Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A 2012 car accident rendered Hernandez a quadriplegic. He was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence involving an accident causing death. Hernandez was taken into custody while he was hospitalized for treatment of pressure wounds. Under Cook County Sheriff’s Office policy, officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized pre‐trial detainee to his hospital bed. Hernandez was shackled and sent to Cook County Jail, then immediately transferred to Stroger Hospital, where he remained from March 14 to April 18, 2013; the shackling continued. Hernandez claims that doctors had instructed him to move every two hours to help his sores heal, and that the shackling stunted his recovery. Hernandez complained orally. The grievance process, described in a handbook that Hernandez did not receive, states that an inmate must file a written grievance within 15 days of the alleged incident. Hernandez never filed a written grievance. After discharge from Stroger, he entered the jail general population. Unable to write, he had other inmates write and file grievances, including an August 3, 2013, grievance stating that nursing staff refused to help him move between his chair and his bed. Hernandez received a response on September 11 and appealed. On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court stated that Hernandez’s oral complaints constituted a proper grievance but held that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that Hernandez did exhaust his remedies. View "Hernandez v. Dart" on Justia Law

Officer Homoky was under investigation by the Hobart Police Department for officer misconduct and was ordered to submit to a voice stress test, a type of lie detector. He was told that if he did not comply, he would be subject to dismissal. Homoky refused to sign a release form because his participation was not voluntary, and was charged with insubordination and placed on administrative leave. He was later assigned to garage duty, which included scrubbing toilets. Homoky had filed suit, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and abuse of process under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding no constitutional violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that forcing him to sign the release form under threat of dismissal deprived him of his right against self-incrimination in violation of the Constitution. The department informed him that any statement made would not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, so it was free to compel him to answer any question, even incriminating ones. View "Homoky v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Pickett, a nursing home housekeeper, filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that residents sexually harassed her and that Sheridan fired her for complaining. Sheridan won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but Pickett was awarded $65,000 on the retaliation claim, which was affirmed. Pickett sought attorney’s fees for work done by her attorney, Rossiello, his associates, and paralegals, but did not request prejudgment interest. The court determined that Rossiello’s market rate was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of 225 hours submitted were proper, excluding hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit found that the court improperly calculated the rate and erred in declining to award fees to outside counsel. On remand, Pickett sought fees for the life of the case and requested prejudgment interest. Considering his disciplinary history, experience, and prior fee awards, the court ordered payment for the hours approved before Pickett II at $425 per hour, rather than the $540-620 requested; approved the time requested for work on Pickett II, less the time spent on administrative tasks; awarded prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees; and determined that the claim to fees for the work done on remand had been waived.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DPickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

