Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In several cases, including this one, plaintiffs have asserted that medical care at the Cook County Jail falls below constitutional standards as a matter of official policy, custom, or practice. The 2008 findings from a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of health care at the Jail found systemic flaws in the Jail’s scheduling, record‐keeping, and grievance procedures that produced health care below the minimal requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to allow admission of the report as evidence toward meeting a plaintiff’s burden of proving an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The district court held that the report was hearsay and was not admissible to prove the truth of its findings. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it should be admitted under the hearsay exception for civil cases in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) for factual findings from legally authorized investigations. View "Daniel v. Cook County" on Justia Law

McKenzie was killed when he fell to electrified train tracks during a gang-related fight. An Illinois jury convicted Evans of felony murder based on the felony “mob action.” Evans argued on direct appeal that independent purpose was an element of the crime of mob action and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to have the jury to determine whether the underlying offense of mob action had a felonious purpose independent of the killing. The state court concluded that the trial court “adequately apprised” the jury. The federal district court denied relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasoning that Evans’s claim improperly asked a federal court to review a state court’s interpretation of state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Evans did properly present a federal claim: the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine each element of a state crime, his assertion that Illinois defines felony murder to include “independent felonious intent” as a factual element is inaccurate. View "Evans v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

While working as a part-time Village of Orland Hills police officer, Kristofek cited and arrested a driver for car-insurance-related infractions. After several phone calls between the driver’s mother, local politicians, and Scully, the chief of police, the driver was released and the citations were voided. Months later, Kristofek participated in a police training session that involved hypothetical instances of misconduct. Based on these hypotheticals, Kristofek became concerned that official misconduct may have occurred involving the voided citations. After Kristofek shared this concern with other officers and with the FBI, Scully fired him. Kristofek sued Scully and the Village. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Kristofek’s statements to his colleagues and the FBI about the voided citations were protected under the First Amendment. Kristofek was speaking as a private citizen about a matter of public concern, and his interest in speaking outweighed Scully’s interest in promoting efficiency within the department. The Seventh Circuit agreed that the Village was not liable for Scully’s actions under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services; Scully did not possess the requisite authority to unilaterally fire Kristofek or to set departmental firing policy. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

After a 2003 shooting, Lisle was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to 37 years in prison. He sought habeas corpus relief, arguing that the state trial court admitted as evidence testimonial statements made by the surviving victim (Hearn) in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that the state courts did not apply Supreme Court precedent unreasonably in holding that the testimony, about a wounded man’s statement to his aunt (Lee) while waiting for an ambulance that Lisle had shot him, was not a “testimonial” out-of-court statement and was permitted under the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court had not held in 2007 that a statement to someone other than a law enforcement officer can be testimonial, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that Hearn’s statement to Lee was part of an effort to deal with an ongoing emergency and thus was nontestimonial. View "Lisle v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Five months after Chicago police arrested Janusz, a court found that the officers’ stated reasons for approaching and arresting Janusz at a gas station were implausible. Janusz had lost his job because of the charges. Janusz sued in Illinois state court, alleging breach of employment contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and separately sued the city and officers in federal court, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The state court jury awarded Janusz $3,177,500. While appeals were pending, the parties executed a settlement. Janusz executed a release in exchange for $3 million; the parties stipulated that the defendants “ha[d] paid [Janusz] all monies due and owing him as the result of the Judgment previously entered.". In the federal suit, the city defendants sought summary judgment as to damages, arguing that Illinois’s single‐recovery rule prevented Janusz from recovering any damages relating to lost wages and emotional injuries for which the state settlement had compensated him. The district court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both lawsuits involve a single, indivisible set of injuries for which Janusz has already received compensation. Janusz is judicially estopped from arguing that the judgment in the state action was not fully satisfied. View "Janusz v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2000, Morris and Smith were sitting in Morris’s car. Morris fired a handgun, killing Smith. Later that day, Smith’s body was found in a Milwaukee alley. Morris, charged with first‐degree reckless homicide while using a dangerous weapon, retained attorney Backes. On the day set for trial, Backes stated that Morris wanted a new lawyer and that he was not prepared for trial because he believed, until two days earlier, that Morris planned to plead guilty. The court offered to postpone the trial for two days. The prosecutor stated, contrary to its earlier position, that if the case went to trial the state would seek leave to increase the charge to first‐degree intentional homicide. The judge never responded. Morris agreed to plead guilty to first‐degree reckless homicide, without the enhancement for being armed. The judge conducted a plea colloquy: Morris stated that no one had made any threats or in any way forced him to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with attorney Backes, who was also satisfied that the plea was knowing and voluntary. After pleading guilty, Morris fired Backes and hired attorney Awen. At no point before or during sentencing did either move to withdraw his guilty plea or question the plea's voluntariness. The court sentenced Morris to 30 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Morris was under strong pressures, but the evidence did not show that his plea was involuntary. View "Morris v. Bartow" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Zoretics rented a Castilian Court condominium. Their landlord stopped paying condominium assessments and lost possession to Castilian in 2008. Castilian obtained an eviction order. The Cook County Sheriff evicted the family in January 2009. Later that day, Castilian’s agent allowed them to reenter the unit, agreeing they would sign a new lease. Zoretic never signed the lease or paid rent. After receiving no response to two letters, Castilian’s lawyers obtained a new date stamp (April 2009) from the Clerk on the September 2008 order and placed the order with the Sheriff. On June 5, deputies knocked, announced their presence, got no answer, opened the door, and entered the unit with guns drawn. They found Zoretic, put down their weapons, conducted a protective sweep, and escorted Zoretic out of the unit. Days later, Zoretic sued and was awarded possession until Castilian obtained a lawful eviction order. The family returned, continued not paying rent, and were evicted in March 2012. Zoretic sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Fourth Amendment claims against the deputies, but affirmed as to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the owners. Zoretic failed to create a material factual dispute about whether the owners were extreme and outrageous in pursuing eviction. View "Zoretic v. Darge" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2003, a Wisconsin state court convicted Jordan of first‐degree reckless homicide, three counts of first‐degree endangerment, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, based on the shooting of Robinson, who was sitting in a car with three other people when he was killed by shots from a passing car. Before trial, Jordan repeatedly complained about his appointed attorney, Bohach. After a hearing, at which Jordan represented himself, the court denied Jordan’s motion asking for either appointment of new counsel, a delay to enable Bohach to do research Jordan thought necessary, or to waive counsel and represent himself. Jordan had an eighth‐grade education, but a fourth‐grade reading ability. At trial, “Bohach gave Jordan reason to be displeased.” In its closing argument, the prosecution made statements vouching for the detectives’ credibility and urged the jury to consider who had the most to lose—Jordan or the prosecutor. Bohach failed to object. After exhausting state remedies, Jordan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim. The court affirmed with respect to self-representation. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Jordan would not be able to use necessary documents, which would prevent him from effectively representing himself. View "Jordan v. Hepp" on Justia Law