Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Felton was in a car in Harvey, Illinois, when he was approached by an unmarked car with tinted windows. Felton, who was unarmed, claims that he feared for his life and fled onto the expressway, heading toward Chicago. Officers “chased” him, firing guns, then “ram[med]” their cars into his, causing him to crash. He states he was “shot by 6 different stu[n] guns,” “put into critical condition,” and suffered broken bones, bruises, a concussion, lost vision, and other injuries. He underwent several surgeries and suffered “excruciating pain and mental anguish.” He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because Felton was incarcerated at the time, the judge conducted an initial screening under, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, noting that the allegations were insufficient to state claims against the only named defendants: Chicago and its police superintendent (in his official capacity). The judge found it “painfully obvious” that Felton’s complaint “had omitted critical facts” and consulted newspaper accounts of Felton’s arrest. “Instead of expending further resources in recapping what those newspaper accounts reflected,” the judge attached them as exhibits to his order, dismissing the suit as “frivolous.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that at least one part of Felton’s complaint was legally viable: his allegation that he was shot by multiple stun guns. View "Felton v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After he was temporarily suspended from Watseka Community High School for allegedly consuming or possessing drugs, Dietchweiler filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his due process rights, with state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and violations of the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/10-22.6, which provides procedures for suspending and expelling students. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the due process claim and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The administrators explained to Dietchwieler and his parents the general nature of the charges against him and provided him with a written suspension notice. Most of Dietchweiler’s complaints about the hearing relate to the defendants’ alleged failure to follow their own published policies and procedures, but failure to follow state statutes or state-mandated procedures does not amount to a federal due process claim of constitutional magnitude. While the Board disbelieved the evidence he presented, due process does not guarantee that his version of events will be believed. View "Dietchweiler v. Lucas" on Justia Law

After a fight with another inmate, Ogurek required stitches and was charged with a disciplinary infraction. Ogurek says he told investigator Gabor that he wanted to charge the other inmate with starting the fight and that he wanted an investigation of the theft of property from his cell while he was in segregation after the fight. When 10 days elapsed with no response Ogurek complained to the warden. According to Ogurek, Gabor berated him for complaining and told him that, after watching a security video, he had determined that Ogurek had started the fight. Ogurek denied this. Gabor filed a disciplinary report for impeding an investigation, which led to Ogurek remaining in segregation for six months. An administrative appeal resulted in expungement, on grounds that Gabor had violated procedure and had failed to substantiate his charge. During discovery in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Ogurek sought the video. The district judge ordered Gabor to respond within 17 days, which he did not do. The judge dismissed the suit before the video surfaced. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An inmate’s complaint of being assaulted and injured by another inmate and then framed by a guard is not a “personal gripe,” that is unprotected by the First Amendment. View "Ogurek v. Gabor" on Justia Law

Stanley was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to distributing crack cocaine. The court found that he was a career offender. Stanley did not appeal his sentence or file a collateral attack within the year allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2255(f). After the Supreme Court held, in Johnson v. United States (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was invalid, Stanley filed a motion under 2255(f)(3), which allows a fresh year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” The district judge denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the Johnson decision applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, it does not apply to Stanley. His drug conviction counts under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b); his conviction for aggravated battery of a peace officer also is outside the scope of Johnson and was counted under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). His conviction for illegal possession of a firearm never qualified as a violent felony and should not have been counted, but the classification is unaffected by Johnson; section 2255(f)(3) does not grant Stanley a fresh window to file a collateral attack. View "Stanley v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Hill was convicted of several drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846. Hill was a career offender based on Illinois convictions for attempted murder (shooting at a car and wounding two occupants) and for aggravated discharge of a firearm (toward a person, not a car), both “crimes of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. His 360-month sentence was within his guidelines range of 360 months to life. His sentence was reduced to 226 months when the Sentencing Guidelines were held not to be mandatory in 2005. In 2016 he sought permission to file a successive motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), based the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which held unconstitutionally vague the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, (mirrored in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2)), which deemed any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, stating that the judge who sentenced Hill and the appellate panel "know with certainty that Hill committed two crimes of violence and that his sentence—amplified by those crimes—for the federal drug offenses of which he was convicted was light, considering the circumstances.” View "Hill v. United States" on Justia Law

