Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial (without an evidentiary hearing) of a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, which had claimed that Spiller’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the plea-bargaining process after Spiller was charged with two counts of distributing a controlled substance 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and one count of selling a firearm to a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). The government had filed a notice, under 21 U.S.C. 851, that it would seek an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence based on Spiller’s three prior drug felonies. The government had offered an agreement that, it conceded, did “not offer a whole lot beyond a blind plea.” Spiller executed a blind plea. With a Guidelines range of 262-327 months, Spiller was sentenced to 240 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the Seventh Circuit noted that his attorney reviewed Spiller’s plea options, specifically inquired of the government whether there were differences, examined the government’s response, and suggested that Spiller plead blindly, reserving the right to challenge the government’s Guidelines calculation, a right he would have sacrificed under the government’s proposal. The record was sufficient to explain counsel’s decision as strategic, thereby eliminating the need for an evidentiary hearing. View "Spiller v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants in a suit by Johnson, an inmate of the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility for persons believed prone to sexual violence, claiming that staff had caused Johnson to take the antipsychotic drug Risperdal, for more than a month, without Johnson’s knowledge or consent. The staff did not follow Illinois’s procedures for ordering forced medication; Johnson had not been found to be dangerous to himself or others. The doctor prescribed Risperdal after Johnson complained about feelings of aggression and hopelessness, even though Johnson refused to consent. The doctor stated that he wrote the prescription so that Johnson could take the medication if he wanted it. The nurse, not knowing what the pill was, included the Risperdal with Johnson’s medications for blood pressure, cholesterol, and stomach problems, so Johnson took the drug without noticing it. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a “significant liberty interest,” under the due process clause in “avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” which can have “serious, even fatal, side effects.” While Johnson was not forced to take the pill, the doctor “must have known that pills were delivered to the inmates, unlabeled, in little cups.” View "Johnson v. Tinwalla" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit directed the district court to dismiss, as moot, a lawsuit by a Chicago-area family-owned firm, challenging the “contraception mandate” under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 119. Ozinga regards certain of the contraceptives covered by the mandate as potential abortifacients, the use of which is proscribed by its owners’ and managers’ religious tenets, and sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, in 2013. The government had established an accommodation for certain religious employers that provided for alternate means of ensuring employee access to the contraceptive services specified by the mandate without payment or direct involvement by an objecting employer; the accommodation was not then available to for-profit employers like Ozinga. In light of Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court granted Ozinga a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court subsequently decided, in “Hobby Lobby” (2014), that the contraception mandate, as applied to closely-held private firms whose owners objected on religious grounds to contraceptives covered by the mandate, substantially burdened the exercise of religion by those owners and their companies, in view of the fines to which they were subject for noncompliance. The government then extended the accommodation to private employers, including Ozinga, rendering its suit moot. View "Ozinga v. Price" on Justia Law

Trask was gambling at the Horseshoe Casino when she picked up a $20 bill from the floor. The customer who had dropped the money thought he had been short-changed and reported the loss. Casino personnel reviewed security videos. For 70 minutes Trask was detained by agents of the Indiana Gaming Commission. At the request of the agents, she dumped the contents of her purse and agreed to be patted down; her cell phone was temporary taken from her. Agents seized $8 from the purse. Trask could not find her driver’s license. Agents escorted her to her car, where she found the license and $5, both of which the agents confiscated. She was told she was banned from the casino and would be arrested if she tried to return. Trask filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Indiana law. Trask, acting pro se, contacted the casino's lawyer and accepted a settlement of $100. She later left a voicemail, rejecting the settlement, stating that “I had a change of heart and I called you within 24 hours.” The court ordered the settlement enforced and her claims dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trask’s notarized letter to the casino admitted that she agreed to accept $100 in satisfaction of her claims; her belief that she could back out is “unfounded in the law.” View "Trask v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Hirschbach, a trucking company, offered Turner, an African-American, a job as a driver contingent on his completion of orientation and a drug test. Turner claims that throughout orientation, the evaluator stared at him and once whispered insults. An independent facility collected a urine sample. MedTox split the sample, tested one part, and stored the other. As required by Department of Transportation regulations, MedTox reported Turner's positive result to Hirschbach’s independent medical review officer. Hirschbach’s safety officer, Winegarden, told Turner he could request that the second half of his sample be tested by a different laboratory. Turner told Winegarden he wanted the split test. That test never took place; the reason is disputed. Turner left the orientation program. Hirschbach, as permitted by DOT regulations, reported Turner’s results to an industry consortium which can be seen by future employers, with Turner’s permission. Turner sued under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000– e(2)(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Illinois civil conspiracy law. The district court granted Hirschbach summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Turner did not respond to most of Hirschbach’s statements of undisputed facts. Giving Turner the benefit of conflicts in the evidence, the court found evidence that Winegarden cancelled the split test and acted based on racial animus but no evidence that Winegarden’s racial animus caused him not to be hired. There was no evidence that the MedTox test was unreliable or that the split test would have been negative. View "Turner v. Hirschbach Motor Lines" on Justia Law

