Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Officer Byrne, responding to a bar fight, spotted one man chasing another. One man reached and entered a parked car; the other began punching at the driver’s window. Byrne restrained the pursuer, Hess, a student at Southern Illinois University. The car drove away. Hess stated that Franks had hit Hess’s sister in the face. Hess gave chase but claimed to have never made contact with Franks. Hess’s girlfriend and his siblings corroborated his story, though the sister did not have any injuries. Franks, who had driven himself to a hospital, had been stabbed several times. Franks’s description of his attacker matched Hess’s appearance. Hess was charged with aggravated battery. SIU’s Director of Students reviewed the incident reports and recommended that Hess be suspended. Although he received personal notice of his rights, Hess did not request an interim hearing, and, while suspended, missed final exams. At a subsequent hearing, Hess testified but said little. His counsel, who was present, had instructed him not to answer questions. Hess’s girlfriend testified on his behalf. Byrne testified that officers had found no evidence that Hess had a knife. Hess was expelled; he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The university is not a “person” from whom money damages can be obtained under section 1983. Hess established neither a protected property interest nor a protected liberty interest; even if he had proven such an interest, defendants provided Hess with sufficient procedural protections. View "Hess v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

While serving a probation-revocation sentence in an Illinois prison, Whiting fell ill with what turned out to be a rare form of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. A prison doctor initially diagnosed an infection and prescribed antibiotics and nonprescription pain relievers. Two months later the doctor ordered a biopsy and the cancer was discovered. Whiting filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the prison doctor and the prison’s private medical provider alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs during the two months that his cancer went undiagnosed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There was no evidence from which a jury could infer that the doctor was subjectively indifferent to Whiting’s condition. Without expert testimony a lay jury could not infer that because amoxicillin and Bactrim did not work, it was obvious to the doctor that the doxycycline and Augmentin also would fail. To survive summary judgment Whiting needed to present evidence sufficient to show that decision was “so far afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually based on a medical judgment.” He did not do so. View "Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Williams, an African-American began working for the Cook County Probation Department in 1995. In 2008, Williams reported an incident of racial intimidation. The co‐workers were counseled not to make such remarks again. In 2010, Williams reported that a supervisor was making phone calls about union matters. The supervisor was disciplined. In 2010, Williams was injured at work by a co‐worker, who yanked a door open while Williams was holding it, injuring her shoulder, and yelling, “report this too, b**ch?” She took a medical leave, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and received temporary total disability benefits. In December 2010, an independent medical evaluation determined she was capable of returning to work. No one noticed the report until June 2011. Human Resources asked her to return to work on August 2 and directed her to obtain releases, warning that failure to return to work would be considered an implied resignation. The county doctor approved her return to work, but noted that her personal physician stated that she was not able to return to work. The attorneys negotiating Williams’s disability benefits disputed the consequences of the disagreement. Williams was sent a termination letter on August 30, citing failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits. The agreement ultimately reached concerning benefits listed Williams’s return to work date as September 6. Williams sued under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation and Whistleblower Acts, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, with breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no disputes regarding material facts. View "Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of Cook Cnty." on Justia Law

Cole, an African-American has worked for Northern Illinois University in the Building Services Department since 1998. He alleges that beginning with his 2009 promotion to sub-foreman, he experienced race discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, including the discovery of a hangman’s noose in his workspace. In 2011, he was again promoted. Cole was the only African-American sub-foreman or foreman. He believed that others with the same title were paid more or given more authority and that he was the subject of surveillance. In 2012, Cole filed an ethics complaint with the university about various alleged unethical practices. Cole was later demoted and twice subjected to discipline. He sued, asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The hostile work environment claim presented the closest question, but Cole did not show a basis for employer liability for the alleged harassment. Cole did not offer evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his race. His retaliation claim failed because he offered no evidence that he engaged in protected activity. View "Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Urbana police officers responded to a domestic dispute. In their report, the officers noted that Hamilton called Wright a “pedophile” during the altercation. No arrests were made. The following morning, McNaught, who specializes in crimes against children, reviewed the report as a matter of course, and called Hamilton. Hamilton granted permission to search the couple’s apartment and computers for evidence of child pornography. McNaught seized a desktop computer from the living room; forensic analysis revealed images of child pornography on the hard drive. Wright was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, and sexually exploiting a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Hamilton lacked authority to consent to the warrantless search. McNaught testified that Hamilton had stated that Wright used his cellphone to visit a website called “Jailbait,” which McNaught recognized as featuring pornographic images of underage girls. Hamilton also mentioned seeing a video with a disturbing title on the computer. McNaught testified that he had “previewed” the hard drive by connecting it to his laptop, a standard procedure. Hamilton described the living arrangements at the apartment, which was leased in her name. The district judge denied the motion. Wright pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of suppression. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Wright owned the computer, Hamilton was a joint user who enjoyed virtually unlimited access to and control over it. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

