Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Whitfield's 2002, 2003, and 2007 prison disciplinary proceedings resulted in the revocation of 16 months of good-conduct credit Whitfield had earned. Whitfield diligently, but unsuccessfully, filed administrative grievances regarding all three actions. In 2003-2004, Whitfield filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the 2002 and 2003 proceedings, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district courts dismissed. Whitfield also, unsuccessfully, sought mandamus relief in Illinois state court alleging due process violations. In 2009, Whitfield attempted to challenge all three revocations of good-conduct credit through a state-law habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed without prejudice. An appeal was dismissed because Whitfield was unable to obtain the record. In March 2011, Whitfield filed a federal habeas petition. The state argued that Whitfield’s petition would be rendered moot in July 2011, when he was scheduled for release, and failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court dismissed the action as moot when Whitfield was released. Whitfield filed the present section 1983 action. Upon preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)) the district court found that Whitfield stated claims for due process violations and for retaliation but granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Whitfield’s suit was barred by precedent requiring a plaintiff to pursue timely collateral relief while in custody. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whitfield did his best to obtain timely relief while in custody; precedent requires no more. View "Whitfield v. Howard" on Justia Law

Collins, a regular heavy drinker, had suffered alcohol withdrawal, and kept a bottle of Librium to treat withdrawal and anxiety. Collins had Librium with him when he was arrested for DUI. The jail physician, Dr. Al‐Shami, who approved Collins’s use of the Librium while in custody. Collins was taken to a cell; officers checked on him every 15 minutes. The next day Collins began to complain of shaking from alcohol withdrawal. He was given Librium and vitamins. By lunchtime, Collins was better and eating normally. In the afternoon, he began to complain again. A nurse called Dr. Al‐Shami, who ordered that Collins be given the normal treatment for alcohol withdrawal. After being treated for additional incidents, Collins was taken to the hospital. The examining physician concluded that Collins was not suffering from delirium tremens. Collins was returned to the jail. Collins continued to display strange behavior, interspersed with periods of normalcy. Officers continued to check on Collins every 15 minutes. Eventually, Collins was again taken to the hospital. Collins was hypothermic, had low blood pressure, and was suffering from dehydration, sepsis, and acute respiratory failure. He was in a medically‐induced coma for several days. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in Collins's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, concluding that the level of care was reasonable. View "Collins v. Al-Shami" on Justia Law

While lifting a heavy door at his prison job in 2008, Cesal heard a “snap” in his back and felt pain in his leg and hip. He sought treatment from the prison’s medical staff but was dissatisfied with their response. He alleged that he received a three-year runaround, during which his pain was ignored, that the Clinical Director canceled Cesal’s insulin prescription in retaliation for Cesal’s filing a complaint about the inadequate care. Without the prescription, Cesal, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was unable to control his blood sugar and suffered additional pain and harm. He filed a second complaint with the prison about the insulin deprivation. Cesal, acting pro se, sued the Clinical Director and another Pekin physician. At the screening phase, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the district court identified an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim related to the withholding of insulin. The court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the statute of limitations had run and that, in any event, there was no question of material fact that would justify allowing his case to proceed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that "Cesal’s allegations are troublesome," but noting important differences between ordinary, or even aggravated, medical malpractice, and an Eighth Amendment violation View "Cesal v. Molina" on Justia Law

Petitioner, serving a 110 year sentence for two murders he committed when he was 16 years old, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3) application seeking authorization to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2254. Petitioner challenged his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, which was made retroactive by Montgomery v. Louisiana. The court agreed with the state that petitioner cannot state a claim to relief under Miller because his sentencing judge was afforded significant discretion by the Indiana Code to fashion an appropriate sentence and, in fact, considered petitioner's age at the time of the offense in mitigation. Accordingly, the court denied the authorization and dismissed the application. View "Kelly v. Brown" on Justia Law

