Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In November 2012, 18 months before Indiana’s primary election, Common Cause sought a declaration that Indiana Code 33– 33–49–13 violated its members’ First Amendment right to cast a meaningful vote. The statute established the system for electing Marion Superior Court judges, providing that a political party could not nominate through the primary election more than half of the candidates eligible to sit on that court. Political parties eligible to hold primaries were those whose candidates for Indiana Secretary of State received at least 10 percent of the votes cast in the last general election; since 1952, only the Republican and Democratic parties have met that threshold, effectively limiting the candidates that could be selected by the voters. Marion County was the only place in the country to employ such a process. While the litigation was pending, Marion County held its primary election. There were 16 open Superior Court positions; eight Republican and 11 Democratic candidates (including plaintiffs) ran. Plaintiffs spent almost no effort campaigning and did poorly. The statute was declared unconstitutional before the general election. Plaintiffs sought a special election, to vindicate their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, holding that a special election was not appropriate, given the potential burdens on the county as weighed against plaintiffs’ interest in being placed on the ballot and the voters’ interest in casting a meaningful vote. View "Bowes v. Ind. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Williams, serving a 65‐year prison sentence for murder at the Pontiac Illinois maximum‐security prison, ordered the death certificate of the woman whom he murdered. Staff confiscated the certificate (which had arrived from the county clerk's office with an unsigned note: “There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!” The stated reason for confiscation was “it posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution and would negatively impact Inmate Williams’ rehabilitation.” The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that confiscating the certificate had decreased the risk that inmates would retaliate against “boasting inmates” like Williams, and had protected the victim’s family from being identified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to defendants not involved in the confiscation, but otherwise reversed. The right of an inmate to read the mail he receives, provided that his reading it would not infringe legitimate interests, is clearly established. The prison must present “some evidence” to show that the restriction is justified. A prison has a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies, but Williams asserted that he needed the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings; the defendants presented no contrary evidence. View "Williams v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law

Ernst and four other women, all experienced paramedics from public and private providers of emergency medical services, sought employment as paramedics with the Chicago Fire Department. All five women were denied jobs because they failed Chicago’s physical-skills entrance exam. The test had first been implemented in 2000 and had a disparate impact on women. The five filed a Title VII gender-discrimination lawsuit against the city, arguing that Chicago had a discriminatory motive against women and that that improper statistical methods were used to establish the skills test. Both arguments were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On the disparate impact claims, the jury should have been instructed on the plaintiffs’ burden of proving that Chicago was motivated by anti-female bias, when it created the exam that; instead, jurors were instructed on a different burden, which failed to address Chicago’s motive for creating the test. The physical-skills study was neither reliable nor validated under federal law; the skills that Chicago paramedics learn on the job are different than what was tested. Even if they were the same, the physical-skills entrance exam is significantly more difficult than the actual job workers perform. View "Ernst v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hinesley was convicted of molesting his 13-year‐old former foster daughter, V.V. At trial, the prosecution had elicited the initial, inculpatory out‐of‐court statements of V.V. and her former foster brother, Billy, at length, with no objection. Before trial, it had come to light that V.V. and Billy (age 20) had been in a sexual relationship and had tried to conceal that relationship. The two had changed their accounts. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of statements by the investigating detective and by Billy that they believed V.V. The defense highlighted the changed stories. The trial judge found V.V.’s testimony credible. After exhausting state court remedies, Hinesley sought federal habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance by trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of his petition. The Indiana Court of Appeals took the constitutional standard seriously and produced an answer within the range of defensible positions. The defense had a pre‐trial run‐through with V.V. and Billy at their depositions and knew that they would acknowledge inconsistencies in their statements. The risks of allowing the prosecution to elicit their original statements were low. With the judge serving as the trier of fact, it was unlikely that undue weight would be given to the out‐of‐court statements rather than their in‐court testimony. View "Hinesley v. Knight" on Justia Law

