Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Day, a Memphis armored truck driver, was shot on the job. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Day died two years later, of complications from his injuries. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway car driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court and was sentenced to death. Thomas exhausted his Tennessee post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Safe Streets Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it years later during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The district court denied Thomas habeas relief in the death penalty case, reasoning that the payment was not sufficiently “material.” The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment rather than allow Jackson to commit perjury. View "Thomas v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Witzke is currently serving four sentences in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) for using forged financial instruments. In May 2013, the Parole Board released Witzke on parole for a 15-month term. A year later, authorities arrested him for eight alleged parole violations, including a new criminal conviction for using a fake check. An MDOC agent found probable cause for all eight counts. Witzke pled guilty to two counts. At a second hearing, another MDOC officer dismissed all remaining counts except the fraudulent check violation. Finding Witzke guilty of that violation, the officer recommended revocation of Witzke’s parole. The Parole Board adopted the recommendation. Without seeking relief in Michigan courts, Witzke filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging violation of his due process rights and requesting a new hearing before the Parole Board. The district court summarily dismissed his petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. While his appeal was pending, the Parole Board re-released Witzke on parole. He will finish serving his sentence for his underlying criminal conviction in May 2017. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as moot, stating that there was nothing to remedy. View "Witzke v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Before his jury trial on charges of murder, Watkins submitted four times to psychiatric evaluation. Though the first evaluator found him incompetent, subsequent evaluators found him competent and criminally responsible for his actions. Despite his bizarre behavior during trial, including exhibiting paranoid beliefs and urinating on a television screen, defense counsel did not request a fifth psychiatric evaluation. A jury found Watkins guilty. Nearly four years after filing a timely habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for “failure to investigate and raise a defense,” Watkins filed an amended petition arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request another psychiatric evaluation after Watkins’ conduct during trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief. Watkins cannot establish that his amended petition relates back to his original petition or that he is entitled to equitable tolling; the petition was, therefore, untimely. View "Watkins v. DeAngelo-Kipp" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Michigan Board of Commissioners begins its monthly meetings with a Christian prayer. Bormuth, a non-Christian county resident, attended meetings because he was concerned about environmental issues. During the prayer, Bormuth was the only one in attendance who did not rise and bow his head. Bormuth felt isolated, and worried that the Commissioners would hold against him his decision to stay seated. He later raised the First Amendment issue during a public comment period. The Commissioners reacted with “disgust.” Bormuth filed suit asserting that this prayer practice violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. In the meantime, the Commissioners declined Bormuth’s application to serve on an environmental committee. The district court granted the County summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The prayer practice coerced residents to support and participate in the exercise of religion and was well outside the tradition of historically tolerated prayer. View "Bormuth v. County of Jackson" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted in 1994 of kidnapping, robbery, and murder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed denial of post-conviction relief. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review. Moore applied to reopen his appeal, claiming ineffective assistance by counsel in his first appeal. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied the application as untimely and based on res judicata. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The district court granted federal habeas relief on claims that Moore had received ineffective assistance at sentencing and alleging improper jury instructions in the penalty phase. The Sixth Circuit remanded in part, holding that a 2011 Supreme Court decision precluded the district court from considering additional evidence that Moore had introduced in support of his ineffective assistance claim and rejecting Moore’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 2012 Martinez decision required remand for factual development of the claim. Moore moved to set aside the judgment, arguing that the Supreme Court’s 2013 Trevino decision permitted him to use newly-developed evidence of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish cause for his failure to present evidence to support his post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Trevino expanded Martinez only to cases in which an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim could not have been made meaningfully on direct appeal. Moore made that claim on direct appeal; the Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated it on the merits. View "Moore v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Turner robbed four Memphis-area businesses at gunpoint in October 2007 and was arrested by officers working with a joint federal-state anticrime task force. He was charged with aggravated robbery under Tennessee law and retained attorney McDaniel. During the pendency of the state proceedings, the U.S. Attorney’s Office told McDaniel that the United States planned to bring federal charges against Turner under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for interference with commerce by threats or violence, and for using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Turner rejected a federal plea offer (15 years imprisonment) regarding the uncharged case, but subsequently pled guilty to those charges with a 25-year sentence. He moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate or set aside his federal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel during federal plea negotiations. The government argued that Turner had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding plea negotiations conducted before the filing of formal charges. The district court denied the motion without reaching the merits of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing its precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach before formal charges are filed. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

