Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Osvaldo Villarreal, a police officer in Tustin, California, fatally shot Benny Herrera during an attempted investigatory stop, relatives of Herrera filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officer Villarreal and the City of Tustin, alleging that the officer used excessive force against Herrera. The district court denied Officer Villareal's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the government's interests were insufficient to justify the use of deadly force where the crime at issue was a domestic dispute that had ended before the police became involved, Herrera did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and Officer Villarreal escalated to deadly force very quickly. Based on the totality of circumstances, and balancing the interests of the two sides, the court concluded that the intrusion on Herrera’s interests substantially outweighed any interest in using deadly force. Therefore, Officer Villarreal’s fatal shooting of Herrera violated the Fourth Amendment. The court further concluded that the officer violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law when he shot and killed Herrera. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "A. K. H. V. City of Tustin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was in the custody of Maricopa County for a nonviolent offense when she gave birth to her son. After her release, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1983, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated when, among other things, she was shackled and restrained during labor and postpartum recovery. The district court granted summary judgment for the County Defendants and the Medical Center on all of plaintiff's claims, and taxed costs against her. The court addressed an issue of first impression: whether the U.S. Constitution allows law enforcement officers to restrain a female inmate while she is pregnant, in labor, or during postpartum recovery. The court held that, in this case, the answer to that question depends on factual disputes a properly instructed jury must resolve. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the County Defendants on most of plaintiff's shackling claims. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants on the remaining claims, and affirmed summary judgment on all claims against the Medical Center. The court vacated the cost award to the County Defendants and remanded, but the court affirmed the cost award to the Medical Center. View "Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights action, alleging a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment stemming from a physical altercation with defendant Officer David Rosario. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant Lieutenant E. Rogers deprived him of a fair hearing in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Eighth Amendment claim was tried and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Rosario. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff's procedural due process claim; because the district court applied the correct (summary judgment) standard, remand is not necessary; the district court properly concluded that plaintiff's unsupported allegations were insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact; because plaintiff failed to rebut defendants’ evidence of non-exhaustion, the district court properly dismissed his procedural due process claim against Rogers; the court rejected plaintiff's evidentiary challenges; the court concluded that defense counsel improperly vouched for the credibility of correctional officer witnesses during closing argument, but on plain error review, the district court’s failure to correct the error sua sponte does not warrant reversal; and the court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding $3,018.35 in costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, vacated the award of costs, and remanded for further consideration. View "Draper v. Rosario" on Justia Law

C.R. challenged his suspension, for sexually harassing two younger students, in district court under the First Amendment. C.R. argued that because the harassment occurred off-campus, in a public park, the school lacked the authority to discipline him. C.R. also challenged his suspension on due process grounds. The district court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The court upholds a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge. In this case, the school administration’s investigation uncovered at least some evidence that C.R. participated in sexually suggestive joking directed at the younger students. The court concluded that the school district's characterization of this behavior as sexual harassment in its Student Handbook is reasonable. Thus, the court deferred to the school district’s determination that C.R. participated in sexual harassment. The court concluded that the school district had the authority to discipline C.R. for his off-campus, sexually harassing speech where the speech occurred exclusively between students, in close temporal and physical proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously demarcated from the campus itself. The court concluded that a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community. The court also concluded that the school district's decision to suspend C.R. for two days for sexual harassment was permissible under Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. because sexually harassing speech, by definition, interferes with the victims' ability to feel safe and secure at school. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the school district on C.R.'s First Amendment claims. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the school district afforded C.R. all the process that he was due and that C.R. failed to raise any viable substantive due process claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J" on Justia Law

