Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Two individuals made false statements to a Village of Deerfield police officer, which resulted in Doe’s arrest. The Village prosecuted Doe for ordinance violations. Although the Village became aware of the falsity of the statements during the prosecution, it nevertheless proceeded and refused to dismiss the charges. The criminal case “resolved in [Doe’s] favor,” and he obtained an order expunging his related arrest and prosecution records. Doe asserts that his arrest and prosecution were conducted in retaliation for his previous lawsuit against a Deerfield police officer. Doe filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing Doe’s failure to comply with FRCP 10(a) requiring him to provide his true name in his complaint’s caption. The court denied Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously, finding Doe did not show exceptional circumstances. Doe argued that having to reveal his true identity would thwart the purpose of the expungement of his criminal records and would embarrass him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that an order denying leave to proceed anonymously falls within the collateral order doctrine and is immediately appealable, but Doe failed to show exceptional circumstances justifying anonymity. View "Doe v. Village of Deerfield" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Jung, patrolling with his partner, approached “Maxwell Street Hot Dog Stand” and saw a woman run into traffic waving her hands, her face covered in blood. She stated that her husband had struck her and pointed toward Hall, to identify her husband. Jung parked, and walked toward Hall. Hall did not comply with Jung’s commands to “stop, put his hands behind his back, calm down, [and] stop screaming.” Jones grabbed Hall. who attempted to twist away; his momentum caused him to fall. After he was in handcuffs, Hall continued to resist and again fell to the ground. Hall did not complain of pain or indicate that his arm was injured. Hours later at the police station, Hall complained of pain; he was taken to the hospital, where doctors discovered his arm was fractured. The entire arrest was captured on video. Hall pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, but filed suit, claiming excessive force, assault, and battery. During discovery, the magistrate set a deadline for Hall to disclose his expert witness (FRCP 26(a)(2)). Hall failed to provide the expert’s report and did not respond to Jung’s motion to strike. The magistrate barred Hall from presenting the expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in Jung’s favor, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings because Hall failed to provide transcripts memorializing proceedings regarding three rulings. Hall’s fourth challenge did not warrant reversal. View "Hall v. Jung" on Justia Law

In September 2008 Dixon was sent to the Cook County jail as a pretrial detainee. A month later, he developed severe and persistent pain in his back and abdomen. In December, he had a CT scan that revealed a paratracheal mass. Over the next few weeks, the mass grew rapidly. Medical personnel at the jail were aware of the problem, but accused Dixon of malingering, gave him over-the-counter analgesics, and ordered him to seek psychiatric care. By January 2009, Dixon’s condition had deteriorated severely. He was finally taken to Stroger Hospital, where he was diagnosed with lung cancer. He died two months later. Dixon’s mother sued Cook County and the doctor and nurse who had overseen Dixon’s care at the jail, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to Dixon’s serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A reasonable jury could find that pervasive systemic deficiencies in the detention center’s health-care system were the moving force behind Dixon’s injury. View "Kevin Dixon v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Chaib worked for GEO Group, a private company that managed an Indiana correctional facility. In 2011-2012, Chaib filed several complaints of racism and workplace harassment with the human resources department and her supervisor. She was injured at work in March 2012, when a remotely-operated metal gate hit her head. Chaib suffered a concussion, GEO Group became suspicious that Chaib was malingering, had an investigator videotape her in public places, and sent the videos to a neurologist whom Chaib was scheduled to visit, ahead of the appointment and without Chaib’s knowledge. The neurologist opined to GEO Group that Chaib was likely malingering. Chaib returned to work after six weeks. She was ultimately fired for “unbecoming conduct” because she improperly extended her medical leave. Chaib sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e., and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and national origin, and retaliation for her reports of workplace discrimination. Chaib also alleged, under Indiana law, that GEO Group had retaliated against her for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of GEO. Chaib did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that GEO Group terminated Chaib for discriminatory reasons View "Chaib v. Geo Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Hill, an Indiana inmate, sued prison staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they had violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from inmates who threw feces at him on four occasions in 2011-2012. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that Hill had not exhausted administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Hill claimed that prison staff had prevented him from filing formal grievances. For the first two incidents, they had improperly refused to process grievance forms. For the third and fourth incidents, they prevented him from filing formal grievances. His counselor refused to give him a grievance form after the third incident, and after the fourth incident, defendant Snyder demanded to know its exact time. Hill is now time-barred by the prison’s grievance policy from further pursuing administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit concluded that summary judgment was improper for three of the incidents. Evidence of refusals to give Hill an available form was sufficient to permit a finding that Hill was prevented from grieving these incidents. The administrative remedies were not available to him. He was not required to hunt for a form from others. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulb was charged with three counts related to methamphetamine manufacturing materials, appeared in an Illinois court via video conference, and waived his right to appointed counsel. Boulb alleges that he met Hyde, his public defender in a 1998 DUI case, and that when Hyde offered him a plea deal, Boulb thought Hyde was his attorney discussing the prosecutor's offer. In fact, in 2008, Hyde was the State’s Attorney. Boulb entered a negotiated plea for a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. Weeks later, Boulb sought transcripts from his case, permission to proceed as a poor person, and appointment of counsel. The court ordered preparation of transcripts. Boulb took no further action. In 2012, Boulb pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846; 841(c)(2); and 843(a)(6), in connection with a methamphetamine conspiracy. The court classified him as a career offender based on his prior state court convictions, including his 2008 conviction. In 2013, Boulb appealed his 2008 conviction, with a motion to withdraw his plea because there was no verbatim transcript of his waiver of counsel, as required. The Illinois appellate court dismissed the request as untimely. Boulb filed an affidavit in his federal criminal case concerning his interactions with Hyde. Relying on 28 U.S.C. 2255’s one-year limitations period, the court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have held a hearing to determine whether the limitations period was equitably tolled by Boulb’s purported mental incompetence. View "Boulb v. United States" on Justia Law

