Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Felix suffers from mental health disabilities, including PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and phobia. She takes prescribed medication and attends counseling. Felix was employed from 1998 to 2013 in the Appleton Division of Motor Vehicles customer service facility, administering road tests, performing clerical duties, and collecting fees. She “was punctual, reliable, friendly with customers, and patient with new drivers.” She excelled in administering road tests, but did not meet expectations in financial accountability. A 2011 rule change precluded an overall rating of satisfactory if the employee did not meet expectations in specified areas, including financial accountability. Felix was given an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory and was placed on probation. Her difficulties persisted. Her employer's procedures called for a final performance improvement plan which, if not completed successfully, would result in her discharge. Felix began to experience panic attacks and notified her supervisor of her anxiety disorders. One panic attack included hysterical screaming and self-harm. Her co-workers called 911. She did not return to work. An independent medical examiner concluded that she “remains at increased risk for potentially violent behavior toward self and others within the workplace.” Her employment was terminated. She sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Felix, reasoning that she was discharged not solely because of her disabilities but based on workplace behavior that indicated that she posed a safety risk to herself and others. View "Felix v. Wis. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former detainees, brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cook County, claiming that the level of dental care at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under FRCP 23, but later decertified one class and modified the other, finding that the Jail’s implementation of a consent order with the Department of Justice eliminated a common question concerning inadequate staffing and brought care into compliance with national standards. The court could not find another common factor among the claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages.” The court then determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. While an appeal was pending, the detainees unsuccessfully moved for a new trial (FRCP 60(b)) based on newly discovered evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding decertification of the classes because of the lack of a common issue of fact or law. The detainees’ questions do not point to the type of systematic and gross deficiency that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment; they did not allege a specific policy that directly causes delay, nor a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. Filing a Rule 60(b) motion during the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate; there was no final judgment in the case. View "Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law

Morris filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3), seeking authorization to file a successive motion to vacate under section 2255. Morris was sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and wanted to challenge his sentence under the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, in Johnson v. United States, that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court made Johnson retroactive. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition. Morris made a prima facie showing that he may be entitled to relief. Morris proposes to challenge only one of his three predicate offenses: his conviction for attempted robbery in Illinois, 720 ILCS 5/8‐4(a), 18‐1(a). To determine whether an attempt offense constitutes a violent felony, a court must examine how state courts have applied the general attempt statute to the particular crime attempted. View "Morris v. United States" on Justia Law

Todd sold 22.1 grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer. In 2010, he pled guilty and, having a criminal record that included five prison sentences totaling 22 years, was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He unsuccessfully appealed, claiming ineffective assistance because his lawyer told him the government would recommend no more than a 10‐year sentence. Four years later he unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus in federal court on the same ground. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting the evidence in support of state court findings that Todd had not been confused about the terms of the plea agreement and that defense counsel was not ineffective. Even if Todd believed in the claimed 10‐year cap, he either lied or was confused in replying “no” when asked by the judge whether any promises had been made to him other than that his bond would be reduced and the other charge against him dropped. If he was confused and still believed there was a sentencing cap, the trial judge disabused him of his mistake by telling him he could be sentenced to anywhere from six to 60 years even if he pleaded guilty. View "Todd v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Simpson, a registered nurse, began working at St. James Health in 2008 and was not reprimanded until after 2009 when Kelly, a Caucasian woman, became the manager of Simpson’s department. From October 2010 through September 2011 Kelly disciplined Simpson four times. The discipline was progressive. The fourth incident resulted in termination of Simpson’s employment. After the EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter, Simpson filed suit, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The employer claimed that she had not been performing up to expectations and could not identify a similarly situated co-worker who was treated more favorably, noting that Simpson was not disputing the existence of the complaints from patients and their families. The district court granted St. James summary judgment, reasoning that Simpson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under the indirect method, but lacked evidence that the explanation for firing her was pretextual. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Simpson did not even establish a prima facie case of discrimination, let alone that the proffered explanation was pretextual. View "Simpson v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

