Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Carrion entered the apartment of 69‐year‐old Zymal and stabbed her, causing her death. Carrion, who lived in an apartment above Zymali’s, was a 19-year‐old immigrant who spoke almost no English. He was interviewed in Spanish, denied involvement with Zymali’s death, but agreed to provide fingerprint samples. His fingerprint was found on a knife recovered from Zymali’s apartment. Illinois courts affirmed his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree murder on direct appeal and on post-conviction review. Carrion’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 was denied. The court concluded that although it probably was timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted and remaining claims were meritless. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his confession. The court concluded that, whether applying the deferential review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or de novo review, Carrion is not entitled to relief. The prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no due process violation in the reception into evidence of Carrion’s statement, as translated by an investigating officer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thoroughly at trial. View "Carrion v. Butler" on Justia Law

McGuire pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce by threat or violence. The district court classified McGuire as a career offender under section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in section 4B1.2 and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (the residual clause). The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence. One conviction, for fleeing the police, qualified only under the residual clause. With the career-offender enhancement, McGuire’s Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the judge imposed a sentence of 188 months, noting her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson holding that the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Rebirth ran a child care ministry—a “child care operated by a church or religious ministry that is a religious organization exempt from federal income taxation,” Ind. Code 12‐7‐2‐28.8. After an unannounced inspection, a Bureau of Child Care employee gave Rebirth a “Plan of Improvement,” stating that Rebirth had violated statutes and regulations governing registered child care ministries and directed Rebirth to cure the purported infractions and submit proof within 10 days. Rebirth believed that it had not committed any violations and did not submit any documentation. The Bureau sent Rebirth a notice of termination. Despite Rebirth’s request to appeal administratively, the Bureau terminated Rebirth’s registration and the child care operation closed. Indiana’s statutory scheme does not give providers an administrative opportunity to challenge the decision to revoke a certificate of registration. Rebirth sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the due‐process clause. The district court dismissed Rebirth’s individual‐capacity claims, citing qualified immunity. After the parties developed an evidentiary record on the official‐capacity claims, Rebirth prevailed on its claims for injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the individual-capacity claims, concluding that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants violated clearly established law by depriving Rebirth of a property interest (its registration) without first providing any opportunity to be heard. View "Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers arrested Bell for possession of a controlled substance while he was driving Spinks’s vehicle. They impounded the vehicle after Bell’s arrest. Chicago Municipal Code 7‐24‐225 permits police to impound a vehicle when officers have probable cause to believe it contained a controlled substance or was used in an illegal drug transaction. Spinks challenged the impoundment in the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ determined that probable cause existed to impound the vehicle. A month later, an ALJ found Spinks liable for violating the Code and ordered that she pay the prescribed penalty of $2,000 plus $180 in storage and towing fees. Spinks and Bell filed suit, alleging that the ordinances were facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Code permits warrantless seizure of vehicles in all instances and allows for a non‐judicial officer to determine whether probable cause exists to allow the vehicle to remain seized. Under the Code, the officer seizing the vehicle without a warrant must have probable cause to believe it contains illegal drugs or has been used in an illegal drug transaction. The court noted that plaintiffs did not employ post-seizure state law remedies. View "Bell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Walker, convicted in 2006 of robbery, was adjudicated a habitual offender pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-8. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison; 20 of those years were attributable to his habitual-offender status. The Indiana habitual-offender statute applied if a defendant had been convicted of two prior unrelated felonies: the second felony had to have been committed after the sentencing for the first, and the present crime had to have been committed after the sentencing of the second earlier offense. At Walker’s trial, the state provided evidence of three prior felonies but failed to offer evidence of the date when one of the crimes was committed. Seeking federal habeas relief, Walker argued that his lawyer on direct appeal should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the habitual-offender conviction, given the missing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Even assuming that counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Walker’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not infringed meets the generous standards that apply under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Walker v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Lane, an African-American, began working as a hospital security guard in 1999. He had an unblemished employment record until August 2012, when a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started hitting and kicking his caregivers. Health care professionals, afraid to approach the patient or enter the room, summoned security. Lane responded and saw the patient kick a staff member in the back. Lane tried to restrain the patient, who tried to bite him and spit in Lane’s mouth. Lane slapped him in the face. The patient settled down. Lane filed reports explaining why he thought the slap was justified with the hospital and with the Sheriff’s Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a condition of his job. The recipients concluded he had shown poor judgment. The hospital’s director of human resources recommended that Lane’s employment be terminated. After a consultation with the Sheriff’s Department, the hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would be fired. He resigned. After exhausting EEOC remedies, Lane filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Lane intentionally struck a patient; termination was a reasonable response. “Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstantial evidence of race discrimination” did “not hold together sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact.” View "Lane v. Riverview Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2001, 15‐year‐old Stacy opened the door of her Dale, Indiana home to Ward, ostensibly looking for a lost dog. Stacy let him in. Her sister, who was upstairs, heard screams. Looking down, she saw Stacy on the ground with a man on top of her. Her sister called 911; police arrived 10 minutes later. Marshal Keller entered and saw Ward, near the door with a knife in his hand, sweating. Keller took Ward, in custody, outside, and returned to see Stacy lying in a pool of blood, disemboweled, evidently raped, trying to speak. She died hours later. After a conviction was vacated for failure to grant a change of venue, Ward pleaded guilty. A jury recommended death; the trial court sentenced him accordingly. His conviction and sentence were upheld in state courts. The district court denied habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting an argument that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by portraying him as a dangerous, incurable “psychopath,” which was enough to undermine confidence in the sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Ward suffered no prejudice was reasonable. “Against the mitigating evidence counsel did not use, and the psychological labels that were used, stood a mountain of stark evidence against Ward.” View "Ward v. Neal" on Justia Law

During a “shakedown” of several cells, Stateville guards handcuffed Anderson behind his back and ordered him to walk down a flight of stairs to wait in a holding area while his cell was searched. These stairs were “covered [with] food, milk, and other garbage, and had been for several days.” The guards refused Anderson’s request to help him walk. He slipped and fell down 13 stairs. He was knocked unconscious and suffered “continuing and permanent” injuries. Anderson sued the guards, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the risk was not substantial enough to violate the Eighth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the risk of serious harm involved in negotiating the stairs, strewn with litter and slick from milk, unaided and cuffed behind the back, was substantial. View "Anderson v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Weldon, Fields, and Roth pooled $120 to buy heroin from Weldon’s drug dealer. Roth drove. Weldon got out of Roth’s car, walked to the dealer’s car, gave the dealer the $120, and returned with the heroin. At Roth’s home, Fields mixed the heroin with water, divided it, and injected it into the three of them. Roth died as a result. Fields was tried, but argued that injecting Roth was not distribution; she was acquitted. Weldon pleaded guilty to having distributed an illegal drug, resulting in a death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Because he agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of another person he received a prison sentence of only eight years. Three years later he moved to vacate his conviction on grounds that his lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance by persuading him to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit vacated denial of the motion. Individuals who “simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together,” are not distributors, “since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person.” Fields was acquitted and the defendants were participants in the same transaction. The insistence of Weldonʹs lawyer that a defense to the charge of distribution had no chance of success was constitutionally deficient. View "Weldon v. United States" on Justia Law