Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1994 Brown was convicted of four sex offenses and sentenced to prison. His projected release date was July 2009, followed by three years of mandatory supervised release. On that date, the Illinois Department of Corrections did not release Brown, but issued a “Parole Violation Report” reciting anticipatory violations of the terms of supervised release. Brown refused to accept required electronic monitoring; he lacked a place where he could lawfully reside. Illinois tries to find lawful accommodations for sex offenders who wear electronic monitoring devices, but because Brown rejected the device the system did not try to find him a place to live. The Prisoner Review Board held a hearing in October 2009 and determined that Brown had not violated the conditions of his release, but on the same date the Department of Corrections issued a second Parole Violation Report, giving the same two reasons. Brown remained in prison until January 2011, when he was released unconditionally. Brown sought damages for the delay. He did not contend that either the electronic-monitoring or the residential-location condition was invalid, but cited the lack of a hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his claims, based on qualified immunity. As of 2009, no court had held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a sex offender to release when it appears likely that, as soon as he steps is released, he will be in violation of the terms of release. View "Nathaniel Brown v. Michael Randle" on Justia Law

Tatum was charged with two counts of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. The case was set for a jury trial on November 29, 2010. On August 12, at Tatum’s request, counsel moved to withdraw. Lawyer 2 was subsequently allowed to withdraw. The court reset the date for January 31, 2011 for Tatum’s third lawyer, Erickson. On January 18, Erickson requested a competence evaluation. After an in-patient exam, the report concluded that Tatum was competent to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, but was likely to be “an extremely challenging defendant.” Tatum asked the court to dismiss Erickson, stating that she was working with the state and not investigating his case to his standards. Tatum refused to meet with Erickson because of counsel’s competence challenge. Tatum stated that he wished to represent himself. After engaging in a colloquy with Tatum, the court denied his request, stating that Tatum’s limited education would make it difficult for him to understand the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation, and refused to dismiss Erickson. Tatum, convicted and sentenced to life in prison, was unsuccessful on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. The Seventh Circuit reversed denial of a federal habeas petition; the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when they refused to allow Tatum to represent himself, after questioning Tatum not about his general competence, but about his educational level and understanding of the legal system. View "Tatum v. Foster" on Justia Law

On the day he was moved to a new unit at the Terre Haute prison, Miller told a circulating guard, Rogers, that he had a brain tumor and was entitled to a lower bunk. Rogers replied that Miller must follow his assignment or be put on report . Days later, Miller fell out of the bunk. He was examined in the emergency room, then returned to the prison, where he still had an upper bunk. He again complained to Rogers, but did not follow procedures for obtaining a new bunk assignment. He subsequently fell out of the bunk and broke his back. After surgery, he was temporarily returned to the upper bunk. Contending that he should have been in a lower bunk, Miller sought compensation, naming two defendants, Rogers, and then-warden Marberry. Miller did not seek relief from any physician or nurse, although the prison’s medical department is responsible for deciding who has a medical need for a lower bunk, nor did he sue the guard responsible for making bunk assignments. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that there is a material dispute about what Rogers would have found, had he consulted the database. Inaction following receipt of a complaint about someone else’s conduct is not a source of liability, View "Miller v. Marberry" on Justia Law

In 1998 Maryetta was raped, strangled to death, and left in an abandoned garage. In 2004 Milwaukee police arrested Avery, who was convicted of first-degree homicide. Avery spent six years in prison before DNA evidence proved that a serial killer linked to nine similar homicides was responsible for the murder. Avery alleged that detectives concocted a fake confession and induced jailhouse informants to falsely incriminate him and that the detectives failed to disclose, as required by Brady v. Maryland, impeachment evidence about the informants’ false statements. Avery added a “Monell” claim against the city. The district judge rejected the Brady claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the detectives had no duty to disclose the impeachment evidence because Avery already knew the informants’ statements were false. A jury found two detectives liable for violating Avery’s due-process rights, found the city liable, and awarded $1 million, but the judge invalidated the verdict based on “mixed signals” from the Seventh Circuit on whether an officer’s fabrication of evidence is actionable as a due process violation, and holding that without a constitutional violation by the detectives, Monell liability was not possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Avery’s due-process claims fall “comfortably within” circuit precedent. That Avery knew the informants’ statements were false did not relieve the detectives of their duty to disclose impeachment evidence. View "Avery v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

