Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2001, 15‐year‐old Stacy opened the door of her Dale, Indiana home to Ward, ostensibly looking for a lost dog. Stacy let him in. Her sister, who was upstairs, heard screams. Looking down, she saw Stacy on the ground with a man on top of her. Her sister called 911; police arrived 10 minutes later. Marshal Keller entered and saw Ward, near the door with a knife in his hand, sweating. Keller took Ward, in custody, outside, and returned to see Stacy lying in a pool of blood, disemboweled, evidently raped, trying to speak. She died hours later. After a conviction was vacated for failure to grant a change of venue, Ward pleaded guilty. A jury recommended death; the trial court sentenced him accordingly. His conviction and sentence were upheld in state courts. The district court denied habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254), rejecting an argument that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by portraying him as a dangerous, incurable “psychopath,” which was enough to undermine confidence in the sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision that Ward suffered no prejudice was reasonable. “Against the mitigating evidence counsel did not use, and the psychological labels that were used, stood a mountain of stark evidence against Ward.” View "Ward v. Neal" on Justia Law

During a “shakedown” of several cells, Stateville guards handcuffed Anderson behind his back and ordered him to walk down a flight of stairs to wait in a holding area while his cell was searched. These stairs were “covered [with] food, milk, and other garbage, and had been for several days.” The guards refused Anderson’s request to help him walk. He slipped and fell down 13 stairs. He was knocked unconscious and suffered “continuing and permanent” injuries. Anderson sued the guards, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the risk was not substantial enough to violate the Eighth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that the risk of serious harm involved in negotiating the stairs, strewn with litter and slick from milk, unaided and cuffed behind the back, was substantial. View "Anderson v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Weldon, Fields, and Roth pooled $120 to buy heroin from Weldon’s drug dealer. Roth drove. Weldon got out of Roth’s car, walked to the dealer’s car, gave the dealer the $120, and returned with the heroin. At Roth’s home, Fields mixed the heroin with water, divided it, and injected it into the three of them. Roth died as a result. Fields was tried, but argued that injecting Roth was not distribution; she was acquitted. Weldon pleaded guilty to having distributed an illegal drug, resulting in a death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Because he agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of another person he received a prison sentence of only eight years. Three years later he moved to vacate his conviction on grounds that his lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance by persuading him to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit vacated denial of the motion. Individuals who “simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own use, intending only to share it together,” are not distributors, “since both acquire possession from the outset and neither intends to distribute the drug to a third person.” Fields was acquitted and the defendants were participants in the same transaction. The insistence of Weldonʹs lawyer that a defense to the charge of distribution had no chance of success was constitutionally deficient. View "Weldon v. United States" on Justia Law

For 60 years, a butcher shop operated on property in Black Earth that is zoned for commercial use, as a legal nonconforming use. In 2001, BEM purchased the property. After 2009, the volume and frequency of slaughter increased. By 2011, neighbors were complaining about increased traffic, trucks blocking the road, livestock noise, foul odors, improper storage of animal parts, and the presence of offal, blood, and animal waste in the streets. Steers escaped from the facility three times and had to be shot dead on Village streets. In 2013, the Village held several public meetings, and, because citations had no effect on BEM’s behavior, ordered BEM to propose an acceptable plan for relocating its slaughter activities. BEM did not relocate. After several delays, the Village threatened litigation. As a result of that threat, the USDA refused to guarantee a bank loan to BEM. BEM lost its financing, closed, and sued the Village and board members. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Even if the threat of litigation could, itself, constitute a due process violation and were a sufficiently direct cause of BEM’s alleged deprivations, there is no evidence that the process accorded to BEM was inadequate. Procedural due process generally requires only “notice and an opportunity to be heard.” View "Black Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Village of Black Earth" on Justia Law

Sutton has been convicted of violent crimes in multiple separate Illinois prosecutions, including 1991 and 1997 convictions for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. The state concedes that it unlawfully collected a sample of Sutton’s blood during the 1991 prosecution and then used that blood sample in the 1997 prosecution. In his habeas conviction, relating to the 1997 case, the district court granted relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the inevitable discovery doctrine. Although the court order under which the blood was collected was not supported by probable cause, the blood (and thus the DNA) would inevitably have been produced under a state law that provided legal authority for collecting the sample. The relevant statute stated that persons convicted of certain sexual offenses “shall … be required to submit blood samples and saliva to the Illinois State Police.” (currently codified at 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3). View "Sutton v. Pfister" on Justia Law

