Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Turner was convicted of murder, criminal confinement, and class A felony attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He did not seek certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court; his opportunity to do so expired on September 22, 1997. In 2000, Turner successfully sought state post‐conviction relief. In 2013, the trial court reduced Turner’s robbery conviction to a Class B felony robbery conviction and resentenced Turner on that count. The order did not reference Turner’s other convictions or sentences. In 2014, Turner sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his life sentence for murder was unconstitutional under Apprendi and ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court ruled that the deadline for Turner to file had expired on September 23, 1998, one year after the last day on which he could have filed a petition for certiorari, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), reasoning that the state post‐conviction relief process could not toll the federal deadline because Turner’s time under federal law had expired before he sought relief. The Seventh Circuit found that Turner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel,” 28 U.S.C. 2253(c), but ultimately affirmed the dismissal. The court rejected Turner’s argument that “the date on which the judgment became final” was altered by the state court’s grant of relief on the robbery count; his murder conviction and life sentence were unaffected by the 2013 resentencing. View "Turner v. Brown" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that, during his transfer between institutions, he was subjected to excessive force, and failure to protect by the refusal of his request to be placed in a prison in which he had no known enemies. He claims that other inmates were able to refuse transfers on that basis, but that officers lifted him over their heads and threw him, head first, into the van. The officers disputed his testimony, stating that he never claimed any injury, nor did he request medical treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendants, rejecting a claim that Jackson was entitled to a new trial because the court refused to grant a continuance when his attorney withdrew on the eve of trial. The court had denied requests for appointed counsel, finding that Jackson had experience litigating and his pleadings demonstrated a grasp of the relevant facts and law, so that he was competent to proceed pro se. In permitting his attorney to withdraw, the court required him to remain as standby counsel. The court also upheld the admission of a seven‐year‐old disciplinary report without a limiting instruction or explanation, and of a 12‐year-old burglary conviction as evidence of Jackson’s truthfulness. View "Jackson v. Willis" on Justia Law

Leaver’s car was struck by a driver whose insurer provided Leaver a rental car. Leaver went to Hertz’s Wisconsin office, signed a rental agreement, and drove to Montana. When Leaver failed to return the car by the contract date, Hertz reported it stolen. Weeks later, the car was located in Montana. Six months later, Leaver was charged with theft by lessee. Leaver contacted the prosecutor, identifying Hertz employees from whom he claimed to have permission to act as he did. The rental agreement contained three inconsistent statements about the maximum time the car could be kept. Leaver claims that he returned the car to the Hertz Belgrade, Montana parking lot within two weeks of the stated return date. Leaver was arrested in Montana, remained in jail for two months, and was extradited to Wisconsin. The court denied motions to dismiss. Weeks later, the prosecutor dropped the charge. Leaver filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming intentional or reckless omission from his police reports of facts that would have affected the probable-cause determination. The judge rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the officer was aware of the information at issue; if he was aware of it, qualified immunity applies. It is unclear whether the information would have negated probable cause. View "Leaver v. Shortess" on Justia Law

Murphy was an inmate in the Illinois Vandalia Correctional Center when correctional officers hit him, fracturing part of his eye socket, and left him in a cell without medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law theories. The court reduced a jury award of damages to $307,733.82 and awarded attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, rejecting an argument that state-law sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims. The Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to state-law claims against a state official or employee who has violated statutory or constitutional law. The court reversed and remanded the attorney fee award. Under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award, and the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage. View "Murphy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Foreman alleged that Rockford police officers came to his restaurant because the man living in an upstairs apartment accused Foreman of cutting off his electricity. Foreman refused to answer questions and was arrested. Prosecutor Leisten charged Foreman with obstructing a police officer. The charge was dismissed. The court ordered Foreman to show cause why claims against Leisten should not be dismissed; the prosecutor would have absolute immunity in her individual capacity and the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity claims. In a previous case Foreman’s lawyer, Redmond, had raised similar claims against prosecutors that were dismissed, so the court ordered Redmond to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. The court granted Leisten judgment on the pleadings, noting that Foreman had not offered a basis for challenging the existing law of prosecutorial immunity and that the official capacity claim would not fall under the Eleventh Amendment's exception for injunctive relief because Foreman’s complaint did not allege an ongoing constitutional violation. The court censured Redmond, stating that he did not argue for a change in the law until after he was faced with a recommendation of censure. The court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers, concluding that they had probable cause to arrest Foreman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent that state prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under section 1983 for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” View "Foreman v. Wadsworth" on Justia Law

