Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Illinois’ Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility houses persons adjudged to be sexually violent; many have completed prison sentences for sexually violent acts but are considered too dangerous to be released into the general population. Rushville detainee Hayes alleged deliberate indifference to Hayes’s hydration needs during a five-day “boil order” imposed by the city and applicable to the detention facility. The boil order directed residents to boil tap water before drinking it. The detainees have sinks in their rooms and access to a microwave oven, so Hayes could boil the water from his sink in his microwave. He was also given an eight-ounce carton of milk at each of three daily meals. He nonetheless claimed to have gone without drinkable water for five days, during which time he felt dizzy and dehydrated. The district judge rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that detainees were notified of the order and how to cope with it (by boiling water in their microwave ovens). The facility ordered extra boiled water. The court noted that Hayes did not report feeling dizzy and dehydrated during the boil order: “there can’t be deliberate indifference if the indifferent person did not know what harm he was being indifferent to.” View "Hayes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2007, Dr. Eli examined Indiana inmate James, diagnosed his ingrown toenail as infected, ordered antibiotics, and referred him to a foot specialist. A week later, Eli prescribed additional drugs because of continuing pain. A month later, the toenail was removed. The following month, James, who was taking a narcotic for the continuing pain, fell while “hopping up the steps” and hurt his jaw. Thrice he unsuccessfully requested emergency treatment. A month later his jaw “cracked” while he was eating. X‐rays revealed a fractured left mandible. A plastic surgeon, advised against surgery because of the passage of time since the injury. He recommended a soft diet. Two years later, James filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. James, now incarcerated in Arizona, was unable to recruit an attorney or obtain all of his medical records. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants. If a pro se plaintiff in a case like this is unable, despite best efforts, to obtain a lawyer and a medical expert, and if the case would have a chance of success were the plaintiff represented by counsel, the trial judge should endeavor to obtain them for him. It is possible that James has a meritorious Eighth Amendment claim, given his current medical problems, which may be attributable to the injury and lack of adequate medical treatment. View "James v. Eli" on Justia Law

David, an African-American woman over the age of 40, was an employee of the City Colleges of Chicago (CCC) from 1980-2012. She announced in 2011 that she planned to retire in 2012. She then requested a change in title and an increase in salary because she was performing additional responsibilities related to the implementation of a software system; she was not awarded either. CCC characterized her additional responsibilities as “lateral,” not requiring a change in title. Giving David a raise a raise over a certain amount would have resulted in a fine by the State University Retirement System. Following her retirement, her responsibilities were performed by an Asian man under the age of 40, who was paid substantially more than David. David sued, alleging that she was denied a pay increase on the basis of her race, sex, and age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court granted CCC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record, assessed in its entirety, does not contain sufficient evidence to permit a verdict for David on any of the counts. David’s “comparator” employees performed functions she could not perform and her announcement of her intent to retire left CCC with little motivation to respond. View "David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District 508" on Justia Law

In Presley v. Georgia (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. In one of the cases consolidated for appeal, Pinno was convicted of assisting in the mutilation of a corpse and interference with police, having assisted her son in disposing of the body of his girlfriend, whom the son had murdered. The trial judge called for a pool of more than 80 prospective jurors. To assure that enough seats were available for the prospective jurors and to prevent members of the public from influencing the jury by remarks or facial expressions, given the “gruesome and bizarre facts,” the Wisconsin state judge ordered spectators to leave and the door locked until all the prospective jurors were seated. After they were seated the door was unlocked and members of the public were able to enter. The other defendant, Seaton, was convicted of first‐degree reckless homicide. The public was, similarly, temporarily excluded. In neither case did defense counsel object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of their habeas petitions, noting that the trial judge may have had no option but to exclude the public until all the panel members were seated and that it is possible that the defendants would have been harmed by the presence of the public. View "Seaton v. Smith" on Justia Law

Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on an injury he suffered in Cook County jail. For his in forma pauperis (IFP) applications, McWilliams used a form provided by the Northern District of Illinois clerk’s office. McWilliams checked a box, indicating that his application was for “both” leave to proceed IFP and appointment of counsel. The form, which says nothing about the need for a separate motion if assistance of counsel is desired, asks for an inmate identification number, the name of the applicant’s institution, and records from the inmate’s trust account. He omitted his identification number and the name of the prison (both appeared on his complaint, submitted contemporaneously, and in the attached trust officer’s certification). The court denied IFP, for failure “to provide sufficient or accurate information” and denied McWilliams’s “motion for attorney assistance,” although no such motion had been filed. McWilliams submitted a second IFP application, with a motion for appointment of counsel, providing his inmate identification number and the name of the prison. Instead of checking “no” in response to every question about sources of funds, he said that he was not employed and wrote “N/A” across the questions. The prison trust officer certified that McWilliams had $106.85 in his account. In seeking appointment of counsel, McWilliams explained that he “has limited formal education of a fourth grader.” The court denied the IFP application because McWilliams had written “N/A” instead of answering “no,” struck McWilliams’s motion for appointment of counsel as moot, and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit authorized McWilliams to file an appeal IFP and reversed. That McWilliams was indigent and qualified to proceed IFP is apparent from the applications he submitted. View "McWilliams v. Cook County" on Justia Law

In 1995, Turner was convicted of murder, criminal confinement, and class A felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He did not seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court; his opportunity to do so expired on September 22, 1997. In 2000, Turner successfully sought state post‐conviction relief. In 2013, the trial court reduced Turner’s robbery conviction to a Class B felony robbery conviction and resentenced Turner on that count. The order did not reference Turner’s other convictions or sentences. In 2014, Turner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his life sentence for murder was unconstitutional under Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ruled that the deadline for Turner to file had expired on September 23, 1998, one year after the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), reasoning that the state post‐conviction relief process could not toll the federal deadline because Turner’s time under federal law had expired before he sought relief. The Seventh Circuit found that Turner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), but ultimately affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected Turner’s argument that “the date on which the judgment became final” was altered by the state court’s grant of relief on the robbery count; his murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by the 2013 resentencing. View "Turner v. Brown" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that, during his transfer between institutions, he was subjected to excessive force, and failure to protect by the refusal of his request to be placed in a prison in which he had no known enemies. He claims that other inmates were able to refuse transfers on that basis, but that officers lifted him over their heads and threw him, head first, into the van. The officers disputed his testimony, stating that he never claimed any injury, nor did he request medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendants, rejecting a claim that Jackson was entitled to a new trial because the court refused to grant a continuance when his attorney withdrew on the eve of trial. The court had denied requests for appointed counsel, finding that Jackson had experience litigating and his pleadings demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts and law, so that he was competent to proceed pro se. In permitting his attorney to withdraw, the court required him to remain as standby counsel. The court also upheld the admission of a seven‐year‐old disciplinary report without a limiting instruction or explanation, and of a 12‐year-old burglary conviction as evidence of Jackson’s truthfulness. View "Jackson v. Willis" on Justia Law

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Murphy was an inmate in the Illinois Vandalia Correctional Center when correctional officers hit him, fracturing part of his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law theories. The court reduced a jury award of damages to $307,733.82 and awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, rejecting an argument that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims. The Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law. The court reversed and remanded the attorney fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law