Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Dr. Lawrence P. Rudolph filed suit against SCI after various SCI members accused him of official misconduct, stripped him of his awards, and kicked him out of the association. Rudolph surreptitiously recorded a conversation with his friend John Whipple, SCI's president, and posted it on YouTube to exonerate himself. Whipple and SCI filed numerous claims against Rudolph, including statutory invasion of privacy, negligence per se, and common law invasion of privacy. The district court granted Rudolph’s motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, as to four claims, but denied relief as to three claims. Rudolph appeals. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied Rudolph's motion as to the claims for violation of California Penal Code section 632, negligence per se, and common law invasion of privacy. In this case, although Rudolph can show that those claims arise from activity he took in furtherance of his right to free speech, plaintiffs can show a reasonable probability of prevailing on each of the challenged claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment; denied Rudolph's corresponding request for an additional attorney fee award; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Safari Club International v. Rudolph" on Justia Law

After Nóirín Plunkett accused Michael Schwern of raping her and he was arrested, he filed suit against Plunkett for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with economic relations. Plunkett filed a special motion to strike under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law, Or. Rev. Stat. 31.152(4), but the district court denied the motion. The court held that it has jurisdiction to review denials of Oregon anti-SLAPP motions in light of Oregon's passage of amendments to create a right of immediate appeal from denials of anti-SLAPP motions. On the merits, the court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact could not find that Schwern met his burden of production to support a prima facie case with substantial evidence. Because Schwern failed to establish a prima facie case through substantial evidence, Plunkett was entitled to relief under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law. Accordingly, the court reversed and instructed the district court to grant the motion to strike. View "Schwern v. Plunkett" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against King County and King County Sheriff's Deputies, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, inter alia, that Deputy Volpe violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause, conducting an unreasonable seizure, using excessive force during the arrest, and conducting an unlawful search of her truck. Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force and unlawful search claims. The court concluded that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity in this case because the government's interests at stake - providing life-saving emergency medical care and to protect first responders and other motorists from potential harm - outweighed any intrusion on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The court thought that Deputy Volpe’s use of force in this case was reasonable in response to the totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, Deputies Sawtelle and Christian did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they searched her truck in an attempt to find the medications plaintiff's son had ingested in his overdose. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of dismissal. View "Ames v. King County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arizona state prisoner and former pretrial detainee, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging defendants' alleged policy of allowing female guards to observe daily, from four to five feet away, male pretrial detainees showering and using the bathroom. The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, concluding that Ninth Circuit precedent foreclosed plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the fact that plaintiff is a pretrial detainee is enough to distinguish his allegations from precedent concerning convicted prisoners; even if plaintiff were a convicted prisoner, plaintiff's allegations survive section 1915A dismissal because the scope and manner of the intrusions were far broader than those the court previously has approved; the allegations of plaintiff's bodily privacy claim, taken as true, warrant an answer; and plaintiff's allegations for his cruel and unusual punishment claim, taken as true, are sufficient to meet the low threshold for proceeding past the screening stage. The court noted that it may be that the prison’s up close and personal policy of female guards observing male pretrial detainees is necessary to ensure security and provide equal work opportunities in the prison. The court explained that such considerations and their legal effect are just conjecture at this point. And conjecture is not enough to dismiss a complaint under section 1915A. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the widow and children of the late spiritual leader of the Sikh Dharma faith, filed suit against defendants, alleging claims related to the control of two nonprofit entities associated with the Sikh Dharma religious community. Plaintiffs alleged several interlocking conspiracies and fraudulent activities designed to exclude them from certain management positions and to convert millions of dollars in assets from entities under the individual defendants’ control for personal benefit. The district court dismissed the complaint and concluded that plaintiffs' claims were foreclosed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The court concluded, however, that based on the pleadings, plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the First Amendment’s ministerial exception and can be resolved by application of neutral principles of law without encroaching on religious organizations’ right of autonomy in matters of religious doctrine and administration. For the reasons stated in this opinion and in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Puri v. Khalsa" on Justia Law