A resident of Elkhart’s housing for low-income elderly people and disabled adults was strangled to death. Canen and Royer, recipients of disability benefits, were also residents. They were convicted of felony murder in Indiana state court in 2005. Seven years later, Canen’s conviction was vacated after Chapman, the state’s fingerprint expert, recanted his testimony, conceding that he mistakenly had identified a latent fingerprint found at the crime scene as belonging to Canen. Chapman only was trained to compare “known prints” (i.e., digital, ink, or powder fingerprint exemplars), not “latent prints” (i.e., invisible, unknown fingerprints found at a crime scene), and lacked the necessary qualifications to identify the latent print. He had not disclosed his lack of training in the state proceeding. Canen sued Chapman under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he had withheld his lack of qualification to perform latent fingerprint analysis in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court dismissed, holding that Chapman was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chapman’s failure to disclose that he was not trained as a latent print examiner is not a violation of any clearly established right, and, to the degree that Canen’s claims are premised on the preparation or presentation of his testimony, absolute immunity protects him. View "Canen v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Illinois’ Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility houses persons adjudged to be sexually violent; many have completed prison sentences for sexually violent acts but are considered too dangerous to be released into the general population. Rushville detainee Hayes alleged deliberate indifference to Hayes’s hydration needs during a five-day “boil order” imposed by the city and applicable to the detention facility. The boil order directed residents to boil tap water before drinking it. The detainees have sinks in their rooms and access to a microwave oven, so Hayes could boil the water from his sink in his microwave. He was also given an eight-ounce carton of milk at each of three daily meals. He nonetheless claimed to have gone without drinkable water for five days, during which time he felt dizzy and dehydrated. The district judge rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that detainees were notified of the order and how to cope with it (by boiling water in their microwave ovens). The facility ordered extra boiled water. The court noted that Hayes did not report feeling dizzy and dehydrated during the boil order: “there can’t be deliberate indifference if the indifferent person did not know what harm he was being indifferent to.” View "Hayes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2007, Dr. Eli examined Indiana inmate James, diagnosed his ingrown toenail as infected, ordered antibiotics, and referred him to a foot specialist. A week later, Eli prescribed additional drugs because of continuing pain. A month later, the toenail was removed. The following month, James, who was taking a narcotic for the continuing pain, fell while “hopping up the steps” and hurt his jaw. Thrice he unsuccessfully requested emergency treatment. A month later his jaw “cracked” while he was eating. X‐rays revealed a fractured left mandible. A plastic surgeon, advised against surgery because of the passage of time since the injury. He recommended a soft diet. Two years later, James filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. James, now incarcerated in Arizona, was unable to recruit an attorney or obtain all of his medical records. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. If a pro se plaintiff in a case like this is unable, despite best efforts, to obtain a lawyer and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him. It is possible that James has a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim, given his current medical problems, which may be attributable to the injury and lack of adequate medical treatment. View "James v. Eli" on Justia Law

David, an African-American woman over the age of 40, was an employee of the City Colleges of Chicago (CCC) from 1980-2012. She announced in 2011 that she planned to retire in 2012. She then requested a change in title and an increase in salary because she was performing additional responsibilities related to the implementation of a software system; she was not awarded either. CCC characterized her additional responsibilities as “lateral,” not requiring a change in title. Giving David a raise a raise over a certain amount would have resulted in a fine by the State University Retirement System. Following her retirement, her responsibilities were performed by an Asian man under the age of 40, who was paid substantially more than David. David sued, alleging that she was denied a pay increase on the basis of her race, sex, and age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court granted CCC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record, assessed in its entirety, does not contain sufficient evidence to permit a verdict for David on any of the counts. David’s “comparator” employees performed functions she could not perform and her announcement of her intent to retire left CCC with little motivation to respond. View "David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District 508" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on an injury he suffered in Cook County jail. For his in forma pauperis (IFP) applications, McWilliams used a form provided by the Northern District of Illinois clerk’s office. McWilliams checked a box, indicating that his application was for “both” leave to proceed IFP and appointment of counsel. The form, which says nothing about the need for a separate motion if assistance of counsel is desired, asks for an inmate identification number, the name of the applicant’s institution, and records from the inmate’s trust account. He omitted his identification number and the name of the prison (both appeared on his complaint, submitted contemporaneously, and in the attached trust officer’s certification). The court denied IFP, for failure “to provide sufficient or accurate information” and denied McWilliams’s “motion for attorney assistance,” although no such motion had been filed. McWilliams submitted a second IFP application, with a motion for appointment of counsel, providing his inmate identification number and the name of the prison. Instead of checking “no” in response to every question about sources of funds, he said that he was not employed and wrote “N/A” across the questions. The prison trust officer certified that McWilliams had $106.85 in his account. In seeking appointment of counsel, McWilliams explained that he “has limited formal education of a fourth grader.” The court denied the IFP application because McWilliams had written “N/A” instead of answering “no,” struck McWilliams’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit authorized McWilliams to file an appeal IFP and reversed. That McWilliams was indigent and qualified to proceed IFP is apparent from the applications he submitted. View "McWilliams v. Cook County" on Justia Law