In 2002, Nina Buckner was found brutally murdered in her home. Forensic testing confirmed that the blood on a hammer and knife found at the scene belonged to Buckner; the blood was also found on King’s clothes. Buckner’s neighbors reported seeing King near Buckner’s home the night of Buckner’s murder. When questioned, King gave multiple, very different, versions of his actions during that night. King was convicted of the first‐degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.The trial judge that presided over King’s trial and sentencing had represented King over 15 years earlier as an assistant public defender. King’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. King's petition for post‐conviction relief was dismissed by the trial court, affirmed on appeal, and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court. Subsequently, King unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, for not seeking substitution of the trial judge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, noting that the judge had no independent recollection of King and that the evidence against King was overwhelming. King did not “fairly present” a federal due process claim of ineffective assistance in a complete round of state court review. View "King v. Pfister" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and orthopedic examination as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctors, but on rehearing, en banc, reversed. Even if a doctor denies knowing that he was exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious harm, evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a doctor knew he was providing deficient treatment is sufficient to survive summary judgment. Petties produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the doctors knew the care they were providing was insufficient. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

Hillmann began working for the Chicago Parks District in 1973. Later he became a Department of Streets and Sanitation truck driver. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a work-related injury. In 1995 he entered into an accommodation agreement with the city and was reassigned as chief timekeeper. He never performed all of the duties required by the job description, but he performed the essential functions and other tasks as directed by his supervisor. In 2000 a new supervisor gave Hillmann duties that required use of his injured arm.. Hillmann experienced various difficulties until his position was eliminated in 2002, in a city-wide reduction in forces. He sued, alleging that he was targeted because he asserted his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. A jury found in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and awarded damages. The judge rejected the ADA claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the city; neither claim should have been tried. To prevail on his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. No evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the city withheld raises or targeted him for the RIF based on his ADA accommodation. View "Hillmann v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury convicted Poe of narcotics‐related offenses, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. 848(c). In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, rendering the CCE jury instructions used in Poe’s trial erroneous: “You must unanimously find that the defendant committed at least two violations of the federal drug laws, but you do not have to agree on which two violations.” Poe sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, challenging his conviction under Richardson. Fourteen months later, the district court dismissed Poe’s petition without prejudice, because he should have filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Poe’s June 18, 2001 habeas petition, under section 2255, was denied as time‐barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2006. In 2014, Poe filed a new section 2241 petition, citing Alleyne v. United States (2013). The district court denied his petition, again for not filing it under section 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Construing Poe’s petition as a successive one under section 2255 would be futile; that section allows a successive motion for “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Alleyne is not retroactive on collateral review.” View "Poe v. LaRiva" on Justia Law

Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, claiming that Belleville police needlessly used a Taser against him. Armstrong did not reply to defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court entered judgment. Armstrong did not appeal within 30 days or request an extension. In September 2014 he requested a docket sheet, which showed the case as closed in May. In January 2015, Armstrong moved to reopen, claiming that he had not received defendants’ motion or the order. The motion cited FRCP 59(e), but the judge deemed it to be under Rule 60(b), because it had not been filed within 28 days, then denied the motion. Armstrong had notified the clerk of his address change, but did not include the caption or docket number of either of two suits he had pending. The clerk found one case, but apparently was unaware of the other. In March, Armstrong filed another unsuccessful motion; 38 days later, a notice of appeal appeared in the electronic filing system, from a state prison library. Armstrong stated that he gave the notice to staff, who delayed filing. The Seventh Circuit deemed the appeal timely under the mailbox rule, FRAP 4(c)(1), but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal. Armstrong did not appeal until after denial of multiple post-judgment motions. Successive post-judgment motions do not extend the time to appeal the denial of the initial motion, nor from the original judgment. Armstrong learned of the judgment within 180 days, but waited to seek relief. Armstrong missed deadlines that a court cannot extend, so the characterization of his papers is irrelevant. View "Armstrong v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law