Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Miller was convicted in Indiana of three counts of child molestation and sentenced to three consecutive 40-year terms. The sexual abuse, including anal intercourse, began when the victim was nine and continued for six years. When imposing the lengthy term the state judge relied on the nature of Miller’s conduct, on his four prior convictions, his failure to reform after stretches of imprisonment, and the absence of any mitigating factors. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal in 2004. Miller then filed a collateral attack, contending that his appellate lawyer furnished ineffective assistance by failing to contest his sentence. The state’s court of appeals concluded that counsel should have raised this issue, but that its omission did not result in prejudice under the standard of Strickland v. Washington because Miller did not establish that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. A federal district judge then denied Miller’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the state’s decision was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” View "Miller v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail, fell and injured his back. It was a month before he was able to see a doctor. Correctional officers did not move him although the doctor determined that he needed to be in a lower bunk. There was no ladder to his upper bunk, so had to sleep on the floor until his term of confinement ended. He sued correctional officers, contending that they had manifested deliberate indifference to an acute medical need. The district judge granted the defendants summary judgment, stating only that “it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received a lower bunk permit at any time while at the jail.” The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that it was disputed and he did receive an order from a doctor directing that he be assigned to a lower bunk. The defendants’ brief did not discuss the dispute and did not substantiate its denial. View "Bolling v. Carter" on Justia Law

Former gang member Herron is serving long sentences. Before his transfer to Terre Haute, he was attacked by inmates and left permanently disabled and confined to a wheelchair. At Terre Haute, Herron was assigned to a wheel-chair-accessible cell. Terre Haute inmates told Herron that he had been targeted because he was believed to be a pedophile. Herron learned that his prison records contained references to the Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. 16901–91, although his convictions are for other crimes. He filed a grievance; the Bureau of Prisons corrected his record. Hearing other inmates were planning to attack him, he asked to be placed in segregation. The prison complied and assigned him a wheelchair-accessible cell. Within a month, his cellmate attacked him over his “Walsh Act stuff.” Herron rejected another assigned cellmate, whom he viewed as threatening, and filed grievances. Guards took Herron to a non-accessible cell and refused to help him to the toilet. He was found lying near the toilet. He was treated for head lacerations, a shoulder contusion, and a sprained spine. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim and the district court's grant of qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment theory, which accepted a claim that the guard was implementing a policy of moving every inmate who objects to a new cellmate, to prevent inmates from reserving one-person cells. View "Herron v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Indiana Pendleton Correctional Facility inmate Ellison was notified of a disciplinary proceeding concerning his possession of heroin that was confiscated by Officer Bynum during a cell-search. Ellison told Officer Guffey that two unfamiliar guards, not Bynum, had conducted the search and found nothing. Although Bynum's report stated that he found heroin in cell 10-5D, assigned to Ellison, a photo of the heroin is labeled “Cell 10-6D.” Ellison requested the identities of the guards who searched his cell and that they appear as witnesses, and sought surveillance video and test results for the substance. He later recognized one of the guards, who identified himself as Dorethery, and confirmed that he had searched Ellison’s cell on the day in question and that no contraband was found. Ellison specifically requested his presence. No witnesses, not even Bynum, appeared at the hearing and Ellison was not permitted to view the video. The hearing officer stripped Ellison of 90 days’ good-time credit. After exhausting administrative remedies, Ellison unsuccessfully sought collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Ellison was entitled to present evidence refuting Bynum’s report, and given the conflict between that report and the photo, the refusal to permit Ellison to exercise that right was “particularly troubling.” View "Ellison v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law

Indiana inmate Flynn claims that the prison impermissibly favored Honor Program participants by allowing them more time outside their cells, more visits, exclusive access to video games, and greater use exercise machines and microwaves. To be eligible for the Program, inmates must be at least 30 (previously 35) years old and cannot have committed any infraction for 24 months or an infraction involving violence for 48 months. Flynn alleges that his first application was denied because he was too young. His reapplication after the minimum age was lowered was denied because the program and waiting list were full. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking the same privileges as Program inmates. The court construed the complaint as claiming age discrimination and dismissed because using age as a proxy for maturity is rationally related to conferring greater trust and responsibility. Flynn unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that the court ignored his equal protection claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates differently if that treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. There are obvious reasons to extend preferential treatment to Program inmates; there are rational reasons for evaluating the prisoner before awarding benefits. The court noted that Flynn incurred one “strike” for filing his complaint and another for his appeal. View "Flynn v. Thatcher" on Justia Law

