Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

A Christian humanitarian organization offered a remote customer service representative position to an applicant who was openly in a same-sex marriage. After the applicant disclosed her marital status while inquiring about parental leave, the organization rescinded the job offer, citing its policy that limits employment to those who comply with its religious standards, including a prohibition on sexual conduct outside of marriage between a man and a woman. The applicant, who identifies as Christian and is active in LGBTQ advocacy, sued the organization for discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under federal and state law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially granted summary judgment to the organization, finding that the church autonomy doctrine barred judicial inquiry into the religiously motivated employment decision. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed itself, holding that the church autonomy doctrine did not apply because the organization’s hiring policy was facially discriminatory and could be evaluated using neutral legal principles. The district court also rejected the organization’s ministerial exception defense and other constitutional and statutory defenses, ultimately granting summary judgment to the applicant and entering judgment for stipulated damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the ministerial exception applies because customer service representatives at the organization perform key religious functions central to its mission, such as communicating its ministries to donors, engaging in prayer with supporters, and inviting participation in its religious mission. The court concluded that these duties are vital to the organization’s religious purpose, and therefore, the ministerial exception bars the applicant’s employment discrimination claims. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the organization. View "MCMAHON V. WORLD VISION INC." on Justia Law

During a protest in Seattle on June 7-8, 2020, Taylor Cheairs was filming the event when Officer Anderson of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) threw a blast ball grenade that exploded and struck Cheairs in the groin, causing serious injury. Cheairs sued the City of Seattle, the SPD, and unnamed officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Cheairs was not seized, and no First Amendment violation because there was no evidence of retaliation. The court also ruled that without a constitutional violation, there could be no municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that although a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Cheairs was seized when Officer Anderson struck him with the blast ball, the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the protesters near Cheairs posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers, citizens, and property. The court also held that Cheairs failed to establish a viable First Amendment retaliation claim because he did not provide evidence that his filming was a substantial or motivating factor in the use of force against him. Consequently, without a viable constitutional claim, Cheairs could not establish a claim for municipal liability. View "CHEAIRS V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two national organizations and five sets of parents, challenged three Washington laws regulating minors' access to mental health care and shelter services, particularly for transgender minors. The parents' children had shown signs of gender dysphoria, and the plaintiffs argued that the laws constrained their ability to parent, forced them to censor their speech, and limited their access to information about their children.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiffs' alleged harms were speculative and not concrete injuries. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated current or future injuries sufficient to confer standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing based on current injuries because their alleged injuries were self-inflicted and not directly caused by the laws. The court also found that the plaintiffs' fears of future injuries were too speculative and not imminent. Additionally, the court held that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not demonstrate that their members had standing to sue in their own right.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated standing to bring their claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Inslee" on Justia Law

Rodney Burch, the former Public Works Director for the City of Chubbuck, Idaho, filed a lawsuit against the City and Mayor Kevin England, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of Idaho state law. Burch claimed that adverse employment actions were taken against him due to his protected speech, which included criticisms of England’s policies and performance, advocacy for a city administrator position, and displaying a political yard sign supporting England’s opponent during the mayoral election.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were made pursuant to his official duties and thus were not protected speech under the First Amendment. However, the court recognized that Burch’s political yard sign was protected speech. Despite this, the court concluded that Burch failed to establish a First Amendment violation because the defendants had adequate justification for their actions and would have taken the same actions regardless of the yard sign.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Burch’s criticisms and advocacy were unprotected as they were part of his official duties. The court also found that while Burch’s yard sign was protected speech, the defendants had legitimate reasons for their actions, including Burch’s unprotected speech and the need to maintain effective city operations. Additionally, the court held that Burch’s state law claim was time-barred as the adverse employment actions occurred outside the statute of limitations.In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Burch’s First Amendment retaliation claim and Idaho state law claim both failed as a matter of law. View "Burch v. City of Chubbuck" on Justia Law

