Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Committee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Commonwealth, alleging that the Incumbent Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. 24.2-509(B), infringes on its First Amendment right to freedom of association by preventing it from determining the method of nomination in contravention of the terms of the Party's Plan of Organization. Senator Hanger and Moxley, who sought the Party’s nomination for Senator Hanger’s seat on the 24th District, both moved to intervene. The district court subsequently granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s holding that the Committee lacks standing to bring this suit because the language of the Plan is clear and unambiguous: the Plan delegates to the Committee the authority to determine the nomination method unless Virginia law otherwise limits that authority. Because the Party has made a voluntary choice to limit the Committee’s authority in this way, plaintiffs have “no complaint that the party’s right to govern itself has been substantially burdened by” the Act because “the source of the complaint is the party’s own decision.” Because neither Virginia law nor the Plan gives Moxley “a legally protected interest” in determining the nomination method in the first place, he fails to establish that he has standing independent of the Party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "24th Senatorial Dist. v. Alcorn" on Justia Law

After G.G., a transgender boy, began to use the boys’ restrooms with the approval of the school administration, the local school board passed a policy banning G.G. from the boys’ restroom. G.G. filed suit alleging that the school board impermissibly discriminated against him in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The district court dismissed G.G.’s Title IX claim and denied his request for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed the dismissal of G.G.’s Title IX claim, concluding that the district court did not accord appropriate deference to the relevant Department of Education regulations. In this case, the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation, 34 C.F.R. 106.33, as it relates to restroom access by transgender individuals, is entitled to Auer v. Robbins deference and is to be accorded controlling weight. The court also concluded that the district court used the wrong evidentiary standard in assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court evaluated G.G.’s proffered evidence against a stricter evidentiary standard than is warranted by the nature and purpose of preliminary injunction proceedings to prevent irreparable harm before a full trial on the merits. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the preliminary injunction without considering G.G.’s proffered evidence. The court vacated the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for consideration under the correct standard. View "G. G. v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

S.B., by and through his mother, filed suit against the Board, alleging primarily that by allowing other students to harass S.B. based on his disability, the Board violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. S.B.'s father, a teacher and athletic director at the school, filed suit in his own right, claiming that the Board also violated section 504 by retaliating against him for advocating on S.B.’s behalf. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board. The court affirmed the judgment because no evidence support's the claims. In this case, S.B. has provided no evidence that the Board acted with the deliberate indifference necessary to hold it liable for student-on-student harassment. Nor does the record substantiate the father's allegation of a causal connection between his advocacy for S.B. and any adverse action taken by the Board. View "SB v. Board of Educ. of Harford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Terry and others after he was pulled over, tased three times, and arrested. Plaintiff was charged with an excessive noise violation, no license in possession, and disorderly conduct, all of which were nol prossed. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to all claims except for the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force against Terry in his individual capacity. The district court denied Terry summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court's analysis of the Graham v. Connor factors when measured against the level of force used by Terry against plaintiff leads the court to conclude that such force was not objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case. Therefore, plaintiff has established that Terry's use of his taser constituted excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Further, no reasonable officer would have believed that Terry’s use of the taser was justifiable at all and certainly not on three occasions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Terry’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Yates v. Terry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Terry and others after he was pulled over, tased three times, and arrested. Plaintiff was charged with an excessive noise violation, no license in possession, and disorderly conduct, all of which were nol prossed. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as to all claims except for the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force against Terry in his individual capacity. The district court denied Terry summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court's analysis of the Graham v. Connor factors when measured against the level of force used by Terry against plaintiff leads the court to conclude that such force was not objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case. Therefore, plaintiff has established that Terry's use of his taser constituted excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Further, no reasonable officer would have believed that Terry’s use of the taser was justifiable at all and certainly not on three occasions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Terry’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Yates v. Terry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at a Virginia correctional facility, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant's deliberate indifference to plaintiff's safety, and the resulting injuries, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate after requesting a transfer from defendant, the Prison Housing Manager. The court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact underlie plaintiff's claim where plaintiff alleged specific facts describing the injuries he sustained as a result of the attack, and alleged two independent grounds for establishing defendant's subjective knowledge of the risk of assault. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. The court vacated and remanded. View "Raynor v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit after her termination against her former employers for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), and for other violations of state and federal law. The jury found in favor of plaintiff on certain state law claims and in favor of the employers on all other claims. The court concluded that the district court correctly applied a but-for causation standard to plaintiff's ADA claim; the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in instructing the jury where the "prevents or significantly restricts" standard is too demanding under the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No 110-325, section 5; even if the court assumes that the district court’s instruction was erroneous and that the error was plain, plaintiff has not shown that it affected her substantial rights; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability because she failed to show how she was prejudiced. Therefore, the court found no abuse of discretion and no serious prejudice to plaintiff that warrants vacating the verdict on her disability discrimination claims. Further, the court rejected plaintiff's challenge to the district court’s instruction on “record of” disability where she did not object to the instruction and on appeal did not explain how the omitted language applies to her case. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's challenges to the damages the jury awarded on her state law claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gentry v. East West Partners Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, alleging that the City, acting through it's Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by denying plaintiffs' request for a variance to permit a certain property to be used as a church facility. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the BZA’s decision imposed a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ right of religious exercise. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint, because any such amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Andon, LLC v. The City of Newport News, VA" on Justia Law

Maryland allows any voter to vote via absentee ballot. Plaintiffs filed suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, against state election officials under federal law, alleging that marking a hardcopy ballot by hand without assistance is impossible for voters with various disabilities, and that they have therefore been denied meaningful access to absentee voting. Defendants argue that even if absentee voting is not fully accessible, the full accessibility of Maryland’s in-person polling places provides disabled voters with meaningful access to voting. The court concluded that defendants’ proposed focus is overbroad and would undermine the purpose of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that by effectively requiring disabled individuals to rely on the assistance of others to vote absentee, defendants have not provided plaintiffs with meaningful access to Maryland’s absentee voting program. The court also concluded that plaintiffs’ proposed use of the online ballot marking tool is a reasonable modification to Maryland’s absentee voting policies and procedures. The court agreed with the the district court that defendants have not met their burden to show that plaintiffs’ proposed modification - use of the online ballot marking tool - would fundamentally alter Maryland’s voting program. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "National Federation of the Blind v. Lamone" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Maryland's Firearm Safety Act (FSA), Md. Code, Crim. Law 4-303(a), which, among other things, bans law-abiding citizens, with the exception of retired law enforcement officers, from possessing the vast majority of semi-automatic rifles commonly kept by several million American citizens for defending their families and homes and other lawful purposes. The court concluded that the FSA implicates the core protection of the Second Amendment and the court, pursuant to District of Columbia v. Heller, McDonald v. City of Chicago, and its own precedent, concluded the burden is substantial and strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review for plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's denial of these claims and remanded for the district court to apply strict scrutiny. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the statutory exception allowing retired law enforcement officers to possess prohibited semi-automatic rifles. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the term “copies” as used by the FSA is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Kolbe v. Hogan, Jr." on Justia Law