Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Twenty-year-veteran Deputy Yahnke supported the Sheriff’s opponent in a 2006 election. The prior Sheriff had approved Yahnke’s request to work as the part-time Maple Park police chief. After the new Sheriff took office, Yahnke was injured while working as a Deputy Sheriff and began receiving disability benefits. The Sheriff advised Yahnke that his secondary employment was suspended until he could return to work in the Sheriff’s office. At a party, Yahnke openly discussed running for the Sheriff’s position in 2010. Based on the Sheriff’s inquiry, the Illinois Attorney General concluded that secondary employment presented a potential conflict of interest. The Sheriff initiated an investigation, which concluded that Yahnke continued to work for Maple Park while his secondary employment was suspended. The Sheriff notified Yahnke that he was seeking his removal for cause. After the Sheriff terminated Yahnke’s employment, Yahnke sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the due process claim but vacated on the political affiliation count. A process existed for Yahnke to challenge his termination: a hearing before the Merit Commission or a grievance followed by arbitration The finder of fact could conclude that the Sheriff rejected lesser sanctions in favor of termination because Yahnke expressed a desire to run against the Sheriff, which is enough to defeat summary judgment. View "Yahnke v. County of Kane" on Justia Law

On July 4, 2002, Cox was standing outside a Chicago restaurant when he was gunned down by two men. Two women driving cars near the scene saw the murder and the shooters’ faces. Less than two months later, both women independently chose Blackmon’s photograph out of arrays. They repeated those identifications at a live line-up and again at trial. Primarily on the strength of their testimony, Blackmon was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 60 years in prison. Blackmon petitioned the state courts for post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present eyewitness and alibi testimony, and in the alternative, that he was actually innocent. The state courts summarily denied relief. Blackmon then unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of habeas relief and remanded for determination of whether Blackmon “is actually ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” The record supported conclusions that Blackmon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate alibi witnesses and that the state court’s summary dismissal of the claim was unreasonable. Because of that summary dismissal, the alibi witnesses have not yet been tested in any adversary proceeding. View "Blackmon v. Williams" on Justia Law

Left Field publishes Chicago Baseball magazine, producing four issues per baseball season. Copies are sold for $2 outside Wrigley Field before the Chicago Cubs’ home games. On the day of the Cubs’ 2015 home opener, Chicago police officer Voulgaris saw Left Field’s editor, Smerge, selling the magazine at the corner of Clark and Addison streets. Voulgaris told Smerge to move across the street to comply with Chicago’s Adjacent Sidewalks Ordinance, which forbids all peddling on the streets adjacent to Wrigley Field. Smerge refused to move and was ticketed. Left Field sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Chicago agreed not to enforce the ordinance pending a decision. The 2015 season ran its course. As the playoffs began, the district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, noting the density of the area around the field and the tight passages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ordinance does not regulate speech. It regulates peddling, without regard to what the peddler sells. The court noted that Left Field has never applied for a license: while additional issues could arise if the ordinance were applied to newspapers, the court expressed doubt that it would be applied to a newspaper. View "Left Field Media LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Thomas was convicted of the 2001 murder of Shakir. In 2005, after his conviction was final, Thomas received a letter informing him that unidentified gang members told police that Thomas did not commit the murder and that the shooter was Pinkston, a drug dealer. Thomas filed an unsuccessful state court petition for post‐conviction relief, arguing that he was actually innocent in light of the newly discovered evidence. Thomas filed a second state court petition in 2007, this time alleging that the government withheld evidence that the officer was told that Pinkston was the shooter in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court held that the claim was defaulted; Thomas had not raised it in his first petition. The district court denied federal habeas corpus petition raising the Brady claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the questionable reliability of his alibi, it was not more likely than not that a jury would have acquitted Thomas based solely on evidence that unidentified gang members told someone who told someone that Thomas did not commit the murder. Thomas’s gateway claim of actual innocence was, therefore, insufficient to excuse his procedural default. View "Thomas v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2012 Brown pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release. Within months of being released from prison, Brown was arrested for violating the Illinois sex-offender registration law, 730 ILCS 150/3(a). He pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. Brown’s federal probation officer then petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), citing Brown’s state case and his failure to submit timely supervision reports on five occasions. Brown admitted the allegations. The district court revoked his supervised release, ordered him to serve an additional 12 months in prison (consecutive to his new state sentence) and imposed a 10-year term of supervised release. Brown filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserted that the appeal was frivolous and sought to withdraw under Anders v. California. The Seventh Circuit granted the Anders motion and dismissed. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding when the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Becker sued Evansville, Indiana police officer Elfreich under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Elfreich used excessive force in arresting him because, after Becker had surrendered, Elfreich pulled him down three steps and placed his knee on his back while allowing a police dog to continue to bite him. Officers had arrived with an arrest warrant, which alleged that three weeks earlier Becker had held a knife to his brother-in-law’s neck and threatened to kill him. Elfreich claimed that he released the dog only after Becker failed to respond to warnings to come out of hiding and that the dog could not hear the release command because of screaming; he argued he was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not constitute excessive force or, alternatively, that it did not violate clearly established constitutional law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of Elfreich’s motion for summary judgment. A jury could reasonably find the force was excessive; it was clearly established at the time of Becker’s arrest that no more than minimal force was permissible to arrest a non-resisting, or passively resisting, suspect. View "Becker v. Effriechs" on Justia Law

