Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Boulb was charged with three counts related to methamphetamine manufacturing materials, appeared in an Illinois court via video conference, and waived his right to appointed counsel. Boulb alleges that he met Hyde, his public defender in a 1998 DUI case, and that when Hyde offered him a plea deal, Boulb thought Hyde was his attorney discussing the prosecutor's offer. In fact, in 2008, Hyde was the State’s Attorney. Boulb entered a negotiated plea for a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. Weeks later, Boulb sought transcripts from his case, permission to proceed as a poor person, and appointment of counsel. The court ordered preparation of transcripts. Boulb took no further action. In 2012, Boulb pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846; 841(c)(2); and 843(a)(6), in connection with a methamphetamine conspiracy. The court classified him as a career offender based on his prior state court convictions, including his 2008 conviction. In 2013, Boulb appealed his 2008 conviction, with a motion to withdraw his plea because there was no verbatim transcript of his waiver of counsel, as required. The Illinois appellate court dismissed the request as untimely. Boulb filed an affidavit in his federal criminal case concerning his interactions with Hyde. Relying on 28 U.S.C. 2255’s one-year limitations period, the court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the limitations period was equitably tolled by Boulb’s purported mental incompetence. View "Boulb v. United States" on Justia Law

Hill and Roberts applied for firefighter positions with the Chicago Fire Department in 1995, but were not hired because of their scores on a pre-employment examination. They joined a class of roughly 6,000 similarly-situated applicants who argued that the hiring process had an unjustified adverse impact on African-American applicants. In 2011, the court ordered the city to hire 111 class members who were denied employment based on examination scores and to provide compensation to others. The court specified a hiring process with strict deadlines. In October 2011, plaintiffs were notified that they would need to complete a physical abilities test, a drug screening, and a background check. By January 5, 2012, both successfully completed these requirements. On February 22-23, they were notified—allegedly for the first time—that they also needed to pass a medical screening and received offers of employment conditioned on medical screening. Both men complied with the city’s requests concerning identified medical conditions, but they were not hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued right-to-sue letters. Their complaint alleged discrimination against Roberts because of his bronchitis and against Hill because of his asthma and past problems with a hernia and kidney stones. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that plaintiffs did not adequately allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. View "Hill v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Gardner was shot to death in front of a Chicago apartment building in 1999. The state charged three men, including Carter, with Gardner’s murder. Carter was tried alongside his brother, Stone. Both were convicted of murder; Carter was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful state postconviction proceeding, Carter filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief on each of eight grounds presented. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to a single claim: ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim turned on the potential effect of the testimony of two witnesses who were not called in his defense at trial. The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the proffered testimony would not have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that, while trial counsel’s performance may have been deficient in failing to investigate potential witnesses, the state court’s resolution of the prejudice analysis was not unreasonable. The result have been the same even if the witnesses had testified that Carter was unarmed; such testimony would not have illuminated whether Carter was legally accountable for the actions of his co‐defendants. View "Carter v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

In 1995, Neal was working on Mitchell’s car in the backyard of Neal’s home when Mitchell hit Neal in the head with a brick, causing Neal’s death. Mitchell asserted that Neal had attacked him with a wrench. A post‐mortem toxicology report revealed that Neal had been using alcohol and cocaine. The prosecution presented forensic evidence and a witness (also using alcohol and drugs at the time of the incident) to refute Mitchell’s claim of self‐defense. A jury convicted Mitchell of first degree murder. The court sentenced him to 57 years in prison. After unsuccessful direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, Mitchell unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process violation. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Mitchell did not show that his trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to request a second-degree murder “provocation” jury instruction or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision. The due process claim, concerning an unsworn, unsigned affidavit, which avers that the state offered not to charge the witness as an accessory to murder in exchange for her testimony against Mitchell, was procedurally defaulted. View "Mitchell v. Enloe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including many with disabilities, had cases pending in state courts and were represented by an attorney who uses a wheelchair. They claimed that the St. Joseph County Courthouse and the Mishawaka County Services Building did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, particularly with respect to restrooms, elevators, witness stands, jury boxes, jury deliberation rooms, attorney podiums, spectator seating, entrance ramps, clerk counters, services for the blind, water fountains, and parking. While the case was pending, defendants remodeled the courthouse restrooms, which are now accessible. Defendants presented evidence that their facilities complied with the statutes. Plaintiffs offered little evidence in rebuttal. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The court dismissed the claims of non-disabled plaintiffs represented by a disabled lawyer and claims relating to jury facilities, saying that the ADA did not provide for “associational” standing. The court found no evidence that other plaintiffs had suffered past injuries that would support standing for damages, and that the prospect of future injury was too speculative to support an injunction. Some plaintiffs had died; some were no longer in litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without finding the facilities compliant and without expressing an opinion on possible future claims. View "Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Hughes is confined at Rushville as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207. He will remain there unless it is no longer “substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of sexual violence.” He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rushville's program director, grievance examiner, and security therapy aide infringed his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by disregarding his grievances concerning dental care and insulting him. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal, reasoning that grievances are protected speech and that the abuse to which Hughes was subjected and the warning that his life would be better if he stopped filing grievances went beyond simple verbal harassment. The court noted that Hughes is not a prison inmate but a civil detainee, “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Staff of an institution that houses and treats persons suffering from mental disorders should understand that they are dealing with psychologically impaired persons and should have known better than to shout at a possibly vulnerable person, call him “ignorant,” “stupid,” and a “moron,” ignore grievances that may be meritorious and serious, and threaten him with retaliation for complaining. View "Hughes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1992, Holmes, was convicted of two murders committed three years earlier at the restaurant where he worked. He and Vance had stabbed three people and stolen the till. He was sentenced to death. Holmes’s conviction and sentence were affirmed and state post‐conviction relief was denied. He sought federal habeas corpus, raising 18 grounds and claiming that he was not mentally competent to assist his lawyers in the habeas corpus proceeding. The judge found him competent and denied his claims on the merits. On remand, the court again found Holmes competent and reinstated the denial of his claims. The Seventh Circuit again reversed, instructing the court to suspend the habeas corpus proceeding “unless and until the state provides substantial new evidence that Holmes’s psychiatric illness has abated, or its symptoms are sufficiently controlled, to justify the resumption of the proceeding.” The district court complied, suspending the habeas proceeding until 2013, when the prison superintendent moved to lift the stay and dismiss the habeas proceeding, based the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ryan v. Gonzales, rejecting “the assertion that the right to counsel implies a right to competence.” The court recognized that the substantive claims presented in Holmes’s petition are “record‐based” and granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding many of his claims defaulted and the others without merit. View "Holmes v. Levenhagen" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law