Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the New Your State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that plaintiff's employer could not have engaged in retaliation because it could not be held responsible for the retaliatory animus of plaintiff's co-worker, a low-level employee with no decisionmaking authority. The court held, however, that an employee’s retaliatory intent may be imputed to an employer where, as alleged here, the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s retaliatory animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York City taxi driver, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the United States alleging that the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) deprived him of his Fourth Amendment rights in various ways. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiff argued that the TLC’s mandate that all New York City taxicabs install technology systems equipped with Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking abilities amounted to a property‐based search pursuant to United States v. Jones, and that this search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the record is devoid of evidence as to whether plaintiff had any interest in a taxi at the time of an alleged trespass or physical intrusion, plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his property‐based Fourth Amendment claim, and thus defendants are entitled to summary judgment. View "El-Nahal v. Yassky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that she was terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech when she spoke to local leaders about what she saw as a "scam" occurring in the police department. The district court held that the officials had not shown entitlement to summary judgment of qualified immunity because, accepting plaintiff's facts as true and drawing all permissible factual inferences in her favor, she had shown that they had violated her clearly established constitutional rights. The court concluded that, under plaintiff's version of the facts, there was no doubt that under the prevailing decisions, plaintiff's speech was not made "pursuant to" her official duties as a patrol officer. Therefore, defendants failed to show entitlement to fire plaintiff or entitlement to qualified immunity under her version of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ricciuti v. Gyzenis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Rockbestos, on his claims of hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review so much of the district court's judgment as involves plaintiff's claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a‐60. In regard to plaintiff's discriminatory-discharge claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., the court concluded that, although the district court's explanation of why plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that he was qualified for his position was erroneous, the decision was nevertheless correct because plaintiff failed to proffer a sufficient explanation in light of the record why his assertion that he was qualified for his position was consistent with his earlier sworn statement to the SSA that he was “unable to work.” Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge on summary judgment under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Finally, the court held that to the extent plaintiff pleaded hostile-work-environment claims in his amended complaint, he has subsequently abandoned these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction in regard to the CFEPA claim. View "Kovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Columbia University student, appealed the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that the University violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and state law, by acting with sex bias in investigating him and suspending him for an alleged sexual assault. The court concluded that the complaint meets the low standard described in Littlejohn v. City of New York, by alleging facts giving rise to a plausible minimal inference of bias sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, which the court held applies to Title IX cases. In this case, the complaint alleged that both the investigator and the panel declined to seek out potential witnesses plaintiff had identified as sources of information favorable to him; the investigator and the panel failed to act in accordance with University procedures designed to protect accused students; and the investigator, the panel, and the reviewing Dean reached conclusions that were incorrect and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Doe v. Columbia University" on Justia Law

Defendant, a mobility‐impaired inmate who suffers from cerebral palsy and scoliosis, filed suit against DOCCS under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief allowing him to use his motorized wheelchair within DOCCS facilities. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of DOCCS because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the mobility assistance program provides plaintiff meaningful access to DOCCS services and as to whether allowing him the use of his motorized wheelchair would unduly burden DOCCS. The court also held that DOCCS’s blanket ban on motorized wheelchairs - without an individualized inquiry into the risks of allowing a mobility‐impaired inmate to use his or her motorized wheelchair - violates the ADA and the RA. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wright v. New York State Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Priatno and Gammone under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they brutally beat him for talking back to another officer when he was an inmate at Downstate Correctional Facility. At issue is whether plaintiff exhausted all available administrative remedies prior to filing suit in the district court, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court concluded that the prison's grievance process was not available to plaintiff because the applicable grievance procedures are “so opaque” and confusing that they were, “practically speaking, incapable of use.” Because plaintiff satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, the court reversed and remanded. View "Williams v. Correction Officer Priatno" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiff obtained limited variances from a land-use regulation prohibiting accessory structures on the lot of their newly purchased home, allowing plaintiffs to install a fence, pool, and deck designed to accommodate their son's disability. The Town Board’s resolutions allowing the variances required removal of the structures when, inter alia, the disabled child’s residency in the house terminated (Restoration Provision). The district court dismissed the complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6). The district court determined that it did not need to reach the issue of whether the Restoration Provisions were reasonable under the FHA because plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege facts sufficient to show either an intent to discriminate or to constitute disparate impact discrimination. The court concluded, however, that the reasonableness of the Town’s accommodations is in issue. The reasonableness issue here cannot be determined on the pleadings because the relevant factors are numerous and balancing them requires a full evidentiary record. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's dismissal as to this issue. The court affirmed as to the dismissal of plaintiffs' retaliation claim where the Restoration Provisions on their face simply restore the requirements applicable to all such properties in the area once the needs of plaintiff's disabled child are not an issue. View "Austin v. Town of Farmington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting claims for violation of his First Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, and for false imprisonment and negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671–2680. Plaintiff alleged that he was placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for publishing an on-line article. The court concluded that, in light of the different interests at stake, the court's case law establishing a prisoner’s right to file a lawsuit or grievance does not clearly establish a prisoner’s right to publish an article under a byline. Therefore, the court held that Defendant Rivers, a BOP employee, is entitled to qualified immunity from the Bivens claim and did not reach the question of whether Rivers violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim on the ground that it lacks a private analogue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "McGowan v. United States" on Justia Law