Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Schmid was convicted of murdering her boyfriend. She testified that she had heard a voice telling her that she is the Messiah and that the boyfriend had sexually abused her daughter. The jury found her guilty but mentally ill. Her conviction and sentence of 55 years were affirmed in 2004. Schmid unsuccessfully sought Indiana state court collateral review, after which, appointed counsel stopped representing her. Federal law gives state prisoners one year to commence proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2254, with time suspended while state collateral proceedings are pending. When Schmid sought state collateral review, 178 days remained in the one-year period. Schmid filed a federal petition 15 months after state proceedings ended. Schmid, representing herself, contended that equitable tolling was justified, given her mental problems and delay by former counsel in turning over legal papers. The court denied Schmid’s petition as untimely, stating that Schmid failed to explain which documents she needed in order to file or why she needed them, and did not address Schmid’s claim of mental disability. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court’s first step should have been to appoint counsel for Schmid under 18 U.S.C. 3006A(a)(2)(B). Counsel could have investigated Schmid’s mental condition and explored the contents of prior counsel’s files, formulating an explanation for delay satisfactory to the judge. View "Schmid v. McCauley" on Justia Law

Heinz was the victim of a 2011 home invasion. One burglar entered, punched Heinz and locked him in a closet, then was joined by a second burglar. They stole Heinz’s possessions, including his car. Police arrested Jackson. After he was acquitted, Jackson sued the police under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that there was probable cause for the arrest. Heinz identified Jackson’s picture in a photo spread; Heinz’s neighbor identified Jackson as one of two people he saw loitering outside Heinz’s house near the time of the burglary. Jackson’s son told the police that his father had committed some burglaries recently. Jackson had no evidence for his claim that the photo spreads were conducted improperly. A search of Jackson’s home was authorized by a warrant. Jackson claimed that he was mistreated during this custody by being held incommunicado and without food for several days, but did not sue any of the guards. The court characterized Jackson’s claims as irresponsible and stated that his attorney “should count himself lucky that the appellees have not requested sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38.” View "Jackson v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

The Board of Education has a written policy that forbids teachers from using racial epithets in front of students, no matter the purpose. Brown, a Chicago sixth grade teacher, caught students passing a note in class. The note contained music lyrics with the offensive word “nigger.” Brown used the episode as an opportunity to conduct an apparently well‐intentioned discussion of why such words must not be used. The school principal happened to observe the lesson. Brown was suspended and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Two of his theories were rejected on summary judgment: that his suspension violated his First Amendment rights, and that the school’s policy was so vague that his suspension violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating “not everything that is undesirable, annoying, or even harmful amounts to a violation of the law, much less a constitutional problem.” Public‐employee speech is subject to a special set of First Amendment rules. Brown himself emphasized that he was speaking as a teacher, an employee, not as a citizen, so his suspension did not implicate his First Amendment rights. Brown’s surprise at being disciplined, along with a few episodes of non‐enforcement, do not support a substantive due process claim. View "Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Kankakee County Sheriff has a written policy requiring a strip search of every arrestee before that person enters the detention center’s general population. The policy permits manual body-cavity inspections of some arrestees. Arrestees filed suit to contest the policy as applied to persons whose custody has not yet been approved by a judge. The district judge certified a class: “All persons held in the custody of the Sheriff of Kankakee County from April 20, 2010 to the date of entry of judgment who, following a warrantless arrest, were strip searched in advance of a judicial determination of probable cause,” but later dismissed, finding the policy valid as applied to the class, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Florence v. Burlington County. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the written policy may be valid, while its application is not. The district judge implied that the class had forfeited its opportunity to contest how the policy works in practice, but when the suit began, and the definition was proposed, class counsel had no reason to think that the jail’s staff was doing something other than what the written policy required. Two members of the class contend that they were arrested, strip searched, and then immediately released. View "Fonder v. Kankakee County" on Justia Law

