Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Zaya, an inmate at the Henry Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, broke his wrist. The prison physician, Dr. Sood, sent Zaya to an off-site orthopedic surgeon who took x-rays, fitted Zaya with a cast, and sent him back to the prison with instructions that he return in three weeks. Sood did not follow those instructions, but waited nearly seven weeks to send Zaya back to the orthopedic surgeon. By then, Zaya’s wrist had healed at an improper angle, and two surgeries were required to repair the defect. Zaya filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that Sood was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted Sood summary judgment, holding that the decision to delay Zaya’s return to the orthopedic surgeon constituted a mere difference of opinion between medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A difference of opinion between two doctors is insufficient to survive summary judgment on a deliberate-indifference claim, but when a plaintiff provides evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant doctor disregarded rather than disagreed with the course of treatment recommended by another doctor, summary judgment is unwarranted. Zaya provided such evidence. View "Zaya v. Sood" on Justia Law

Bradley’s third civil rights suit involving alleged improprieties with revocation of her license to operate a childcare center named six defendants—five of whom Bradley had sued in her second suit. She claims that Wisconsin Department of Children and Families employees, without permission, interviewed her adopted son; photographed the space in her home where she operated the daycare program and was in the process of reorganizing; falsely accused her of child abuse and neglect and forced her to surrender her license; and violated the “Federal Right to Privacy Act” (likely referring to 5 U.S.C. 552a), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106(a), the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3). The district court dismissed; claim preclusion barred the claims against the five second-lawsuit defendants because the claims there were based on the same events. As for the sixth defendant, the court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under any constitutional provision or federal statute identified by Bradley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The court warned Bradley that submitting further frivolous appeals may result in sanctions. View "Bradley v. Sabree" on Justia Law

In 1999, Werner was convicted of multiple sex offenses and was a Special Bulletin Notification (SBN) sex offender under Wisconsin law. Werner’s release was deferred until his 2010 mandatory release date. Werner and his probation agents were unable to secure an approved residence as required by his rules of supervision, so the Department of Corrections detained him pursuant to Administrative Directive No. 02‐10, under which persons who had reached their mandatory release date but could not secure approved housing were detained in the county jail at night but permitted to seek housing during certain hours of the day. In 2011, he moved into an approved residence. Werner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permitted Werner to proceed on individual‐capacity claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and to maintain an official‐capacity claim, for injunctive relief, that AD 02‐10 violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The court ultimately granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims, finding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims barred by qualified immunity and that his challenge to the policy was moot. AD 02‐10 was replaced in 2015 by AD 15‐12, under which SBN sex offenders lacking approved residences are no longer held in jail. Werner has twice violated probation and is again incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; clearly established law at the time would not have notified the defendants that the AD 02‐10 procedures were unlawful. View "Werner v. Wall" on Justia Law

In 2001, Carrion entered the apartment of 69‐year‐old Zymal and stabbed her, causing her death. Carrion, who lived in an apartment above Zymali’s, was a 19-year‐old immigrant who spoke almost no English. He was interviewed in Spanish, denied involvement with Zymali’s death, but agreed to provide fingerprint samples. His fingerprint was found on a knife recovered from Zymali’s apartment. Illinois courts affirmed his convictions for residential burglary and first‐degree murder on direct appeal and on post-conviction review. Carrion’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254 was denied. The court concluded that although it probably was timely filed, most of the claims were procedurally defaulted and remaining claims were meritless. The Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address: whether there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions, whether Carrion’s confession was voluntary, and whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his confession. The court concluded that, whether applying the deferential review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or de novo review, Carrion is not entitled to relief. The prosecution met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no due process violation in the reception into evidence of Carrion’s statement, as translated by an investigating officer. Any ambiguities in the statement were examined thoroughly at trial. View "Carrion v. Butler" on Justia Law

