Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In March 2020, Andrew Cooperrider, owner of Brewed, a coffee shop and bar in Lexington, Kentucky, criticized Governor Beshear’s COVID-19 policies on social media. In November 2020, the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC) suspended Brewed’s alcohol license, and officially revoked it in March 2022. Cooperrider filed a lawsuit against Governor Beshear, DABC officials, and other state officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and due-process violations, claiming the license revocation was in retaliation for his critical speech.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the case, granting the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court found that most of Cooperrider’s claims were barred by absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity. It also determined that Cooperrider’s remaining substantive-due-process claim did not meet the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of most claims, agreeing that the defendants were protected by absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity. However, the appellate court found that the district court improperly granted qualified immunity to Governor Beshear, Ray Perry, and Wesley Duke regarding Cooperrider’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The appellate court held that Cooperrider had plausibly alleged that the enforcement action against Brewed was motivated by his protected speech. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s decision on this point and remanded the case for further proceedings on the First Amendment retaliation claim. View "Cooperrider v. Woods" on Justia Law

Lamont Heard, a Michigan prisoner, claimed that prison officials retaliated against him for his litigation activities by transferring him to a different housing unit. He sought to sue the officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights. Heard was transferred on January 10, 2017, and filed a grievance the next day. After exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed a lawsuit on January 19, 2021, four years and nine days after the transfer.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Heard's claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Heard then exhausted his remedies and refiled his lawsuit. The district court dismissed the refiled claim as untimely, reasoning that Michigan's tolling provision, which pauses the statute of limitations while a claim is pending in court, conflicted with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Michigan's tolling provision does not conflict with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit but does not address tolling. The court emphasized that federal courts have historically borrowed state statutes of limitations and tolling provisions for § 1983 suits. The court found that Michigan's tolling rule, which pauses the statute of limitations during a prior suit, is consistent with the PLRA and does not undermine its purposes. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, allowing Heard's claim to proceed. View "Heard v. Strange" on Justia Law

Glorianna Moore was stopped by Officer Brian Wilson for speeding in Pontiac, Michigan. When Moore refused to show her license and moved her hands towards the center console, Wilson reached into her car, grabbed her arm, and ordered her to shut off the car. Moore resisted by screaming and twisting her body. Wilson restrained her by holding her arm and head until backup arrived. Moore was subsequently handcuffed and placed in Wilson's patrol car. Although an initial test indicated the presence of cocaine in Moore's car, further testing revealed it was not cocaine, leading to the dismissal of all charges against her.Moore filed a § 1983 action against Wilson and other officers, alleging excessive force in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to all defendants except Wilson, who appealed the denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Officer Wilson did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment principles. The court reasoned that Wilson's actions were reasonable given Moore's refusal to show her license, her movement towards the center console, and her active resistance. The court concluded that no clearly established law indicated that Wilson's use of force was excessive under the circumstances, thus entitling him to qualified immunity. View "Moore v. Oakland County" on Justia Law

Megan Miller was arrested and booked into the City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility, where she informed staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal. Over the next two and a half days, Miller vomited continually. On the third day, she was found unconscious and unresponsive in her cell and was pronounced dead shortly after. Despite her continual vomiting, no jail official sought medical care for her, including Julie Green-Hernandez, who was responsible for monitoring detainees on the day of Miller’s death. Miller’s husband sued Green-Hernandez, claiming she violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate pretrial medical care and acted with gross negligence under Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Green-Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim or state law immunity on the negligence claim. The court found that there were disputes of material fact regarding whether Green-Hernandez was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs and whether her conduct amounted to gross negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Green-Hernandez’s appeal regarding qualified immunity due to lack of jurisdiction, as her arguments were based on factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. However, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that while Green-Hernandez’s conduct could be considered grossly negligent, it was not the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death. The court concluded that Miller’s ingestion of fentanyl was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her death, entitling Green-Hernandez to state law immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gillman v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Michael and Rebecca McIntosh owned a mobile home park in Madisonville, Kentucky. In 2020, a tenant complained about mold and mildew in one of the mobile homes. The City of Madisonville inspected the home and found it unsafe, condemning it and giving the McIntoshes 30 days to submit repair plans. The McIntoshes disputed the condemnation, claiming they made necessary repairs and attempted to contact city officials multiple times without success. The City demolished the mobile home a month later.The McIntoshes pursued a § 1983 action, alleging due process violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, leading the McIntoshes to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that while the City provided adequate notice of the condemnation, it failed to provide the McIntoshes with a pre-demolition hearing, as required by due process. The court noted that the City’s Code promised a hearing before a Local Appeals Board, which did not exist. The court also found that informal opportunities for a hearing were not adequately communicated to the McIntoshes. However, the court upheld the district court’s decision on the substantive due process claim, stating that the City’s actions did not rise to the level of conscience-shocking behavior. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the procedural due process claim and affirmed the decision on the substantive due process claim, remanding the case for further proceedings on the procedural due process claim. View "McIntosh v. City of Madisonville" on Justia Law