The Home and Community‐Based Care Waiver Program allowed states to diverge from the traditional Medicaid structure by providing community‐based services to people who would, under the traditional structure, require institutionalization, 42 U.S.C. 1396n. The Indiana Family and Social Services Administration operates the Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program (A&D waiver), the Community Integration and Habilitation Medicaid Waiver Program (CIH waiver), and the Family Supports Medicaid Waiver Program (FS waiver). Because Indiana has closed most of its institutional facilities, these waiver programs serve the vast majority of its people with disabilities. Until 2011, the Administration placed many people with developmental disabilities on the A&D waiver, which has no cap on services. The Administration then changed its policies, rendering many developmentally disabled persons ineligible for the A&D waiver. These people were moved to the FS waiver, under which they may receive services capped at $16,545 annually. The CIH waiver is uncapped, but not everyone qualifies for the CIH waiver. Plaintiffs argue that their new assignments violated the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 because it deprives them of community interaction and puts them at risk of institutionalization. The court granted defendants summary judgment on the integration‐mandate claims and denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there is a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the individual claims based on the integration mandate. The court agreed that the proposed class is too vague. View "Steimel v. Wernert" on Justia Law

Over the past decade, Attorney Novoselsky has filed many lawsuits alleging improprieties by Dorothy Brown, in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Brown later made statements to private parties, the public, and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, accusing Novoselsky of being an unscrupulous attorney. Novoselsky sued Brown under state law for defamation and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, and he sought to hold Cook County liable for Brown’s actions. Brown unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that her communications are protected from liability by immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. On the state‐law defamation claim, Brown’s communications were all statements reasonably related to her official duties. Illinois state law provides immunity to Brown for claims based on these statements. Brown is also entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, for all she did to retaliate was criticize Novoselsky, so Cook County is also entitled to summary judgment. View "Novoselsky v. Brown" on Justia Law

McDonald was diagnosed with arthritis and high cholesterol while serving a life sentence at Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois. For 10 years, he received a low-cholesterol diet planned by a prison dietician In 2009, a new warden discharged the dietician and cancelled all special diets; decreased the frequency of outdoor recreation for inmates; and altered the prison’s job-assignment policy to restrict inmates from working in a particular job for more than one year. McDonald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Equal Protection Clause (inmates at the other Illinois maximum-security prisons were allowed to have prescription diets and more time for outdoor recreation). The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The wardens were not entitled to summary judgment on McDonald’s claim concerning the cancellation of his prescription diet. View "McDonald v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Officers noticed Morgan as he crossed the street and pursued him on suspicion that he was in possession of a firearm. They apprehended Morgan outside a house, using force that Morgan would later contend was excessive but that the officers would maintain was reasonable because he was resisting arrest. He was charged with resisting arrest and possession of a controlled substance based on a small bag of cocaine, which the officers claimed to have found near Morgan after his arrest. The state court dismissed the possession charge on the ground that there was not probable cause to prosecute, and the State’s Attorney dropped the charge for resisting arrest. Morgan sued the arresting officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the defendants had violated the Equal Protection Clause by exercising their peremptory strikes on a racially discriminatory basis during jury selection and that the district court had committed multiple procedural and substantive errors, View "Morgan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law