Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit has held that states must permit law-abiding, mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Illinois’ Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1, authorizes an Illinois resident to carry, on his person or next to him in a car, a firearm that is fully or partially concealed if he meets qualifications set forth in the Act: that the permit applicant not present a clear and present danger or a threat to public safety and not in the last five years have been a patient in a mental hospital, or been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use or threat of physical force, or been in a residential or court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program, or have committed two or more DUI violations, or be subject to a legal proceeding that could lead to being disqualified to possess a gun. A non-resident can obtain a permit if he resides in a state or territory that has “laws related to firearm ownership, possession, and carrying, that are substantially similar to the requirements to obtain” an Illinois concealed-carry license, and submits a notarized statement confirming that he is eligible under federal law and the laws of his home state to own a gun and licensed by that state to carry a gun. A person from a state that is not substantially similar, but who has a firearm license from his own state. is allowed to carry a firearm while hunting or at a firing range or on property whose owner permits him to carry a gun, The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by nonresidents, calling the law “imperfect,” but not unreasonable. The court noted that a trial may cast a different light on the law, given the problems inherent in verification of an application. View "Culp v. Madigan" on Justia Law

For weekday shifts, Antioch Rescue (ARS) used paid EMTs through subcontracts with private ambulance companies. For evening and weekend shifts, ARS used unpaid volunteers. Volling began as an unpaid EMT in 2008. In 2010, she transitioned to paid shifts under ARS and Metro. Springer began working for ARS and Metro in 2009. In 2011, Volling filed charges with the EEOC, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; she later filed suit, alleging violation of the Emergency Medical Services Act, including physical abuse of patients and on-duty alcohol and drug abuse. Volling’s report to the Illinois Department of Public Health resulted in fines and EMT license suspensions. Plaintiffs also spoke at public meetings. Springer filed a supporting declaration in Volling’s lawsuit and assisted in the investigation. ARS terminated its subcontract with Metro, replacing Metro with Kurtz. Kurtz immediately began hiring former Metro EMTs, without publicizing its vacancies. ARS instructed every former Metro EMT—except plaintiffs— on how to apply under the new contract. Kurtz asked ARS for the former Metro EMTs’ contact information. ARS and Kurtz rehired every other Metro EMT. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and the Illinois Human Rights and the Illinois Whistleblower Acts. ARS settled with plaintiffs. The district court granted Kurtz’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Title VII and IHRA. Plaintiffs adequately pled both an adverse employment action and a causal link between that action and their protected activity. View "Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Bloomington Officers, surveilling for loud-music violations, saw Tapley drive by and decided to make a stop. Tapley turned into a parking lot. Officer Stanfield followed. Tapley went into a store, then returned to his truck. Stanfield testified that he heard Tapley’s music emanating from the truck as Tapley was preparing to drive away and that he had difficulty following because Tapley was driving “at a very high rate of speed.” When Tapley saw Stanfield’s unmarked cruiser behind him, he turned his music down. Stanfield stopped Tapley, explaining that the stop was for loud music. They also discussed Tapley’s excessive speed. Other officers arrived and told Tapley to get out of the truck. The parties dispute what happened next. Tapley claims he was threatened with a taser; the officers claim that Tapley refused to exit the truck. The officers arrested Tapley for obstruction of justice and resisting arrest and searched Tapley and the truck. Tapley was acquitted of obstruction charges. After an earlier suit was dismissed, Tapley reasserted a claim of illegal seizure that he had previously voluntarily dismissed. The Seventh Circuit declined to review the earlier case for lack of an adequate record and affirmed the dismissal of the 2015 case, finding probable cause for the arrest. View "Tapley v. Chambers" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alston was convicted of five charges and placed on probation. Dane County law enforcement agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to monitor and offer resources to probationers whom they identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In 2011, Alston was identified for participation in that program and was offered resources aimed at deterring him from reoffending, with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation. Alston was arrested a month later, for violating his probation. A revocation hearing was held before an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, who stated that she had attended a presentation on the SIU program and her understanding that “it would be expected that they wouldn’t be given another chance. … [they] would be revoked.” Alston unsuccessfully sought substitution of a “neutral party” who had not attended the presentation. His probation revocation was upheld by state courts, which held that the ALJ's attendance at the presentation did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in violation of Alston’s due process rights. Rejecting Alston’s federal habeas petition, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Alston v. Smith" on Justia Law

n 2010, McDonald, an Illinois inmate, filed a complaint in the Illinois Court of Claims against the Illinois Department of Corrections for violation of his free exercise rights. He alleged that Muslim inmates are not permitted to attend prayer service each Friday, that prison officials regularly steal Arabic prayer cassette tapes and Muslim prayer rugs, and that Christians are permitted to have more volunteers enter the facility than are Muslims. He sought a damages award of $5,000 and injunctive relief The Court of Claims held a hearing but failed to issue a decision for more than two years. Meanwhile, McDonald filed a federal pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming prison officials in their official capacities, seeking only injunctive relief. In 2013, the Court of Claims finally issued a decision, rejecting all of McDonald’s allegations in a terse two‐page order. The district court then dismissed the federal complaint as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the defendants conceded that McDonald’s suit is not barred by res judicata, and expressing no opinion regarding the merits of the remaining arguments. The Illinois Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to decide McDonald’s federal constitutional claim, View "McDonald v. Adamson" on Justia Law