Nettles-Bey travels to assist African-American youths. El-Bey invited Nettles-Bey to South Holland, offered accommodations at “his house," and gave Nettles-Bey a garage-door opener. Nettles-Bey entered the house;. El-Bey, however, was a squatter, with no lawful interest in the house. The property owner arrived while Nettles-Bey was present and called the police, reporting a trespass. On arriving, officers discovered literature referring to Moorish Science. The officers contend that they take into custody anyone who is the subject of a trespass complaint, so they arrested Nettles-Bey as a matter of routine. Nettles-Bey says that the officers remarked on his status as a Moor and congratulated themselves on detaining another member of that troublesome sect. Nettles-Bey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers assumed from his name that he is a Moor and would not have arrested a Christian or an atheist. The court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. When the argument concerns facts, rather than legal uncertainty, an appeal must await a final decision. The district judge had no doubt about the law, deeming it clearly established that an officer may not arrest someone believed to hold certain religious beliefs, when in otherwise-identical circumstances the officer would not arrest a person holding different beliefs. The judge denied the motion because of doubt about what reasonable jurors would infer about why the officers arrested Nettles-Bey. View "Nettles-Bey v. Williams" on Justia Law

Kuttner began working as a DuPage County deputy sheriff in 1998. In an October 2009 complaint, Sheriff Zaruba asserted that, several months earlier, Kuttner, in uniform, visited the home of a person who owed money to her boyfriend. The debtor’s father had answered the door and told Kuttner that his son was not home. Kuttner left a business card listing her name and a company called “Team in Focus.” Kuttner stipulated to the facts and admitted to violating two rules: by “conduct unbecoming” an officer and improper wearing of the uniform. Other disciplinary charges were dropped. The Merit Commission determined that Kuttner’s conduct was serious enough to warrant discharge. The EEOC declined action. Kuttner sued, claiming sex discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) and alleging that Kuttner was fired and denied a promotion because of her sex and that the sheriff’s policies regarding jail staffing discriminated against female employees. Her lawyer sought the personnel files of more than 30 employees in an effort to find a “similarly situated” employee who was treated differently. The judge imposed limits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed those limits and summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Kuttner v. Zaruba" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin enacted a statute requiring voters to present photographic identification. A federal district judge found violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act and enjoined its application. The Seventh Circuit reversed. After the Supreme Court declined review, the state amended Act 23 to require acceptance of veterans’ IDs. The district court declined to address plaintiffs' remaining argument that some persons qualified to vote are entitled to relief because they face daunting obstacles to obtaining acceptable photo ID. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part; it did not previously hold that persons unable to get a photo ID with reasonable effort lack a serious grievance. The right to vote is personal and is not defeated by the fact that 99% of other people can secure the necessary credentials easily. Under Wisconsin’s law, people who do not have qualifying photo ID cannot vote, even if it is impossible for them to get such an ID. Plaintiffs want relief from that prohibition, not from the general application of Act 23. The district court should permit the parties to explore how the state’s system works today before considering plaintiffs’ remaining substantive contentions. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tolliver agreed to deliver drugs for Tyson. Tolliver left Tyson's house with cocaine. A confidential informant had described Tolliver’s car and a drug packaging operation at Tyson’s house. Two officers, in plain clothes, stopped Tolliver, exited their unmarked car, and pointed a gun at Tolliver. According to Tolliver, he backed up about a car length. Tolliver, who was unarmed, then realized that he was dealing with police. He claims that he did not want the officer to think that he was reaching for a gun, so he sat motionless, with his hands on the steering wheel, and his foot on the brake. He claims that the officer shot him while he was in that position and that he became unable to control the car, which rolled toward the officers. The officers fired 14 times and Tolliver was struck by seven bullets. He pled guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but then sued for excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. A convicted criminal may not bring a civil suit questioning his conviction until the conviction has been set aside. Tolliver’s suit rests on a version of the event that completely negates the basis for his conviction. View "Tolliver v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law