After Deanna Fogerty-Hardwick lost custody of her minor children, Preslie and Kendall, Preslie filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and employees of the SSA. Preslie alleges that the social worker employees acting under color of state law maliciously used perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to secure her removal from her mother, and that this abuse of state power violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights to her familial relationship with her mother. After the district court denied absolute and qualified immunity to the individual defendants, they appealed. The court affirmed the district court's denial of absolute immunity where Preslie’s complaint targets conduct well outside of the social workers’ legitimate role as quasi-prosecutorial advocates in presenting the case. The court concluded that Beltran v. Santa Clara County disposes of the issue. In Beltran, the court held that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made false statements in a dependency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of perjury, because such actions are not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. The court also concluded that defendants' use of perjured testimony and fabricated evidence in court in order to sever Preslie’s familial bond with her mother was unconstitutional. In this case, Preslie has produced more than sufficient admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether her removal from her mother’s custody violated her clearly established constitutional rights, and defendants’ case for qualified immunity from these charges is not supported by the law or the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hardwick v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, pursuant to Article XVIII, section 5(c) of the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Constitution, restricts voting in certain elections to individuals of "Northern Marianas descent" (NMDs). Plaintiff filed suit alleging that this restriction is race-based and violates the Fifteenth Amendment. The district court granted plaintiff declaratory and injunctive relief and required that non-NMDs be permitted to vote in the November 2014 special election. The court concluded that the voting restriction in Article XVIII, section 5(c) would divide the citizenry of the Commonwealth between NMDs and non-NMDs when voting on amendments to a property restriction that affects everyone. The court explained that the Fifteenth Amendment aims to prevent precisely this sort of division in voting. Because Article XVIII, section 5(c) relies on ancestral distinctions to limit voting in a territory-wide election in the Commonwealth, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment. The court rejected the remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Davis, Jr. v. Commonwealth Election Commission" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a California law establishing a ten-day waiting period for all lawful purchases of guns. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the application of the full ten-day waiting period to those purchasers who have previously purchased a firearm or have a permit to carry a concealed weapon and who clear a background check in less than ten days. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the State, holding that, applying intermediate scrutiny analysis, the law does not violate Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights because the ten-day wait is a reasonable precaution for the purchase of a second or third weapon, as well as for a first purchase. View "Silvester v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that officers used excessive force in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Corporal Kisela, concluding that his actions were reasonable and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court concluded that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support Corporal Kisela’s perception of an immediate threat. In this case, plaintiff did not raise the knife she was holding and did not make any aggressive or threatening actions toward another woman, Sharon Chadwick. Ms. Chadwick describes plaintiff as having been composed and non-threatening immediately prior to the shooting. The court concluded that material questions of fact, such as the severity of the threat, the adequacy of police warnings, and the potential for less intrusive means are plainly in dispute. Therefore, Corporal Kisela was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to the reasonableness of his actions. The court also concluded that Corporal Kisela is not entitled to qualified immunity where the facts present the police shooting a woman who was committing no crime and holding a kitchen knife. While the woman with the knife may have been acting erratically, was approaching a third party, and did not immediately comply with orders to drop the knife, a rational jury—accepting the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff—could find that she had a constitutional right to walk down her driveway holding a knife without being shot. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hughes v. Kisela" on Justia Law

After Jacob Newmaker was fatally shot by Officer Maxwell Soeth, Newmaker's parents filed suit against the City of Fortuna, Officer Soeth, and Fortuna Police Sergeant Ellebrecht. Plaintiffs alleged that Soeth used unconstitutionally excessive force by striking Newmaker multiple times with his police baton and then fatally shooting him. The district court granted summary judgment to Officer Soeth based on qualified immunity. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Officer Soeth. The court explained that summary judgment is not appropriate in 42 U.S.C. 1983 deadly force cases that turn on the officer’s credibility that is genuinely in doubt. In this case, a reasonable jury could conclude that Soeth and Ellebrecht were wrong when they claimed that Newmaker grabbed the baton. In the alternative, a reasonable jury could conclude, given the trajectory of the bullets through Newmaker’s body, that even if Newmaker had grabbed the baton Officer Soeth could not have fired his first shot while Newmaker was standing up and swinging the baton. Because this case requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Newmaker v. City of Fortuna" on Justia Law