Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the Zoretics rented a Castilian Court condominium. Their landlord stopped paying condominium assessments and lost possession to Castilian in 2008. Castilian obtained an eviction order. The Cook County Sheriff evicted the family in January 2009. Later that day, Castilian’s agent allowed them to reenter the unit, agreeing they would sign a new lease. Zoretic never signed the lease or paid rent. After receiving no response to two letters, Castilian’s lawyers obtained a new date stamp (April 2009) from the Clerk on the September 2008 order and placed the order with the Sheriff. On June 5, deputies knocked, announced their presence, got no answer, opened the door, and entered the unit with guns drawn. They found Zoretic, put down their weapons, conducted a protective sweep, and escorted Zoretic out of the unit. Days later, Zoretic sued and was awarded possession until Castilian obtained a lawful eviction order. The family returned, continued not paying rent, and were evicted in March 2012. Zoretic sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Fourth Amendment claims against the deputies, but affirmed as to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the owners. Zoretic failed to create a material factual dispute about whether the owners were extreme and outrageous in pursuing eviction. View "Zoretic v. Darge" on Justia Law

In 1993 Bradford, then an Evansville police officer, was convicted in Indiana state court of murder and arson and was sentenced to 80 years in prison, where he remains. The victim, who was apparently killed by stabbing before the fire started, was the woman with whom Evans had been having an extramarital affair. In 2013 he filed a federal habeas corpus suit, claiming that he could prove his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Bradford had his chance and failed to present reliable evidence that would establish his innocence. The Indiana Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Bradford’s trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by selecting a particular fire expert as a witness. This was not a case in which counsel made no meaningful investigation or failed to present a defense expert on a critical issue. View "Bradford v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2003, a Wisconsin state court convicted Jordan of first‐degree reckless homicide, three counts of first‐degree endangerment, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, based on the shooting of Robinson, who was sitting in a car with three other people when he was killed by shots from a passing car. Before trial, Jordan repeatedly complained about his appointed attorney, Bohach. After a hearing, at which Jordan represented himself, the court denied Jordan’s motion asking for either appointment of new counsel, a delay to enable Bohach to do research Jordan thought necessary, or to waive counsel and represent himself. Jordan had an eighth‐grade education, but a fourth‐grade reading ability. At trial, “Bohach gave Jordan reason to be displeased.” In its closing argument, the prosecution made statements vouching for the detectives’ credibility and urged the jury to consider who had the most to lose—Jordan or the prosecutor. Bohach failed to object. After exhausting state remedies, Jordan filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim. The court affirmed with respect to self-representation. It was reasonable for the court to infer that Jordan would not be able to use necessary documents, which would prevent him from effectively representing himself. View "Jordan v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Hively began teaching as a part‐time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000. In 2013, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that she had been “discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation” as she had been “blocked from fulltime [sic] employment without just cause.” After exhausting the procedural requirements in the EEOC, she filed suit, pro se, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (Title VII). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination. The court relied on precedent, but acknowledged the EEOC’s criticism of its position and that “It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry.” View "Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

A woman reported that her former boyfriend, Giddeon, had attacked and threatened to shoot her. The police searched near the home without success, but later spotted a woman (Giddeon’s sister) leaving the victim’s house and entering a car in which the police could see other occupants. The police followed, stopped the car, recognized Giddeon among the passengers, handcuffed him, and put him in their squad car. The driver consented to a search that revealed a shopping bag that contained a gun wrapped in clothing. Giddeon, told of the discovery, admitted after a half hour that it was his gun. In Wisconsin state court he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and disorderly conduct and was sentenced to five years in prison. In Giddeon’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the defendants conceded that the police lacked probable cause to stop the car. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. While the search was consensual, Giddeon's arrest in a public place was not unlawful, and Giddeon’s discomfort in sitting in the squad car for 30 minutes on a hot day was not disabling, the stop was an unreasonable seizure of Giddeon’s person, entitling him to damages. View "Giddeon v. Flynn" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915(a)), against prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and medical malpractice. The defendants learned that in seeking permission to litigate in forma pauperis the plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had approximately $1400 in a trust account outside the prison. The district court dismissed, with prejudice on that basis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, on appeal, the plaintiff had not argued that the dismissal should have been without prejudice and that such a dismissal would have had a different impact because the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Wisconsin is six years, not three. The decision to dismiss with prejudice was proper, however, and sends a strong message to all litigants, particularly to the prison population, that dishonesty to the court will not be tolerated. View "Kennedy v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