Gray, an inmate at Illinois’s Stateville Correctional Center for 15 years, sued the warden under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the warden violated the Eighth Amendment by failing adequately to address the infestation of vermin, insects, and birds in Gray’s cell. He alleged that the prison cleans only infrequently and does not fix broken windows and holes in the walls. Gray suffers from asthma and claims that he had not had an attack for seven years before arriving at Stateville and that he now takes a prescription for attacks that occur about every two years. Gray claims that he has also suffered rashes and is given inadequate access to cleaning supplies. Gray has submitted unsuccessful grievances through the prison’s system. The district court granted summary judgment to the warden, finding that none of the conditions Gray described were so bad that they violated the Eighth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Gray’s individual claims were dismissed prematurely. On remand, the district court can decide how to coordinate the case with a pending class action involving similar allegations. View "Gray v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Imani and Raziga were charged with bank robbery. While fleeing, Imani forced a driver to give him a ride. Police recovered Imani’s fingerprints from the car. The driver identified Imani, in a photo array and later during a preliminary hearing. Raziga pled guilty and testified against Imani. Imani’s lawyer unsuccessfully moved to suppress the driver’s identification as tainted by television coverage. Imani then sought to represent himself, stating that he questioned his lawyer’s abilities. The judge discounted Imani’s statements that he had been “working on this for 13 months;” that he read at a college level; and that he had appeared in court for at least five previous criminal matters, while represented by lawyers. The judge treated the request as requiring permission and as an “immature decision.” Although Imani said that he had no problem with the trial date, the judge denied permission, stating that, upon a further request, he would reconsider. There was no further request. Imani, represented by counsel, was convicted. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's new trial order and affirmed Imani’s conviction, stating that although the court did not conduct a full colloquy, its determination that Imani was not competent to proceed pro se was supported by the record. The district court stated that the competency finding appeared to violate the right to self‐representation, but denied Imani’s habeas petition, based on the finding that Imani’s invocation of that right was not knowing and voluntary. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing Supreme Court precedent, Faretta v. California (1975). A judge may not deny a competent defendant’s timely invocation of his right to represent himself. View "Imani v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, walking her brown labrador retriever, “Dog,” encountered a gray and white pit bull running loose, which lunged at Dog’s neck. The dogs began to fight. Neighbors unsuccessfully tried to separate them. Plaintiff dropped Dog’s leash so that Dog could defend himself. Officer Davis, driving to a burglary call, received a report that a pit bull was attacking another dog at a corner along his route. Davis pulled over and trained his spotlight on the dogs. Plaintiff, who was crying, identified herself and described Dog. Davis has a form of colorblindness that makes it difficult for him to distinguish certain colors, but had not informed his employer of his condition. Davis shot at what he thought was the aggressor. The dogs separated. Dog limped toward plaintiff, who cried that Davis had shot her dog. Davis then aimed at the pit bull and fired several times. The pit bull left the scene. Dog died as a result of the gunshot wound. From the time Davis had arrived until the time he fired his seventh shot, about two minutes elapsed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of Davis in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of Dog. The court upheld a conclusion that Davis had not committed discovery violations and the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ proffered Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis jury instruction. View "Saathoff v. Davis" on Justia Law

Rhein called and sent papers to Illinois Representative DeLuca, accusing DeLuca of violating the constitution and threatening violence. One document asserted: “Now you know why so many of you people or going to be shot because your too selfish too understand the truth.” There were hand-drawn crosshairs. Rhein visited DeLuca’s office and said that he was “ready to start shooting people.” The Illinois State Police discovered that Rhein was licensed to own firearms and had some registered in his name. Officer Coffman concluded that his “mental condition is of such a nature that it poses a clear and present danger,” 430 ILCS 65/8(f), sufficient to justify summary revocation. Police removed his weapons. Coffman sent a letter, stating that Rhein could apply to have the Card reinstated and strongly encouraging Rhein to include three character references plus a psychologist's report. Six months later Rhein requested the Card’s reinstatement, including three references plus a psychologist’s report concluding “that Rhein is all bark and no bite.” Eventually, the Director reinstated Rhein’s Card without a hearing; the firearms were returned. Rhein sued Coffman under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Rhein’s claims. Summary revocation, with hearing to follow, is proper when delay poses unacceptable risks; the officer is entitled to qualified immunity on the delay theory, because courts have yet to determine how quickly governmental bodies must act when the right to keep firearms is at stake. The court noted that Coffman had no role in the restoration of the Card or return of the guns. View "Rhein v. Coffman" on Justia Law

In 2005 the City of Joliet filed a condemnation action concerning the Evergreen Housing Complex. The complex’s owner filed suit under the Fair Housing Act and other federal statutes. After a remand by the Seventh Circuit, the condemnation suit went to trial, spread over more than 18 months of calendar time. In 2014, the district court held that Joliet is entitled to possess (and demolish) Evergreen Terrace, but did not decide the amount of compensation. Pursuant to 735 ILCS 30/10-5-5(a), a jury concluded that $15,077,406 was just compensation. The owner appealed, arguing that Evergreen Terrace is not dilapidated and that razing the buildings would have a disparate impact on its predominantly black tenants, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district judge’s rejection of those arguments. There was substantial evidence to support a finding of no discriminatory intent or disparate impact. The complex is dilapidated and crime-ridden and the city plans to use the land to extend the existing Riverwalk park. View "City of Joliet v. New West, L.P." on Justia Law