Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Montana was convicted of aiding and abetting a bank robbery in which an accomplice used a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 2113 and 924(c), and was sentenced to a total of 322 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. He then filed unsuccessful postconviction petitions, including a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2014, Montana filed a new petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging only his section 924(c) conviction for use of a firearm in a crime of violence. He contended that the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision (Rosemond) narrowed the scope of criminal liability for aiding and abetting section 924(c) offenses and that the court, therefore, had erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of the offense. The district court dismissed the petition on the merits at the screening stage under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Montana’s prior section 2255 motion and the consequent statutory bar on successive petitions. Rosemond significantly changed the landscape for his offense of conviction and therefore applies retroactively, but Montana cannot avail himself of the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) because he could have brought his current argument at an earlier time. View "Montana v. Cross" on Justia Law

Wilson and Hanson, business partners, had a property ownership dispute. Warren County issued a letter stating that real property occupied by Wilson had to be cleaned up, but sent the letter to Hanson. Hanson, attorney Johnson, and Reiners, photographed Wilson’s property. Wilson, who suffers from psychological disorders, became upset and was hospitalized. Wilson’s friend called State’s Attorney Algren, who stated that the men could not take Wilson's property without a court order. Hanson, through Johnson, sought such an order, but was unsuccessful because the judge was unavailable. Johnson told Algren about the suit but did not disclose his failure to get the order. When the men began removing items, Wilson called the sheriff’s department, which dispatched Carithers, who believed that Hanson owned the property. Johnson told Carithers that they had a legal right to remove property and handed him a stack of "court papers." Carithers called Algren, who advised him that if Johnson had the proper papers, they were within their rights. Wilson suffered another anxiety attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, rejecting Wilson’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Hanson, Johnson, Reiners, the county, Carithers, and Algren, and dismissal of a Fair Housing Act claim against the three private defendants.There was insufficient raise the inference that the private defendants would not have removed Wilson's property if he wasn’t disabled or that they acted under color of law. View "Wilson v. Warren County" on Justia Law

Dawkins was convicted of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, as a career offender, based on Illinois convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking and residential burglary. He was previously has been denied permission to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States. The Seventh Circuit concluded that residential burglary in Illinois is equivalent to generic burglary of a dwelling, which is an enumerated crime of violence, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). Dawkins again sought to challenge his sentence, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 holding in Mathis v. United States, that Iowa’s burglary statute, which forbids entering “an occupied structure” with the intent to commit a felony is broader than “generic burglary,” and categorically not a violent felony. The Seventh Circuit dismissed. Even if Mathis made reliance on an Illinois burglary conviction suspect for purposes of the career‐offender guideline or Armed Career Criminal Act, Dawkins has already been denied permission to file a successive section 2255 motion, so this claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1). An independent claim based on Mathis must be brought, if at all, under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the district where he is in custody. View "Dawkins v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Southern Illinois University (SIU) hired Dr. Hatcher as an assistant professor of political science. In 2010 Hatcher assisted a graduate student in making a sexual harassment complaint about a faculty member. Hatcher was up for tenure and promotion to associate professor in 2011. Hatcher had received positive annual evaluations. Her external reviewers all recommended tenure.The political science department voted in favor of promotion and tenure. The College of Liberal Arts committee voted 5‐4 in favor of tenure and 5‐4 against promotion, noting Hatcher’s success in teaching and service, but expressing concern about her lack of academic publications in prestigious journals. The dean recommended that she receive neither tenure nor promotion. The provost agreed. Hatcher was denied tenure and, later, fired. Two male professors in Hatcher’s department were promoted and awarded tenure. The Review Board found that the provost did not sufficiently explain his decision; the Chancellor agreed, but declined to reverse the denial. Hatcher filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her subsequent suit was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Hatcher did not produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that SIU was lying about its reason for denying her tenure; she was not engaging in speech protected under Title VII or by the First Amendment when she assisted the student with the sexual harassment report. The court reversed dismissal of her claim of retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC. View "Hatcher v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a prisoner and a Wiccan, was denied permission to wear a “pentacle medallion,”a five-pointed silver star set in a circle less than an inch in diameter. The pentacle medallion is to the Wiccan religion what the cross is to many Christians. Plaintiff’s medallion was small enough to comply with prison regulations regarding jewelry; the day after issuing him a jewelry retention permit, the prison confiscated the medallion. In plaintiff’s suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc–1, the warden argued that the Illinois Department of Corrections prohibits inmates from possessing “five and six-point star symbols” because they are usable as gang identifiers. Without addressing the merits of the suit or the defense, the district judge denied a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened religious exercise, not whether the claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise. The court noted that the plaintiff is willing to wear his medallion under his shirt whenever he’s outside his cell to protect himself from being identified as a gang member and had tendered an affidavit from another Wiccan prisoner, who attested that he has worn his medallion in maximum security prisons since 1998 without experiencing threats or violence. View "Knowles v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Gaylord pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to distribution of oxycodone. Evins had ingested the oxycodone pills distributed by Gaylord, as well as cocaine from another source, and died. Gaylord was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence when death results from the distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Gaylord later brought a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing that as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “death results” enhancement of section 841(b)(1)(C) was inappropriately applied to his sentence. Gaylord contended that the oxycodone he distributed was not shown to be the but-for cause of Evins’s death, so counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the sentencing enhancement incorporated in the plea agreement. The district court dismissed Gaylord’s motion. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Gaylord’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to provide Gaylord’s counsel with an opportunity to explain whether he was aware of the “but-for” causation requirement and whether he examined the postmortem and forensic pathology reports and shared the results of his analysis with Gaylord. View "Gaylord v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1994, Shott, a tenured associate professor of biostatistics at Rush University, sued, claiming discrimination by refusing to make reasonable accommodations for her religion (Orthodox Judaism) and disability (rheumatoid arthritis). A jury rejected Shott’s claim of religious discrimination but awarded her $60,000 for disability discrimination. She sued Rush again in 2011, alleging that Rush refused to increase her salary or promote her in retaliation for her earlier lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Rush. While that lawsuit was pending, Shott sued Katz (42 U.S.C. 1981), whom she had occasionally helped with statistical analysis, alleging that, in retaliation for her litigation Katz impeded her career advancement by rebuffing her invitations to collaborate. Katz was also Shott’s treating rheumatologist; she claimed he failed to timely respond to requests for prescription refills, requiring her to have an examination every six months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that Shott had not alleged that Katz’s medical care affected Shott's employment. Nor did the examination requirement amount to a material adverse action. “If she was not willing to comply with that obviously reasonable condition, she should have tried to find a new doctor, not filed a federal civil rights lawsuit.” Shott failed to allege a sufficient “nexus” between Katz’s refusal to collaborate and her career advancement; Katz’s decisions about what research to pursue, and with whom, are protected by the First Amendment. View "Shott v. Katz" on Justia Law