In 1993, Figgs was convicted of murder, committed while on bond for a drug offense. His 40-year sentence was to be served consecutively to his four-year sentence for the drug offense and was to include credit for time served prior to conviction. His planned release date of November 23, 2013, was apparently calculated under the mistaken belief that he had violated the terms of his mandatory supervised release on the drug charge. He was released on June 28, 2012, having survived summary judgment in his state‐court mandamus proceeding, in which he challenged his release date. Figgs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the possibility that he was being held unlawfully. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the warden, whose conduct did not demonstrate a sufficiently culpable state of mind. The court vacated as to the record office supervisor, who did not attempt to calculate Figgs’s sentence until June 2012, nor thoroughly review Figgs’s master file; a jury could find her minimal action so ineffectual that it amounted to criminal recklessness. Her conduct violated Figgs's established constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; the supervisor is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Figgs v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Elkhart Community Schools (ECS), has employed Riley, an African‐American female, as a teacher since 1980. She has an administrator’s license and is pursuing her doctorate in education. In 2010, she was named the ECS Teacher of the Year. From 2005-2013, Riley unsuccessfully applied for 12 different administrative positions with ECS. Riley filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge, claiming that race, sex, and age discrimination were the reasons that ECS had not promoted her. The EEOC sent Riley a right to sue letter. Riley filed suit, alleging race, sex, and age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for ECS on all counts, dismissing some claims on procedural grounds, and dismissing the remaining claims because Riley had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Of the positions for which action was not time-barred, one was given to an African-American woman; Riley did not apply for two; and one position was a lateral move so that Riley did not suffer an adverse employment action. Riley did not produce evidence of pretext with respect to other positions. ECS produced the list of factors that the screening committee considered in recommending candidates. View "Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs." on Justia Law

In 2009, Pyles fell down a wet staircase and injured his back while incarcerated at Menard. Since then he has experienced numbness and radiating pain. In 2012, Pyles twice saw Dr.Nwaobasi, an employee of the company that furnishes medical care at Menard. Nwaobasi refused to order additional testing or specialist care. Pyles wanted to photocopy his original grievance before filing it but copies could be made only by the library, which did not accept new photocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles submitted his grievance for photocopying. He received his copies on January 3, 2013, after the 60-day filing window had passed. Pyles submitted the grievance that day. On January 13, Pyles filed a separate grievance against the library, which was lost in the prison administrative system. On March 1, Pyles saw Dr. Shearing, another Wexford employee, and again failed to obtain relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Shearing on March 27, which was denied on June 12, 2013. Pyles claimed that he never received notice of the denial. On July 30, Pyles filed a civil rights action. After a hearing under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, the magistrate found that he had not shown good cause for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment. Pyles had good cause for failing to timely file his grievance against Nwaobasi. The defendants did not meet their burden of proving that Pyles failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the Shearing grievance. View "Pyles v. Nwaobasi" on Justia Law

Chicago police learned from an informant that Anthony was selling crack cocaine from his apartment and answered the door carrying a handgun during drug transactions. They obtained a search warrant. The SWAT team executed a “High Risk Warrant Services” form. The plan called for a team of 20 officers to effect a “dynamic entry” to secure the premises within 30 seconds and authorized the use of “flashbang” grenades. The team executed the warrant while Flournoy was visiting her son “Tony,” with his girlfriend and another of Flournoy’s sons. An officer knocked on the door and yelled, “Chicago police, search warrant!” When no one answered after several seconds, officers breached the door with a battering ram and cleared the windows. Officer Colbenson saw Flournoy move toward the door. Officer Quinn looked through the doorway, did not see anyone, and tossed a flashbang inside. The blast severely wounded Flournoy’s leg. Officers administered first aid until Flournoy was transported. A search uncovered narcotics and a loaded handgun. In Flournoy’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the jury ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury’s verdict was supported by the record; the exclusion of a handwritten notation--two flashbangs deployed––on one of Colbenson’s typed reports was not an abuse of discretion. A jury statement that “While we agree that this was a horrible instance ... the errors made by the Chicago Police Department as a whole cannot fall on the shoulders of these two defendants” was consistent with the verdict. View "Flournoy v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law