘crime of violence,” and that he is “serving an erroneous career offender sentence" that makes him “categorically ineligible” for retroactive amendments to the guidelines that could reduce his sentence by several years. Finding section 2241 inapposite because Hill did not claim to be “actually innocent,” the district court denied Hill’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that section 2241 petitions may be used by prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime; who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under section 2255; and when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Masters" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law

The Libertarian Party filed suit, claiming that Kentucky law unconstitutionally burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of political association and equal protection by categorizing the Libertarian Party and Constitution Party as “political groups,” which must petition to list their candidates for state and local office on election ballots, rather than as “political parties” or “political organizations,” which enjoy “blanket” ballot access for all the candidates they nominate (Ky. Rev. Stat. 118.015). The district court concluded, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Kentucky’s three-tiered ballot-access scheme is a constitutional means of exercising the Commonwealth’s power to regulate elections. The court found the burden imposed by the ballot-access scheme “less than severe,” so that strict scrutiny did not apply, but not so “minimal” as to warrant rational basis review. Engaging in “flexible scrutiny,” the court found that Kentucky has an important interest in ensuring that candidates demonstrate a “significant modicum of support,” strong enough to justify the scheme. View "Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes" on Justia Law

A Kentucky jury sentenced Foley to death for the 1991 shootings the Vaughn brothers. After exhausting all available appeals, Foley moved under 18 U.S.C. 3599(a)(2) and (f) for the district court to appoint counsel and grant funds to retain experts in anticipation of state clemency proceedings. Foley requested a neuropsychologist to evaluate the impact of multiple head injuries on his mental functioning. He also sought a ballistics and crime scene​ reconstruction expert to support his contention that he shot Rodney in self-defense and that someone else shot Lynn. The district court granted his motion to appoint counsel but denied expert funds as not reasonably necessary for Foley’s clemency bid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion and noting that Foley is under additional death sentences for murdering four people in 1989. View "Foley v. White" on Justia Law

One sitting judge and two aspiring Kentucky judges challenged the Commonwealth’s Code of Judicial Conduct clauses prohibiting “campaign[ing] as a member of a political organization,” “endors[ing] . . . a candidate for public office,” “mak[ing] a contribution to a political organization,” making any “commitments” with respect to “cases, controversies, or issues” likely to come before the court, making “false” or “misleading” statements. The sitting judge, previously appointed, made statements regarding being “re-elected,” and concerning penalties for heroin use. A candidate for the judiciary referred to himself as a Republic and his opponents as Democrats. The Third plaintiff wanted to publicly participate in Republican Party functions. The district court struck some of these provisions and upheld others. The Sixth Circuit found contributions, leadership, false statements and endorsement clauses valid. The campaigning, speeches, clauses are unconstitutional. The misleading statements prohibition is valid on its face, but may be unconstitutional as applied to one of the plaintiffs. View "Winter v. Wolnitzek" on Justia Law

The Ohio election regulation at issue, Senate Bill 238, amends Ohio Revised Code section 3509.01, to allow early in-person voting for 29 days before Election Day. The law previously allowed 35 days for early voting, including six days during which a person could both register and vote. In one of many pending challenges to the state’s election laws, the district court found the provision invalid. The Sixth Circuit reversed, calling Ohio “a national leader when it comes to early voting opportunities.” The law is facially neutral; it offers early voting to everyone. The Constitution does not require any opportunities for early voting and as many as 13 states offer only Election Day voting. The regulation was the product of a bipartisan recommendation, as amended pursuant to a subsequent litigation settlement. It is the product of collaborative processes, not unilateral overreaching by the political party that happened to be in power. While the challenged regulation may slightly diminish the convenience of registration and voting, it applies even-handedly to all voters, and, despite the change, Ohio continues to provide generous, reasonable, and accessible voting options to all Ohioans. There is no cognizable injury under the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. View "OH Democratic Party v. Husted" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, in a 2007 Detroit police raid on their home, Geraldine heard a loud boom and went upstairs where an officer put a gun to her face and said, “on the floor.” She explained that she had undergone two knee replacements. Another officer shoved her. She fell, hitting her head, shoulder, neck, and back against a table. Another officer walked on top of her body. When Geraldine’s adult daughter, Caroline, entered, an officer allegedly put a gun to her face and threw her onto the floor. Caroline yelled, “I’ve had back surgeries.” Another officer placed his foot on her back. The officers allegedly concealed their identities, wearing black clothing with their faces covered except for their eyes. The officers would only say that they were “Team 11,” from a multi-agency task force. It took two years for Wayne County to disclose a report that purportedly revealed the identities of the officers who executed the warrant. The federal defendants did not assert their lack of involvement during early discovery, but, after the limitations period had run, alleged that they did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the federal officers .On remand, the jury found that defendants did not participate in the raid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, upholding the district court’s decision not to “shift[] the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement.” View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law