Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Burris v. Smith
During an argument, Burris fired his handgun, hitting Kamal in the neck and paralyzing him. Burris fled and evaded police for five months, before surrendering. The state judge instructed the jury on first-degree reckless injury, possession of a firearm by a felon, and the lesser included offense of second-degree reckless injury. For first-degree liability, the government had to prove circumstances showing an “utter disregard for human life.” Burris argued that the shooting was an accident. The jury submitted a written question: “Regarding the element of utter disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the shooting?” The judge gave a supplemental instruction: First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely on the instructions that I gave you. All right? And to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. And in response to this question, if this clarifies anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does not negate utter disregard otherwise established by the circumstances before and during the crime. It may be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the total factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life. The element of utter disregard for human life is measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known. The jury convicted Burris of first-degree reckless injury. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, although the instruction may have been ambiguous, it was not reasonably likely that it misled the jury. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law . View "Burris v. Smith" on Justia Law
Wells v. Winnebago County
Wells worked as a “computer navigator” at the Winnebago County courthouse, helping pro se litigants deal with the judicial system’s requirements. She claimed that before her departure to take a better job, state and county officials discriminated against her on the basis of her race (she is black) and disability (chronic fatigue syndrome). The district court granted summary judgment to the county, finding any discrimination attributable to state workers and that the record would not allow a reasonable jury to find actionable discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Evidence would permit a jury to find that Winnebago County was Wells’s employer, the entity responsible for complying with federal employment discrimination statutes, regardless of the identity of the person whose acts are complained of, but Wells was treated the same as the other computer navigators, who were white. She did not contend that any supervisor said anything about race or used language with racial connotations. Time off had been granted as an accommodation of her disability and Wells did not substantiate the medical need for any additional accommodation. View "Wells v. Winnebago County" on Justia Law
Miller v. Zatecky
Miller was convicted in Indiana of three counts of child molestation and sentenced to three consecutive 40-year terms. The sexual abuse, including anal intercourse, began when the victim was nine and continued for six years. When imposing the lengthy term the state judge relied on the nature of Miller’s conduct, on his four prior convictions, his failure to reform after stretches of imprisonment, and the absence of any mitigating factors. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. Miller then filed a collateral attack, contending that his appellate lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by failing to contest his sentence. The state’s court of appeals concluded that counsel should have raised this issue, but that its omission did not result in prejudice under the standard of Strickland v. Washington because Miller did not establish that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A federal district judge then denied Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the state’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” View "Miller v. Zatecky" on Justia Law
Bolling v. Carter
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, fell and injured his back. It was a month before he was able to see a doctor. Correctional officers did not move him although the doctor determined that he needed to be in a lower bunk. There was no ladder to his upper bunk, so had to sleep on the floor until his term of confinement ended. He sued correctional officers, contending that they had manifested deliberate indifference to an acute medical need. The district judge granted the defendants summary judgment, stating only that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received a lower bunk permit at any time while at the jail.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that it was disputed and he did receive an order from a doctor directing that he be assigned to a lower bunk. The defendants’ brief did not discuss the dispute and did not substantiate its denial. View "Bolling v. Carter" on Justia Law
Herron v. Meyer
Former gang member Herron is serving long sentences. Before his transfer to Terre Haute, he was attacked by inmates and left permanently disabled and confined to a wheelchair. At Terre Haute, Herron was assigned to a wheel-chair-accessible cell. Terre Haute inmates told Herron that he had been targeted because he was believed to be a pedophile. Herron learned that his prison records contained references to the Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901–91, although his convictions are for other crimes. He filed a grievance; the Bureau of Prisons corrected his record. Hearing other inmates were planning to attack him, he asked to be placed in segregation. The prison complied and assigned him a wheelchair-accessible cell. Within a month, his cellmate attacked him over his “Walsh Act stuff.” Herron rejected another assigned cellmate, whom he viewed as threatening, and filed grievances. Guards took Herron to a non-accessible cell and refused to help him to the toilet. He was found lying near the toilet. He was treated for head lacerations, a shoulder contusion, and a sprained spine. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the district court's grant of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment theory, which accepted a claim that the guard was implementing a policy of moving every inmate who objects to a new cellmate, to prevent inmates from reserving one-person cells. View "Herron v. Meyer" on Justia Law
