Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Putnam County, Indiana police officer Smith, with others, pursued Warren, for whom an arrest warrant was outstanding. The police were able to box in Warren's truck with their cars. Warren got out of the cab, jumped onto the truck’s bed, and lay down on his back. Officers followed, picked him up, and handed him to officers on the ground. All the officers except Smith testified that they had Warren under control when Smith punched him in the face with a closed fist. Warren bled extensively and was taken in an ambulance to a hospital. Smith said “I guarantee I broke that mother fucker’s nose.” Months later Smith and others were summoned to a violent domestic dispute. Smith handcuffed the male suspect, Land, and led him toward his patrol car, then raised Land in the air, dropped him, and drove his (Smith’s) knee into Land’s back, causing him to defecate. Later, Smith bragged that he had done the same thing before. Convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 242 by depriving two persons of their constitutional right not to be subjected to the intentional use of unreasonable and excessive force, Smith was sentenced to 14 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence, questioning whether the judge’s review provided any basis for thinking 14 months a proper sentence for Smith, given a guidelines range of 33-41 months. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Sedgwick is a claims management services company. Bagwe, who was born in India, began working in Sedgwick’s Chicago office in 2001. She was promoted to Assistant Manager II in 2005. She was asked to serve as Interim Operations Manager in 2007 and was promoted to Operations Manager. A Managing Director made the promotion decision. Bagwe’s direct supervisor, counseled against promoting Bagwe, indicating that Bagwe had poor leadership skills and had not provided sufficient direction to subordinates. In the following months, one of Bagwe’s subordinates asked to be reassigned; Bagwe repeatedly complained about her compensation; Bagwe had confrontations with and made accusations against coworkers; and Bagwe was the subject of performance improvement plan. In 2009 she was terminated with statements that she had a “continuing lack of trust” that had “become a distraction to the business.” Her replacement was a white, American male. Bagwe filed claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, claiming that Sedgwick had paid her a comparatively low salary because of her race and national origin and that she was terminated for retaliatory and racially discriminatory reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, noting that Bagwe had not identified a similarly-situated employee who was paid more. View "Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

A Wisconsin jury convicted Ramirez of first‐degree intentional homicide in 2003. Ramirez discovered that his interpreter at trial has failed certification tests and has been declared ineligible for state compensation for his services; he claims that the court subsequently failed to execute a subpoena or obtain the telephonic testimony of appellate counsel and an expert witness on the translator certification process. In 2014 Ramirez filed his second petition for federal habeas relief, which the district court denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Ramirez did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), View "Flores-Ramirez v. Foster" on Justia Law

Nelson was driving home one night when, he claims four Chicago police officers in two squad cars pulled him over, pointed a gun in his face, threatened to kill him, handcuffed him, and searched his car for no apparent reason. The officers have no recollection of the stop; squad car​ computers confirm that they ran Nelson’s name through the law-enforcement database at the time of the stop and turned up nothing that would justify stopping him and searching his car. Nelson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial. The judge should not have admitted evidence of Nelson’s arrest record, nor allowed the defense attorney to cross-examine Nelson about other civil suits he had filed against the city. The judge also improperly allowed one of the officers to offer generalized testimony about when the police might be justified in using firearms and handcuffs during a traffic stop. The errors were not harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Jaburek, a woman of Mexican descent, began working for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) at its Des Plaines, Illinois, office in 1987. After various promotions and raises, followed by reassignment to her earlier position, there was a dispute about her responsibilities. She filed suit, alleging that the FAA paid her less than other employees who did the same work that she did but did not share her protected class status, and that the FAA retaliated against her for complaining about such discrimination, asserting: failure to promote in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.; violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d); and a Title VII retaliation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the FAA, stating that Jaburek failed to produce the necessary evidence to establish prima facie claims for any of her causes of action. View "Jaburek v. Foxx" on Justia Law

