Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell, physically a man, psychologically a woman, sought to compel her probation officers to alter conditions of her probation, by allowing her to reside with her family rather than in the men’s homeless shelter, allowing her to dress as a woman, and referring her to treatment programs for her gender dysphoria. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on grounds that she hadn’t complied with rules governing injunctive relief, that the requested injunctive relief was unrelated to the merits of her claims against prison doctors (the only claims that had survived screening of her complaint), and that she had failed to demonstrate either that she was likely to prevail on the underlying claims or would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. While the appeal was pending, Mitchell was returned to custody, after pleading guilty to theft, prostitution, and resisting an officer. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal of denial of an injunction as moot. Mitchell still has claims pending against the doctors, unaffected by the denial of the preliminary injunction, and should she be released from jail during the litigation and again placed on probation she can renew her objections to the terms of her probation. View "Mitchell v. Wall" on Justia Law

Carothers, an African-American woman, was hired by Cook County Juvenile Detention Center (JDC) in 2005 as an Administrative Assistant-Hearing Officer, inputting data and creating reports, and serving as a hearing officer for juvenile detainee grievances. In 2009, Carothers had a physical altercation with a detainee during a riot. Carothers injured her hands, went on a leave of absence, and obtained a worker’s compensation settlement. HR acknowledged that Carothers had been released to return with a restriction precluding her from interacting with the detainees, which her job required, and suggested that Carothers review available positions. Carothers replied that she could not find a position that accommodated her restriction. HR replied that she should apply for disability benefits. In March, 2010, Carothers returned to her job. She had to be taken from work in an ambulance following Physical Restraint Techniques training and Deescalation training. In 2011, HR submitted a “Disciplinary Recommendation” because Carothers refused to file for disability and could not obtain a release to return to full duty. A Hearing Officer recommended discharge due to more than 10 unauthorized absences, and failure to follow instructions. The JDC discharged Carothers, who sued, alleging that she had developed an anxiety disorder and that termination constituted discrimination on account of disability, race, and sex, and retaliation for her EEOC claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Carothers v. County of Cook" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under Section 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐6, claiming that CVS Pharmacy violates Title VII by offering a severance agreement, with waivers of claims against CVS, that could deter terminated employees from filing charges with the EEOC or participating in EEOC proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment for CVS, interpreting Title VII as requiring the EEOC to conciliate its claim before bringing a civil suit. The EEOC had refused to engage in conciliation. The court was also skeptical that an employer’s decision to offer a severance agreement to terminated employees could serve as the basis for a “pattern or practice” suit under Title VII, without any allegation that the employer engaged in retaliatory or discriminatory employment practices. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Section 707(e), the EEOC is required to comply with all of the pre‐suit procedures contained in Section 706 when it pursues “pattern or practice” violations. Because the EEOC has not alleged that CVS engaged in discrimination or retaliation by offering the Agreement to terminated employees, the EEOC failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law

A few months after Horsley turned 18, she mailed in an application for an Illinois Firearm Owner’s Identification Card (FOID) card along with the requisite check for $10. Horsley’s application was returned to her with a letter, informing her that the application was incomplete because she was not yet 21 years old and her application did not contain the signature of a parent or guardian. Horsley did not appeal or seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police, but filed suit, alleging that the Illinois statutory scheme violated her rights under the Second Amendment. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected her claims. Illinois does not impose a categorical ban on firearm possession for 18-to- 20-year-olds whose parents do not consent. When an applicant cannot obtain a parent or guardian signature, he may appeal to the Director for a FOID card; the process for 18-to-20-year-olds is not unconstitutional. View "Horsley v. Trame" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a restaurant in the City of Angola, Indiana and planned to convert it to an adult-entertainment venue featuring dancers wearing only “pasties and a g-string.” Angola reacted to the proposed sexually-oriented business by amending its zoning and other ordinances to make this use of the property impermissible. Plaintiffs sued the City and two of its officials in federal court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claim that the City’s actions violated its right to expression under the First Amendment failed because Plaintiffs stipulated away the key factual issue in the analysis of the claim; and (2) to the extent that the preliminary-injunction motion was premised on the state-law claims, the motion was properly denied. View "BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is confined at a treatment and detention facility in Illinois as a result of his designation as a sexually violent person for purposes of Illinois’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against a facility employee and the facility’s rehabilitation director, arguing that the employee abused him because he is a homosexual and that the rehabilitation director suspended his treatment for complaining about it. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that Plaintiff stated a claim against both defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Hughes v. Farris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for United Airlines as a ramp serviceman at O’Hare International Airport. Plaintiff twice injured his back at work. When he returned for the second time, he had several permanent work restrictions. United subsequently assigned Plaintiff to the Matrix position as part of the Product Sort work area. United later placed Plaintiff on extended illness status. Plaintiff filed suit against United for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Thereafter, Plaintiff returned to work for United in the Matrix position. Plaintiff then waived his retaliation claim and focused instead on whether United discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that United did not fail to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. View "Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Illinois Stateville Prison, filed a complaint against members of the prison staff, claiming that a prison prohibition against inmates receiving any magazine that “includes sexually explicit material that by its nature or content poses a threat to security, good order, or discipline” violates his First Amendment rights. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prison regulation is valid because it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and Defendant made no valid case against the district judge’s grant of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Payton v. Cannon" on Justia Law