Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jones was arrested in 2013, charged with felonious assault. He pled guilty to a reduced charge on February 3, 2015. At his sentencing hearing that day, the judge imposed an 18-month sentence in the Ohio Department of Corrections, with 560-days credit for time served, but stated that Jones “may be supervised . . . if the parole board determines it is necessary.” The board would make that determination “[b]efore [Jones is] released,” and the sheriff’s office was to “process him.” The judge predicted that Jones “will never be transported.” The sheriff did not release Jones on February 3 or February 4. Jones’ counsel attempted to secure his release. Those efforts failed, absent documentation. The court finally filed the judgment on February 5, but the sheriff had processed Jones. He was transported on February 6. The Department applied the credit, gave Jones the official certificate of expiration of sentence, and released him that day. Jones sued the sheriff in his official capacity for damages, alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and false imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Although Ohio generally treats its sheriffs as county policymakers, Ohio law required the sheriff to transport Jones to the Department. The sheriff, as an arm of the state in this respect, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. View "Jones v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

In addition to removing the names of the deceased, adjudicated incompetents, and felons from its voter rolls, Ohio removess voters who are no longer eligible to vote because they have moved outside their county of registration, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.21.1 The “NCOA Process” mirrors the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20507(c), description of ways in which states “may” comply with their obligation to remove voters who are no longer eligible. The Secretary of State’s office compares names and addresses from Ohio’s Statewide Voter Registration Database to the U.S. Postal Service’s National Change of Address database, then provides each county’s Board of Elections (BOE) with a list of voters who appear to have moved. The BOEs send a confirmation notice. Recipients are removed if they do not respond or update their registration and do not subsequently vote during four consecutive years, including two federal elections. Ohio’s “Supplemental Process” begins with each BOE's list of registered voters who have not engaged in “voter activity” for two years, followed by a mailed notice: a voter is removed after six years of inactivity. During the litigation, the Secretary revised the confirmation notice, so that voters can confirm their address by signing and returning a postage-prepaid form, without including extensive personal information previously required. The Sixth Circuit concluded that claims regarding Ohio’s confirmation notice are not moot, and that the court erred by concluding that Ohio need not provide out-of-state movers with information on how they can continue to be eligible to vote. View "A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted" on Justia Law

On November 29, 2012, a vehicle sped by Cleveland Police Officers and emitted a loud bang. Thinking that it was a gunshot, the officers radioed their dispatcher, stating that they were shot at by two African-American men in a vehicle. Officers responded and attempted a traffic stop. The subsequent 25-minute pursuit, reached speeds of 100 miles per hour, involved 62 police vehicles, and ended in a school parking lot. With the car contained, Officer Diaz exited his vehicle. Believing that he saw the passenger reach for a gun, Diaz fired his weapon. The vehicle then accelerated toward Diaz; 13 officers fired 139 shots. The vehicle occupants were killed. The media framed the incident as one Hispanic and 12 Caucasian officers killing unarmed African-Americans. Community response was significant. Under department policy, the officers were assigned to restricted duty status, which they call “demeaning.” After the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation released its report to the county prosecutor, but before the prosecutor finished his review, the officers were returned to transitional duties. The state grand jury declined to issue criminal charges. The officers returned to full duty. Nine officers sued, claiming that because of the racial implications and community response, they were assigned to restricted duty for a longer period than their African-American colleagues who have also been involved in deadly force incidents with African-Americans (42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 42 U.S.C. 1983). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting the claims. “While we should heed history’s lesson about protecting civil liberties in times of crisis, history alone is not evidence of civil rights violations.” The officers did not complain to the department about their assignments; they did not show that the decision to keep them on restricted duty pending the investigation’s outcome was a pretext for discrimination. View "O'Donnell v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Shimel pled guilty to second-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in the shooting death of her husband. After sentencing, the trial court conducted a “Ginther” hearing and concluded that Shimel’s attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a battered spouse self-defense theory and granted her motion to withdraw her plea. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of counsel on a matter of strategy. On collateral review, the federal district court denied Shimel’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time consulting with her and for advising her to plead guilty rather than taking the case to trial and presenting a battered spouse self-defense theory. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Shimel did not establish prejudice. A reasonable defendant in Shimel’s situation, charged with open murder, would have accepted the plea, in light of the prosecutor’s stance that, even with expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, he would not have reduced the charge to manslaughter. Shimel failed to establish a reasonable probability that expert testimony would have improved her result. Michigan law only permits a defendant to plead battered spouse syndrome as part of a self-defense claim. Shimel’s husband suffered nine gunshot wounds. Seven entered his body through his back. There was evidence that the shooting was precipitated by financial problems View "Shimel v. Warren" on Justia Law