Ellison v. Zatecky
Indiana Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate Ellison was notified of a disciplinary proceeding concerning his possession of heroin that was confiscated by Officer Bynum during a cell-search. Ellison told Officer Guffey that two unfamiliar guards, not Bynum, had conducted the search and found nothing. Although Bynum's report stated that he found heroin in cell 10-5D, assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” Ellison requested the identities of the guards who searched his cell and that they appear as witnesses, and sought surveillance video and test results for the substance. He later recognized one of the guards, who identified himself as Dorethery, and confirmed that he had searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question and that no contraband was found. Ellison specifically requested his presence. No witnesses, not even Bynum, appeared at the hearing and Ellison was not permitted to view the video. The hearing officer stripped Ellison of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting administrative remedies, Ellison unsuccessfully sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Bynum’s report, and given the conflict between that report and the photo, the refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right was “particularly troubling.” View "Ellison v. Zatecky" on Justia Law
Zappa v. Smith
Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law
Flynn v. Thatcher
Indiana inmate Flynn claims that the prison impermissibly favored Honor Program participants by allowing them more time outside their cells, more visits, exclusive access to video games, and greater use exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible for the Program, inmates must be at least 30 (previously 35) years old and cannot have committed any infraction for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 48 months. Flynn alleges that his first application was denied because he was too young. His reapplication after the minimum age was lowered was denied because the program and waiting list were full. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the same privileges as Program inmates. The court construed the complaint as claiming age discrimination and dismissed because using age as a proxy for maturity is rationally related to conferring greater trust and responsibility. Flynn unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that the court ignored his equal protection claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if that treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. There are obvious reasons to extend preferential treatment to Program inmates; there are rational reasons for evaluating the prisoner before awarding benefits. The court noted that Flynn incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and another for his appeal. View "Flynn v. Thatcher" on Justia Law
Nettles-Bey v. Williams
Nettles-Bey travels to assist African-American youths. El-Bey invited Nettles-Bey to South Holland, offered accommodations at “his house," and gave Nettles-Bey a garage-door opener. Nettles-Bey entered the house;. El-Bey, however, was a squatter, with no lawful interest in the house. The property owner arrived while Nettles-Bey was present and called the police, reporting a trespass. On arriving, officers discovered literature referring to Moorish Science. The officers contend that they take into custody anyone who is the subject of a trespass complaint, so they arrested Nettles-Bey as a matter of routine. Nettles-Bey says that the officers remarked on his status as a Moor and congratulated themselves on detaining another member of that troublesome sect. Nettles-Bey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers assumed from his name that he is a Moor and would not have arrested a Christian or an atheist. The court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. When the argument concerns facts, rather than legal uncertainty, an appeal must await a final decision. The district judge had no doubt about the law, deeming it clearly established that an officer may not arrest someone believed to hold certain religious beliefs, when in otherwise-identical circumstances the officer would not arrest a person holding different beliefs. The judge denied the motion because of doubt about what reasonable jurors would infer about why the officers arrested Nettles-Bey. View "Nettles-Bey v. Williams" on Justia Law
Kuttner v. Zaruba
Kuttner began working as a DuPage County deputy sheriff in 1998. In an October 2009 complaint, Sheriff Zaruba asserted that, several months earlier, Kuttner, in uniform, visited the home of a person who owed money to her boyfriend. The debtor’s father had answered the door and told Kuttner that his son was not home. Kuttner left a business card listing her name and a company called “Team in Focus.” Kuttner stipulated to the facts and admitted to violating two rules: by “conduct unbecoming” an officer and improper wearing of the uniform. Other disciplinary charges were dropped. The Merit Commission determined that Kuttner’s conduct was serious enough to warrant discharge. The EEOC declined action. Kuttner sued, claiming sex discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) and alleging that Kuttner was fired and denied a promotion because of her sex and that the sheriff’s policies regarding jail staffing discriminated against female employees. Her lawyer sought the personnel files of more than 30 employees in an effort to find a “similarly situated” employee who was treated differently. The judge imposed limits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed those limits and summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Kuttner v. Zaruba" on Justia Law