Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Trask was gambling at the Horseshoe Casino when she picked up a $20 bill from the floor. The customer who had dropped the money thought he had been short-changed and reported the loss. Casino personnel reviewed security videos. For 70 minutes Trask was detained by agents of the Indiana Gaming Commission. At the request of the agents, she dumped the contents of her purse and agreed to be patted down; her cell phone was temporary taken from her. Agents seized $8 from the purse. Trask could not find her driver’s license. Agents escorted her to her car, where she found the license and $5, both of which the agents confiscated. She was told she was banned from the casino and would be arrested if she tried to return. Trask filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana law. Trask, acting pro se, contacted the casino's lawyer and accepted a settlement of $100. She later left a voicemail, rejecting the settlement, stating that “I had a change of heart and I called you within 24 hours.” The court ordered the settlement enforced and her claims dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trask’s notarized letter to the casino admitted that she agreed to accept $100 in satisfaction of her claims; her belief that she could back out is “unfounded in the law.” View "Trask v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Hirschbach, a trucking company, offered Turner, an African-American, a job as a driver contingent on his completion of orientation and a drug test. Turner claims that throughout orientation, the evaluator stared at him and once whispered insults. An independent facility collected a urine sample. MedTox split the sample, tested one part, and stored the other. As required by Department of Transportation regulations, MedTox reported Turner's positive result to Hirschbach’s independent medical review officer. Hirschbach’s safety officer, Winegarden, told Turner he could request that the second half of his sample be tested by a different laboratory. Turner told Winegarden he wanted the split test. That test never took place; the reason is disputed. Turner left the orientation program. Hirschbach, as permitted by DOT regulations, reported Turner’s results to an industry consortium which can be seen by future employers, with Turner’s permission. Turner sued under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000– e(2)(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Illinois civil conspiracy law. The district court granted Hirschbach summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Turner did not respond to most of Hirschbach’s statements of undisputed facts. Giving Turner the benefit of conflicts in the evidence, the court found evidence that Winegarden cancelled the split test and acted based on racial animus but no evidence that Winegarden’s racial animus caused him not to be hired. There was no evidence that the MedTox test was unreliable or that the split test would have been negative. View "Turner v. Hirschbach Motor Lines" on Justia Law

After Brown was charged with sexually abusing his children, before trial, the court three times allowed Brown’s appointed counsel to withdraw because Brown would not cooperate. Brown appeared pro se but after “multiple outbursts” and attempts “to intimidate the victim‐witnesses,” the court held that he had “forfeited his right to represent himself.” Brown was convicted. The Public Defender’s Office appointed attorney Rosen to represent Brown on appeal. Brown objected, arguing Rosen was acting without his “consent or participation.” Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of “his constitutional right to represent himself on appeal” and that a lawyer had deprived him of legal documents and prevented him from requesting legal help from a nonprofit organization. The district court screened Brown’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and concluded that his claim that Rosen had been ineffective in representing him was barred because it implied that his conviction may have been invalid and there is no constitutional right to self‐representation on appeal. The Supreme Court has held that in an appeal the state’s “interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice” outweighs the defendant’s interest in autonomy because there is no longer the presumption of innocence and because the Sixth Amendment does not refer to appellate proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, held that Brown’s appeal was frivolous, and imposed two strikes on him under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Brown v. Milwaukee County Public Defender's Office" on Justia Law

Smego, a civilly committed sex offender at Rushville, sued his treatment team, alleging that another resident sexually assaulted him and that defendants forced Smego to continue group therapy with his alleged assailant and retaliated against Smego. After the Seventh Circuit held that Smego was entitled to a jury trial, Smego was represented by University of Illinois law students. Before trial, Smego appeared by video conference or telephone at hearings. For trial, Smego appeared in person. During an off‐the‐record break after closing arguments, the judge removed Smego for transport back to Rushville. The court did not address this removal on the record and issued no cautionary jury instruction regarding Smego’s absence, but instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Smego was not presemt when the jury found in favor of defendants. The judge asked whether the students wanted the jury polled, and a student, without consulting Smego, responded in the negative. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the jury had questions during deliberation or had any reason to know that Smego was not present during deliberations. Failing to poll the jury when it is clear that the verdict was unanimous, was a “minor matter.” View "Smego v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Madison Police Department established a focused deterrence program to increase surveillance of repeat violent offenders. Alston, one of 10 repeat violent offenders originally selected for the program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was selected for the program because of his race, and arguing that his inclusion in the program deprived him of liberty without due process of law and that he was stigmatized and subjected to increased surveillance, penalties, and reporting requirements. Alston presented evidence that blacks accounted for only 4.5 percent of the Madison population but 37.6 percent of arrests and 86 percent of the program; four candidates associated with allegedly black gangs were selected while the one candidate associated with an allegedly white gang was not. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Alston failed to produce evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the program had a discriminatory effect or purpose or that Alston’s legal rights were altered by inclusion in the program. Alston’s statistics did not address whether black, repeat violent offenders were treated differently from white, repeat violent offenders and were not evidence of discriminatory effect. View "Alston v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Nance shot and killed her husband, Timothy, in the shower. Four days later, Nance reported him missing. Fond du Lac detectives interviewed Timothy’s family, his new girlfriend, friends, and Nance’s sister, Ewell. They learned of the couple’s history of threats and violence. One witness had noticed that the shower curtain, liner, and hooks in the Nance bathroom had been replaced after Timothy disappeared. The detectives reviewed surveillance tapes from a local store, which showed Ewell and Nance buying new shower curtain liners and hooks the night Timothy went missing. Executing a search warrant at the Nance house, detectives seized “biological specimens,” a “projectile” from the bathtub pipes, and other evidence. Ewell refused to answer questions. Both sisters were arrested. A judge, relying on Ledger’s statement and affidavit, determined that probable cause existed to detain Ewell. She spent 12 days in custody before her release. Ewell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. While her appeal of the dismissal of that case was pending. Ewell was convicted in state court of hiding a corpse, harboring or aiding a felony, and resisting or obstructing an officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For purposes of qualified immunity, it would not have been plain to a reasonable officer that arresting and detaining Ewell under the circumstances would have been unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. View "Ewell v. Toney" on Justia Law

