Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hilliard (age 19) was a prostitute staying at a Madison Heights, Michigan Motel 6 while Officer Wolowiec was conducting a narcotics investigation. Wolowiece saw a bag of marijuana through Hilliard’s open window. Wolowiece and Officer Koehler initiated a “knock and talk.” Hilliard consented to the officers entering her room. Hilliard asked whether she could “work off” the possession charge. Hilliard called her drug dealer, Raqib, and ordered drugs. Wolowiec planned to have officers intercept Raqib before he arrived. Hilliard signed a confidential informant form, which provided that the “Department will use all reasonable means to protect your identity; however, this cannot be guaranteed.” Wolowiec asked Hilliard whether she was afraid that Raqib would hurt her. She responded “No.” Wolowiec nonetheless removed her from the hotel. Koehler made a traffic stop and conducted a canine search of Raqib’s car. Wolowiec later told Raqib’s passenger, Clark, that he had ordered the drugs. Wolowiec testified that he did not think this would reveal Hilliard as the informant. After the arrests, Wolowiec told Hilliard that Raqib and Clark believed she had set them up. Clark later testified that Wolowiec told her that Hilliard set up Raqib and that she relayed the information to Raqib. Raqib stated that Clark told him that Hilliard informed on him. Days later, Raqib and an accomplice murdered Hilliard. Hilliard’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment of qualified immunity. A reasonable jury could find that Wolowiec acted with deliberate indifference when he told Clark that Hilliard set up Raqib. View "Nelson v. City of Madison Heights" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

Decatur County Sheriff’s Department Officer Jones conducted a controlled buy of marijuana on May 22, 2013, through a confidential informant (CI) as part of a county-wide drug–bust operation. A warrant issued for Sanders's arrest and she turned herself in, but the state later dismissed the charges against her due to misidentification. Sanders filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for malicious prosecution, alleging that Jones prepared a misleading police report and gave false grand jury testimony identifying Sanders as the person who sold the CI drugs. Jones moved for summary judgment on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. The district court denied both defenses. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones’s absolute immunity defense presented a question of first impression about how the Supreme Court’s provision of absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses in Rehberg v. Paulk (2012), intersected with the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that an indicted plaintiff present evidence that the defendant provided false testimony to the grand jury. The court concluded that Rehberg’s absolute immunity for false grand jury testimony precludes Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim because she cannot rebut the indictment’s presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s grand jury testimony. View "Sanders v. Jones" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Battle Creek Police Department obtained a warrant to search a residence, based on evidence from a trash pull and from a confidential informant. The Emergency Response Team was involved due to the subject’s (Jones) criminal history, gang affiliations, possession of firearms, and possible possession of cocaine and heroin. Jones and Brown were detained outside. Officer Klein testified that, approaching the door, he could see dogs barking aggressively and “jumping.” The dogs, owned by Brown, were pit bulls, weighing about 97 pounds and 53 pounds. Klein testified that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs down there.” The officers shot and killed the dogs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of the dogs, unreasonable forced entry, and that the city was liable under “Monell” because the Department failed to provide training to address the known risk of constitutional violations arising from dog shootings. The court dismissed, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the Fourth Amendment claims or that an inadequate training policy caused the alleged constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the officers acted reasonably and that there was no history of “needless killing of animals in the course of searches in Battle Creek.” View "Brown v. Battle Creek Police Department" on Justia Law

In April 1987, witnesses saw Middlebrooks and Brewington chase Majors, a 14-year-old black male. The next day, Majors’ body was found near where that incident had occurred. Majors had been tortured. Brewington led police to a bloodstained knife and to Middlebrooks, who resisted arrest. Middlebrooks gave a video-taped statement. He admitted that he stabbed Majors twice, but depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator. A jury convicted Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Middlebrooks’s convictions but vacated the death sentence. Evidence presented on remand indicated that Majors was small for his age, a good student, not violent, and not armed. Middlebrooks was described as a member of the KKK, who “hated niggers.” Middlebrooks’ relatives described his childhood as involving sexual abuse and neglect. There was testimony that Middlebrooks has severe mental illness and organic brain impairment. The jury found the murder “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,’” and that this outweighed any mitigating factors. Middlebrooks was resentenced to death. The sentence was affirmed. His petition for state post-conviction relief was unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Middlebrooks’s federal habeas petition. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated in light its 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan. On remand, the district court again denied Middlebrooks’s petition, finding his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims not “substantial” under Martinez and not warranting an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Middlebrooks’s claims were rejected on the merits in state court. View "Middlebrooks v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

A preliminary injunction required the Highland School District Board to treat an 11-year old transgender special-needs student as a female and permit her to use the girls’ restroom. Highland moved to stay the injunction pending appeal and to file an appendix under seal. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion to file under seal only with respect to four exhibits that were filed under seal in the trial court. In denying a stay, the court noted the girl’s personal circumstances—her young age, mental health history, and unique vulnerabilities—and that her use of the girls’ restroom for over six weeks has greatly alleviated her distress. Maintaining the status quo in this case will protect the girl from the harm that would befall her if the injunction is stayed. Public interest weights strongly against a stay of the injunction; the protection of constitutional and civil rights is always in the public interest. View "Board of Education of Highland School v. Doe" on Justia Law

Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Ohio House Bill No. 663 protects the identity of individuals and entities that participate in the lethal injection process (Participants), not to be disclosed in public records or during judicial proceedings, except in limited circumstances, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(1)(cc), 2949.221(B)–(C). It directs courts to seal records that contain information related to the identity of Participants, allowing disclosure only if, “through clear and convincing evidence presented in the private hearing," the court finds that the Participant appears to have acted unlawfully with respect to the person’s involvement in the administration of a lethal injection.” HB 663 prevents licensing authorities from taking disciplinary action against a Participant and permits a Participant to bring a civil suit against any person who discloses that individual’s identity and participation. Plaintiffs, Ohio prisoners sentenced to death, claimed that HB 663 unconstitutionally burdened speech, created a regime of unconstitutional prior restraint, violated the Plaintiffs’ equal-protection and due-process rights, and their right of access to the courts, and denied the Plaintiffs constitutionally protected access to government proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Licensure-Immunity Provision and the Civil-Action Provision. Plaintiffs suffered only “conjectural or hypothetical injuries” rather than a “requisite distinct and palpable injury.” Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to the information they claimed they were being deprived of. View "Phillips v. DeWine" on Justia Law