Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, including many with disabilities, had cases pending in state courts and were represented by an attorney who uses a wheelchair. They claimed that the St. Joseph County Courthouse and the Mishawaka County Services Building did not comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, particularly with respect to restrooms, elevators, witness stands, jury boxes, jury deliberation rooms, attorney podiums, spectator seating, entrance ramps, clerk counters, services for the blind, water fountains, and parking. While the case was pending, defendants remodeled the courthouse restrooms, which are now accessible. Defendants presented evidence that their facilities complied with the statutes. Plaintiffs offered little evidence in rebuttal. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The court dismissed the claims of non-disabled plaintiffs represented by a disabled lawyer and claims relating to jury facilities, saying that the ADA did not provide for “associational” standing. The court found no evidence that other plaintiffs had suffered past injuries that would support standing for damages, and that the prospect of future injury was too speculative to support an injunction. Some plaintiffs had died; some were no longer in litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without finding the facilities compliant and without expressing an opinion on possible future claims. View "Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Hughes is confined at Rushville as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207. He will remain there unless it is no longer “substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of sexual violence.” He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rushville's program director, grievance examiner, and security therapy aide infringed his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by disregarding his grievances concerning dental care and insulting him. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal, reasoning that grievances are protected speech and that the abuse to which Hughes was subjected and the warning that his life would be better if he stopped filing grievances went beyond simple verbal harassment. The court noted that Hughes is not a prison inmate but a civil detainee, “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Staff of an institution that houses and treats persons suffering from mental disorders should understand that they are dealing with psychologically impaired persons and should have known better than to shout at a possibly vulnerable person, call him “ignorant,” “stupid,” and a “moron,” ignore grievances that may be meritorious and serious, and threaten him with retaliation for complaining. View "Hughes v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1992, Holmes, was convicted of two murders committed three years earlier at the restaurant where he worked. He and Vance had stabbed three people and stolen the till. He was sentenced to death. Holmes’s conviction and sentence were affirmed and state post‐conviction relief was denied. He sought federal habeas corpus, raising 18 grounds and claiming that he was not mentally competent to assist his lawyers in the habeas corpus proceeding. The judge found him competent and denied his claims on the merits. On remand, the court again found Holmes competent and reinstated the denial of his claims. The Seventh Circuit again reversed, instructing the court to suspend the habeas corpus proceeding “unless and until the state provides substantial new evidence that Holmes’s psychiatric illness has abated, or its symptoms are sufficiently controlled, to justify the resumption of the proceeding.” The district court complied, suspending the habeas proceeding until 2013, when the prison superintendent moved to lift the stay and dismiss the habeas proceeding, based the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ryan v. Gonzales, rejecting “the assertion that the right to counsel implies a right to competence.” The court recognized that the substantive claims presented in Holmes’s petition are “record‐based” and granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding many of his claims defaulted and the others without merit. View "Holmes v. Levenhagen" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

Boss, an African-American engineer for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 2002 to 2011, sued HUD under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging workplace discrimination; retaliation for a prior EEOC discrimination complaint; and hostile work environment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Boss, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1, which requires a summary judgment movant to submit a statement of material facts consisting of enumerated, short, numbered paragraphs with specific references to the record. The court’s discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been repeatedly upheld. Boss could not identify any fact that the court ignored that would have materially altered the Title VII analysis. The court noted that Boss’ arguments and evidence were impermissibly relied upon the conclusions of an ALJ who, in 2009, held a hearing on Boss’ 2007 EEOC complaint; the ALJ had no personal knowledge of this case. Boss failed to prove a materially adverse employment action. He was assigned tasks he did not prefer, but there was no evidence of comments meant to intimidate him, threaten him, or which would be so severe or persuasive as to alter his work environment. View "Boss v. Castro" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Simstads, developers, began the process of seeking approval from the Lake County Plan Commission for a proposed subdivision, “Deer Ridge South.” In late 2006, the Commission approved the plans. The Simstads believed that approval was delayed, at great cost to them, because of their support in 1996 for commission member Scheub’s opponent in the County Commissioner primary race. They sued Commission members and Lake County, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and various Indiana laws. A jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that a defense of claim preclusion, based on earlier state proceedings, had been waived. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a belated answer to the amended complaint or in allowing the defendants to withdraw their deemed admissions. Rejecting an argument that approval was a ministerial act, the court stated that determination of whether a project meets the ordinances, with or without waivers, involves some degree of discretion. The court noted the absence of evidence of animus. View "Simstad v. Scheub" on Justia Law

