Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Jim Little, the Executive Director of Employee Relations at the District, alleging sex discrimination for acts that had occurred in 2008. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice based on lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. Plaintiff later filed suit in 2013 against Little and the District, alleging sex discrimination claims, under state and federal law, stemming in part from her termination in 2010. The district court held that the earlier dismissal was res judicata and barred this action. The court held - consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and at least three sister circuits - that an earlier dismissal on alternative grounds, where one ground is a lack of jurisdiction, is not res judicata. Therefore, the court concluded that res judicata does not bar this action. The court reversed the dismissal in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claim because plaintiff's lawyer clearly and expressly abandoned the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's state-law claims to the extent that they rely solely on events that occurred more than three years before the filing of the complaint in this case. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, at least two claims are timely: (1) plaintiff's claim alleging discriminatory firing in 2010; and (2) a hostile work environment claim founded in part on actions occurring within the limitations period. The court remanded. View "Ruiz v. Snohomish County PUD" on Justia Law

ASA filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, alleging that the Board modified its policies to retaliate against the ASA's exercise of its First Amendment free speech rights. The ASA alleged that the Board's retaliatory policy change caused it harm by chilling students’ political speech and depriving the ASA of its income. The district court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim by the ASA for retrospective relief, including money damages, against the Board. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred when it failed to apply Ex Parte Young to the ASA’s claim of ongoing First Amendment retaliation, and its request for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief. In this case, the ASA properly alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim, and it identified the Board's changes to its fee-collection policies as the sources of ongoing violations of federal law within the meaning of Young and its progeny. The court also concluded that the district court erred when it dismissed the suit with prejudice on futility grounds. In this case, the ASA adequately and plainly pleaded a plausible claim for First Amendment retaliation on the basis that the Board deprived it of a valuable government benefit. The collection and remittance of funds is a valuable government benefit, and a change in policy undertaken for retaliatory purposes that results in the deprivation of those funds implicates the First Amendment. Finally, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the ASA leave to amend its complaint to conform with the requirements of Young. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civil-service employee at a naval base, filed a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics action after he was involved in a budgetary investigation against base administrators for employment-related due process and First Amendment violations. Plaintiff also filed suit against the investigator for Fourth Amendment violations. The court held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., precludes employment-related Bivens claims by Non-Appropriated Fund Instrumentality Program (NAFI) employees like plaintiff, for whom Congress has provided other safeguards. The court also concluded that plaintiff suffered no Fourth Amendment violation because he impliedly consented to the storage of his belongings by voluntarily passing through an internal checkpoint in a passage-restricted military installation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint. View "Farkas v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City and police officers, alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and California law. The officers were responding to a report that two armed black males had been seen in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The officers, eventually numbering over twenty, were armed with assault rifles. There was no one meeting the description of the report at the scene, only a large Samoan family celebrating a little girl's birthday. The officers detained the family, searched them for weapons, and searched the family's apartment without a warrant or consent. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but its jurisdiction is limited to deciding only the question whether, taking all the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The court concluded that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure of the three teenage boys, for the seizure of Sialoi Sialoi Jr., for the seizure of the remaining plaintiffs, and for the warrantless search of the apartment. Because defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court properly denied their motion for summary judgment. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Sialoi v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CCA under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that CCA staffed the Idaho Corrections Center (ICC) with an inadequate number of security guards, in deliberate indifference to the health and safety of prisoners. After the parties settled, CCA agreed to staff ICC with a specified number of security personnel. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The district court subsequently held CCA in contempt for falsifying staffing reports, ordered remedial measures, and awarded plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. The court concluded that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order. The court also concluded that the extension of the settlement agreement is a compensatory civil sanction. Rather than punishing CCA, this sanction sought to return plaintiffs as nearly as possible to the position they would have occupied had CCA not violated the agreement. By extending the settlement agreement for two years, the district court thus ordered the relief to which plaintiffs were originally entitled under the agreement but that CCA had failed to provide. The court concluded that the remedies remain narrowly drawn, necessary, and the least intrusive means to rectify CCA’s continued Eighth Amendment violations. In regard to attorney's fees, the court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626, allows enhancement of the lodestar figure in appropriate circumstances; while the PLRA limits the hours and the hourly rate used in calculating the lodestar figure, it does not cap the total amount of attorney’s fees awards in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and it continues to authorize a court to enhance the lodestar figure based on non-subsumed factors; and even when an enhancement is appropriate it may not be based on considerations already subsumed in the PLRA rate. In this case, the district court provided clear reasons, supported by specific evidence in the record, for enhancing the lodestar figure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the contempt order and the order awarding attorney's fees. View "Kelly v. Wengler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and two other individuals, seeking to operate a gun shop in the County, challenged the County's ordinance which requires that the proposed location of the business is not within 500 feet of a residentially zoned district. The district court subsequently granted the County's motion to dismiss for failure to state claim. The court concluded that, because plaintiff's equal protection challenge is no more than a Second Amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing, it is subsumed by, and coextensive with the former, and therefore is not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. Nor did plaintiff adequately plead a class-of-one Equal Protection claim where plaintiff acknowledges that gun stores are materially different from other retail businesses and therefore is not a similarly situated business. The court concluded that the right to purchase and to sell firearms is part and parcel of the historically recognized right to keep and to bear arms, and that the Ordinance's potential interference was a proper basis for plaintiff's Second Amendment challenge. Furthermore, the Ordinance burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment and is subject to heightened scrutiny. Under this standard, the court concluded that the County failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that there was a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and its asserted objective. In this case, the County failed to satisfy its burden because it never justified the assertion that gun stores act as magnets for crime. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Teixeira v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action filed against DSHS by plaintiff. At issue is whether the Due Process Clause compels the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation. The district court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The district court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. View "Trueblood V. WSDSHS" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Roca Solida filed suit seeking relief from the United States and from a federal officer for the allegedly unconstitutional diversion of a stream that once flowed through Roca Solida’s church camp property. Through its Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics action, Roca Solida seeks an injunction compelling Sharon McKelvey personally to restore the stream to its route through church property and a declaration that her actions violated Roca Solida’s constitutional rights, but it does not seek damages against her. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, decided that the Bivens claim could proceed, and held that McKelvey was not protected by qualified immunity. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that relief under Bivens does not encompass injunctive and declaratory relief where, as here, the equitable relief sought requires official government action. Bivens is both inappropriate and unnecessary for claims seeking solely equitable relief against actions by the federal government. In this case, only the United States - through its officers - has the power to take the action that Roca Solida seeks: returning the stream to its previous path through Roca Solida’s land. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. McKelvey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, fell off of a ladder while working his prison job as an electrician’s assistant. A prison medical professional diagnosed him as having an umbilical hernia. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the prison officials to refer him to a surgeon for evaluation and to authorize surgical treatment. Plaintiff consequently received umbilical hernia surgery. Then plaintiff sought damages for the pain he suffered because of the prison officials' refusal to authorize the surgery prior to litigation. The court concluded that the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity where, even when the facts are viewed most favorably to plaintiff, it is at least debatable that the prison officials complied with the Eighth Amendment. To the extent the officials played any role in the decision to deny the umbilical hernia surgery, the record makes clear that they did so based on legitimate medical opinions that have often been held reasonable under the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in denying injunctive relief relating to his potential inguinal hernia because plaintiff failed to provide evidence suggesting that the prison officials' decision to forgo surgery at this time is medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the officials chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hamby v. Hammond" on Justia Law