Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action filed against DSHS by plaintiff. At issue is whether the Due Process Clause compels the state to perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within seven days of a court order requiring evaluation. The district court addressed both initial competency evaluations and the mental health restoration services that follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that services for both categories must be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an individualized determination of clinical good cause. The district court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although Washington appeals only that portion related to initial competency evaluations. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct competency evaluations within a reasonable time following a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate, however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. View "Trueblood V. WSDSHS" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Roca Solida filed suit seeking relief from the United States and from a federal officer for the allegedly unconstitutional diversion of a stream that once flowed through Roca Solida’s church camp property. Through its Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics action, Roca Solida seeks an injunction compelling Sharon McKelvey personally to restore the stream to its route through church property and a declaration that her actions violated Roca Solida’s constitutional rights, but it does not seek damages against her. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, decided that the Bivens claim could proceed, and held that McKelvey was not protected by qualified immunity. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that relief under Bivens does not encompass injunctive and declaratory relief where, as here, the equitable relief sought requires official government action. Bivens is both inappropriate and unnecessary for claims seeking solely equitable relief against actions by the federal government. In this case, only the United States - through its officers - has the power to take the action that Roca Solida seeks: returning the stream to its previous path through Roca Solida’s land. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Ministerio Roca Solida v. McKelvey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, fell off of a ladder while working his prison job as an electrician’s assistant. A prison medical professional diagnosed him as having an umbilical hernia. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the prison officials to refer him to a surgeon for evaluation and to authorize surgical treatment. Plaintiff consequently received umbilical hernia surgery. Then plaintiff sought damages for the pain he suffered because of the prison officials' refusal to authorize the surgery prior to litigation. The court concluded that the prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity where, even when the facts are viewed most favorably to plaintiff, it is at least debatable that the prison officials complied with the Eighth Amendment. To the extent the officials played any role in the decision to deny the umbilical hernia surgery, the record makes clear that they did so based on legitimate medical opinions that have often been held reasonable under the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in denying injunctive relief relating to his potential inguinal hernia because plaintiff failed to provide evidence suggesting that the prison officials' decision to forgo surgery at this time is medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the officials chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hamby v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Puente filed suit challenging provisions of Arizona’s identity theft laws which prohibit using a false identity to obtain employment. The district court found the laws facially preempted by federal immigration policy and granted a preliminary injunction preventing Arizona from enforcing the challenged provisions. Arizona appealed the preliminary injunction, and defendant Maricopa County individually appealed its liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Monell v. Department of Social Services. The court concluded that the identity theft laws are not facially preempted because they have obvious constitutional applications. The court rejected all of Puente’s arguments because each one applies to only certain applications of the identity theft laws. Therefore, Puente has not met its burden of showing a clear and manifest purpose to completely preempt these laws. Because Puente has not come forward with a compelling reason why the statute is preempted on its face, the court held that Puente has not raised a serious question going to the merits of its facial challenge. The court also held that it does not have pendent jurisdiction over Maricopa County’s Monell liability. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated the injunction, dismissed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Puente Arizona v. Arpaio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., when it failed to return her to a full time position following her medical leave. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s disability discrimination and disparate treatment claims because plaintiff failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not returning plaintiff to full-time work was pretextual. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., does not affect the court's analysis where plaintiff's claims in this case are distinguishable. The court reiterated that its ADA cases, which require a plaintiff who alleges disparate treatment to show that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the defendant, remain good law. The court also concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim because plaintiff failed to establish that a full-time position was available. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mendoza v. RCALA" on Justia Law

After the university found that plaintiff had violated the Student Conduct Code’s prohibition on harassment and intimidation that poses a threat to others, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of his constitutional rights including those protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that California Code of Regulations, tit. 5, 41301(b)(7), which authorizes branches of California State University to discipline students for conduct that “threatens or endangers the health or safety of any person . . . including . . . intimidation [or] harassment,” is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. In this case, plaintiff confronted and videotaped two professors in their offices, questioning them about a poem that had been published in a supplement to the student newspaper. The court held that the regulation supported imposing discipline for plaintiff's conduct. However, the court held that plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against some of the defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "O'Brien v. Welty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. 1996, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prevent the government from prosecuting them under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing cannabis for religious or therapeutic use, obtaining cannabis, and cultivating or distributing cannabis consistent with state law. At issue in this appeal is the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the RFRA claim. The court concluded that, even assuming such use constitutes an “exercise of religion,” no rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that a prohibition of cannabis use imposes a “substantial burden.” Nothing in the record demonstrates that a prohibition on cannabis forces plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and criminal sanction, such that they are being "coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs." The court failed to see how prohibiting a substance that plaintiffs freely admit is a substitute for peyote would force them to act at odds with their religious beliefs. In light of Holt v. Hobbs, plaintiffs in this case have produced no evidence establishing that denying them cannabis forces them to choose between religious obedience and government sanction. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the AIRFA because the Act does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. 1996, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to prevent the government from prosecuting them under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., for possessing cannabis for religious or therapeutic use, obtaining cannabis, and cultivating or distributing cannabis consistent with state law. At issue in this appeal is the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government on the RFRA claim. The court concluded that, even assuming such use constitutes an “exercise of religion,” no rational trier of fact could conclude on this record that a prohibition of cannabis use imposes a “substantial burden.” Nothing in the record demonstrates that a prohibition on cannabis forces plaintiffs to choose between obedience to their religion and criminal sanction, such that they are being "coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs." The court failed to see how prohibiting a substance that plaintiffs freely admit is a substitute for peyote would force them to act at odds with their religious beliefs. In light of Holt v. Hobbs, plaintiffs in this case have produced no evidence establishing that denying them cannabis forces them to choose between religious obedience and government sanction. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the AIRFA because the Act does not create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Oklevueha Native Am. Church v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Palomar College Police Officer Christopher Dillard under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of unlawful seizure and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Dillard qualified immunity on summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liability. At issue was whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, searching a suspect for weapons, based solely on the perceived domestic violence nature of the investigation. The court held that, although the domestic violence nature of a police investigation is a relevant consideration in assessing whether there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous, it is not alone sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. In this case, the court held that Dillard violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure by detaining him for the purpose of performing a Terry frisk. However, the court held that Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established at the time that the perceived domestic violence nature of an investigation was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The court further held that Dillard used excessive force when he tased plaintiff in order to force him to submit to the Terry frisk against his consent. Nonetheless, given the unsettled state of the law regarding the use of Tasers at the time, Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity. It was not clearly established at the time of Dillard’s actions that an officer who mistakenly but reasonably believed he had the right to conduct a Terry frisk could not deploy a Taser in dart mode to overcome a suspect’s resistance to the frisk. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Thomas v. Dillard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and the ADAC, seek permanently to enjoin defendants from categorically denying drivers' licenses to DACA recipients. Defendants had instituted a policy that rejected the Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) issued to DACA recipients under the DACA program as proof of authorized presence for the purpose of obtaining a driver’s license. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction. The court agreed with the district court that DACA recipients are similarly situated to other groups of noncitizens Arizona deems eligible for drivers’ licenses. Consequently, Arizona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the court's previous opinion in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer indicated is likely the case. Applying the principle of constitutional avoidance, however, the court need not and should not come to rest on the Equal Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for plaintiffs, so long as there is a viable alternate, nonconstitutional ground to reach the same result. In this case, the court concluded that Arizona’s policy classifies noncitizens based on Arizona’s independent definition of “authorized presence,” classification authority denied the states under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.1101, et seq. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order that Arizona’s policy is preempted by the exclusive authority of the federal government to classify noncitizens. View "Arizona Dream Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law