Torres‐Chavez, a member of the drug‐trafficking cartel “La Familia,” which is based in Michoacán, Mexico, was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment after his convictions for conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, and using a cellular phone to facilitate the distribution conspiracy, After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Torres‐Chavez sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that six months before trial, the government offered a plea agreement that provided for 10 years’ imprisonment (the statutory minimum for conspiring to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II)) and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for advising him that the government lacked enough evidence to convict him. The district court denied Torres‐Chavez’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding that this advice was not objectively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit reversed the ruling as premature. The record contains no evidence about what Torres‐Chavez’s counsel knew about the government’s case against his client at the time of the offer, and the government’s case at trial was quite strong. View "Torres-Chavez v. United States" on Justia Law

Felix suffers from mental health disabilities, including PTSD, major depressive disorder, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and phobia. She takes prescribed medication and attends counseling. Felix was employed from 1998 to 2013 in the Appleton Division of Motor Vehicles customer service facility, administering road tests, performing clerical duties, and collecting fees. She “was punctual, reliable, friendly with customers, and patient with new drivers.” She excelled in administering road tests, but did not meet expectations in financial accountability. A 2011 rule change precluded an overall rating of satisfactory if the employee did not meet expectations in specified areas, including financial accountability. Felix was given an overall evaluation of unsatisfactory and was placed on probation. Her difficulties persisted. Her employer's procedures called for a final performance improvement plan which, if not completed successfully, would result in her discharge. Felix began to experience panic attacks and notified her supervisor of her anxiety disorders. One panic attack included hysterical screaming and self-harm. Her co-workers called 911. She did not return to work. An independent medical examiner concluded that she “remains at increased risk for potentially violent behavior toward self and others within the workplace.” Her employment was terminated. She sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Felix, reasoning that she was discharged not solely because of her disabilities but based on workplace behavior that indicated that she posed a safety risk to herself and others. View "Felix v. Wis. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former detainees, brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Cook County, claiming that the level of dental care at the Jail demonstrated deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court originally certified two classes of plaintiffs under FRCP 23, but later decertified one class and modified the other, finding that the Jail’s implementation of a consent order with the Department of Justice eliminated a common question concerning inadequate staffing and brought care into compliance with national standards. The court could not find another common factor among the claims, noting that “treatment of dental pain may fall below the deliberate indifference threshold for many reasons and at many stages.” The court then determined that the detainees’ motion for injunctive relief was moot. While an appeal was pending, the detainees unsuccessfully moved for a new trial (FRCP 60(b)) based on newly discovered evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding decertification of the classes because of the lack of a common issue of fact or law. The detainees’ questions do not point to the type of systematic and gross deficiency that would lead to a finding that all detainees are effectively denied treatment; they did not allege a specific policy that directly causes delay, nor a pattern of egregious delays across the entire class. Filing a Rule 60(b) motion during the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate; there was no final judgment in the case. View "Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County" on Justia Law