Davies and his then‐girlfriend got into an altercation. She called 911, stating that Davies had “pulled a gun.” Chicago police officers, including Benbenek, responded, kicked down the door because no one answered after they knocked and announced, then encountered Davies, who is paralyzed from the waist down, in his wheelchair, and Davies’ nephew. Police testified that, Davies was very angry, used profanity, and talked about suing them. Officers discovered illegal items in Davies’ bedroom. Davies asked whether his nephew could “take the rap,” then became increasingly agitated. When Benbenek told Davies he would be charged for spitting on her, Davies threw himself onto the floor, yelling. Davies claims Benbenek grabbed him and punched him in the face. Davies was taken to the hospital. The attending physician testified that Davies had a fractured femur, consistent with a fall, and that Davies had severe osteoporosis which made his bones more susceptible to breaking through minor trauma. Davies sued Benbenek, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court allowed testimony that unidentified “items” were recovered, that Davies had stated that he had previously sued, and that Davies wanted to blame his nephew. The testimony was not offered to prove that Davies had a prior history of litigation, nor did it include any description of the items. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Benbenek. The evidence challenged by Davies was used for a permissible purpose and was not unduly prejudicial. View "Davies v. Benbenek" on Justia Law

Rivera, a federal inmate, was burned on his leg, foot, and ankle while working in the prison kitchen. A nurse initially treated the second-degree burn. Rivera returned to the healthcare unit daily so that staff could clean and dress the wound, and complained about pain and numbness. A physician assistant stated that his symptoms probably were normal and suggested that he return in six months. He did so and was told that his symptoms were probably permanent. He saw a physician, Gupta, explaining that his family was willing to pay for him to consult a burn specialist. According to Rivera, Gupta refused to examine him, look up his records, or authorize any treatment, admonishing him that he wouldn’t have scalded himself had he not been in prison, that “only God” could help him, and that if he complained again, Gupta would write a disciplinary report. Gupta disputes Rivera’s account. Rivera sued Gupta and Lopez, an administrator, who did not respond to Rivera’s complaints, for deliberate indifference, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Lopez, who is not a medical professional, but reversed as to Gupta, noting that Lopez was without legal representation. A reasonable jury might infer that personal hostility, divorced from medical judgment, had motivated Gupta’s refusal to provide Rivera with any further treatment, even by a burn specialist whom Rivera’s family would have compensated. View "Rivera v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Zaya, an inmate at the Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, broke his wrist. The prison physician, Dr. Sood, sent Zaya to an off-site orthopedic surgeon who took x-rays, fitted Zaya with a cast, and sent him back to the prison with instructions that he return in three weeks. Sood did not follow those instructions, but waited nearly seven weeks to send Zaya back to the orthopedic surgeon. By then, Zaya’s wrist had healed at an improper angle, and two surgeries were required to repair the defect. Zaya filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Sood was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Sood summary judgment, holding that the decision to delay Zaya’s return to the orthopedic surgeon constituted a mere difference of opinion between medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A difference of opinion between two doctors is insufficient to survive summary judgment on a deliberate-indifference claim, but when a plaintiff provides evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant doctor disregarded rather than disagreed with the course of treatment recommended by another doctor, summary judgment is unwarranted. Zaya provided such evidence. View "Zaya v. Sood" on Justia Law

Bradley’s third civil rights suit involving alleged improprieties with revocation of her license to operate a childcare center named six defendants—five of whom Bradley had sued in her second suit. She claims that Wisconsin Department of Children and Families employees, without permission, interviewed her adopted son; photographed the space in her home where she operated the daycare program and was in the process of reorganizing; falsely accused her of child abuse and neglect and forced her to surrender her license; and violated the “Federal Right to Privacy Act” (likely referring to 5 U.S.C. 552a), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106(a), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3). The district court dismissed; claim preclusion barred the claims against the five second-lawsuit defendants because the claims there were based on the same events. As for the sixth defendant, the court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under any constitutional provision or federal statute identified by Bradley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The court warned Bradley that submitting further frivolous appeals may result in sanctions. View "Bradley v. Sabree" on Justia Law

In 1999, Werner was convicted of multiple sex offenses and was a Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) sex offender under Wisconsin law. Werner’s release was deferred until his 2010 mandatory release date. Werner and his probation agents were unable to secure an approved residence as required by his rules of supervision, so the Department of Corrections detained him pursuant to Administrative Directive No. 02‐10, under which persons who had reached their mandatory release date but could not secure approved housing were detained in the county jail at night but permitted to seek housing during certain hours of the day. In 2011, he moved into an approved residence. Werner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permitted Werner to proceed on individual‐capacity claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and to maintain an official‐capacity claim, for injunctive relief, that AD 02‐10 violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court ultimately granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims, finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by qualified immunity and that his challenge to the policy was moot. AD 02‐10 was replaced in 2015 by AD 15‐12, under which SBN sex offenders lacking approved residences are no longer held in jail. Werner has twice violated probation and is again incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; clearly established law at the time would not have notified the defendants that the AD 02‐10 procedures were unlawful. View "Werner v. Wall" on Justia Law