After Brown was charged with sexually abusing his children, before trial, the court three times allowed Brown’s appointed counsel to withdraw because Brown would not cooperate. Brown appeared pro se but after “multiple outbursts” and attempts “to intimidate the victim‐witnesses,” the court held that he had “forfeited his right to represent himself.” Brown was convicted. The Public Defender’s Office appointed attorney Rosen to represent Brown on appeal. Brown objected, arguing Rosen was acting without his “consent or participation.” Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of “his constitutional right to represent himself on appeal” and that a lawyer had deprived him of legal documents and prevented him from requesting legal help from a nonprofit organization. The district court screened Brown’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and concluded that his claim that Rosen had been ineffective in representing him was barred because it implied that his conviction may have been invalid and there is no constitutional right to self‐representation on appeal. The Supreme Court has held that in an appeal the state’s “interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice” outweighs the defendant’s interest in autonomy because there is no longer the presumption of innocence and because the Sixth Amendment does not refer to appellate proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, held that Brown’s appeal was frivolous, and imposed two strikes on him under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Brown v. Milwaukee County Public Defender's Office" on Justia Law

Smego, a civilly committed sex offender at Rushville, sued his treatment team, alleging that another resident sexually assaulted him and that defendants forced Smego to continue group therapy with his alleged assailant and retaliated against Smego. After the Seventh Circuit held that Smego was entitled to a jury trial, Smego was represented by University of Illinois law students. Before trial, Smego appeared by video conference or telephone at hearings. For trial, Smego appeared in person. During an off‐the‐record break after closing arguments, the judge removed Smego for transport back to Rushville. The court did not address this removal on the record and issued no cautionary jury instruction regarding Smego’s absence, but instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Smego was not presemt when the jury found in favor of defendants. The judge asked whether the students wanted the jury polled, and a student, without consulting Smego, responded in the negative. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the jury had questions during deliberation or had any reason to know that Smego was not present during deliberations. Failing to poll the jury when it is clear that the verdict was unanimous, was a “minor matter.” View "Smego v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Madison Police Department established a focused deterrence program to increase surveillance of repeat violent offenders. Alston, one of 10 repeat violent offenders originally selected for the program, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was selected for the program because of his race, and arguing that his inclusion in the program deprived him of liberty without due process of law and that he was stigmatized and subjected to increased surveillance, penalties, and reporting requirements. Alston presented evidence that blacks accounted for only 4.5 percent of the Madison population but 37.6 percent of arrests and 86 percent of the program; four candidates associated with allegedly black gangs were selected while the one candidate associated with an allegedly white gang was not. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Alston failed to produce evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the program had a discriminatory effect or purpose or that Alston’s legal rights were altered by inclusion in the program. Alston’s statistics did not address whether black, repeat violent offenders were treated differently from white, repeat violent offenders and were not evidence of discriminatory effect. View "Alston v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Nance shot and killed her husband, Timothy, in the shower. Four days later, Nance reported him missing. Fond du Lac detectives interviewed Timothy’s family, his new girlfriend, friends, and Nance’s sister, Ewell. They learned of the couple’s history of threats and violence. One witness had noticed that the shower curtain, liner, and hooks in the Nance bathroom had been replaced after Timothy disappeared. The detectives reviewed surveillance tapes from a local store, which showed Ewell and Nance buying new shower curtain liners and hooks the night Timothy went missing. Executing a search warrant at the Nance house, detectives seized “biological specimens,” a “projectile” from the bathtub pipes, and other evidence. Ewell refused to answer questions. Both sisters were arrested. A judge, relying on Ledger’s statement and affidavit, determined that probable cause existed to detain Ewell. She spent 12 days in custody before her release. Ewell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. While her appeal of the dismissal of that case was pending. Ewell was convicted in state court of hiding a corpse, harboring or aiding a felony, and resisting or obstructing an officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. For purposes of qualified immunity, it would not have been plain to a reasonable officer that arresting and detaining Ewell under the circumstances would have been unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. View "Ewell v. Toney" on Justia Law

Howell, a veteran and school teacher in his early sixties, has had multiple shoulder surgeries, including complete replacement of his right shoulder. He was able to stretch his right arm, to write on a blackboard, and to lift up to six pounds with his right arm. His left shoulder was in better condition. Highland Police Officer Smith received a call from his dispatcher, alerting him to a road rage incident involving the discharge of a firearm. He later came upon a car matching the description and conducted a “high‐risk traffic stop.” Smith placed Howell, the car’s occupant, in handcuffs and detained him until other officers brought the alleged victim to the scene. The victim identified Howell and his vehicle as involved in the road rage incident. The officers, finding no weapon, decided to release Howell. The stop lasted approximately 30 minutes. Howell claims that the officers’ treatment aggravated his preexisting shoulder condition, which required multiple surgeries. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to deny Smith’s qualified immunity claim. Smith’s decision to place Howell, then implicated in a serious crime involving the discharge of a weapon, in handcuffs and to keep him in handcuffs until satisfied that he was not a threat did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Howell v. Smith" on Justia Law