Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs (African-American adult males), and adult female friends, some of whom were Caucasian, walked past the Police Department’s EDU precinct, leaving the nearby Entertainment District. They had spent the evening socializing and drinking alcohol. Off-duty officers, including Flake (an African-American), had congregated in the EDU parking lot to socialize; some were drinking alcohol, as is commonplace at precincts throughout Memphis. Flake approached the plaintiffs and, telling them to move along, referred to their companions as “snow bunnies,” a racial slur. Plaintiff McDonald responded: “Who the fuck are you?” As the group walked away, Flake yelled, “I’m going to show y’all who I am,” and attacked McDonald. Other officers joined in, shouting “Stop resisting arrest!” McDonald’s injuries resulted in $7,000 in medical bills. Plaintiffs were taken into custody and transported to a hospital. Charges of resisting official detention, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct were later dismissed. The Inspectional Services Bureau found that the officers had used excessive force and violated departmental policies. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court denied defendants’ motions seeking summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of qualified immunity claims and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of summary judgment on municipal liability. Citing “the defendants’ disregard for the governing law and the particular circumstances,” the court awarded sanctions. View "McDonald v. Flake" on Justia Law

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

In 1998, Jackson began working at DRH’s Crisis Center as a mental health technician. RNs were required to authorize patient-discharges. MHTs assisted with paperwork and physically escorting the patient. Before the patient is escorted out, both the RN and the MHT are required to check the patient’s identification wristband and bloodwork to verify that the correct patient is discharged. On September 6, 2013, Jackson assisted with a discharge; both she and the RN failed to check the ID band. The patient returned to the Center voluntarily about seven hours later. At an emergency meeting, Jackson admitted her mistake. Three days later, DRH terminated Jackson’s employment, citing “major infractions” of disciplinary policy. Jackson had consistently received high ratings on her performance evaluations and was apparently never disciplined for any prior infraction. At the time, 14 of 18 nurses were female; nine of 12 social workers were female. Jackson was the only female among 14 MHTs. Jackson claimed that the Center preferred male MHTs for their ability to physically handle unruly patients and filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Jackson argued that DRH did not terminate male MHTs who made mistakes of comparable seriousness. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of her suit. View "Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp." on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this. Before Brown retrieved his license and registration, they ordered him out of the car. Brown complied. During a pat-down, Officer Chapman hit Brown in the neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. Chapman tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught and wrestled him down, tasering him. The officers handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before reaching the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M., arrived at 9:07 P.M., found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse, and was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to the officers on plaintiff’s claim that the officers stopped Brown’s vehicle without probable cause, holding that the city is not liable on that claim; reversed summary judgment to Chapman on plaintiff’s claim that use of a taser constituted excessive force, stating that the city is liable on that claim; and reversed summary judgment to an officer on plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines’ busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an “imminent hazard” to public safety based on its finding that the “unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death.” The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; “Bivens” claims were time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Landrum was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated murder for breaking into 84-year-old White’s apartment and killing him in 1985. The jury found two death penalty specifications: Landrum committed aggravated murder to escape detection for committing burglary, and Landrum was the principal offender in an aggravated murder. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Landrum unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief in 1996. The Ohio Supreme Court denied further review. In 1998, Landrum applied to reopen his appeal under Ohio Rule 26(B). The Ohio Court of Appeals denied relief, finding that Landrum failed to show good cause for delaying his application; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Landrum sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce testimony that his co-defendant had confessed to cutting White’s throat. The court granted a conditional writ, finding that Landrum did not procedurally default that claim because Rule 26(B) was not firmly established and regularly followed in Ohio capital cases. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In 2012, Landrum filed an FRCP 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the confession claim. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Landrum did not present a “substantial claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Landrum v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff started work at defendant’s Murfreesboro plant and was informed about the company’s sexual harassment policy. Plaintiff observed Leonard “come up behind” another man, “grab[] him in the butt,” and then sniff his finger. Twice, Leonard came up behind plaintiff and touched him inappropriately; both times plaintiff warned him. A month later, Leonard came up behind him again, “grabbed [him] by [the] hips and started hunching on [him]” so that Leonard’s “privates” were “up against [Plaintiff’s] tail.” Plaintiff confronted Leonard, then reported the incident. Although there had been other incidents, Leonard was suspended for two days and given a form, stating, “No contact with any employees that would be interpreted as sexual harassment.” Plaintiff did not return to work. He suffered anxiety attacks. His short-term disability insurance ran out. Plaintiff’s licensed clinical social worker diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. Leonard was fired after he admitted in a deposition that he had “mooned” or touched other men in the workplace. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and hostile work environment and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The court granted partial summary judgment, rejecting the retaliation and constructive discharge claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict and award of $300,000 on his Title VII claim. View "Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Martin, Kentucky Mayor Thomasine Robinson, sought reelection. Her challenger, Howell, won by three votes. Husband James confronted and threatened to kill Howell; he was convicted in state court of terroristic threatening and menacing. Thomasine was charged with bribery, coercion, and intimidation. Testimony indicated that: Thomasine gave a woman $20 to vote for her and coerced voters to vote for her by absentee ballot; that her son Steven attempted to intimidate a voter; that James paid $10 for a vote; and that James gave an individual money with which to purchase votes. The jury returned a guilty verdict on conspiracy and vote-buying (52 U.S.C. 10307(c)) charges, but the court granted James acquittal on the conspiracy charge. Thomasine was convicted of vote-buying and conspiracy to violate civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241); Steven was found guilty of conspiracy and two counts of vote-buying, but acquitted of a third count. The court assessed a leadership enhancement to James for directing another to purchase votes and an obstruction of justice enhancement for behaving menacingly during a trial recess and sentenced him to an above-guidelines 40 months in prison. Steven was sentenced to 21 months and three years of supervised release, with a condition requiring him to abstain from the consumption of alcohol. Thomasine was sentenced to 33 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Cleveland officers Kazimer and Crisan drove to an apartment complex to investigate a sighting of armed-robbery suspects. Seeing someone who matched the description, they gave chase. A resident slowed Kazimer, knowing the officer was chasing 16-year-old Juan, and told Kazimer about Juan’s disability, Down Syndrome. “Shut up, get out of my way,” Kazmier responded. Juan stopped running at the parking lot, where his family was waiting. Kazimer, who arrived seconds later, admits that he saw Juan “surrendering.” According to witnesses, Kazimer “grabbed Juan from behind, forcefully pulled him from his mother’s arms, and slammed him very hard into [a] vehicle.” He handcuffed Juan and used his 205-pound weight, twice Juan’s weight, “to pin Juan against the hot vehicle.” Juan was not resisting and was crying in pain. Kazimer reportedly kept Juan pinned 15 minutes, telling Juan’s parents that they were “lucky he didn’t shoot.” Crisan did nothing—except, according to witnesses, hurl racial slurs. When police dispatch radioed that the robbers had been apprehended, they released Juan. Juan allegedly suffered chest pains, abrasions, posttraumatic stress, and other medical complications. The court denied the officers’ qualified immunity motion with respect to Juan’s excessive-force claims and some state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the claims must go to a jury. View "Ortiz v. Kazimer" on Justia Law