Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1999, three masked men broke into a Chicago apartment shared by Stone, his cousins, and Grant. Grant and one cousin were home. One intruder beat Grant with a bat. The intruders stole jewelry, marijuana, and cash before fleeing. Stone arrived home, called his half-brother, “Junior,” and explained what happened. Junior, Stone, and Jones decided that Gardner was to blame. They lured Gardner outside; an altercation ensued. They claim Gardner produced a gun. Gardner was fatally shot. Stone turned himself in the next day, claiming that he shot to protect Junior. Stone was convicted of murder. Jones was separately convicted. In his habeas petition, Jones alleged that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the Strickland rule for failure to present Stone’s testimony. Stone had consistently stated that he alone shot Gardner. Stone’s story matched the physical evidence and some eyewitness testimony. Jones failed to submit an affidavit from Stone, as Illinois law requires. The state appellate court found the claim procedurally defaulted and rejected the claim on the merits, holding that failure to call Stone was “trial strategy.” The federal district court excused the procedural default based on new evidence of Jones’s actual innocence (Stone’s testimony) and concluded that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. Failure to call Stone cannot reasonably be classified as mere trial strategy within the range of objectively reasonable professional judgments. View "Jones v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Whitaker is a transgender boy whose high school will not permit him to use the boys’ bathroom. He sued, alleging violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants appealed denial of a motion to dismiss, arguing that appellate jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The district court subsequently vacated its certification and the Seventh Circuit denied permission to appeal. The district court’s decision to withdraw certification destroyed jurisdiction to consider the petition under section 1292(b). View "Kenosha Unified School District v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

In August 2008, a Milwaukee County jury found Carpenter guilty of kidnapping, false imprisonment, four counts of second‐degree sexual assault, and four counts of first‐degree sexual assault. Carpenter was sentenced to 59 years’ imprisonment followed by 24 years of extended supervision. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Carpenter’s petition for review. He unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The petition had been filed almost seven months after the one-year period for filing had passed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Carpenter’s request for equitable tolling. Carpenter did not exercise reasonable diligence in pursuit of his rights. Although he filed two federal motions seeking an extension of time, he ignored the district court’s instructions regarding the proper way to seek such an extension. Carpenter failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his physical and mental health issues, even when combined with the other circumstances he classifies as extraordinary, “actually impaired his ability to pursue his claims.” View "Carpenter v. Douma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, was in his fourteenth year at a Wisconsin medium-security prison when he was placed in a cell with DaSilva, who, 12 days later, sexually assaulted plaintiff in their cell. DaSilva was in prison for having sexually assaulted a woman. Both were classified as “medium security” inmates. DaSilva had committed eight violations of the prison’s rules in two years, including fighting, lying, theft, and use of intoxicants—but no sexual offenses. An investigation resulted in a criminal charge being lodged against DaSilva and an official notice that plaintiff and DaSilva were not to share a cell. Plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to the danger of sexual assaulted by DaSilva, was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to the practice of random assignment of cellmates. The court noted the prison’s compliance with the notification requirements of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 15601–15609, and that there was no evidence that plaintiff expressed any concern about being vulnerable to sexual assault. The staff was apparently unaware that the plaintiff was perceived by other prisoners to be homosexual; nor was there any evidence of such a perception, apart from the plaintiff’s unsupported claim. View "Ramos v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

Viramontes was charged with mob action, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest, arising out of an incident at a Puerto Rican street festival in Chicago. The state court judge held, “I find the Defendant guilty of resisting a police officer and aggravated assault in that he took a substantial step and actively swung in the direction of the police officer and missed,” and that “after the Defendant swung … he did actively resist” and sentenced Viramontes to 100 days’ imprisonment. Viramontes then sued officers involved in the arrest and the city, alleging that the officers used excessive force. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants on Viramontes’s claims. Viramontes unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing attorney misconduct and procedural and evidentiary errors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim involved the incident for which Viramontes was convicted of aggravated assault and resisting arrest, the claim implicated the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, that such a claim is barred if it “necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of his conviction.” While the excessive‐force claim was not inconsistent with Viramontes’s conviction, the court properly instructed the jury that the facts underlying the conviction had to be taken as true. View "Viramontes v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit has held that states must permit law-abiding, mentally healthy persons to carry loaded weapons in public. Illinois’ Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1, authorizes an Illinois resident to carry, on his person or next to him in a car, a firearm that is fully or partially concealed if he meets qualifications set forth in the Act: that the permit applicant not present a clear and present danger or a threat to public safety and not in the last five years have been a patient in a mental hospital, or been convicted of a misdemeanor involving the use or threat of physical force, or been in a residential or court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program, or have committed two or more DUI violations, or be subject to a legal proceeding that could lead to being disqualified to possess a gun. A non-resident can obtain a permit if he resides in a state or territory that has “laws related to firearm ownership, possession, and carrying, that are substantially similar to the requirements to obtain” an Illinois concealed-carry license, and submits a notarized statement confirming that he is eligible under federal law and the laws of his home state to own a gun and licensed by that state to carry a gun. A person from a state that is not substantially similar, but who has a firearm license from his own state. is allowed to carry a firearm while hunting or at a firing range or on property whose owner permits him to carry a gun, The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by nonresidents, calling the law “imperfect,” but not unreasonable. The court noted that a trial may cast a different light on the law, given the problems inherent in verification of an application. View "Culp v. Madigan" on Justia Law

