Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hill suffered a diabetic emergency. Paramedics, including Streeter, found Hill very disoriented and combative. Streeter tested Hill’s blood-sugar level, which was extremely low at 38. As blood sugar falls, a person may lose consciousness, become combative and confused, or suffer a seizure. A blood-sugar level of 38 is a medical emergency and, untreated, can lead to death. Deputy Miracle arrived as paramedics were attempting to intravenously administer dextrose to raise Hill’s blood-sugar level. Hill ripped the catheter from his arm, causing blood to spray, and continued to kick, swing, and swear as the paramedics tried to restrain him. Miracle eventually deployed his taser to Hill’s thigh, quieting Hill long enough for Streeter to reestablish the IV catheter and administer dextrose. Hill’s blood-sugar levels stabilized. Hill denied being in pain, but was taken to the hospital. Not treatment was rendered for the taser wound. Hill claimed that he suffered burns and that his diabetes worsened. Hill filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force, with state-law claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hill subsequently died from complications of diabetes. The district court denied Miracle’s claim of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss. Miracle acted in an objectively reasonable manner with the minimum force necessary to bring Hill under control, and his actions enabled the paramedics to save Hill’s life. View "Estate of Hill v. Miracle" on Justia Law

Memphis animal-control officer Lynch investigated a third complaint of animal cruelty at Moore's house. Moore did not come to the door. Moore’s neighbor, Hillis, told Lynch that Moore had threatened her and that she was “terrified” of him. Backup arrived. Moore opened the door, gestured as if he had a weapon, and shut the door. A second visit was equally unsuccessful. The next day, Hillis told Lynch that Moore said he would kill Lynch if she returned. TACT (the Memphis version of SWAT) was asked to assist in serving a search warrant. At the both doors, officers announced “police" and threw flash-bangs inside. A TACT officer saw Moore enter his bedroom. Moore called 911. The team approached, calling “Memphis Police” and “search warrant.” To prevent a barricade situation, an officer threw a flash-bang into the bedroom. Officer Penny entered and saw Moore holding a semi-automatic pistol, pointed at Penny. On the 911 tape, after the flash-bang, Penny can be heard y elling, “Hands, Don! Hands, hands, hands!” Seconds later, Penny fired at Moore, killing him. Moore’s gun, still in his hand was fully loaded with a round in the chamber; he had another pistol in a holster. Officers found a rifle next to the front door and axes next to each door. Moore’s children sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no violation of Moore’s constitutional rights. View "Moore v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Ohio’s execution protocol allows for lethal injection using a three-drug combination of midazolam; either vecuronium bromide, pancuronium bromide, or rocuronium bromide, which are paralytics; and potassium chloride, which stops the heart. The midazolam is intended to ensure that the person being executed is insensate to the pain that the other drugs cause. If midazolam does not “render the prisoner unconscious,” then “there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation . . . and pain” from the second two drugs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to allow for further litigation regarding midazolam’s efficacy before Ohio executes three men. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate question is whether use of midazolam “entails a substantial risk of severe pain” as compared to “a known and available alternative.” Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim. The public has an interest in sentences being carried out, but also also has an interest in ensuring that those sentences are carried out in a constitutional manner. The court cited estoppel, noting that Ohio represented that it was not going to use pancuronium bromide or potassium bromide “going forward,” and that there was “no possibility” it would revert to using those drugs and subsequently acted inconsistently with those representations. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol" on Justia Law

In 1998, Breeden was found dead in the Kentucky River. King was a suspect because of her sporadic relationship with Breeden, because she had bullet holes inside her home, and because, after Breeden’s disappearance, King had shared premonitions of “Breeden being found in water.” Officers unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a search warrant for King’s residence. In 2006 Detective Harwood obtained a warrant. His affidavit omitted that Breen’s bullet wounds were non-exiting and could not have caused bullet holes in King’s floor and that King had one leg and weighed 100 pounds, while Breeden weighed 187 pounds. There was no evidence that King had destroyed evidence; gunshot evidence at her home did not match bullets recovered from Breeden. King entered an “Alford plea,” maintaining her innocence. In 2012, a serial murderer (Jarrell) confessed that he had killed Breeden and recounted the crime with specific details that had not been released. Harwood visited Jarrell in jail. King alleges that Harwood intimidated Jarrell into recanting. In 2014, charges against King were dismissed. The district court dismissed King’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as time-barred and citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to King’s malicious-prosecution claim against Harwood. King raised genuine issues of material fact: whether Harwood set King’s prosecution in motion by applying for warrants and an indictment despite the lack of probable cause; whether Harwood's false statements, together with his material omissions were material to King’s prosecution; and whether any false statements, evidence, and omissions were “laying the groundwork for an indictment," not “preparatory activity” for a grand-jury hearing that would provide absolute immunity. View "King v. Harwood" on Justia Law