At 3 a.m., inmate Mathison, who suffers from chronic high blood pressure, was awakened by excruciating pain in his chest and left arm and other symptoms of a heart attack. He summoned a guard (Wickman), who summoned supervising lieutenant Omelson, who called the nurse on call (Wall). Wall stated that Mathison’s condition was not an emergency and instructed that Mathison to go to the infirmary in the morning. Mathison went at 6:45 a.m., almost four hours after he suffering a heart attack, and was transported by ambulance to the nearest hospital emergency room, in Pekin. From Pekin he was taken immediately to a Peoria hospital to receive advanced cardiac care. He stayed in the hospital for two days. The district court rejected Mathison’s claims of deliberate indifference on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Wickman and the prison doctor, but reversed dismissal of the claims against Omelson and Wall. The court stated that “civilization requires more in a life and death situation,” and questioned “what the judge thinks the minimum level of care is to which a prisoner who is suffering a heart attack is entitled.” View "Mathison v. Moats" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Board of Education Chief Area Officer Coates sent Bordelon , the long-tenured principal of the Kozminski Academy, notice of a pre‐discipline hearing based on insubordination in failing to respond to a parent issue; failing to arrange a requested meeting regarding the arrest of Kozminski students; and failing to respond to Coates’s email. Bordelon received a five‐day suspension without pay, which he never served. In December 2010, Coates evaluated Bordelon as needing improvement, noting that Kozminski was on academic probation for a second year with test scores trending downward. Coates reassigned Bordelon to home with full pay pending an investigation into improperly replacing asbestos‐containing tile at Kozminski; purchasing irregularities; and tampering with school computers in a manner that impeded Board access to Kozminski’s records. In early 2011, Kozminski's Local School Council voted to not renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon, age 63, believed that Coates, exercised undue influence over the decision, based his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Board, stating that that Bordelon did not prove discrimination and that there was substantial evidence of independent reasons for not renewing Bordelon’s contract, making it unlikely that Coates influenced the Board. View "Bordelon v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The 1983 Shakman Accord resulted from resolution of political patronage litigation; to eliminate political considerations in employment decisions the city agreed to create and implement a hiring plan to effectuate the goal of eradicating political patronage. Shakman “adds speech and political affiliation to the list” of impermissible bases of employment discrimination delineated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Eight applicants for the position of police officer with the Chicago Police Department, disqualified from consideration, sued the city, claiming violations of the city’s 2011 Hiring Plan, violation of the Shakman Accord, and equal protection violations under the Illinois Constitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the Shakman claims, which were filed beyond the 180-day time limit and were, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations.. View "Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Deets, a white construction worker, worked for MTA on a federally assisted project to build a bridge (the Stan Musial Veteran’s Memorial Bridge) across the Mississippi River. MTA’s collective bargaining agreement defined seniority for purposes of layoffs and recalls. The Missouri Department of Transportation’s contract with MTA contained federally mandated goals for participation by minorities (14.7%) and women (6.9%) on the project. Deets claimed racial discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, asserting that he was laid off because management was concerned about meeting minority participation goals. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants, finding material disputes concerning the basis for the layoff: statements to Deets about “minority numbers” and the immediate hiring of a replacement. View "Deets v. Massman Constr. Co." on Justia Law

In 1992 plaintiff, then age 48, was convicted of having sexually assaulted a boy repeatedly for five years beginning when the boy was eight years old. Before his probation expired he was convicted of having (in 1988) sexually assaulted a nine‐year‐old girl and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was paroled after six years. His parole was revoked a year later after he admitted that he had sexual fantasies about two girls, ages four and five. Scheduled to be released in 2005, he was, instead, civilly committed as a “sexually violent person,” Wis. Stat. ch. 980. He was released in 2010, based on the opinion of a psychologist that he was no longer more likely than not to commit further sexual assaults. A 2006 Wisconsin law required that persons released from civil commitment (after 1/1/2008) for sexual offenses wear a GPS monitoring device 24 hours a day for the rest of their lives. Wis. Stat. 301.48. The district court found the Wisconsin monitoring statute unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that a study by the National Institute of Justice found that GPS monitoring of sex criminals has a greater effect in reducing recidivism than traditional parole supervision. View "Belleau v. Wall" on Justia Law

Donelson, an Illinois prisoner, lost a year of accumulated good time as punishment for two incidents involving the same guard. He claimed that the deprivation occurred without his having an opportunity to call supporting witnesses and to offer supporting evidence and that he was denied access to recordings of the incidents. The state appellate court denied relief without reaching the merits. The court’s reason, not mentioned at any earlier stage of the case, was that the prisoner had not followed the instruction on the paper form for requesting witnesses or evidence to tear off the top portion of the form. Donelson sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court ruled against Donelson, partly on the merits and partly on a procedural ground. The Seventh Circuit upheld the partial merits ruling but vacated the procedural ruling. The state court’s “novel ruling carried bureaucratic concerns about paperwork to an unreasonable extreme and does not bar federal consideration of the prisoner’s constitutional claim on the merits.” View "Donelson v. Pfister" on Justia Law