In 1990 Schmidt, then age 27, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of raping a woman multiple times, burglarizing her apartment, falsely imprisoning her, and intimidating her as a witness. He was sentenced to prison and paroled in 2003. His parole was revoked five years later as a result of violation of its terms: he viewed sexually explicit materials on the Internet and was expelled from a treatment program for sexually violent persons. He returned to prison. As his sentence was drawing to an end, the state had him tried civilly on the ground that he was a sexually violent person as a consequence of mental disorder. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 980.06, he was committed for an indefinite period to a secure treatment center. In 2014, having appealed the civil commitment unsuccessfully in the state courts, Schmidt sought federal habeas corpus, claiming that the state violated his due process rights by presenting the jury with evidence of his past sexual misconduct, the prejudicial effect of which outweighed its probative value. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Schmidt’s constitutional rights were not infringed by the presentation at his civil commitment trial of the detailed first-person accounts of his crimes. View "Schmidt v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-veteran Deputy Yahnke supported the Sheriff’s opponent in a 2006 election. The prior Sheriff had approved Yahnke’s request to work as the part-time Maple Park police chief. After the new Sheriff took office, Yahnke was injured while working as a Deputy Sheriff and began receiving disability benefits. The Sheriff advised Yahnke that his secondary employment was suspended until he could return to work in the Sheriff’s office. At a party, Yahnke openly discussed running for the Sheriff’s position in 2010. Based on the Sheriff’s inquiry, the Illinois Attorney General concluded that secondary employment presented a potential conflict of interest. The Sheriff initiated an investigation, which concluded that Yahnke continued to work for Maple Park while his secondary employment was suspended. The Sheriff notified Yahnke that he was seeking his removal for cause. After the Sheriff terminated Yahnke’s employment, Yahnke sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the due process claim but vacated on the political affiliation count. A process existed for Yahnke to challenge his termination: a hearing before the Merit Commission or a grievance followed by arbitration The finder of fact could conclude that the Sheriff rejected lesser sanctions in favor of termination because Yahnke expressed a desire to run against the Sheriff, which is enough to defeat summary judgment. View "Yahnke v. County of Kane" on Justia Law

On July 4, 2002, Cox was standing outside a Chicago restaurant when he was gunned down by two men. Two women driving cars near the scene saw the murder and the shooters’ faces. Less than two months later, both women independently chose Blackmon’s photograph out of arrays. They repeated those identifications at a live line-up and again at trial. Primarily on the strength of their testimony, Blackmon was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 60 years in prison. Blackmon petitioned the state courts for post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to present eyewitness and alibi testimony, and in the alternative, that he was actually innocent. The state courts summarily denied relief. Blackmon then unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated the denial of habeas relief and remanded for determination of whether Blackmon “is actually ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” The record supported conclusions that Blackmon’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate alibi witnesses and that the state court’s summary dismissal of the claim was unreasonable. Because of that summary dismissal, the alibi witnesses have not yet been tested in any adversary proceeding. View "Blackmon v. Williams" on Justia Law

Left Field publishes Chicago Baseball magazine, producing four issues per baseball season. Copies are sold for $2 outside Wrigley Field before the Chicago Cubs’ home games. On the day of the Cubs’ 2015 home opener, Chicago police officer Voulgaris saw Left Field’s editor, Smerge, selling the magazine at the corner of Clark and Addison streets. Voulgaris told Smerge to move across the street to comply with Chicago’s Adjacent Sidewalks Ordinance, which forbids all peddling on the streets adjacent to Wrigley Field. Smerge refused to move and was ticketed. Left Field sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Chicago agreed not to enforce the ordinance pending a decision. The 2015 season ran its course. As the playoffs began, the district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, noting the density of the area around the field and the tight passages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The ordinance does not regulate speech. It regulates peddling, without regard to what the peddler sells. The court noted that Left Field has never applied for a license: while additional issues could arise if the ordinance were applied to newspapers, the court expressed doubt that it would be applied to a newspaper. View "Left Field Media LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Thomas was convicted of the 2001 murder of Shakir. In 2005, after his conviction was final, Thomas received a letter informing him that unidentified gang members told police that Thomas did not commit the murder and that the shooter was Pinkston, a drug dealer. Thomas filed an unsuccessful state court petition for post‐conviction relief, arguing that he was actually innocent in light of the newly discovered evidence. Thomas filed a second state court petition in 2007, this time alleging that the government withheld evidence that the officer was told that Pinkston was the shooter in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The state court held that the claim was defaulted; Thomas had not raised it in his first petition. The district court denied federal habeas corpus petition raising the Brady claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt and the questionable reliability of his alibi, it was not more likely than not that a jury would have acquitted Thomas based solely on evidence that unidentified gang members told someone who told someone that Thomas did not commit the murder. Thomas’s gateway claim of actual innocence was, therefore, insufficient to excuse his procedural default. View "Thomas v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2012 Brown pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by 60 months of supervised release. Within months of being released from prison, Brown was arrested for violating the Illinois sex-offender registration law, 730 ILCS 150/3(a). He pled guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. Brown’s federal probation officer then petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), citing Brown’s state case and his failure to submit timely supervision reports on five occasions. Brown admitted the allegations. The district court revoked his supervised release, ordered him to serve an additional 12 months in prison (consecutive to his new state sentence) and imposed a 10-year term of supervised release. Brown filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserted that the appeal was frivolous and sought to withdraw under Anders v. California. The Seventh Circuit granted the Anders motion and dismissed. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a revocation proceeding when the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law