Consistent with a letter issued by the ATF, a firearms dealer refused to sell plaintiff a firearm because of her medical marijuana registry card. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the federal statutes, regulations, and guidance that prevented her from buying a gun. The district court dismissed the complaint. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that plaintiff lacks standing to challenge 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); plaintiff does have standing to raise her remaining claims challenging 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. 478.11, and the Open Letter; and plaintiff's remaining claims are not moot. The court concluded that by preventing plaintiff from purchasing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(3), 27 C.F.R. 478.11, and the Open Letter directly burden her core Second Amendment right to possess a firearm; because these laws and guidance do not place a severe burden on plaintiff's core right to defend herself with firearms, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to determine whether these laws and guidance pass constitutional muster; and, applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court concluded that the degree of fit between the laws and guidance and the aim of preventing gun violence is reasonable. Because the Open Letter satisfies each of the United States v. O’Brien conditions, it survives intermediate scrutiny, and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's First Amendment claims. In regard to the Fifth Amendment claims, the laws and guidance survive rational basis scrutiny because they are reasonably related to reducing gun violence. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Wilson v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking monetary and equitable relief against various state and federal officials alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, state law tort claims, and constitutional claims based on her inclusion in the government’s terrorist databases, including the No-Fly List. After determining that plaintiff was a prevailing party, the district court found that the government was substantially justified respecting its pre-Ibrahim II standing arguments, its defense against plaintiff's visa-related claims, and its various privilege assertions. The court disallowed fees associated with those issues and otherwise found the government's conduct was not justified. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart. Plaintiff contends, among other things, that the district court incorrectly found that the government had not acted in bad faith under EAJA section 2412(b) and therefore erred by declining to award market-rate fees. The court held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner, INS v. Jean, the district court erred by making multiple substantial justification determinations. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue. The court also reversed the district court’s various reductions imposed on plaintiff's eligible fees arising from its incorrect substantial justification analysis. However, the court affirmed the district court’s bad faith findings as well as its relatedness findings under Eckerhart, and the district court's striking of plaintiff's objections to the special master’s report on expenses. View "Ibrahim v. US DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Hawaiian residents who challenge the recent efforts by a group of Native Hawaiians to establish their own government. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s order denying their request for a preliminary injunction to stop activities related to the drafting and ratification of self-governance documents. Separately, another group of Hawaii residents appeals the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene in plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Before the district court, plaintiffs focused their injunction request on the delegation election. That election, however, has been cancelled, and plaintiffs do not argue that similar elections will occur in the future. The court affirmed the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal as moot, concluding that there is no reasonable expectation that plaintiffs will be subject to the same injury again, given the disavowal of any election. Further, the district court retains jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit, and dismissing the preliminary injunction appeal will not, by itself, insulate defendants’ practices from judicial scrutiny. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying intervention as of right where the court agreed with the district court that the prospective intervenors’ interests would not, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded as a result of plaintiffs’ litigation. The district court properly reasoned that the prospective intervenors’ claims would raise entirely different issues from those raised by plaintiffs, and that the proposed intervenors could adequately protect their interests in separate litigation. View "Akina v. Hawaii" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured in an altercation with two LAPD officers, he filed an administrative claim against the City, alleging that the officers acted unlawfully. The police union, LAPPL, allegedly with assistance from City officials, responded by accusing plaintiff, a prominent business executive, of being a drug abuser and of having acted aggressively toward the officers. The episode attracted publicity and plaintiff lost his job. Plaintiff then filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against defendants. Plaintiff's claims were based on this initial interactions with the LAPD and on the subsequent publicity. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the unlawful retaliation claim and on plaintiff's claim that the LAPD acted negligently. Plaintiff's other claims proceeded to trial and the jury found for defendants. The court concluded that the statements allegedly made against plaintiff as joint state actions by the LAPPL were not sufficiently adverse to support a claim of First Amendment retaliation. Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for that claim was proper. Similarly, the district court did not err in its decisions regarding plaintiff's police negligence, excessive force, and negligent supervision claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mulligan v. Nichols" on Justia Law

After Manuel Diaz was shot by an Anaheim police officer, Diaz's estate and mother filed suit against the officer and the city, alleging federal civil rights violations. The jury returned the verdict in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate liability from compensatory damages where graphic and prejudicial evidence about the victim has little, and in large part no, relevance to the liability issue. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court with some guidance. First, the evidence of Diaz’s drug use and gang affiliation has marginal, if any, probative value as to damages, and none as to liability. On retrial, the district court should closely review this evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, and should assure that such evidence is admitted only to the degree that the testimony is connected up with Ms. Huizar’s reaction to her son’s death. Second, if plaintiffs are willing to stipulate that Diaz was a gang member (which they claim they tried to do during trial), no expert testimony about gangs - such as gang activities, tattoos, or monikers - should be admitted. Third, while there is a “strong presumption that jurors follow instructions,” a limiting instruction may not sufficiently mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence in all cases. And fourth, if the district court is going to sustain an objection and grant a motion to strike, merely saying “stricken” does not sufficiently inform the jury about the proper use of the evidence it just heard. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling force was not excessive as a matter of law. View "Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging facial constitutional challenges to California’s law prohibiting state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) with minor patients (Senate Bill 1172, Business and Professions Code sections 865, 865.1, and 865.2). The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that SB 1172 violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and that SB 1172 violates the privacy rights of their minor clients. In this case, SB 1172 does not regulate conduct outside the scope of the counselor-client relationship, and thus the law does not excessively entangle the State with religion. The court further concluded that the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that the primary intended effect of SB 1172 was to inhibit religion. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the Religion Clauses and declined to apply strict scrutiny where the court held in Pickup v. Brown that SB 1172 survives rational basis review because “SB 1172 is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-being of minors.” Finally, plaintiffs' privacy claim is foreclosed (see Pickup v. Brown). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Welch v. Brown" on Justia Law