Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Hively began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been “discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation” as she had been “blocked from fulltime [sic] employment without just cause.” After exhausting the procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. The court relied on precedent, but acknowledged the EEOC’s criticism of its position and that “It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

A woman reported that her former boyfriend, Giddeon, had attacked and threatened to shoot her. The police searched near the home without success, but later spotted a woman (Giddeon’s sister) leaving the victim’s house and entering a car in which the police could see other occupants. The police followed, stopped the car, recognized Giddeon among the passengers, handcuffed him, and put him in their squad car. The driver consented to a search that revealed a shopping bag that contained a gun wrapped in clothing. Giddeon, told of the discovery, admitted after a half hour that it was his gun. In Wisconsin state court he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and disorderly conduct and was sentenced to five years in prison. In Giddeon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the defendants conceded that the police lacked probable cause to stop the car. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. While the search was consensual, Giddeon's arrest in a public place was not unlawful, and Giddeon’s discomfort in sitting in the squad car for 30 minutes on a hot day was not disabling, the stop was an unreasonable seizure of Giddeon’s person, entitling him to damages. View "Giddeon v. Flynn" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915(a)), against prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and medical malpractice. The defendants learned that in seeking permission to litigate in forma pauperis the plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had approximately $1400 in a trust account outside the prison. The district court dismissed, with prejudice on that basis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, on appeal, the plaintiff had not argued that the dismissal should have been without prejudice and that such a dismissal would have had a different impact because the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Wisconsin is six years, not three. The decision to dismiss with prejudice was proper, however, and sends a strong message to all litigants, particularly to the prison population, that dishonesty to the court will not be tolerated. View "Kennedy v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

In 1993, Figgs was convicted of murder, committed while on bond for a drug offense. His 40-year sentence was to be served consecutively to his four-year sentence for the drug offense and was to include credit for time served prior to conviction. His planned release date of November 23, 2013, was apparently calculated under the mistaken belief that he had violated the terms of his mandatory supervised release on the drug charge. He was released on June 28, 2012, having survived summary judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding, in which he challenged his release date. Figgs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the warden, whose conduct did not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court vacated as to the record office supervisor, who did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s sentence until June 2012, nor thoroughly review Figgs’s master file; a jury could find her minimal action so ineffectual that it amounted to criminal recklessness. Her conduct violated Figgs's established constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; the supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Figgs v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Elkhart Community Schools (ECS), has employed Riley, an African‐American female, as a teacher since 1980. She has an administrator’s license and is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named the ECS Teacher of the Year. From 2005-2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for 12 different administrative positions with ECS. Riley filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge, claiming that race, sex, and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not promoted her. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter. Riley filed suit, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Of the positions for which action was not time-barred, one was given to an African-American woman; Riley did not apply for two; and one position was a lateral move so that Riley did not suffer an adverse employment action. Riley did not produce evidence of pretext with respect to other positions. ECS produced the list of factors that the screening committee considered in recommending candidates. View "Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs." on Justia Law

In 2009, Pyles fell down a wet staircase and injured his back while incarcerated at Menard. Since then he has experienced numbness and radiating pain. In 2012, Pyles twice saw Dr.Nwaobasi, an employee of the company that furnishes medical care at Menard. Nwaobasi refused to order additional testing or specialist care. Pyles wanted to photocopy his original grievance before filing it but copies could be made only by the library, which did not accept new photocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles submitted his grievance for photocopying. He received his copies on January 3, 2013, after the 60-day filing window had passed. Pyles submitted the grievance that day. On January 13, Pyles filed a separate grievance against the library, which was lost in the prison administrative system. On March 1, Pyles saw Dr. Shearing, another Wexford employee, and again failed to obtain relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Shearing on March 27, which was denied on June 12, 2013. Pyles claimed that he never received notice of the denial. On July 30, Pyles filed a civil rights action. After a hearing under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, the magistrate found that he had not shown good cause for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment. Pyles had good cause for failing to timely file his grievance against Nwaobasi. The defendants did not meet their burden of proving that Pyles failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the Shearing grievance. View "Pyles v. Nwaobasi" on Justia Law