Dr. Liu, an Asian woman, began working at Stroger Hospital in 1984. Liu says that, beginning in 2003, her supervisors sent a disproportionate number of her cases to review committees as compared to white male colleagues. In 2004, Liu treated a 19-year-old with appendicitis non-operatively and the patient suffered a heart attack, resulting in a clash between Liu and administration regarding her preference for non-operative treatment. After several incidents involving her refusal to conform to policy and to treat appendicitis surgically, her supervisor suspended Liu’s surgical privileges and limited her to “low complexity” cases. The Peer Review Committee investigated several cases and recommended that the suspension continue until Liu completed counseling, “with the goals of gaining insight into her problems, accepting responsibility.” The Executive Medical Staff concurred. in 2010, Liu was terminated because, during the proceedings, she accessed patient records to try to support her position, violating HIPAA and the Hospital System Privacy Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Liu’s claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Liu presented only sparse evidence of animus based on her race, sex, and national origin, none of it linked to the challenged decisions, and did not create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the stated reasons for discipline were honest. View "Liu v. Cook County, Ill." on Justia Law

In 2012, Pierce began working as a Zoetis sales representative. Pierce had several unpleasant encounters with her supervisor, Heuchert, and others. Pierce complained about Heuchert’ to Human Resources, which she alleges, prompted retaliation. Zoetis’ human resources director initiated an investigation, after which all sales representatives were notified that their sales quotas were being adjusted. Pierce alleges that her quotas were adjusted upward more substantially than those of other employees. Pierce also attributes increased difficulty in receiving expense reimbursements to retaliation. In 2013, Pierce took time off for foot surgery. Around that same time, Human Resources informed Pierce that the investigation had concluded and that Heuchert would be disciplined. Pierce returned to work, but was fired three weeks later for failure to meet the increased sales goals. Pierce sued, alleging Indiana state-law claims of wrongful termination and tortious interference with a business relationship. The district court dismissed, citing Indiana’s employment at will doctrine and noting that Pierce failed to follow prerequisites for bringing suit under the Indiana Civil Rights Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of the behavior Pierce identified in her complaint was taken within the scope of Heuchert’s duties as Pierce’s manager, and could not form the basis of a tortious interference claim. View "Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against USPS for employment discrimination based on race and age, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 and 2000e-3, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS and plaintiff appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that USPS has waived any timeliness arguments with regard to the denial of the non-competitive transfer at issue. On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination where another officer's better performance in an interview is unquestionably a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis to hire one candidate over another. The court also concluded that plaintiff has developed no independent age discrimination argument in either the district court or in this appeal supporting his ADEA claims. Furthermore, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails where, plaintiff failed to present any direct or circumstantial evidence that the filing of the EEO complaint was the cause of his direct supervisor's, Captain Williams, rejection of the doctor’s note. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between the filing of plaintiff's informal EEO complaint and the activity of Captain Williams, as plaintiff's proffered pattern does not support a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent. Finally, plaintiff's retaliation claim also fails under the indirect method of proof because plaintiff failed to proffer any employees who are similarly situated for comparison purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Formella v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Illinois and the Board after the Board refused to put plaintiff's name on the ballot for a local government election in 2015. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that, in this case, all three requirements of claim preclusion are satisfied where the parties in the state and federal actions are the same, and the Circuit Court of Cook County's order dismissing plaintiff's petitions for judicial review are a final judgment on the merits. Nor is there any doubt that the state court was competent to resolve plaintiff's federal claims. Finally, both the state and federal actions are clearly predicated on the same set of operative facts and are therefore the same cause of action under Illinois law; the state court proceedings to which plaintiff voluntarily submitted were constitutionally adequate; and plaintiff had a fair opportunity to appeal the state court's decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, and the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause were met. View "Rose v. Board of Election Commissioner" on Justia Law