Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Turner robbed four Memphis-area businesses at gunpoint in October 2007 and was arrested by officers working with a joint federal-state anticrime task force. He was charged with aggravated robbery under Tennessee law and retained attorney McDaniel. During the pendency of the state proceedings, the U.S. Attorney’s Office told McDaniel that the United States planned to bring federal charges against Turner under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for interference with commerce by threats or violence, and for using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Turner rejected a federal plea offer (15 years imprisonment) regarding the uncharged case, but subsequently pled guilty to those charges with a 25-year sentence. He moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate or set aside his federal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel during federal plea negotiations. The government argued that Turner had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding plea negotiations conducted before the filing of formal charges. The district court denied the motion without reaching the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing its precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach before formal charges are filed. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

White County parents formed the Association for Accurate Standards in Education (AASE) to oppose another group advocating for removal of a social studies textbook that includes discussion of Islam. Eight part-time volunteers comprise AASE. It does not have a separate bank account and does not keep regular records. Five or six people have donated to AASE. No individual donation has exceeded $200; total donations have not reached $500. Seats on the Board of Education were up for election in 2016. AASE parents wanted to support and oppose candidates through AASE. They did not want AASE to make direct campaign contributions, but wanted AASE to spend less than $250 on independent expenditures, including yard signs, stickers, and brochures. They learned that the Tennessee Registry of Election Finance had fined Williamson Strong, an unincorporated group that disseminates information about candidates and issues in Williamson County, $5,000 for failing to certify a treasurer or file financial disclosure statements under Tenn. Code 2-10-102(12)(A), which defines a political campaign committee as: A combination of two or more individuals . . . to support or oppose any candidate. They sued the Registry’s officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Act violates their First Amendment, equal protection, and due process rights. The district court stayed the case pending the outcome of the state administrative proceedings in the Williamson Strong case. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Abstention was improper in this case, in light of the Act’s alleged chilling effects. View "Jones v. Coleman" on Justia Law

King confessed to an acquaintance and to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent that, after drinking large amounts of alcohol, ingesting LSD, and Quaaludes, and engaging in sexual intercourse, King drove Smith to a wooded area and shot her in the back of the head. King’s trial counsel suspected that King had brain damage as a result of a childhood head injury and substance abuse. An expert report concluded that King did not manifest evidence of psychotic thought process nor organic brain syndrome, but recommended an electroencephalogram and psychological testing. The expert later testified that an electroencephalogram was not necessary; the court denied a motion for such testing. Defense counsel suggested in his opening statement that King’s intoxicated state influenced his actions. The defense changed strategy after King’s former girlfriend testified about his violence against her. There was testimony about King sniffing gasoline “several times a week.” The jury found King guilty of first-degree murder and recommended death by electrocution, which the trial court imposed. King’s appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a federal habeas petition, rejecting arguments that counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony about King’s intoxication at the time of the murder and failing to investigate adequately King’s mental health and to obtain expert assistance in a timely manner. View "King v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Moody, engaged in harness racing, is the horse trainer of record for his family farm. The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) suspended Moody’s father, John, in 2010. John publicly criticized and sued the MGCB. An anonymous email led to MGCB’s investigation into whether Moody was only a “paper trainer” for John. When Moody attempted to apply for 2013 licensing, he was disqualified. In January 2013, a consent order was prepared that would have allowed Moody to begin participating in racing in March 2013, but it required Moody to agree not to take legal action against MGCB. Moody did not sign the order; he remained disqualified for six months. In September 2013, Moody was told that he could apply for licensure without any conditions. The ALJ dismissed the case. In 2015, Moody filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation in his disqualification due to his father’s lawsuit, and that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests in his right to engage in harness-racing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. MGCB was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity; neither MGCB nor the individual defendants in their official capacities were “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Moody lacked third-party standing for a First Amendment claim because failed to show a hindrance to his father’s ability to protect his own rights. Moody did not have a liberty interest in his license and was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Hilliard (age 19) was a prostitute staying at a Madison Heights, Michigan Motel 6 while Officer Wolowiec was conducting a narcotics investigation. Wolowiece saw a bag of marijuana through Hilliard’s open window. Wolowiece and Officer Koehler initiated a “knock and talk.” Hilliard consented to the officers entering her room. Hilliard asked whether she could “work off” the possession charge. Hilliard called her drug dealer, Raqib, and ordered drugs. Wolowiec planned to have officers intercept Raqib before he arrived. Hilliard signed a confidential informant form, which provided that the “Department will use all reasonable means to protect your identity; however, this cannot be guaranteed.” Wolowiec asked Hilliard whether she was afraid that Raqib would hurt her. She responded “No.” Wolowiec nonetheless removed her from the hotel. Koehler made a traffic stop and conducted a canine search of Raqib’s car. Wolowiec later told Raqib’s passenger, Clark, that he had ordered the drugs. Wolowiec testified that he did not think this would reveal Hilliard as the informant. After the arrests, Wolowiec told Hilliard that Raqib and Clark believed she had set them up. Clark later testified that Wolowiec told her that Hilliard set up Raqib and that she relayed the information to Raqib. Raqib stated that Clark told him that Hilliard informed on him. Days later, Raqib and an accomplice murdered Hilliard. Hilliard’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment of qualified immunity. A reasonable jury could find that Wolowiec acted with deliberate indifference when he told Clark that Hilliard set up Raqib. View "Nelson v. City of Madison Heights" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

