Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that police officers' warrantless entry into a warehouse during a musical event and fundraiser, and their subsequent search and detention of everyone inside, violated the attendees' First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants with respect to the warrantless-search claims and with respect to the unreasonable-seizure claim of Plaintiff Javier Cortez. The court agreed that the majority of the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the warrantless entry, concluded that the district court’s holding that Cortez is subject to the Heck bar was correct, and rejected all of plaintiffs’ claims of error regarding the jury instructions given at trial. However, the court concluded that Plaintiffs Cortez and Elizabeth Lopez, who were organizers of the event and thus were in possession of the warehouse on the night at issue, have standing to challenge the officers' entry into the warehouse. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to that issue. The court remanded the warrantless-entry claims for trial. View "Lyall v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and his children against police officers, four DHS officials and the City, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that DHS and the officers took custody of his children without reasonable cause. The court concluded that the factual issues do not preclude the court from hearing the officers' appeal and rejected plaintiff's claim under Johnson v. Jones. In this case, the undisputed facts provide a sufficient basis to determine whether the officers’ reliance on DHS’s determination violated any clearly established right of plaintiffs. The court also concluded that the officers were not incompetent in believing that they were legally authorized to act in reliance on DHS’s determination. And even if the officers were mistaken in their belief that they could remove the children at the direction of DHS without court authorization, their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's order denying qualified immunity to the officers and remanded. View "Sjurset v. Button" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of representatives of a group of tenants who receive rent subsidies through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, filed suit asserting that defendants reduced the amount of Section 8 beneficiaries' subsidies without providing adequate notice, in violation of federal and state law. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the Housing Authority; there is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether the Housing Authority failed to provide meaningful information to Section 8 beneficiaries about the change to the payment standard and the effect of that change upon the beneficiaries and their property interests; that failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program regulations and the requirements of procedural due process; and that failure also resulted in a violation of two state statutes which require public entities to take reasonable efforts to comply with the mandatory duties established by federal regulations. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nozzi v. HACLA" on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law