Linkletter signed an online petition supporting a Cincinnati women’s shelter after she had accepted a position with W&S. W&S rescinded the employment agreement because she signed the petition while the company was engaged in a lengthy real estate dispute with the shelter over its location in the neighborhood. Shelter residents had previously sued W&S under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. W&S reached a settlement with the shelter and purchased the property. After Linkletter’s employment contract was rescinded she sued W&S under the Act and Ohio law. Section 3617 states: It shall be unlawful to . . . interfere with any person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by … this title. Linkletter claimed her petition-signing encouraged the residents of the shelter in their rights granted by the Act, involving discrimination in the rental or sale of housing. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s rejection of the claim, finding that Linkletter had a plausible claim for relief. Linkletter’s petition-signing supporting the shelter fits within the meaning of the phrase “aided or encouraged” and the defendants’ rescission of their employment agreement constitutes an “interference” with that encouragement. View "Linkletter v. Western & Southern Financial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of a male victim with nine stab wounds and a pregnant female victim, dead as a result of manual strangulation and stabbed after her death. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders and sentenced to death, changed his story several times. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. After the Supreme Court reversed, the Sixth Circuit reinstated the death penalty, rejecting claims: that admission of evidence as to the availability of prison furloughs in the future; concerning penalty-phase jury instructions that, allegedly, improperly instructed jurors that they were required to be unanimous regarding the presence of mitigating factors; concerning prosecutorial misstatements: and that Kentucky’s proportionality review violates the Eighth Amendment View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Mosley's Wickliffe, Ohio Motel needed a tenant for its lounge. Miller's nightclub in neighboring Willoughby had drawn the ire of law enforcement. The two executed a lease; Miller applied for permits. Miller claims that the city was initially receptive, but, after informing it of his plan to host a “Hip Hop night, [catering] to African American[s],” the city allegedly changed its position. Miller’s occupancy permit application was denied pending revised parking plans. Miller needed a liquor license from the state. The city did not oppose Miller’s application, but religious organizations did. The city passed a resolution, supporting that opposition. The state denied Miller’s application, citing the objections of the religious organizations and “the peace and good order of the neighborhood.” Miller did not appeal. The city passed Ordinance 2009-49, requiring “nightclubs” to obtain a permit and delineating the health ad safety responsibilities; it restricted nightclub locations to buffer schools, churches, libraries, parks, taverns, bars, other nightclubs, and residential districts. Miller and Mosley never applied for nightclub permits. Miller became involved with Cirino in a proposed billiards hall, the temporary-occupancy permit for which was then revoked. The three sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 2000A (racial discrimination) with state law and takings claims. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Wickliffe had reached a final decision under the ordinance, or that they faced a credible threat of prosecution, and cannot show a particularized and concrete injury sufficient to confer jurisdiction. View "Mosley v. City of Wickliffe" on Justia Law

Mattox, a Michigan inmate, repeatedly complained of pain in his chest, neck, shoulders, and arms, and shortness of breath and dizziness. After visits to an emergency room, outside cardiologists recommended that Mattox undergo cardiac catheterization to determine whether he needed a stent or surgery to prevent a future heart attack. Doctors employed by the Department of Corrections health care contractor denied approval for the procedure. After three grievances were denied, Mattox’s chest pains returned. An outside cardiologist recommended the heart drug Ranexa. Ranexa was not on the prison’s formulary; prison doctors denied permission for Ranexa, and ordered Mattox to remain on medication that made him dizzy. Mattox’s chest pains continued intermittently for two and a half years, requiring multiple hospitalizations. Mattox eventually received cardiac catheterization, which ruled out heart disease, and suggested that he be treated with medication. Prison doctors denied another request for Ranexa; a fourth grievance was denied until, following another hospitalization, Mattox was given a six-month prescription for Ranexa. Mattox did not experience any cardiac symptoms during those six months. After the Ranexa prescription ran out, Mattox’s chest pains returned. Renewal was denied; a fifth grievance was denied. Mattox's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Eighth Amendment was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to a physicians' assistant, but reversed as to the three physicians. View "Mattox v. Edelman" on Justia Law

Two victims were killed in 1999. Phillips was arrested. The primary witness was Phillips’ stepdaughter, a neighbor of the victim. She testified that she heard the confrontation, followed by shooting, and that Phillips was “intoxicated” that night. A jury convicted Phillips of both counts of first-degree murder. Judge Maricle asked whether the parties were prepared to proceed with sentencing. Phillips’s attorney, Charles, replied, “No,” but neglected to request a continuance, stating, "I don’t know anything about death penalty litigation.” Charles did not object to the prosecution's jury instructions, consulted with Phillips for less than an hour, and offered no opening statement nor evidence. The Commonwealth suggested that the aggravating factor prevented the jury from considering sentences with possible parol. Rather than clarifying the sentencing options or advocating for a particular sentence, Charles remarked: I don’t intend to take anymore of your time. The jury recommended life with no possibility of parole for 25 years. The court entered that sentence with minimal explanation. The state supreme court affirmed. Although Phillips's post-conviction attorney dropped a claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing, Maricle felt “compelled” to authorize relief on that basis. Phillips complied with Maricle's request and submitted information about evidence relevant sentencing, but Maricle was indicted and no state judge decided Phillips’s claims, which were pending for over six years. The district court dismissed his federal habeas petition, finding that Phillips had not shown prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the deferential standard is inapplicable because no Kentucky court ever decided Phillips's claims, that Phillips’s counsel was ineffective, that prejudice is presumed, and counsel’s performance actually prejudiced Phillips under Strickland. View "Phillips v. White" on Justia Law

In 1997, a Memphis armored truck driver was shot while working; he died two years later, as a result. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court, was sentenced to death, and exhausted state post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief in the death penalty case, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment, but affirmed the denial of relief in the federal case. The state court Brady violation, failure to disclose that Jackson had received compensation after her federal testimony, occurred after Thomas’s federal trial. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law