Jessica Bates, a devout Christian and widowed mother of five, applied to adopt children through the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS). Her application was denied because she could not comply with Oregon Administrative Rule § 413-200-0308(2)(k), which requires prospective adoptive parents to "respect, accept, and support" the sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression of children. Bates objected to using preferred pronouns and taking children to medical appointments for gender transitions, citing her religious beliefs. She sued, claiming the policy violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Bates's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the policy was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject to rational basis review, which it survived. The court also concluded that the policy, as applied to Bates, compelled and restricted speech based on content and viewpoint, triggering strict scrutiny. However, it held that the policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in protecting LGBTQ children.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Oregon's application of § 413-200-0308(2)(k) to Bates triggered strict scrutiny for both her free speech and free exercise claims. The court found that the policy restricted and compelled speech based on content and viewpoint and was not neutral or generally applicable. The court concluded that Oregon's policy was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, as less restrictive means were available to protect LGBTQ children. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining ODHS from applying the rule to Bates in deeming her ineligible for certification as an adoptive parent. View "Bates v. Pakseresht" on Justia Law

In 2002, Tracy Allen Hampton was convicted of killing Charles Findley, Tanya Ramsdell, and Ramsdell’s unborn child. A jury sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Hampton’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied his petition for state post-conviction relief. Hampton then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied.Hampton raised four certified claims on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that each lacked merit. The court found that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland or Napue v. Illinois in connection with the testimony of a jailhouse informant, George Ridley. Hampton was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to obtain evidence that could have been used to impeach Ridley. The court also held that Hampton’s defense counsel were not constitutionally ineffective at the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial. Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Hampton’s request for evidentiary development on his Brady, Napue, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Hampton’s uncertified claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hampton’s federal habeas petition. The court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also denied Hampton’s motion for reconsideration as moot. View "HAMPTON V. SHINN" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, a middle school teacher and an assistant principal, were employed by a school district in Oregon. They created the "I Resolve" campaign, which included a website and a video uploaded to YouTube, advocating for policies on gender identity, parental rights, and education. They used their own devices and time but also sent emails from their school accounts to district employees with links to the campaign. Following complaints from employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator's determination that they violated district policies, the district terminated them but later reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and individual defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs alleged that their termination was in retaliation for their protected speech and that they were discriminated against based on their religion and viewpoint. The district court concluded that the defendants' interests in avoiding disruption outweighed the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment. It held that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of the plaintiffs' expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption. The court affirmed the summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment claim for damages due to qualified immunity but vacated the summary judgment for the district on the First Amendment claim for damages and the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also vacated the summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim and the Title VII claim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the credibility of the district's proffered reasons for the terminations. View "DAMIANO V. GRANTS PASS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7" on Justia Law

Ryan Barry, a probationer subject to warrantless search conditions, was implicated in drug trafficking by an anonymous tipster who reported that a person named "Ryan" was selling drugs from an apartment in Van Nuys, California. The tipster also mentioned that "Ryan" drove a red convertible Ford Mustang. Officer Giovanni Espinoza of the LAPD investigated and found Barry, who matched the description and was on post-release community supervision for felony convictions. Barry was observed driving a red Mustang near the apartment. During a subsequent encounter, Barry was found with drugs and did not deny living at the apartment when informed of the impending search. Barry's possession of a key to the apartment further supported the officers' belief that he resided there.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Barry's motion to suppress the evidence found in the warrantless search of the apartment, as well as his request for an evidentiary hearing. Barry entered a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motion, and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard articulated in United States v. Grandberry, which requires probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at the location to be searched. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Barry's responses to Officer Espinoza, the anonymous tip, and Barry's possession of a key, established probable cause that Barry resided at the apartment. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. View "USA V. BARRY" on Justia Law

Edward B. Spencer, an indigent and incarcerated individual, filed multiple lawsuits against various California prison officials. He initially proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) in each case. Spencer had previously filed numerous lawsuits while incarcerated, and he conceded that two of those actions resulted in strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). However, he disputed whether two other actions, which he voluntarily dismissed, should count as strikes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California revoked Spencer's IFP status in four cases, finding that he had four strikes, including the two voluntary dismissals. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which concluded that the voluntary dismissals counted as strikes under the PLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status. The Ninth Circuit held that voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) do not constitute strikes under the PLRA. The court reasoned that the "on the grounds that" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires grounds to be decided by a court, and voluntary dismissals do not have grounds decided by a court. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals cannot count as strikes because they are never "on the grounds that" the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status in each of the four cases on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address any other issues urged by the parties. View "Spencer v. Milan" on Justia Law