Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, but the panel remanded for consideration of his claims of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal. After the district court denied these claims, petitioner sought review from the Ninth Circuit.In this appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that it need not consider petitioner's argument that the district court erred in determining that some claims were outside the scope of the Ninth Circuit's remand, because that determination does not affect the scope of the issues before the panel here; counsel was not ineffective for failing to adequately present an overall defense theory; counsel need not explore the possibility of a mental incapacity defense of impulsivity where such a defense would have been counterproductive; and petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire in failing to discover that a juror had been the victim of a violent crime that would have disqualified that juror was also without merit. The panel denied a certificate of appealability as to all other claims and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Greenway v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that RFC was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claim challenging the City of Oakland's ordinance regulating unattended donation collection boxes (UDCBs) because the ordinance was content neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny. Assuming that charitable solicitations are protected speech, the Ordinance was content neutral to the extent it regulated speech or expressive activity at all. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Ordinance plainly served important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of protected speech; was sufficiently narrowly tailored and left alternative avenues of communication for RFC to express its message; and, because RFC did not demonstrate that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claim, the court need not address RFC's irreparable harm argument. View "Recycle for Change v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion and dissent, filing a superseding opinion and dissent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs in their suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., against the DOD, seeking the names of foreign students and instructors at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The Ninth Circuit held that the disclosure of the names would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Applying a two-step test to determine whether disclosing the names would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under FOIA Exemption 6, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the DOD were sufficient to carry the DOD's burden to establish that disclosure of the requested information gave rise to a nontrivial risk of harassment and mistreatment. Furthermore, the public interest did not outweigh the serious risks that would result from disclosure where any incremental value stemming from the disclosure of the names was small. View "Cameranesi v. US Department of Defense" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants in plaintiff's suit challenging the constitutionality of section 134-7 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which prohibit plaintiff from owning or possessing firearms because of his 1997 state law conviction for harassment. Although plaintiff stated that he challenged only section 134-7, that statute, in relevant part, merely incorporates federal law. Therefore, plaintiff's argument focuses on the latter federal statutes. The Ninth Circuit held that, as a matter of statutory construction, the unavailability of a procedure for either expungement, set-aside, pardon, or civil rights restoration does not remove plaintiff from the ambit of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9)'s prohibition or, by extension, section 134-7(a)'s prohibition. In regard to plaintiff's Second Amendment challenge, the Ninth Circuit held that, under intermediate scrutiny, the statute addressed a substantial governmental interest and was tailored sufficiently to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In this case, section 922(g)(9) was not unconstitutionally applied to plaintiff where his argument that his harassment conviction occurred many years ago, and he has not committed any other crimes since that time, was not meaningfully distinguishable from the one the court rejected in United States v. Chovan. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to avail himself of the one restoration mechanism that was available to him under Hawaii law, and he was in no position to argue that Hawaii's restoration mechanisms were constitutionally insufficient. View "Fisher v. Kealoha" on Justia Law

After plaintiff discovered that she was payed less than her male counterparts for the same work, she filed suit under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5; and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code 12940. The County conceded that it paid plaintiff less than comparable male employees for the same work, but raised an affirmative defense to a claim under the Equal Pay Act that the differential was "based on any other factor other than sex." In this case, the County claimed that the pay differential was a result of prior salary. The court concluded that Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co. is controlling in this case. Kouba held that prior salary can be a factor other than sex, provided that the employer shows that prior salary effectuates some business policy and that the employer uses prior salary reasonably in light of its stated purpose as well as its other practices. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's denial of the County's motion for summary judgment, remanding with instructions for the district court to evaluate the business reasons offered by the County and to determine whether the County used prior salary reasonably in light of its stated purposes as well as its other practices. View "Rizo v. Yovino" on Justia Law

Two disabled individuals filed suit against the City, alleging that the City's FlyAway bus facility and service failed to meet the accessibility standards set forth in Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.; and various California statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the FlyAway bus facility in Van Nuys had been constructed in such a manner that it was inaccessible by disabled individuals. The City then filed a third-party complaint against AECOM and Tutor, alleging that pursuant to the contract entered into by the City and the company hired to design and construct the Van Nuys FlyAway facility (which was AECOM's predecessor-in-interest), AECOM was obligated to defend, indemnify, and hold the City harmless to all suits. The City also alleged a similar claim against Tutor. The court held that Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do not preempt a city's state-law claims for breach of contract and de facto contribution against contractors who breach their contractual duty to perform services in compliance with federal disability regulations. In this case, the court applied the presumption against preemption and concluded that Congress did not indicate a clear and manifest purpose to preempt claims for state-law indemnification or contribution filed by a public entity against a contractor. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Los Angeles v. AECOM Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joann Davis and Paul Cilley filed suit against the United States and NASA officials, alleging, among other things, a claim for wrongful detention under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. The court concluded that the federal agent involved in the detention was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for detaining Davis, an elderly woman, in a public parking lot for two hours, while she stood in urine-soaked pants, to question her, incident to a search, about her possession of a paperweight containing a rice-grain-sized bit of lunar material. The court agreed with Davis that, in light of Franklin v. Foxworth, the agent violated the Fourth Amendment because his detention of her was unreasonably prolonged and degrading. In this case, the agent was aware of several facts that color the reasonableness of his actions: he knew that Davis was a slight, elderly woman; Davis had lost control of her bladder and had visibly wet her pants; Davis and Cilley were unarmed and the search warrant had been fully executed; Davis had not concealed possession of the paperweights, but rather had reached out to NASA for help in selling the paperweights; and the agent knew that Davis was experiencing financial distress as a result of having to raise grandchildren after her daughter died, her son was severely ill and required expensive medical care, and Davis needed a transplant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over which California government entity would be responsible for funding the education of K.G. pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The School District contended that the district court erred in granting K.G. relief from its original judgment denying attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the district court did not apply the incorrect legal rule in evaluating whether to grant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) where the district court's determination that K.G.'s delay in pursuing Rule 60(b) relief was understandable in light of the original attorney's poor mental and physical health; K.G. was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees because K.G.'s prayer was answered in full when the ALJ designated the School District as the responsible agency and granted K.G.'s requested relief; K.G. qualified as a prevailing party under the IDEA, and this victory was not trivial or merely technical; but it was not clear from the district court's award that it took into account forgoing considerations in reducing the fees originally requested. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Irvine Unified School District v. K.G." on Justia Law

The court filed an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the denial of habeas relief, and order denying a petition for rehearing en banc. Petitioner, convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that the relevant state court decision, relating to petitioner's claims regarding (1) the use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; (2) the use of dual juries; (3) juror bias; (4) counsel's performance during the plea process; and (5) counsel's performance during the penalty phase, was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before that court. The court concluded, however, that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a "causal nexus” test, whereby not all mitigating evidence was considered under Lockett v. Ohio, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and their progeny. Consequently, this decision was contrary to established federal law and the court reversed, remanding with instructions to grant the petition with respect to petitioner's sentence. View "Hedlund v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of injuries he sustained while he was housed in the county jail. On appeal, the county and Conmed, a private contractor, challenged the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Plaintiff argued that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under RCW 4.96.020. The court held that RCW 4.96.020 is a special statute of limitations as opposed to a typical tolling provision, and thus it is not applicable to claims filed under section 1983. Therefore, the court found that plaintiff filed his federal complaint after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired, and that his section 1983 claims were thus time-barred. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the section 1983 claims. View "Boston v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law