Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After being terminated by Logansport when he was 61-years-old, plaintiff filed suit against the company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted Logansport's motion for summary judgment. The ADEA defines “employer” as someone who has twenty or more employees for each working day, in each of twenty or more calendar weeks, in the calendar year of (or in the year preceding) the discriminatory act. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Logansport was not an "employer" under the ADEA because it did not have twenty or more employees. View "Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc." on Justia Law

Boston worked at U.S. Steel for 18 years before she was laid off in 2008, along with other employees. While on layoff status, Boston remained eligible to bid on posted positions for which she was qualified. Between September 2010 and January 2012, Boston was awarded, worked temporarily at, and was subsequently disqualified from, three different clerical positions at the plant. Boston claimed that the first disqualification was based on her age (61) and a preference for having a man in the job. Boston filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but did not file suit. After two subsequent disqualifications, she filed an EEOC complaint asserting that she was laid off in January 2012 in retaliation for an earlier EEOC discrimination charge she had filed in October 2010. She later filed suit under Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ADEA, with a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of U.S. Steel. Boston did not present enough evidence to prevail under the direct method, indirect method, or cat’s paw theory. View "Boston v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Alicea burglarized a Hammond residence; seeing a police vehicle, he fled, cutting through an alley and hiding in an above-ground pool in the backyard of another house. Sergeant Thomas was on canine duty, drove to the location, and released his 72-pound dog, Leo on a 30-foot leash. He announced his presence twice. Leo began barking by the pool. Officers Alvarez, Grisafi, and Fletcher arrived. Alicea was bleeding, looked in pain, and was screaming that a dog had bitten him and he needed medical help. Stories diverge about what happened. Alicea was taken to the squad car, where he was handcuffed. Someone called an ambulance. Alicea admits he may have told police and hospital personnel that he had used cocaine in order to explain why he started running and to gain admission into the hospital’s cardiac ward, where he believed he would receive better treatment. Aliciea sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana Code 34-13-4-1, which governs indemnification of government employees for civil rights violations. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Alicea create a material dispute as to whether each officer’s actions violated clearly established law. View "Alicea v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

Blake pled guilty to possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Based on his career offender status, he was sentenced to 216 months in prison. Blake did not appeal, but almost a year later filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on one of Blake’s claims, that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal, then denied Blake’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on a finding that Blake did not ask his attorney to file an appeal. View "Blake v. United States" on Justia Law

A 2012 car accident rendered Hernandez a quadriplegic. He was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence involving an accident causing death. Hernandez was taken into custody while he was hospitalized for treatment of pressure wounds. Under Cook County Sheriff’s Office policy, officers must shackle one hand and one foot of a hospitalized pre‐trial detainee to his hospital bed. Hernandez was shackled and sent to Cook County Jail, then immediately transferred to Stroger Hospital, where he remained from March 14 to April 18, 2013; the shackling continued. Hernandez claims that doctors had instructed him to move every two hours to help his sores heal, and that the shackling stunted his recovery. Hernandez complained orally. The grievance process, described in a handbook that Hernandez did not receive, states that an inmate must file a written grievance within 15 days of the alleged incident. Hernandez never filed a written grievance. After discharge from Stroger, he entered the jail general population. Unable to write, he had other inmates write and file grievances, including an August 3, 2013, grievance stating that nursing staff refused to help him move between his chair and his bed. Hernandez received a response on September 11 and appealed. On February 19, 2014, Hernandez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court stated that Hernandez’s oral complaints constituted a proper grievance but held that Hernandez had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that Hernandez did exhaust his remedies. View "Hernandez v. Dart" on Justia Law

Officer Homoky was under investigation by the Hobart Police Department for officer misconduct and was ordered to submit to a voice stress test, a type of lie detector. He was told that if he did not comply, he would be subject to dismissal. Homoky refused to sign a release form because his participation was not voluntary, and was charged with insubordination and placed on administrative leave. He was later assigned to garage duty, which included scrubbing toilets. Homoky had filed suit, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and abuse of process under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, finding no constitutional violation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that forcing him to sign the release form under threat of dismissal deprived him of his right against self-incrimination in violation of the Constitution. The department informed him that any statement made would not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, so it was free to compel him to answer any question, even incriminating ones. View "Homoky v. Ogden" on Justia Law

Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, Glisson underwent surgery that removed his larynx, part of his pharynx, portions of his mandible and 13 teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent opening in his throat, with a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube through his stomach to help with nutrition. In 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised. Glisson also suffered ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. In 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. Prison medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson’s blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, low oxygen saturation level, confusion, and anger. He was at one point deemed a suicide risk. His condition worsened: his symptoms suggested acute renal failure. After a short stay a local hospital, Glisson died in prison. The district court rejected his mother’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that failure to implement a particular Indiana Department of Corrections Health Care Service Directive, requiring a plan for management of chronic diseases, violated Glisson’s Eighth Amendment rights. View "Glisson v. Corr. Med. Servs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Pickett, a nursing home housekeeper, filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that residents sexually harassed her and that Sheridan fired her for complaining. Sheridan won summary judgment on the harassment claim, but Pickett was awarded $65,000 on the retaliation claim, which was affirmed. Pickett sought attorney’s fees for work done by her attorney, Rossiello, his associates, and paralegals, but did not request prejudgment interest. The court determined that Rossiello’s market rate was $400 per hour and that 175 hours of 225 hours submitted were proper, excluding hours it found duplicative and hours accumulated while Rossiello was suspended from practice. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit found that the court improperly calculated the rate and erred in declining to award fees to outside counsel. On remand, Pickett sought fees for the life of the case and requested prejudgment interest. Considering his disciplinary history, experience, and prior fee awards, the court ordered payment for the hours approved before Pickett II at $425 per hour, rather than the $540-620 requested; approved the time requested for work on Pickett II, less the time spent on administrative tasks; awarded prejudgment interest as to the Pickett II fees; and determined that the claim to fees for the work done on remand had been waived.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "DPickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr." on Justia Law

At 3 a.m., inmate Mathison, who suffers from chronic high blood pressure, was awakened by excruciating pain in his chest and left arm and other symptoms of a heart attack. He summoned a guard (Wickman), who summoned supervising lieutenant Omelson, who called the nurse on call (Wall). Wall stated that Mathison’s condition was not an emergency and instructed that Mathison to go to the infirmary in the morning. Mathison went at 6:45 a.m., almost four hours after he suffering a heart attack, and was transported by ambulance to the nearest hospital emergency room, in Pekin. From Pekin he was taken immediately to a Peoria hospital to receive advanced cardiac care. He stayed in the hospital for two days. The district court rejected Mathison’s claims of deliberate indifference on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Wickman and the prison doctor, but reversed dismissal of the claims against Omelson and Wall. The court stated that “civilization requires more in a life and death situation,” and questioned “what the judge thinks the minimum level of care is to which a prisoner who is suffering a heart attack is entitled.” View "Mathison v. Moats" on Justia Law