Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In April 1987, witnesses saw Middlebrooks and Brewington chase Majors, a 14-year-old black male. The next day, Majors’ body was found near where that incident had occurred. Majors had been tortured. Brewington led police to a bloodstained knife and to Middlebrooks, who resisted arrest. Middlebrooks gave a video-taped statement. He admitted that he stabbed Majors twice, but depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator. A jury convicted Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Middlebrooks’s convictions but vacated the death sentence. Evidence presented on remand indicated that Majors was small for his age, a good student, not violent, and not armed. Middlebrooks was described as a member of the KKK, who “hated niggers.” Middlebrooks’ relatives described his childhood as involving sexual abuse and neglect. There was testimony that Middlebrooks has severe mental illness and organic brain impairment. The jury found the murder “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,’” and that this outweighed any mitigating factors. Middlebrooks was resentenced to death. The sentence was affirmed. His petition for state post-conviction relief was unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Middlebrooks’s federal habeas petition. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated in light its 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan. On remand, the district court again denied Middlebrooks’s petition, finding his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims not “substantial” under Martinez and not warranting an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Middlebrooks’s claims were rejected on the merits in state court. View "Middlebrooks v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

A preliminary injunction required the Highland School District Board to treat an 11-year old transgender special-needs student as a female and permit her to use the girls’ restroom. Highland moved to stay the injunction pending appeal and to file an appendix under seal. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion to file under seal only with respect to four exhibits that were filed under seal in the trial court. In denying a stay, the court noted the girl’s personal circumstances—her young age, mental health history, and unique vulnerabilities—and that her use of the girls’ restroom for over six weeks has greatly alleviated her distress. Maintaining the status quo in this case will protect the girl from the harm that would befall her if the injunction is stayed. Public interest weights strongly against a stay of the injunction; the protection of constitutional and civil rights is always in the public interest. View "Board of Education of Highland School v. Doe" on Justia Law

Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Ohio House Bill No. 663 protects the identity of individuals and entities that participate in the lethal injection process (Participants), not to be disclosed in public records or during judicial proceedings, except in limited circumstances, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(1)(cc), 2949.221(B)–(C). It directs courts to seal records that contain information related to the identity of Participants, allowing disclosure only if, “through clear and convincing evidence presented in the private hearing," the court finds that the Participant appears to have acted unlawfully with respect to the person’s involvement in the administration of a lethal injection.” HB 663 prevents licensing authorities from taking disciplinary action against a Participant and permits a Participant to bring a civil suit against any person who discloses that individual’s identity and participation. Plaintiffs, Ohio prisoners sentenced to death, claimed that HB 663 unconstitutionally burdened speech, created a regime of unconstitutional prior restraint, violated the Plaintiffs’ equal-protection and due-process rights, and their right of access to the courts, and denied the Plaintiffs constitutionally protected access to government proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Licensure-Immunity Provision and the Civil-Action Provision. Plaintiffs suffered only “conjectural or hypothetical injuries” rather than a “requisite distinct and palpable injury.” Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to the information they claimed they were being deprived of. View "Phillips v. DeWine" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tennial, an African-American began working as the Business Manager of a UPS Packaging Center. His supervisors noted serious performance deficiencies at that facility over the next two years. Tennial contends that his performance was on par with Caucasian managers. After moving to a new position, Tennial’s deficiencies persisted. There was one incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. He refused to step down. Tennial claims that an extremely hostile work environment ensued. As a result, Tennial requested and was granted leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act. He missed UPS’s peak holiday season. When he returned to work, new supervisors noted numerous service failures. Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan and eventually demoted to a position that he currently holds. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Tennial argued that the Plan and his subsequent demotion were motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, and by retaliation for taking medical leave. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Caucasian managers identified by Tennial were not valid comparators; the reasons for his demotion were not pretextual. View "Tennial v. United Parcel Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Cole, a Memphis police officer, was arrested after leaving a Beale Street nightclub. He filed a class action, alleging that Memphis’s routine practice of sweeping Beale Street at 3 a.m. on weekend nights violated his constitutional right to intrastate travel. The jury found that the city implemented its street-sweeping policy without consideration of whether conditions in the area posed an existing, imminent, or immediate threat to public safety. Based on those findings, the court found the policy unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, entered an injunction, and ordered other equitable relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in subjecting the Sweep to strict scrutiny and in certifying a class when the precise members of the class were not ascertainable. The primary purpose of the Sweep was to impede travel; it resulted in the broad denial of access to a popular, two-block area of a public roadway and sidewalk. The Sweep was more than an incidental inconvenience. Under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the city bore the burden of justifying the Sweep to its stated goal of public safety. The jury found that the timing and execution of the Sweep was arbitrary. The precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification, in a case seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief. View "Cole v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

In response to a phone tip that Courtright had “come out of his room [at the Traveler’s Inn] with a gun and threatened to shoot” the dog of “another resident” at the hotel, Battle Creek Officers Wolf and Rathjen were dispatched to the Traveler’s Inn. Courtright claims that he “was nowhere near his room when the alleged incident was said to have taken place,” and that he tried to explain that to the officers. Courtright was nonetheless arrested. He claims he told the officers that prior rotator cuff injuries and shoulder surgeries precluded him from placing his hands behind his back and that he repeatedly complained of pain to the officers after he was handcuffed. He claims the officers disregarded his complaints. The officers and the city appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an assertion of qualified immunity. Courtright alleged a plausible claim that the officers violated his clearly established constitutional rights. View "Courtright v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law