Crangle agreed to plead guilty to rape with a recommended sentence of life imprisonment and parole eligibility after 10 years. Crangle acknowledged, “I have been informed that . . . after my release from prison I [May__ or Will__] be supervised under post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, which could last up to 5 years,” with a checkmark after “Will.” At the sentencing hearing, the judge and Crangle’s attorney incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to “straight parole” and not post-release control. The sentencing entry did not refer to post-release control. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected an argument that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by encouraging him to plead guilty rather than no contest. Because Crangle did not appeal, his conviction became final in December 2008. In June 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered a trial judge who “failed to include in the sentencing entry any term of postrelease control,” to issue a judgment in compliance with the statute. In November 2010, the court denied Crangle’s motion to withdraw his plea based on that case and ordered a correction to the judgment, which was backdated to Crangle’s initial sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed denial of the motion in November 2011. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on April 4, 2012 and in January 2013. Crangle placed a federal habeas petition in the prison mail on March 28, 2013, which was docketed on April 15, 2013, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. The district court dismissed Crangle’s petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the state-court order imposing post-release control was a new judgment, that reset AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. View "Crangle v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Sargent pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received an enhanced (327-month) sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on convictions for arson; first-degree wanton endangerment; trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana; and first-degree rape. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancement in 2012. Sargent filed his first 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2014, claiming that it was error for the court, rather than a jury, to enhance his sentence based on his convictions, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. United States. The district court denied the motion; the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. In a second motion, Sargent cited Johnson v. United States (2015), in which the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the ACCA as unconstitutionally vague. Sargent claimed that the district court ruled that his conviction for wanton endangerment fell within the residual clause and that his conviction for arson has been reversed and cannot qualify as a predicate offense. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider the petition, concluding that Sargent had made a prima facie showing that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” View "In re: Sargent" on Justia Law

J.G.’s mother, Gohl, enrolled J.G. (age 3) in the Webster School Moderate Cognitive Impairment Program. During the year, his teacher,Turbiak, a 12-year special education teacher, faced criticism that she was overly harsh. It was reported that she pushed on children’s shoulders, once force-fed a gagging and crying student, and lifted children by one arm. During a meeting with Principal Moore, Turbiak admitted that she was “stressed out.” Although Moore told Turbiak not to do so, Turbiak called a meeting to find out who had complained. Turbiak’s co-workers returned to Moore, fearing retaliation. Turbiak was sent home for a few days and warned to be more professional, or face disciplinary action. The letter did not accuse Turbiak of abusing students. For four months, no one reported any problems. Then a social worker saw Turbiak “grab [J.G.] by the top of his head and jerk it back quite aggressively.” Turbiak claimed she was using a “redirecting” technique to focus J.G.’s attention after he threw a toy. A special education teacher familiar with this technique thought this sounded reasonable and returned Turbiak to her classroom. After a subsequent investigation, the district placed Turbiak on administrative leave. Gohl sued on J.G.’s behalf. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants; Gohl did not sufficiently allege violation of the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Rehabilitation Act. View "Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Schs." on Justia Law

Ballard and France were framed during Operation Turnaround, a corrupt investigation into the Mansfield, Ohio drug trade by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Richland County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO). The federal government prosecuted Ballard and France for allegedly selling drugs to law-enforcement officials and confidential informant, Bray. After Operation Turnaround ended, however, Bray admitted that he used his friends to act as “stand-ins” for the drug buys and intentionally misidentified them to frame Ballard and France. Ballard and France then sued Bray, DEA Special Agent Lucas, RCSO officers, and the County of Richland, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ballard and France failed to produce evidence showing that the officers personally violated their constitutional rights. In addition, the officers relied on eyewitness identifications of Ballard and France by Agent Lucas and indictments from a federal grand jury for probable cause; Ballard and France failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants should have doubted that there was probable cause. View "France v. Lucas" on Justia Law

In 2000, Hill was arrested, following an undercover investigation into drug-trafficking activities between Baltimore and Charleston. Hill pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a), and was sentenced under the then-mandatory 2001 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Hill had two prior felony convictions, a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault, and was sentenced as a career offender (USSG 4B1.1) to 300 months of imprisonment, which was affirmed. Hill has brought several challenges to his sentence. In 2014, Hill filed a section 2241 habeas corpus petition, citing the Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision and the Fourth Circuit’s subsequent Royal decision, to argue that his “second-degree assault conviction no longer qualifies as a ‘crime of violence,” and that he is “serving an erroneous career offender sentence" that makes him “categorically ineligible” for retroactive amendments to the guidelines that could reduce his sentence by several years. Finding section 2241 inapposite because Hill did not claim to be “actually innocent,” the district court denied Hill’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that section 2241 petitions may be used by prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime; who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under section 2255; and when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Masters" on Justia Law

A house fire took the lives of Gavitt’s wife and two daughters. Gavitt, convicted of arson and felony murder, was sentenced to life in prison in 1986. In 2012, the state court granted Gavitt’s unopposed motion for relief. Advancements in fire science research and investigation methods impugned some of the evidence on which Gavitt’s convictions were based. The judgment was vacated and Gavitt was released. Gavitt brought a civil rights action, claiming that multiple defendants violated his due process rights by intentionally misrepresenting evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and conspiring to deprive him of his rights. The district court dismissed, except with respect the Estate of DeVries, a Michigan forensic laboratory technician who testified at Gavitt’s trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The record is not so clear as to permit a ruling that the Estate’s evidence-sufficiency appeal presents a purely legal issue. While the likelihood that discovery will reveal evidence of intentional or reckless wrongdoing may be minimal, it is not inconceivable. While Gavitt may have been “wronged,” he did not sufficiently allege facts to support his claims that other defendants acted with such culpable states of mind as to warrant relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Due process guarantees a right to a fair trial, not perfection. Using the methods of the 1980s during the 1980s did not violate the Constitution; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gavitt v. Born" on Justia Law