Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and orthopedic examination as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctors, but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. Even if a doctor denies knowing that he was exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a doctor knew he was providing deficient treatment is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Petties produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the doctors knew the care they were providing was insufficient. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, claiming that Belleville police needlessly used a Taser against him. Armstrong did not reply to defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court entered judgment. Armstrong did not appeal within 30 days or request an extension. In September 2014 he requested a docket sheet, which showed the case as closed in May. In January 2015, Armstrong moved to reopen, claiming that he had not received defendants’ motion or the order. The motion cited FRCP 59(e), but the judge deemed it to be under Rule 60(b), because it had not been filed within 28 days, then denied the motion. Armstrong had notified the clerk of his address change, but did not include the caption or docket number of either of two suits he had pending. The clerk found one case, but apparently was unaware of the other. In March, Armstrong filed another unsuccessful motion; 38 days later, a notice of appeal appeared in the electronic filing system, from a state prison library. Armstrong stated that he gave the notice to staff, who delayed filing. The Seventh Circuit deemed the appeal timely under the mailbox rule, FRAP 4(c)(1), but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal. Armstrong did not appeal until after denial of multiple post-judgment motions. Successive post-judgment motions do not extend the time to appeal the denial of the initial motion, nor from the original judgment. Armstrong learned of the judgment within 180 days, but waited to seek relief. Armstrong missed deadlines that a court cannot extend, so the characterization of his papers is irrelevant. View "Armstrong v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law

Ortiz worked as a freight broker for Werner Enterprises for seven years until his discharge in 2012. Werner claims that it fired Ortiz for falsifying business records. Ortiz claims that Werner fired him because of his Mexican ethnicity and sued Werner under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment rejection of the claims. A reasonable juror could infer that managers did not like Hispanics and tried to pin heavy losses on Ortiz to force him out and also might infer that, because of Ortiz’s ethnicity, Werner’s managers fired him for using techniques that were tolerated when practiced by other brokers. It is also possible that a jury might not credit Ortiz’s evidence and could accept Werner’s explanations. Given the conflict on material issues, a trial is necessary. View "Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

O’Malley is serving 10 years in prison for violating the Clean Air Act by improperly removing and disposing of insulation containing regulated asbestos, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(1). After the Seventh Circuit upheld his convictions on direct appeal, O’Malley filed what he called a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1) for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. That rule authorizes a district court to grant a timely request for a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” The district court concluded that O’Malley’s submission contained constitutional theories that, the court reasoned, are incompatible with Rule 33 and cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and that the remainder of O’Malley’s motion could not entitle him to relief under Rule 33, because the new evidence, purportedly discrediting a prosecution witness, was not material. The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the entirety of O’Malley’s submission was within the scope of Rule 33(b)(1) even if his theories overlap with section 2255 and that the district court should have respected his choice between these available means of relief. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Whatley was convicted, under a now‐repealed Indiana law, of possessing about three grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a “youth program center.” Whatley’s father’s home, where he was arrested, was 795 feet from the Robinson Community Church, which hosted events targeted to young persons, including religious services, mentoring programs, a Girl Scout troop, weekly Family Fun Night, and children’s choirs. On direct appeal and in federal habeas corpus proceedings, Whatley argued that the statutory definition of “youth program center,” as any: building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court declined to address the claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Whatley did not procedurally default his claim. The state courts were unreasonable in applying federal law on vagueness: the word “regular” in the definition provides no objective standard and fails to place persons of ordinary intelligence on notice of the conduct proscribed and allows for arbitrary enforcement; defendants are strictly liable for violating the nebulous provision; and the consequences of a violation were extreme. No one in Whatley’s position could have known that the Church would fall within the definition simply because it hosted a few children’s events each week. View "Whatley v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

In several cases, including this one, plaintiffs have asserted that medical care at the Cook County Jail falls below constitutional standards as a matter of official policy, custom, or practice. The 2008 findings from a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of health care at the Jail found systemic flaws in the Jail’s scheduling, record‐keeping, and grievance procedures that produced health care below the minimal requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to allow admission of the report as evidence toward meeting a plaintiff’s burden of proving an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The district court held that the report was hearsay and was not admissible to prove the truth of its findings. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it should be admitted under the hearsay exception for civil cases in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) for factual findings from legally authorized investigations. View "Daniel v. Cook County" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While working as a part-time Village of Orland Hills police officer, Kristofek cited and arrested a driver for car-insurance-related infractions. After several phone calls between the driver’s mother, local politicians, and Scully, the chief of police, the driver was released and the citations were voided. Months later, Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved hypothetical instances of misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. Kristofek sued Scully and the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Kristofek’s statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the voided citations were protected under the First Amendment. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within the department. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Village was not liable for Scully’s actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services; Scully did not possess the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set departmental firing policy. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law