Decatur County Sheriff’s Department Officer Jones conducted a controlled buy of marijuana on May 22, 2013, through a confidential informant (CI) as part of a county-wide drug–bust operation. A warrant issued for Sanders's arrest and she turned herself in, but the state later dismissed the charges against her due to misidentification. Sanders filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit for malicious prosecution, alleging that Jones prepared a misleading police report and gave false grand jury testimony identifying Sanders as the person who sold the CI drugs. Jones moved for summary judgment on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. The district court denied both defenses. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones’s absolute immunity defense presented a question of first impression about how the Supreme Court’s provision of absolute immunity for grand jury witnesses in Rehberg v. Paulk (2012), intersected with the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that an indicted plaintiff present evidence that the defendant provided false testimony to the grand jury. The court concluded that Rehberg’s absolute immunity for false grand jury testimony precludes Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim because she cannot rebut the indictment’s presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s grand jury testimony. View "Sanders v. Jones" on Justia Law

During an investigation into alleged misconduct at the Bay County jail, union president Gillis received complaints that the jail’s staff felt intimidated by management’s tactics. Gillis worked with Sergeant Walraven to draft a memorandum informing staff of their rights. The memo stated “I am in no way advising you not to cooperate with management, just advising you of your rights. It is your responsibility to ask for the representation.” Sheriff Miller summoned Gillis the day after Gillis posted the memorandum, asked who wrote it, and declared: “I can have you prosecuted for interfering with an ongoing investigation.” The investigation into Walraven began in January with an anonymous note, suggesting that administrators review security camera footage from shifts when Walraven was the supervisor. The footage showed officers playing cards, damaging jail property, conducting outside business, not monitoring security cameras, and other violations of department policy. Walraven was placed on administrative leave. His employment was terminated in April. An investigation into Gillis began in February. A former inmate alleged that Gillis engaged in a sexual relationship with her during her time in custody and under court supervision. Gillis ultimately admitted involvement and resigned. The district court rejected the officers’ First Amendment retaliation claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the memorandum was protected speech on matters of public concern, plaintiffs’ speech interests were outweighed by defendants’ interest in obtaining compliance from the correctional officers with their investigation. View "Gillis v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Battle Creek Police Department obtained a warrant to search a residence, based on evidence from a trash pull and from a confidential informant. The Emergency Response Team was involved due to the subject’s (Jones) criminal history, gang affiliations, possession of firearms, and possible possession of cocaine and heroin. Jones and Brown were detained outside. Officer Klein testified that, approaching the door, he could see dogs barking aggressively and “jumping.” The dogs, owned by Brown, were pit bulls, weighing about 97 pounds and 53 pounds. Klein testified that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs down there.” The officers shot and killed the dogs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of the dogs, unreasonable forced entry, and that the city was liable under “Monell” because the Department failed to provide training to address the known risk of constitutional violations arising from dog shootings. The court dismissed, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the Fourth Amendment claims or that an inadequate training policy caused the alleged constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the officers acted reasonably and that there was no history of “needless killing of animals in the course of searches in Battle Creek.” View "Brown v. Battle Creek Police Department" on Justia Law