An Illinois inmate sued a corrections officer, Liszewski, with whom he had had an altercation almost a decade ago, alleging excessive force. On remand after an initial dismissal, a jury determined that Liszewski had used excessive force, but awarded Moore only one dollar on the ground (one of the options given in jury instructions) that the excessive force had not caused injury, so there was nothing to compensate. After exploring the justifications for awarding nominal damages as opposed to simply rejecting the suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. “By making the deprivation of such rights . . . actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights.” The court noted evidence that Moore’s the injury was attributable to having fallen and hit his head on a table, an accident not caused by Liszewski. View "Moore v. Liszewski" on Justia Law

Kubsch was twice convicted of the 1998 murders of his wife, her son, and her ex-husband and was sentenced to death. No eyewitness, DNA evidence, fingerprints, or other forensic evidence linked Kubsch to the murders. After exhausting state remedies, he filed an unsuccessful petition for federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed, rejecting Kubsch’s arguments that the Indiana trial court wrongfully excluded evidence of a nine-year-old witness’s exculpatory but hearsay statement to police; that he was denied effective assistance of counsel with respect to that witness’s statement; and that his decision to represent himself at sentencing was not knowing and voluntary. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The case concerns the total exclusion of relevant evidence, not with a limitation on the way the evidence can be used; the defendant’s interest in the evidence was at its zenith. The excluded evidence was easily the strongest evidence on Kubsch’s only theory of defense—actual innocence. It was not cumulative, unfairly prejudicial, potentially misleading, or merely impeaching. It was unusually reliable. The Indiana Supreme Court’s conclusion that Supreme Court precedent (Chambers) did not require the admission of this critical evidence was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Chambers line of Supreme Court precedent. View "Kubsch v. Neal" on Justia Law

In November 2012, 18 months before Indiana’s primary election, Common Cause sought a declaration that Indiana Code 33– 33–49–13 violated its members’ First Amendment right to cast a meaningful vote. The statute established the system for electing Marion Superior Court judges, providing that a political party could not nominate through the primary election more than half of the candidates eligible to sit on that court. Political parties eligible to hold primaries were those whose candidates for Indiana Secretary of State received at least 10 percent of the votes cast in the last general election; since 1952, only the Republican and Democratic parties have met that threshold, effectively limiting the candidates that could be selected by the voters. Marion County was the only place in the country to employ such a process. While the litigation was pending, Marion County held its primary election. There were 16 open Superior Court positions; eight Republican and 11 Democratic candidates (including plaintiffs) ran. Plaintiffs spent almost no effort campaigning and did poorly. The statute was declared unconstitutional before the general election. Plaintiffs sought a special election, to vindicate their constitutional rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, holding that a special election was not appropriate, given the potential burdens on the county as weighed against plaintiffs’ interest in being placed on the ballot and the voters’ interest in casting a meaningful vote. View "Bowes v. Ind. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

Williams, serving a 65‐year prison sentence for murder at the Pontiac Illinois maximum‐security prison, ordered the death certificate of the woman whom he murdered. Staff confiscated the certificate (which had arrived from the county clerk's office with an unsigned note: “There is a place in hell waiting for you, as you must know you will reap what you have sowed!” The stated reason for confiscation was “it posed a threat to the safety and security of the institution and would negatively impact Inmate Williams’ rehabilitation.” The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, reasoning that confiscating the certificate had decreased the risk that inmates would retaliate against “boasting inmates” like Williams, and had protected the victim’s family from being identified. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to defendants not involved in the confiscation, but otherwise reversed. The right of an inmate to read the mail he receives, provided that his reading it would not infringe legitimate interests, is clearly established. The prison must present “some evidence” to show that the restriction is justified. A prison has a legitimate safety concern about “boasting inmates” carrying around trophies, but Williams asserted that he needed the death certificate for use in state post‐conviction proceedings; the defendants presented no contrary evidence. View "Williams v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Hughes was found to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual violence; he was civilly committed, at Rushville, under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99, “for control, care and treatment” until he “is no longer a sexually violent person.” In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Hughes claimed that Illinois has improperly curtailed his liberty, by employing detention staff who are unable to provide him with the care and treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. Illinois allows only persons licensed under the Act to treat Rushville’s civil detainees and determine whether they can be released without danger to the public. The Seventh Circuit reversed dismissal of Hughes’ complaint. The Supreme Court understands the Fourteenth Amendment to require that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not clear whether Rushville is providing the plaintiff (and others) with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the detainees’ right to be released. Liberty Healthcare, which furnishes the Rushville personnel, does not require that all of them be licensed. View "Hughes v. Dimas" on Justia Law