Hill and Roberts applied for firefighter positions with the Chicago Fire Department in 1995, but were not hired because of their scores on a pre-employment examination. They joined a class of roughly 6,000 similarly-situated applicants who argued that the hiring process had an unjustified adverse impact on African-American applicants. In 2011, the court ordered the city to hire 111 class members who were denied employment based on examination scores and to provide compensation to others. The court specified a hiring process with strict deadlines. In October 2011, plaintiffs were notified that they would need to complete a physical abilities test, a drug screening, and a background check. By January 5, 2012, both successfully completed these requirements. On February 22-23, they were notified—allegedly for the first time—that they also needed to pass a medical screening and received offers of employment conditioned on medical screening. Both men complied with the city’s requests concerning identified medical conditions, but they were not hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued right-to-sue letters. Their complaint alleged discrimination against Roberts because of his bronchitis and against Hill because of his asthma and past problems with a hernia and kidney stones. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that plaintiffs did not adequately allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. View "Hill v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Gardner was shot to death in front of a Chicago apartment building in 1999. The state charged three men, including Carter, with Gardner’s murder. Carter was tried alongside his brother, Stone. Both were convicted of murder; Carter was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful state postconviction proceeding, Carter filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief on each of eight grounds presented. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to a single claim: ineffective assistance of counsel. The claim turned on the potential effect of the testimony of two witnesses who were not called in his defense at trial. The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the proffered testimony would not have changed the outcome. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that, while trial counsel’s performance may have been deficient in failing to investigate potential witnesses, the state court’s resolution of the prejudice analysis was not unreasonable. The result have been the same even if the witnesses had testified that Carter was unarmed; such testimony would not have illuminated whether Carter was legally accountable for the actions of his co‐defendants. View "Carter v. Duncan" on Justia Law

In 2004, Bianchi was elected as McHenry County, Illinois State’s Attorney and embarked on reforms. In 2006, a secretary resigned and took sensitive documents with her. Working with an Assistant State’s Attorney, whom Bianchi had demoted, the secretary delivered the documents to the media and to Bianchi’s opponent in the next election. Bianchi learned of the theft and persuaded a judge to appoint a special prosecutor. The secretary was charged with several felonies and eventually pleaded guilty to computer tampering. Bianchi’s opponent and other political enemies obtained the appointment of another special prosecutor, to investigate Bianchi. A grand jury was convened. Bianchi and three colleagues were indicted on multiple counts of official misconduct. All were acquitted. Bianchi and his colleagues sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the court-appointed special prosecutor (Tonigan), the court-appointed assistant special prosecutor (McQueen) and Quest, a firm of private investigators hired by the special prosecutors, and its investigators. They claimed that the defendants fabricated evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment and political retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Tonigan settled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal as to McQueen and the investigators, holding that absolute prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity foreclose the federal constitutional claims. View "Bianchi v. McQueen" on Justia Law

In 1995, Neal was working on Mitchell’s car in the backyard of Neal’s home when Mitchell hit Neal in the head with a brick, causing Neal’s death. Mitchell asserted that Neal had attacked him with a wrench. A post‐mortem toxicology report revealed that Neal had been using alcohol and cocaine. The prosecution presented forensic evidence and a witness (also using alcohol and drugs at the time of the incident) to refute Mitchell’s claim of self‐defense. A jury convicted Mitchell of first degree murder. The court sentenced him to 57 years in prison. After unsuccessful direct appeal and state post-conviction proceedings, Mitchell unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and a due process violation. The Seventh CIrcuit affirmed. Mitchell did not show that his trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to request a second-degree murder “provocation” jury instruction or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision. The due process claim, concerning an unsworn, unsigned affidavit, which avers that the state offered not to charge the witness as an accessory to murder in exchange for her testimony against Mitchell, was procedurally defaulted. View "Mitchell v. Enloe" on Justia Law