Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Tennial, an African-American began working as the Business Manager of a UPS Packaging Center. His supervisors noted serious performance deficiencies at that facility over the next two years. Tennial contends that his performance was on par with Caucasian managers. After moving to a new position, Tennial’s deficiencies persisted. There was one incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. He refused to step down. Tennial claims that an extremely hostile work environment ensued. As a result, Tennial requested and was granted leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act. He missed UPS’s peak holiday season. When he returned to work, new supervisors noted numerous service failures. Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan and eventually demoted to a position that he currently holds. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Tennial argued that the Plan and his subsequent demotion were motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, and by retaliation for taking medical leave. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Caucasian managers identified by Tennial were not valid comparators; the reasons for his demotion were not pretextual. View "Tennial v. United Parcel Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Cole, a Memphis police officer, was arrested after leaving a Beale Street nightclub. He filed a class action, alleging that Memphis’s routine practice of sweeping Beale Street at 3 a.m. on weekend nights violated his constitutional right to intrastate travel. The jury found that the city implemented its street-sweeping policy without consideration of whether conditions in the area posed an existing, imminent, or immediate threat to public safety. Based on those findings, the court found the policy unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, entered an injunction, and ordered other equitable relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in subjecting the Sweep to strict scrutiny and in certifying a class when the precise members of the class were not ascertainable. The primary purpose of the Sweep was to impede travel; it resulted in the broad denial of access to a popular, two-block area of a public roadway and sidewalk. The Sweep was more than an incidental inconvenience. Under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the city bore the burden of justifying the Sweep to its stated goal of public safety. The jury found that the timing and execution of the Sweep was arbitrary. The precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification, in a case seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief. View "Cole v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

In response to a phone tip that Courtright had “come out of his room [at the Traveler’s Inn] with a gun and threatened to shoot” the dog of “another resident” at the hotel, Battle Creek Officers Wolf and Rathjen were dispatched to the Traveler’s Inn. Courtright claims that he “was nowhere near his room when the alleged incident was said to have taken place,” and that he tried to explain that to the officers. Courtright was nonetheless arrested. He claims he told the officers that prior rotator cuff injuries and shoulder surgeries precluded him from placing his hands behind his back and that he repeatedly complained of pain to the officers after he was handcuffed. He claims the officers disregarded his complaints. The officers and the city appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an assertion of qualified immunity. Courtright alleged a plausible claim that the officers violated his clearly established constitutional rights. View "Courtright v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Jones was arrested in 2013, charged with felonious assault. He pled guilty to a reduced charge on February 3, 2015. At his sentencing hearing that day, the judge imposed an 18-month sentence in the Ohio Department of Corrections, with 560-days credit for time served, but stated that Jones “may be supervised . . . if the parole board determines it is necessary.” The board would make that determination “[b]efore [Jones is] released,” and the sheriff’s office was to “process him.” The judge predicted that Jones “will never be transported.” The sheriff did not release Jones on February 3 or February 4. Jones’ counsel attempted to secure his release. Those efforts failed, absent documentation. The court finally filed the judgment on February 5, but the sheriff had processed Jones. He was transported on February 6. The Department applied the credit, gave Jones the official certificate of expiration of sentence, and released him that day. Jones sued the sheriff in his official capacity for damages, alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and false imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Although Ohio generally treats its sheriffs as county policymakers, Ohio law required the sheriff to transport Jones to the Department. The sheriff, as an arm of the state in this respect, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. View "Jones v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