Brunson purchased the only liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. Bridgeport Police Chief Murray was a frequent visitor and often told Brunson that he was violating liquor laws that did not actually exist. Once, Bridgeport Mayor Schauf, also the local liquor commissioner, “confirmed” a non-existent law. Schauf had made a competing offer to purchase the store and had an interest another alcohol-serving establishment by subterfuge. Schauf’s son opened another Bridgeport bar. In 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license weeks before it would expire. A licensee with no violations is entitled to pro forma renewal. Chief Murray told Bronson to hire a lawyer; Schauf told Brunson that he would not renew the license in time. Brunson had to close his business, hired counsel, and contacted the state Commission, which ordered that Brunson be allowed to remain open pending a hearing. Brunson’s liquor supplier then was told by the city clerk to not sell to Brunson. Before the Commission’s scheduled hearing, Schauf retroactively renewed the license without explanation. Subsequently Brunson discovered an attempted break-in; Murray did not file a report. The following weekend, the store was vandalized and the police took no action. Brunson stood guard the next weekend. During the night, the store’s windows were shattered. Bronson found Harshman—a convicted felon, and occasional employee at Schauf’s businesses. After a fight and a chase, Bronson held Harshman at gunpoint until police arrived. Brunson pointed out Schauf’s son waiting nearby. Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. Brunson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the prosecutor, based on absolute prosecutorial immunity, and with respect to false arrest. The court reversed summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one equal protection claim and for Schauf, who is not entitled to absolute immunity on Brunson’s due process claim. View "Brunson v. Murray" on Justia Law

In 2004, Nelms retained Katz-Crank, a Michigan lawyer with a practice in cemetery management, to assist in his acquisition of cemeteries and funeral homes in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Trust funds associated with these cemeteries were valued at about $22 million. In 2007 Katz‐Crank learned that Nelms was under investigation by the Indiana Secretary of State for misappropriating cemetery trust assets. Katz‐Crank called Haskett, an investigator in that office, to offer cooperation. Haskett did not return the call. In 2008, Nelms was indicted for embezzling $22 million, pleaded guilty, and agreed to testify against Katz‐Crank. Haskett called some of Katz‐Crank’s clients and stated that Katz‐Crank was under criminal investigation. The Secretary of State and the Marion County prosecutor’s office issued press releases publicizing Katz-Crank’s arrest. A jury acquitted Katz‐Crank. Two years later Katz‐Crank sued Marion County and officials who were involved in her investigation and prosecution, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, with three federal conspiracy claims and state‐law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district judge rejected all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Most of Katz‐Crank’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity; the rest were properly dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. View "Katz-Crank v. Haskett" on Justia Law

Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit. View "Haywood v. Hathaway" on Justia Law

In 1997, Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 60 years in prison. The Illinois State Police’s Division of Forensic Services had analyzed four semen stains on a blanket from the bed of the 11-year-old victim. Neither side presented the report at trial. The victim’s mother testified that Rodriquez had indicated he was “up all night” doing laundry; during closing arguments the prosecutor asked whether that might be “to get rid of evidence.” Objecting to the statement, in the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated “In fact, counsel knows that there was sperm on various items that was not presented.” The judge instructed the jury to consider only evidence admitted during trial. On direct appeal, Rodriguez argued, that he was denied effective assistance by the comment about evidence of sperm being found on “various items.” The Illinois Appellate Court denied relief, concluding that Rodriguez had not been prejudiced. The district court denied a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court did not unreasonable the standard from Strickland v. Washington, in light of the other evidence and the judge’s curative instruction. View "Rodriguez v. Gossett" on Justia Law

In 2005, Jennifer’s mother found her 19-year-old daughter dead. Investigators found a chewed 100-microgram Duragesic fentanyl skin patch. The patch is a powerful opioid, not meant to be ingested. Jennifer did not have a prescription. Her friend, Krieger, had such a prescription for pain from severe spinal problems, and had given Jennifer a patch. Investigators also found a hypodermic needle, a small pipe with burnt residue on it, and two red capsules. Neither the capsules nor the pipe were taken into evidence and tested. The syringe was finally tested three years later. A medical examiner found many drugs in Jennifer's system, but concluded that she died from fentanyl toxicity. Krieger was charged with distribution of fentanyl with death resulting, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(c). After its medical witness fled the country, with legal problems of his own, the government dropped the “death resulting” charge, which it would have had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Krieger pleaded guilty to distribution. The prosecution then proposed that “death resulting” be considered as a sentencing factor. The district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death had resulted from the distribution, and that it could only give a 20-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court later issued its decisions in “Alleyne” decision and Burrage v. United States, Krieger filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit vacated her sentence. The district court can consider Jennifer’s death, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, as recommended under USSG 2D1.1; implementation of the mandatory minimum sentence, however, would require that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the patch provided by Krieger was the but-for cause of Curry’s death. The time for such a determination has passed. View "Krieger v. United States" on Justia Law