Felton was in a car in Harvey, Illinois, when he was approached by an unmarked car with tinted windows. Felton, who was unarmed, claims that he feared for his life and fled onto the expressway, heading toward Chicago. Officers “chased” him, firing guns, then “ram[med]” their cars into his, causing him to crash. He states he was “shot by 6 different stu[n] guns,” “put into critical condition,” and suffered broken bones, bruises, a concussion, lost vision, and other injuries. He underwent several surgeries and suffered “excruciating pain and mental anguish.” He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because Felton was incarcerated at the time, the judge conducted an initial screening under, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, noting that the allegations were insufficient to state claims against the only named defendants: Chicago and its police superintendent (in his official capacity). The judge found it “painfully obvious” that Felton’s complaint “had omitted critical facts” and consulted newspaper accounts of Felton’s arrest. “Instead of expending further resources in recapping what those newspaper accounts reflected,” the judge attached them as exhibits to his order, dismissing the suit as “frivolous.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that at least one part of Felton’s complaint was legally viable: his allegation that he was shot by multiple stun guns. View "Felton v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After he was temporarily suspended from Watseka Community High School for allegedly consuming or possessing drugs, Dietchweiler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights, with state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and violations of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-22.6, which provides procedures for suspending and expelling students. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the due process claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrators explained to Dietchwieler and his parents the general nature of the charges against him and provided him with a written suspension notice. Most of Dietchweiler’s complaints about the hearing relate to the defendants’ alleged failure to follow their own published policies and procedures, but failure to follow state statutes or state-mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due process claim of constitutional magnitude. While the Board disbelieved the evidence he presented, due process does not guarantee that his version of events will be believed. View "Dietchweiler v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a fight with another inmate, Ogurek required stitches and was charged with a disciplinary infraction. Ogurek says he told investigator Gabor that he wanted to charge the other inmate with starting the fight and that he wanted an investigation of the theft of property from his cell while he was in segregation after the fight. When 10 days elapsed with no response Ogurek complained to the warden. According to Ogurek, Gabor berated him for complaining and told him that, after watching a security video, he had determined that Ogurek had started the fight. Ogurek denied this. Gabor filed a disciplinary report for impeding an investigation, which led to Ogurek remaining in segregation for six months. An administrative appeal resulted in expungement, on grounds that Gabor had violated procedure and had failed to substantiate his charge. During discovery in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Ogurek sought the video. The district judge ordered Gabor to respond within 17 days, which he did not do. The judge dismissed the suit before the video surfaced. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An inmate’s complaint of being assaulted and injured by another inmate and then framed by a guard is not a “personal gripe,” that is unprotected by the First Amendment. View "Ogurek v. Gabor" on Justia Law

Stanley was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to distributing crack cocaine. The court found that he was a career offender. Stanley did not appeal his sentence or file a collateral attack within the year allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was invalid, Stanley filed a motion under 2255(f)(3), which allows a fresh year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the Johnson decision applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, it does not apply to Stanley. His drug conviction counts under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b); his conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer also is outside the scope of Johnson and was counted under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). His conviction for illegal possession of a firearm never qualified as a violent felony and should not have been counted, but the classification is unaffected by Johnson; section 2255(f)(3) does not grant Stanley a fresh window to file a collateral attack. View "Stanley v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Hill was convicted of several drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846. Hill was a career offender based on Illinois convictions for attempted murder (shooting at a car and wounding two occupants) and for aggravated discharge of a firearm (toward a person, not a car), both “crimes of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. His 360-month sentence was within his guidelines range of 360 months to life. His sentence was reduced to 226 months when the Sentencing Guidelines were held not to be mandatory in 2005. In 2016 he sought permission to file a successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), based the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which held unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, (mirrored in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)), which deemed any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, stating that the judge who sentenced Hill and the appellate panel "know with certainty that Hill committed two crimes of violence and that his sentence—amplified by those crimes—for the federal drug offenses of which he was convicted was light, considering the circumstances.” View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law