McDonald, an Illinois inmate in the segregation unit, suffered an asthma attack in his cell. There were no emergency call buttons. Hours later. his cellmate banged on the door to alert the guards. A guard eventually escorted McDonald to the prison’s healthcare unit, run by Wexford, a private company. McDonald was wheezing and using his accessory muscles to breathe. Nurse Reuter started him on oxygen and administered medications, then phoned Dr. Larson, who was the only on-call doctor for several correctional facilities. He slept through the call. He finally returned her call and prescribed several medications. Thirty minutes later, McDonald was still using his accessory muscles to breathe. Larson then ordered his transfer to a hospital via ambulance and called ahead. In the ER, Dr. Reyes treated him with medications for about two hours, then inserted a breathing tube. McDonald died. The court rejected his estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the warden and Wexford, which focused on the lack of a permanent medical director and the lack of emergency call buttons in segregation cells. Claims against Larson, Reuter, and the guards tried to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the warden consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm to McDonald nor establish that a Wexford policy caused a constitutional injury. View "Chatham v. Davis" on Justia Law

Officer Byrne, responding to a bar fight, spotted one man chasing another. One man reached and entered a parked car; the other began punching at the driver’s window. Byrne restrained the pursuer, Hess, a student at Southern Illinois University. The car drove away. Hess stated that Franks had hit Hess’s sister in the face. Hess gave chase but claimed to have never made contact with Franks. Hess’s girlfriend and his siblings corroborated his story, though the sister did not have any injuries. Franks, who had driven himself to a hospital, had been stabbed several times. Franks’s description of his attacker matched Hess’s appearance. Hess was charged with aggravated battery. SIU’s Director of Students reviewed the incident reports and recommended that Hess be suspended. Although he received personal notice of his rights, Hess did not request an interim hearing, and, while suspended, missed final exams. At a subsequent hearing, Hess testified but said little. His counsel, who was present, had instructed him not to answer questions. Hess’s girlfriend testified on his behalf. Byrne testified that officers had found no evidence that Hess had a knife. Hess was expelled; he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The university is not a “person” from whom money damages can be obtained under section 1983. Hess established neither a protected property interest nor a protected liberty interest; even if he had proven such an interest, defendants provided Hess with sufficient procedural protections. View "Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

While serving a probation-revocation sentence in an Illinois prison, Whiting fell ill with what turned out to be a rare form of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. A prison doctor initially diagnosed an infection and prescribed antibiotics and nonprescription pain relievers. Two months later the doctor ordered a biopsy and the cancer was discovered. Whiting filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the prison doctor and the prison’s private medical provider alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs during the two months that his cancer went undiagnosed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was no evidence from which a jury could infer that the doctor was subjectively indifferent to Whiting’s condition. Without expert testimony a lay jury could not infer that because amoxicillin and Bactrim did not work, it was obvious to the doctor that the doxycycline and Augmentin also would fail. To survive summary judgment Whiting needed to present evidence sufficient to show that decision was “so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” He did not do so. View "Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams, an African-American began working for the Cook County Probation Department in 1995. In 2008, Williams reported an incident of racial intimidation. The co‐workers were counseled not to make such remarks again. In 2010, Williams reported that a supervisor was making phone calls about union matters. The supervisor was disciplined. In 2010, Williams was injured at work by a co‐worker, who yanked a door open while Williams was holding it, injuring her shoulder, and yelling, “report this too, b**ch?” She took a medical leave, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and received temporary total disability benefits. In December 2010, an independent medical evaluation determined she was capable of returning to work. No one noticed the report until June 2011. Human Resources asked her to return to work on August 2 and directed her to obtain releases, warning that failure to return to work would be considered an implied resignation. The county doctor approved her return to work, but noted that her personal physician stated that she was not able to return to work. The attorneys negotiating Williams’s disability benefits disputed the consequences of the disagreement. Williams was sent a termination letter on August 30, citing failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. The agreement ultimately reached concerning benefits listed Williams’s return to work date as September 6. Williams sued under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation and Whistleblower Acts, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, with breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no disputes regarding material facts. View "Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Cole, an African-American has worked for Northern Illinois University in the Building Services Department since 1998. He alleges that beginning with his 2009 promotion to sub-foreman, he experienced race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, including the discovery of a hangman’s noose in his workspace. In 2011, he was again promoted. Cole was the only African-American sub-foreman or foreman. He believed that others with the same title were paid more or given more authority and that he was the subject of surveillance. In 2012, Cole filed an ethics complaint with the university about various alleged unethical practices. Cole was later demoted and twice subjected to discipline. He sued, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The hostile work environment claim presented the closest question, but Cole did not show a basis for employer liability for the alleged harassment. Cole did not offer evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race. His retaliation claim failed because he offered no evidence that he engaged in protected activity. View "Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law