Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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Three inmates in a California state prison jointly filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and false imprisonment due to being forced to stand in unsanitary conditions for nearly nine hours. One inmate also claimed excessive force. They applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied their request for joinder and severed their claims, requiring each inmate to file separately. The court reasoned that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required each prisoner to pay the full filing fee, and allowing joint actions would result in fees exceeding statutory limits. The court also cited practical issues with pro se prisoner lawsuits, such as potential transfers and communication difficulties, as reasons for denying joinder.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PLRA does not prohibit prisoners from proceeding together in lawsuits, but it does require each prisoner to pay the full filing fee. The district court erred by interpreting the PLRA's fee provisions in isolation and failing to harmonize them. The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying permissive joinder under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on hypothetical concerns not supported by the record.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, allowing the inmates to proceed jointly under the PLRA, provided each pays the full filing fee. View "JOHNSON V. HDSP" on Justia Law

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In the 1950s, the Tucson Unified School District (the District) operated a dual school system for Black and non-Black students. In 1974, class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of African American and Latino students, leading to a 1978 settlement agreement and desegregation decree. Over the years, the District undertook numerous efforts to remedy past discrimination. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's preliminary finding of unitary status, remanding the case for further supervision. A Unitary Status Plan (USP) was created in 2013 to guide the District towards unitary status.The District Court for the District of Arizona found partial unitary status in 2018, retaining jurisdiction over unresolved issues. By 2021, the court found the District had achieved unitary status in most areas, except for two subsections of the USP. In 2022, after further revisions and compliance, the district court declared the District had achieved full unitary status and ended federal supervision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District had achieved unitary status, meaning it had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable. The court found no error in the district court's conclusions regarding student assignments, transportation, staff diversity, quality of education, student discipline, family and community engagement, and transparency and accountability. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that perfect implementation of the USP was not necessary for unitary status and that the District had demonstrated a lasting commitment to the USP and the Constitution. View "MENDOZA V. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging California Penal Code 28225 on Second Amendment grounds, alleging that California's allocation of $5 of a $19 fee on firearms transfers to fund enforcement efforts against illegal firearm purchasers was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the collection and use of the fee fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, the fee survived intermediate scrutiny because of the State's important interest in promoting public safety and disarming prohibited persons, and because there was a reasonable fit between these important objectives and the challenged fees. Because section 28225 did not violate the constitution, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Bauer v. Becerra" on Justia Law

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If the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defendant. Before a presumptively innocent defendant may be shackled, the court must make an individualized decision that a compelling government purpose would be served and that shackles are the least restrictive means for maintaining security and order in the courtroom. The Ninth Circuit construed defendants' appeal as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority and found that it had jurisdiction to consider them. The en banc court held that there was still a live controversy over the shackling policy and the case was not moot because of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness. The en banc court clarified the right to be free from shackles and held that it applies whether the proceeding is pretrial, trial, or sentencing, with a jury or without. Although the en banc court held that the policy was unconstitutional, the court withheld the issuance of a formal writ of mandamus. View "United States v. Sanchez-Gomez" on Justia Law

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M.N. filed a due process complaint alleging that the District committed procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A). The ALJ denied all claims and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion reversing the district court's judgment, holding that neither the duration of the hearing, the ALJ's active involvement, nor the length of the ALJ's opinion can ensure that the ALJ was thorough and careful in its findings of fact; plaintiffs' claim that the District committed a procedural violation of the IDEA by failing to adequately document its offer of the visually impaired (TVI) services was not waived; the District committed two procedural violations as to the individualized education plan (IEP); the District's failure to specify the assistive technology (AT) devices that were provided infringed M.N.'s opportunity to participate in the IEP process and denied the student a free appropriate education (FAPE); the panel remanded for a determination of the prejudice the student suffered as a result of the District's failure to respond to the complaint and the award of appropriate compensation; in regard to substantive violations, the panel remanded so the district court could consider plaintiffs' claims in light of new guidance from the Supreme Court in Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017); and M.N., as the prevailing party, was entitled to attorneys' fees. View "M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District" on Justia Law

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Although 28 U.S.C. 1448 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) give plaintiffs additional time to effect service of process, these rules do not extend or revive a state statute of limitations that expired before removal. If the period of time for bringing an action expired under state law before the action was removed to federal court, a defendant can raise the state statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in federal court. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging federal civil rights and negligence claims after plaintiff was injured by a flash-bang grenade a deputy threw during the execution of a warrant at plaintiff's house. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit based on statute of limitations grounds. In this case, although section 1448 and Rule 4(m) allowed plaintiff to serve process on defendants after removal, these laws did not change the period of time for commencing an action under the state statute of limitations. The panel explained that, because the time for commencing the action expired before the case was removed to federal court, defendants were entitled to raise the state statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. View "Whidbee v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff is a street performer. She and her friend were arrested and charged with conducting business without a license, because they were dressed in "sexy cop" outfits on the Las Vegas strip and posed for photos with the officers in exchange for a tip. After the charges were dropped, plaintiff filed suit against the officers, alleging eleven federal and state causes of action. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the officers because the district court misconceived the scope of the applicable First Amendment protections. The record indicated the officers had no evidence before them when they decided to arrest plaintiff that suggested that the "sexy cops" association had any purpose that could have fallen outside the protection of the First Amendment under Berger v. City of Seattle. To infer from plaintiff and her friend's shared costumes and joint performance, alone, an agreement to engage in a regulable transaction impermissibly burdens the right to engage in purely expressive activity and association. The panel held that something more than that constitutionally protected activity is required to justify plaintiff's arrest. Viewing plaintiff's activities separately from her friend's, the panel held that summary judgment for the officers was improper because plaintiff's actions were entirely protected speech. The panel reversed in part and remanded in part. View "Santopietro v. Howell" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Montana Supreme Court: Whether, under Montana law, the public duty doctrine shields a law enforcement officer from liability for negligence where the officer is the direct and sole cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff? View "Bassett v. Lamantia" on Justia Law

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Section 1915A of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915A, applies only to claims brought by individuals incarcerated at the time they file their complaints. Plaintiff, a former prisoner, filed suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and various state laws for injuries he suffered, and the medical treatment he received, after he was struck by shotgun pellets that officers fired. The district court dismissed the complaint. In this case, plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time he filed the complaint and thus should not have been subjected to Section 1915A screening. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. View "Olivas v. Nevada" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a death row inmate, appealed the dismissal of his claims that the ADC policy and practice of inspecting inmates' outgoing legal mail violates his Sixth and First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that ADC's current inspection policy does not satisfy the standard articulated in Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014) (Nordstrom I). The panel explained that the standard was not satisfied because the policy calls for page-by-page content review of inmates' confidential outgoing legal mail. The policy also does not satisfy the four-part test identified in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89โ€“91 (1987), because ADC did not produce evidence of a threat to prison security sufficient to justify its policy, and because feasible, readily available alternatives were apparent. View "Nordstrom v. Ryan" on Justia Law