Anita drove her son, Omar, to Lowe’s, to pick up his last paycheck. When the assistant manager approached, Omar “started talking a lot of gibberish” and eventually began throwing paint cans. Officers, responding to a 911 call, stopped Anita’s car. Omar was evasive but compliant. During the pat-down, officers discovered pills in a container, which they returned to Omar’s pocket after handcuffing him. Omar stated that he had not taken his medication, for a psychiatric condition, for weeks. Anita stated that Omar, who began ranting incoherently, was bipolar, that the pills were Seroquel, and that he had not taken his medication. At the jail, Omar would calm down periodically, then return to rambling, talking to himself, and engaging in strange behavior. Released without handcuffs to make a phone call, Omar threw an officer to the floor and began choking him. Officers rushed into the jail and pulled Omar into the restraint chair and noticed something wrong. Omar’s pulse was weak. They tried to resuscitate him and called the rescue squad. At the hospital, Omar was pronounced dead “as a result of a sudden cardiac event during a physical altercation in association with bipolar disease.” In Anita’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference, the court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. There was no violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The officers did not act with recklessness that would permit them to be liable under Ohio law. View "Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights" on Justia Law

Reporting regulatory violations “up the chain” to supervisory governmental employees can constitute speech on a matter of public concern, for purposes of First Amendment retaliation claim. Mayhew, a long-time employee of Smyrna’s wastewater-treatment plant, reported violations of state and federal requirements and voiced concerns about the hiring of a manager’s nephew without advertising the position. His reports went up the chain of command to government employees. Mayhew was terminated, allegedly because the plant manager no longer felt that he could work with him. The district court rejected his claim of First Amendment retaliation on summary judgment, reasoning that Mayhew’s speech did not involve matters of public concern. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, stating that “constitutional protection for speech on matters of public concern is not premised on the communication of that speech to the public.” Nor must courts limit reports of wrongdoing to illegal acts; a public concern includes “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.” View "Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna" on Justia Law

Damages-only action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against county clerk who had refused to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple is not moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of such a case, noting: the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that Kentucky’s definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman violated the Fourteenth Amendment; the Kentucky Governor’s order that county clerks begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples; a preliminary injunction in another case, prohibiting County Clerk Kim Davis from refusing to issue same-sex marriage licenses; and that the state has amended its marriage-license issuance process so that county clerks’ names and signatures no longer appear on marriage-license forms. The Sixth Circuit stated that “so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant’s change in conduct will not moot the case. Indeed where a claim for injunctive relief is moot, relief in the form of damages for a past constitutional violation is not affected.” View "Ermold v. Davis" on Justia Law

Thomas’s apartment door opened to a breezeway that led to a parking lot. When two men broke through Destin’s door. Destin called 911 from his bedroom and spoke quietly to avoid drawing the burglars’ attention. The men forced their way into Destin’s room. A struggle ensued. Columbus officers responded. Officer Kaufman, the first to arrive, had been alerted that the caller was inside a bedroom, that multiple suspects were inside, and that there was yelling and crashing noises. The complex was in a high-crime area; Kaufman, expecting a gun might be involved, unholstered his weapon. As Kaufman approached the breezeway, two men exited Destin’s apartment and ran toward him. The first had a gun in his hand. Kaufman stopped about 40 feet from Destin’s door, shouted, and fired two shots at the person with the gun. The second suspect fled. Kaufman never administered aid to the wounded man, later saying that he considered it unsafe to do so with an active crime scene and that the suspect appeared to be dead. The person that Kaufman shot was Destin, who had disarmed a burglar before fleeing. Destin died. When the next officer arrived, Kaufman stated, “I think this was the homeowner.” The burglar that fled was captured, but refused to testify. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Destin’s estate’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. View "Thomas v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Phillips worked at the MGM Detroit casino from 1999-2015. Beginning in 2001, she belonged to Local 7777, a UAW International affiliate. In 2002, she became the Local’s chairperson. Phillips, an African-American, claims that UAW employees Johnson and Kagels, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Phillips described “a smattering of offensive conduct” from 2012-2014, including an alleged statement that the “problem with the Union was that there are too many blacks” and speaking “in a condescending tone when dealing with black union members as compared to white members.” Phillips claims that, in a 2013 meeting, Johnson demanded to know the race of each grievant and then separated the grievances into piles based on whether they were filed by “white” or “black” union members and said he intended to withdraw the grievances filed by African-American union members. Johnson and Kagels denied all of the alleged misconduct. The district court dismissed the case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that no matter who can be held liable for hostile work environment claims under Title VII, Phillips fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that she was subjected to one. View "Phillips v. UAW International" on Justia Law