In addition to removing the names of the deceased, adjudicated incompetents, and felons from its voter rolls, Ohio removess voters who are no longer eligible to vote because they have moved outside their county of registration, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.21.1 The “NCOA Process” mirrors the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20507(c), description of ways in which states “may” comply with their obligation to remove voters who are no longer eligible. The Secretary of State’s office compares names and addresses from Ohio’s Statewide Voter Registration Database to the U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address database, then provides each county’s Board of Elections (BOE) with a list of voters who appear to have moved. The BOEs send a confirmation notice. Recipients are removed if they do not respond or update their registration and do not subsequently vote during four consecutive years, including two federal elections. Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” begins with each BOE's list of registered voters who have not engaged in “voter activity” for two years, followed by a mailed notice: a voter is removed after six years of inactivity. During the litigation, the Secretary revised the confirmation notice, so that voters can confirm their address by signing and returning a postage-prepaid form, without including extensive personal information previously required. The Sixth Circuit concluded that claims regarding Ohio’s confirmation notice are not moot, and that the court erred by concluding that Ohio need not provide out-of-state movers with information on how they can continue to be eligible to vote. View "A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted" on Justia Law

On November 29, 2012, a vehicle sped by Cleveland Police Officers and emitted a loud bang. Thinking that it was a gunshot, the officers radioed their dispatcher, stating that they were shot at by two African-American men in a vehicle. Officers responded and attempted a traffic stop. The subsequent 25-minute pursuit, reached speeds of 100 miles per hour, involved 62 police vehicles, and ended in a school parking lot. With the car contained, Officer Diaz exited his vehicle. Believing that he saw the passenger reach for a gun, Diaz fired his weapon. The vehicle then accelerated toward Diaz; 13 officers fired 139 shots. The vehicle occupants were killed. The media framed the incident as one Hispanic and 12 Caucasian officers killing unarmed African-Americans. Community response was significant. Under department policy, the officers were assigned to restricted duty status, which they call “demeaning.” After the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation released its report to the county prosecutor, but before the prosecutor finished his review, the officers were returned to transitional duties. The state grand jury declined to issue criminal charges. The officers returned to full duty. Nine officers sued, claiming that because of the racial implications and community response, they were assigned to restricted duty for a longer period than their African-American colleagues who have also been involved in deadly force incidents with African-Americans (42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claims. “While we should heed history’s lesson about protecting civil liberties in times of crisis, history alone is not evidence of civil rights violations.” The officers did not complain to the department about their assignments; they did not show that the decision to keep them on restricted duty pending the investigation’s outcome was a pretext for discrimination. View "O'Donnell v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Shimel pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in the shooting death of her husband. After sentencing, the trial court conducted a “Ginther” hearing and concluded that Shimel’s attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a battered spouse self-defense theory and granted her motion to withdraw her plea. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of counsel on a matter of strategy. On collateral review, the federal district court denied Shimel’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time consulting with her and for advising her to plead guilty rather than taking the case to trial and presenting a battered spouse self-defense theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Shimel did not establish prejudice. A reasonable defendant in Shimel’s situation, charged with open murder, would have accepted the plea, in light of the prosecutor’s stance that, even with expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, he would not have reduced the charge to manslaughter. Shimel failed to establish a reasonable probability that expert testimony would have improved her result. Michigan law only permits a defendant to plead battered spouse syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Shimel’s husband suffered nine gunshot wounds. Seven entered his body through his back. There was evidence that the shooting was precipitated by financial problems View "Shimel v. Warren" on Justia Law

Crangle agreed to plead guilty to rape with a recommended sentence of life imprisonment and parole eligibility after 10 years. Crangle acknowledged, “I have been informed that . . . after my release from prison I [May__ or Will__] be supervised under post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, which could last up to 5 years,” with a checkmark after “Will.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge and Crangle’s attorney incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to “straight parole” and not post-release control. The sentencing entry did not refer to post-release control. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by encouraging him to plead guilty rather than no contest. Because Crangle did not appeal, his conviction became final in December 2008. In June 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a trial judge who “failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control,” to issue a judgment in compliance with the statute. In November 2010, the court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his plea based on that case and ordered a correction to the judgment, which was backdated to Crangle’s initial sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion in November 2011. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 4, 2012 and in January 2013. Crangle placed a federal habeas petition in the prison mail on March 28, 2013, which was docketed on April 15, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. The district court dismissed Crangle’s petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state-court order imposing post-release control was a new judgment, that reset AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. View "Crangle v. Kelly" on Justia Law