In 2000, Kubiak, a Chicago patrol officer for 14 years, was detailed to the Office of News Affairs, as a media liaison. In 2012, Zala, another media liaison, allegedly ran toward Kubiak, screaming, “Who the fuck do you think you are, you stupid bitch?” He swung his hand back as if to strike her. Officer Perez tried to calm Zala. Kubiak called Director Stratton, stating that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts toward her. During the call, Zala continued to berate and intimidate her. Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. Stratton told Kubiak that she had spoken with Zala and would not discuss the incident further. Kubiak’s supervising Lieutenant also declined to discuss the incident. Kubiak initiated an Internal Affairs Division investigation, which was “sustained.” Within days, Kubiak was reassigned as a patrol officer on a midnight shift in an allegedly dangerous neighborhood. Perez was also reassigned to patrol. Kubiak, the most senior ONA member, and Perez were the only officers reassigned although others had requested transfer. Kubiak alleges that Zala was never reprimanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Kubiak’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that Kubiak’s speech was not constitutionally protected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and did not speak on a matter of public concern. View "Kubiak v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

For 20 years Heard has suffered from inguinal hernias in his groin. When Heard’s imprisonment began in 1995, he had been diagnosed with one painful hernia. A second hernia was diagnosed in 2000. Outside physicians concluded that both hernias required surgical repair, but the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford, which provides medical care for inmates stalled until May 2007, when both hernias required emergency surgery. By then Heard had brought his first lawsuit, claiming deliberate indifference in not authorizing surgery sooner. Heard settled with Wexford in 2012 for $273,250, agreeing to release Wexford and the doctors from all claims. After his 2007 surgery, Heard developed a “recurrent” hernia. A second surgery did not occur until 2013. Heard again sued, claiming that Wexford had been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by delaying the second surgery under its policy to classify hernia surgeries as elective, unnecessary procedures. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that Heard’s release, and the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, foreclosed the section 1983 action. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The release cannot mean that Wexford was free to ignore the recurrent hernia as it grew increasingly painful over time. View "Heard v. Tilden" on Justia Law

In 2003 Tipton Hospital awarded Babchuk medical staff privileges and gave his professional corporation an exclusive contract to provide radiology services. In 2012 Tipton cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s contract. In Babchuk’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, reasoning that the plaintiffs had failed to prove they had a federally protected property interest in Dr. Babchuk’s hospital privileges or in the contract between his professional corporation and the hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the conduct of which Babchuk complained was not state action and, therefore, not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The fact that some of Tipton’s revenues are siphoned off to the state university that owns it does not make the hospital a state actor. The university may well exert pressure direct and indirect on Tipton, just as federal and state governments in manifold ways exert pressure on private institutions. “Government is omnipresent; that doesn’t make all employees of private entities state actors.“ View "Babchuk v. IN Univ. Health, Inc" on Justia Law

Officer Brooks conducted a traffic stop of Williams for failing to activate his turn signal prior to changing lanes. Williams did not cooperate with instructions from Brooks and Officer Kehl, which led to a physical confrontation. Sergeant Trump arrived at the scene. Officer Brooks arrested Williams for resisting law enforcement. A state court judge dismissed the charge. Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to protect in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, relying on a videotape of the incident from a dashboard camera and rejecting arguments that there were material questions of fact as to the unlawful stop and arrest claims, excessive force claim, and failure to protect claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to not consider the state court’s findings and to use and rely on the pretrial diversion agreement View "Williams v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Inmates, acting pro se, alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment by overcrowding and provision of inadequate mental-health services. The district court denied their “Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel” seeking to certify three classes: (1) “all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined in the [Wisconsin Department of Corrections],” (2) all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at [Waupun Correctional Institution],” and (3) all prisoners with a serious mental illness or disability “who are now or in the future will be confined at” Waupun. The courts then rejected their claim that they “should be appointed counsel to represent the certified classes … pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” The court stated that the pro se plaintiffs could not adequately represent a class and that Rule 23(g), “is only implicated when a class is first certified under Rule 23(a)(4).” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for leave to appeal. View "Howard v. Pollard" on Justia Law