Howell, a veteran and school teacher in his early sixties, has had multiple shoulder surgeries, including complete replacement of his right shoulder. He was able to stretch his right arm, to write on a blackboard, and to lift up to six pounds with his right arm. His left shoulder was in better condition. Highland Police Officer Smith received a call from his dispatcher, alerting him to a road rage incident involving the discharge of a firearm. He later came upon a car matching the description and conducted a “high‐risk traffic stop.” Smith placed Howell, the car’s occupant, in handcuffs and detained him until other officers brought the alleged victim to the scene. The victim identified Howell and his vehicle as involved in the road rage incident. The officers, finding no weapon, decided to release Howell. The stop lasted approximately 30 minutes. Howell claims that the officers’ treatment aggravated his preexisting shoulder condition, which required multiple surgeries. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to deny Smith’s qualified immunity claim. Smith’s decision to place Howell, then implicated in a serious crime involving the discharge of a weapon, in handcuffs and to keep him in handcuffs until satisfied that he was not a threat did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Howell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Weiss, a Wisconsin inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Department of Corrections employees failed to prevent an assault by his cellmate that resulted in a broken ankle for Weiss and that they left his broken ankle untreated for months. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Weiss had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the defendants did not contest Weiss’s factual allegations, that he had been transferred from the prison, and that he had been given psychotropic medicine that produced serious side effects. He had submitted a timely complaint about his treatment to the prison’s complaint examiner and a second administrative complaint; the complaint examiner’s correspondence was addressed to Weiss at Racine, where he no longer was. The district court ignored the fact that he had “d[one] the best he could do under the circumstances,” given his transfer to the mental-health center and, once he was there, being forced to take psychotropic drugs. Prisoners cannot be required to exhaust remedies that are unavailable to them. View "Weiss v. Barribeau" on Justia Law

Hively, who is openly lesbian, began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, having been blocked from full-time employment “without just cause.” After exhausting EEOC procedural requirements, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, holding that Title VII did not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. On rehearing, the court reversed, interpreting the Act’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex as including sexual orientation; “the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering the adverse action had his or her sex” been different. The court noted “the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s decisions, not only in the field of employment discrimination, but also in the area of broader discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana" on Justia Law

While riding in a car, Stechauner’s sawed-off shotgun accidentally fired and hit Stechauner in the leg. At the hospital, a nurse reported that he had a bag of bullets. Officers entered Stechauner’s hospital room, where he was awaiting discharge. Eventually Stechauner produced the bullets and stated that the gun was at a friend’s house. The questioning lasted about 90 minutes. Stechauner “seemed lucid, and … was able to answer.” Stechauner was not given Miranda warnings. Stechauner accompanied officers to his friend’s house, where the gun was found under outdoor steps. Detective Kolatski thought that Stechauner may have been involved in recent robberies and other crimes involving such a weapon. Stechauner went with Kolatski to the station. Hours later, Stechauner was given Miranda warnings and was interrogated. Over the course of nine hours, Stechauner admitted to several crimes. The Wisconsin court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Stechauner was not in custody; Miranda’s warning requirement was not triggered. Stechauner pleaded no contest to second-degree reckless homicide and armed robbery. After unsuccessful efforts to obtain state post-conviction relief, Stechauner sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, rejecting arguments that the state court admitted Stechauner’s statements and shotgun in violation of Miranda and that Stechauner had received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by failure to argue that trial counsel had been ineffective at the suppression hearing. View "Stechauner v. Smith" on Justia Law