Crutcher was incarcerated for robbery, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, aggravated discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and mob action. Crutcher was released but returned to prison for domestic battery. Weeks later, he was discharged on supervised release. Chicago police received a tip about guns at Crutcher's residence. Officers and Crutcher's parole agent performed a compliance check at 6:30 AM. Crutcher saw the officers and called Colbert (his brother and housemate) at work. Crutcher took several minutes to open the door. Officers handcuffed Crutcher. Colbert arrived and was handcuffed. Neither was permitted to observe the search. Colbert claimed the officers pulled out insulation, put holes in the walls, ripped the couch, and broke hinges. Colbert did not provide any evidence of the residence’s pre‐search condition and could not identify the officers who allegedly damaged his property. Colbert stated that a locked room was his bedroom. He claims an officer wrestled him to the ground and took his keys. The officers found an unregistered shotgun, a handgun case, and ammunition in the closet. Colbert admitted that he owned both firearms. The officers arrested both men. The arrest report stated: After being Mirandized ...[Crutcher] stated that he had full knowledge of the firearm … but ... it was OK because it was his brother’s. Crutcher, denies that statement. Crutcher was found not guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Unregistered firearm charges against Colbert were dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the brothers' civil rights suit. View "Colbert v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Inmate Diggs injured his knee in a fight in 2006 and complained to medical staff about knee pain and instability 14 times. In 2009, Dr. Ghosh, the prison’s medical director, recommended that Diggs be assigned to a lower bunk and ordered an MRI, which revealed that his right ACL had a complete tear. Ghosh got approval from Wexford, the private company that contracts with Illinois to provide prison medical care, for Diggs to receive orthopedic follow‐up. Notwithstanding recommendations by the outside providers, Diggs received no physical therapy and no follow‐up. After several delays and changes in staff, Diggs unsuccessfully filed an emergency grievance, requesting surgery and complaining that his placement effectively confined him to his cell. In 2015, a Wexford physician reportedly stated that no local doctor would perform the surgery. Diggs sued, alleging that the doctors and warden were deliberately indifferent to his torn ACL and intentionally had caused him emotional distress. He sought an injunction to compel the warden to authorize surgery. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding that the doctors had treatment choices and that Diggs did not establish that the warden knew about the supposed mistreatment nor that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that a reasonable jury could rule in favor of Diggs on the deliberate indifference claims. View "Diggs v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Mulvania, arrested for domestic battery, refused to exit the vehicle at the jail. Officers moved her. Mulvania’s speech was slurred, she screamed obscenities, and was physically combative. Mulvania claims she was experiencing a “post‐traumatic stress disorder flashback.” Mulvania tested positive for cocaine and cannabinoids that day. Mulvania refused to change into a jail uniform. The defendants claim that misdemeanor detainees are permitted to change in a private room when they are cooperative. Two female and three male officers restrained her, placed Mulvania on her stomach, held her arms over her head, and lifted her shirt off. Mulvania banged her head against the floor and yelled, “They’re going to rape me.” After removing her clothing, the officers draped a jail uniform over her body and left the cell. Minutes later, Mulvania had a seizure and was taken to the hospital. After she returned, she was released without charges. Mulvania filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans With Disabilities Act, amending her pleadings several times, claiming the jail had a widespread practice of conducting strip searches with excessive force and without accommodating people who are experiencing mental distress. Others joined the suit to challenge a policy that requires female detainees to either wear white underwear or no underwear. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Mulvania’s claims and denial of class certification, but reversed as to underwear claims. View "Mulvania v. Rock Island County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Gill was in a crowd outside a Milwaukee club when shots were fired, killing Crawley. Detectives collected security videos and interviewed witnesses. Gill’s mother told detectives that Gill had cognitive impairments. Gill voluntarily went to an interview. Gill made statements that were disproved by the video footage, about the people he was with and where he was standing. Police arrested Gill for obstruction and read Gill his Miranda rights. Gill requested a lawyer. The interview ended. Gill said that he wanted to take a polygraph test and would waive his right to a lawyer. The next morning, detectives reiterated that Gill could not take the polygraph without a lawyer present, unless he waived counsel. Gill interpreted this to mean that he could take a polygraph without a lawyer or not take one. Gill stated that he understood and would proceed. He denied any involvement with the shooting. The examination lasted six hours, followed by fives of interrogation. Gill maintained his innocence. The next morning, Gill stated that he wanted a lawyer, but detectives convinced him to waive his rights and employed various interrogation techniques, falsely stating that Gill had been identified as the shooter and had failed his polygraph test. Gill professed innocence more than 140 times, but eventually confessed. He was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and remained in jail. The court suppressed the confession, stating that Gill was “functionally illiterate” and had previously been found incompetent to stand trial for a different crime. Gill filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which were rejected on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gill failed to demonstrate that his right to be free from the interrogation tactics was clearly established; officers had probable cause for Gill’s arrest for obstruction. “Brady” does not require the disclosure of favorable evidence before trial. View "Gill v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Rasho, an Illinois inmate since 1996, has a history of mental illness. After he stopped taking his medication and had escalating symptoms, he was transferred to Pontiac’s Mental Health Unit, where he remained until 2006, when he was transferred to the Segregation Unit. Rasho believes that he was transferred, not because he no longer required specialized treatment, but in retaliation for complaints he lodged against prison staff. According to Rasho, after he was transferred, he was denied minimally adequate mental health care for more than 20 months. Rasho filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Rasho put forward sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could decide that two doctors caused him to be transferred for reasons unrelated to medical judgment. The court affirmed with respect to defendants with more tenuous connections to his mental health treatment: two doctors who allegedly failed to supervise properly the contract between IDOC and its medical provider and the warden. An individual defendant is liable under section 1983 only if personally responsible for the constitutional violation. View "Rasho v. Elyea" on Justia Law

McGreal began working as an Orland Park police officer in 2005. Conflict between McGreal and the department arose in 2009, which culminated in McGreal’s firing in 2010. McGreal alleges that he was fired because of his exercise of protected speech at a village board meeting on November 2, 2009, concerning a proposal to lay off as many as seven full‐time police officers. McGreal, the elected secretary of the local police union, allegedly presented three alternative solutions; he claims the defendants retaliated by accusing, interrogating, and ultimately firing him under the pretext of unsubstantiated violations of department policy. The defendants deny knowing that McGreal even attended the board meeting and claim that McGreal was legitimately fired because of misconduct, including an improper traffic stop; two unauthorized, unnecessary, dangerous high‐speed chases; McGreal’s behavior at and after an awards banquet; reckless driving while off-duty; and violation of a no-contact order during the ensuing investigation. The defendants allege that McGreal lied during questioning about each of those incidents. An arbitrator and a state court sustained McGreal’s termination. McGreal filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that McGreal offered no admissible evidence supporting his claims for relief. View "McGreal v. McCarthy" on Justia Law