Chicago police learned from an informant that Anthony was selling crack cocaine from his apartment and answered the door carrying a handgun during drug transactions. They obtained a search warrant. The SWAT team executed a “High Risk Warrant Services” form. The plan called for a team of 20 officers to effect a “dynamic entry” to secure the premises within 30 seconds and authorized the use of “flashbang” grenades. The team executed the warrant while Flournoy was visiting her son “Tony,” with his girlfriend and another of Flournoy’s sons. An officer knocked on the door and yelled, “Chicago police, search warrant!” When no one answered after several seconds, officers breached the door with a battering ram and cleared the windows. Officer Colbenson saw Flournoy move toward the door. Officer Quinn looked through the doorway, did not see anyone, and tossed a flashbang inside. The blast severely wounded Flournoy’s leg. Officers administered first aid until Flournoy was transported. A search uncovered narcotics and a loaded handgun. In Flournoy’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury’s verdict was supported by the record; the exclusion of a handwritten notation--two flashbangs deployed––on one of Colbenson’s typed reports was not an abuse of discretion. A jury statement that “While we agree that this was a horrible instance ... the errors made by the Chicago Police Department as a whole cannot fall on the shoulders of these two defendants” was consistent with the verdict. View "Flournoy v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Since 2004, Poullard, an African-American man, has worked at the North Chicago Veterans Affairs Medical Center as a training specialist. He received a promotion to the GS‐11 pay grade in 2006, but since then, has received neither a permanent promotion nor a raise. He filed suit, alleging that the refusal to promote him or increase his salary constituted discrimination based on sex and race and that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation and a hostile work environment based on the same lack of pay and recognition, and other incidents. The court rejected the claims on summary judgment, concluding that some claims were time‐barred based on Poullard's failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies under 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a). On the timely claims, the court held that Poullard had not suffered an adverse employment action and that a reasonable jury could not find that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it appears that Poullard may not have been managed well or fairly, three arguably race‐tinged remarks, even in combination with the pay disparity and a letter of admonishment, did not show that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. View "Poullard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

From 2008-2010, the FBI and Chicago Police Department conducted a narcotics investigation, “Operation Blue Knight.” As the operation was wrapping up, Officer O’Donnell applied for dozens of arrest warrants, including one for White. Other officers had observed White and his brother sell heroin to an informant. The observations were in a more comprehensive report (NAGIS) that O’Donnell used as the basis for his arrest warrant application. White was arrested, but the charge was dropped. He then brought a civil rights lawsuit alleging that O’Donnell’s actions and a city policy violated his Fourth Amendment rights. White’s claims are based on a theory that O’Donnell failed to present the judge who issued the warrant enough information to establish probable cause for the arrest. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Donnell’s written application for an arrest warrant, supported by his oral testimony about the NAGIS report of the surveillance of the drug deal, provided probable cause for the warrant. Probable cause also establishes that White did not suffer a constitutional injury, which was a necessary element of his “Monell claim” against the city. View "White v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Fowler pleaded guilty in Indiana to unlawful possession of a firearm by a “serious violent felon” who was also a habitual offender. The judge sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment for the possession offense and 15 extra based on his criminal history. While his case was on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana held (Mills) that a prior conviction used to establish “serious violent felon” status cannot also be used to establish habitual offender status. Fowler’s appellate lawyer did not raise Mills before the appellate court, which affirmed his sentence. On collateral review, the same court held that Fowler’s plea bargain waived reliance on the approach that Mills adopted. Fowler then sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied this petition, relying on the state judiciary’s conclusion that Fowler had waived the benefit of Mills. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Judge Magnus-Stinson, who denied Fowler’s federal collateral attack, had also sentenced Fowler during her time on the state’s bench; 28 U.S.C. 455(a) requires the case to be heard by a different federal judge. Section 2254 is designed to ensure that a fresh pair of eyes looks at the matter, from a different perspective. View "Robertson v. Butts" on Justia Law