McGuire pleaded guilty to interfering with commerce by threat or violence. The district court classified McGuire as a career offender under section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which increases the offense level if the defendant has two prior felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” “Crime of violence” is defined in section 4B1.2 and includes “any offense … that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” (the residual clause). The district judge counted two of McGuire’s prior convictions as crimes of violence. One conviction, for fleeing the police, qualified only under the residual clause. With the career-offender enhancement, McGuire’s Guidelines range increased from 63–78 months to 151–188 months. Citing McGuire’s extensive criminal history, the judge imposed a sentence of 188 months, noting her surprise that the government hadn’t asked for the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Johnson holding that the residual clause in the career-offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Rebirth ran a child care ministry—a “child care operated by a church or religious ministry that is a religious organization exempt from federal income taxation,” Ind. Code 12‐7‐2‐28.8. After an unannounced inspection, a Bureau of Child Care employee gave Rebirth a “Plan of Improvement,” stating that Rebirth had violated statutes and regulations governing registered child care ministries and directed Rebirth to cure the purported infractions and submit proof within 10 days. Rebirth believed that it had not committed any violations and did not submit any documentation. The Bureau sent Rebirth a notice of termination. Despite Rebirth’s request to appeal administratively, the Bureau terminated Rebirth’s registration and the child care operation closed. Indiana’s statutory scheme does not give providers an administrative opportunity to challenge the decision to revoke a certificate of registration. Rebirth sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the due‐process clause. The district court dismissed Rebirth’s individual‐capacity claims, citing qualified immunity. After the parties developed an evidentiary record on the official‐capacity claims, Rebirth prevailed on its claims for injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the individual-capacity claims, concluding that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants violated clearly established law by depriving Rebirth of a property interest (its registration) without first providing any opportunity to be heard. View "Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers arrested Bell for possession of a controlled substance while he was driving Spinks’s vehicle. They impounded the vehicle after Bell’s arrest. Chicago Municipal Code 7‐24‐225 permits police to impound a vehicle when officers have probable cause to believe it contained a controlled substance or was used in an illegal drug transaction. Spinks challenged the impoundment in the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ determined that probable cause existed to impound the vehicle. A month later, an ALJ found Spinks liable for violating the Code and ordered that she pay the prescribed penalty of $2,000 plus $180 in storage and towing fees. Spinks and Bell filed suit, alleging that the ordinances were facially invalid under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Code permits warrantless seizure of vehicles in all instances and allows for a non‐judicial officer to determine whether probable cause exists to allow the vehicle to remain seized. Under the Code, the officer seizing the vehicle without a warrant must have probable cause to believe it contains illegal drugs or has been used in an illegal drug transaction. The court noted that plaintiffs did not employ post-seizure state law remedies. View "Bell v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Walker, convicted in 2006 of robbery, was adjudicated a habitual offender pursuant to Indiana Code 35-50-2-8. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison; 20 of those years were attributable to his habitual-offender status. The Indiana habitual-offender statute applied if a defendant had been convicted of two prior unrelated felonies: the second felony had to have been committed after the sentencing for the first, and the present crime had to have been committed after the sentencing of the second earlier offense. At Walker’s trial, the state provided evidence of three prior felonies but failed to offer evidence of the date when one of the crimes was committed. Seeking federal habeas relief, Walker argued that his lawyer on direct appeal should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the habitual-offender conviction, given the missing date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Even assuming that counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional minimum, the state appellate court’s conclusion that Walker’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not infringed meets the generous standards that apply under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Walker v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Lane, an African-American, began working as a hospital security guard in 1999. He had an unblemished employment record until August 2012, when a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started hitting and kicking his caregivers. Health care professionals, afraid to approach the patient or enter the room, summoned security. Lane responded and saw the patient kick a staff member in the back. Lane tried to restrain the patient, who tried to bite him and spit in Lane’s mouth. Lane slapped him in the face. The patient settled down. Lane filed reports explaining why he thought the slap was justified with the hospital and with the Sheriff’s Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a condition of his job. The recipients concluded he had shown poor judgment. The hospital’s director of human resources recommended that Lane’s employment be terminated. After a consultation with the Sheriff’s Department, the hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would be fired. He resigned. After exhausting EEOC remedies, Lane filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the hospital. Lane intentionally struck a patient; termination was a reasonable response. “Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstantial evidence of race discrimination” did “not hold together sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact.” View "Lane v. Riverview Hosp." on Justia Law