White County parents formed the Association for Accurate Standards in Education (AASE) to oppose another group advocating for removal of a social studies textbook that includes discussion of Islam. Eight part-time volunteers comprise AASE. It does not have a separate bank account and does not keep regular records. Five or six people have donated to AASE. No individual donation has exceeded $200; total donations have not reached $500. Seats on the Board of Education were up for election in 2016. AASE parents wanted to support and oppose candidates through AASE. They did not want AASE to make direct campaign contributions, but wanted AASE to spend less than $250 on independent expenditures, including yard signs, stickers, and brochures. They learned that the Tennessee Registry of Election Finance had fined Williamson Strong, an unincorporated group that disseminates information about candidates and issues in Williamson County, $5,000 for failing to certify a treasurer or file financial disclosure statements under Tenn. Code 2-10-102(12)(A), which defines a political campaign committee as: A combination of two or more individuals . . . to support or oppose any candidate. They sued the Registry’s officials in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Act violates their First Amendment, equal protection, and due process rights. The district court stayed the case pending the outcome of the state administrative proceedings in the Williamson Strong case. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Abstention was improper in this case, in light of the Act’s alleged chilling effects. View "Jones v. Coleman" on Justia Law

King confessed to an acquaintance and to a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent that, after drinking large amounts of alcohol, ingesting LSD, and Quaaludes, and engaging in sexual intercourse, King drove Smith to a wooded area and shot her in the back of the head. King’s trial counsel suspected that King had brain damage as a result of a childhood head injury and substance abuse. An expert report concluded that King did not manifest evidence of psychotic thought process nor organic brain syndrome, but recommended an electroencephalogram and psychological testing. The expert later testified that an electroencephalogram was not necessary; the court denied a motion for such testing. Defense counsel suggested in his opening statement that King’s intoxicated state influenced his actions. The defense changed strategy after King’s former girlfriend testified about his violence against her. There was testimony about King sniffing gasoline “several times a week.” The jury found King guilty of first-degree murder and recommended death by electrocution, which the trial court imposed. King’s appeals and petitions for state post-conviction relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, were unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a federal habeas petition, rejecting arguments that counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony about King’s intoxication at the time of the murder and failing to investigate adequately King’s mental health and to obtain expert assistance in a timely manner. View "King v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Moody, engaged in harness racing, is the horse trainer of record for his family farm. The Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) suspended Moody’s father, John, in 2010. John publicly criticized and sued the MGCB. An anonymous email led to MGCB’s investigation into whether Moody was only a “paper trainer” for John. When Moody attempted to apply for 2013 licensing, he was disqualified. In January 2013, a consent order was prepared that would have allowed Moody to begin participating in racing in March 2013, but it required Moody to agree not to take legal action against MGCB. Moody did not sign the order; he remained disqualified for six months. In September 2013, Moody was told that he could apply for licensure without any conditions. The ALJ dismissed the case. In 2015, Moody filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation in his disqualification due to his father’s lawsuit, and that he had been deprived of liberty and property interests in his right to engage in harness-racing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. MGCB was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity; neither MGCB nor the individual defendants in their official capacities were “persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Moody lacked third-party standing for a First Amendment claim because failed to show a hindrance to his father’s ability to protect his own rights. Moody did not have a liberty interest in his license and was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Moody v. Michigan Gaming Control Board" on Justia Law

Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law