For weekday shifts, Antioch Rescue (ARS) used paid EMTs through subcontracts with private ambulance companies. For evening and weekend shifts, ARS used unpaid volunteers. Volling began as an unpaid EMT in 2008. In 2010, she transitioned to paid shifts under ARS and Metro. Springer began working for ARS and Metro in 2009. In 2011, Volling filed charges with the EEOC, alleging sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation; she later filed suit, alleging violation of the Emergency Medical Services Act, including physical abuse of patients and on-duty alcohol and drug abuse. Volling’s report to the Illinois Department of Public Health resulted in fines and EMT license suspensions. Plaintiffs also spoke at public meetings. Springer filed a supporting declaration in Volling’s lawsuit and assisted in the investigation. ARS terminated its subcontract with Metro, replacing Metro with Kurtz. Kurtz immediately began hiring former Metro EMTs, without publicizing its vacancies. ARS instructed every former Metro EMT—except plaintiffs— on how to apply under the new contract. Kurtz asked ARS for the former Metro EMTs’ contact information. ARS and Kurtz rehired every other Metro EMT. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and the Illinois Human Rights and the Illinois Whistleblower Acts. ARS settled with plaintiffs. The district court granted Kurtz’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Title VII and IHRA. Plaintiffs adequately pled both an adverse employment action and a causal link between that action and their protected activity. View "Volling v. Kurtz Paramedic Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Bloomington Officers, surveilling for loud-music violations, saw Tapley drive by and decided to make a stop. Tapley turned into a parking lot. Officer Stanfield followed. Tapley went into a store, then returned to his truck. Stanfield testified that he heard Tapley’s music emanating from the truck as Tapley was preparing to drive away and that he had difficulty following because Tapley was driving “at a very high rate of speed.” When Tapley saw Stanfield’s unmarked cruiser behind him, he turned his music down. Stanfield stopped Tapley, explaining that the stop was for loud music. They also discussed Tapley’s excessive speed. Other officers arrived and told Tapley to get out of the truck. The parties dispute what happened next. Tapley claims he was threatened with a taser; the officers claim that Tapley refused to exit the truck. The officers arrested Tapley for obstruction of justice and resisting arrest and searched Tapley and the truck. Tapley was acquitted of obstruction charges. After an earlier suit was dismissed, Tapley reasserted a claim of illegal seizure that he had previously voluntarily dismissed. The Seventh Circuit declined to review the earlier case for lack of an adequate record and affirmed the dismissal of the 2015 case, finding probable cause for the arrest. View "Tapley v. Chambers" on Justia Law

In 2010, Alston was convicted of five charges and placed on probation. Dane County law enforcement agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to monitor and offer resources to probationers whom they identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In 2011, Alston was identified for participation in that program and was offered resources aimed at deterring him from reoffending, with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation. Alston was arrested a month later, for violating his probation. A revocation hearing was held before an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, who stated that she had attended a presentation on the SIU program and her understanding that “it would be expected that they wouldn’t be given another chance. … [they] would be revoked.” Alston unsuccessfully sought substitution of a “neutral party” who had not attended the presentation. His probation revocation was upheld by state courts, which held that the ALJ's attendance at the presentation did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in violation of Alston’s due process rights. Rejecting Alston’s federal habeas petition, the district court found, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. View "Alston v. Smith" on Justia Law

n 2010, McDonald, an Illinois inmate, filed a complaint in the Illinois Court of Claims against the Illinois Department of Corrections for violation of his free exercise rights. He alleged that Muslim inmates are not permitted to attend prayer service each Friday, that prison officials regularly steal Arabic prayer cassette tapes and Muslim prayer rugs, and that Christians are permitted to have more volunteers enter the facility than are Muslims. He sought a damages award of $5,000 and injunctive relief The Court of Claims held a hearing but failed to issue a decision for more than two years. Meanwhile, McDonald filed a federal pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming prison officials in their official capacities, seeking only injunctive relief. In 2013, the Court of Claims finally issued a decision, rejecting all of McDonald’s allegations in a terse two‐page order. The district court then dismissed the federal complaint as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the defendants conceded that McDonald’s suit is not barred by res judicata, and expressing no opinion regarding the merits of the remaining arguments. The Illinois Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to decide McDonald’s federal constitutional claim, View "McDonald v. Adamson" on Justia Law