Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A 14-year-old student, S.B., who had a history of trauma and mental health challenges, began high school in Appomattox County, Virginia, in August 2021. S.B. identified as male at school and was advised by a counselor that he could use the boys’ restroom. Following this, S.B. was subjected to harassment, threats, and sexual assault by male students. School staff, including counselors, were aware of the harassment and S.B.’s mental health vulnerabilities but did not inform S.B.’s adoptive mother, Blair, about the gender identity issues, the bullying, or the school’s responses. Instead, staff continued to affirm S.B.’s male identity without parental notification and failed to take effective action to stop the harassment. After a series of escalating incidents, S.B. suffered a breakdown, ran away, and was subsequently victimized by sex traffickers.Blair filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the school board and staff, alleging deliberate indifference to sexual harassment under Title IX, Monell liability for unconstitutional policy or failure to train, and violations of substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed all claims, finding insufficient allegations of deliberate indifference or Monell liability, and granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on the due process claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that Blair’s Title IX claim for deliberate indifference against the school board was sufficiently pleaded and should not have been dismissed, as the complaint alleged the school’s response to known harassment was clearly unreasonable. However, the court affirmed dismissal of the Monell and substantive due process claims, finding the allegations were conclusory or the rights not clearly established. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Title IX claim. View "Blair v. Appomattox County School Board" on Justia Law

The case involves Jane Roe, a student at Marshall University, who was sexually assaulted by her ex-boyfriend, John Doe, at an off-campus party following a football game in September 2022. Roe reported the incident to the police, who then informed the university. The university's Title IX office reviewed the case but determined it fell outside their jurisdiction as the incident occurred off-campus and was not part of a university-sponsored event. The matter was referred to the Office of Student Conduct, which investigated and disciplined both Doe and Roe for their respective violations of the Student Code.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Roe filed a lawsuit against the Marshall University Board of Governors, alleging deliberate indifference and retaliation under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the university, finding that the university's response did not amount to deliberate indifference and that the university did not retaliate against Roe for reporting the assault.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the university did not have substantial control over the context of the harassment, as the incident occurred at a private off-campus residence. Additionally, the court found that Roe failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the university's reasons for disciplining her were pretextual. The court concluded that the university's actions were not retaliatory and upheld the summary judgment in favor of the university. View "Roe v. Marshall University Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Evy Orellana suffered serious injuries when a tactical canine bit her leg as a U.S. Marshals fugitive task force executed an arrest warrant for her boyfriend, Eric Trinidad. Orellana, Trinidad, and their baby lived in the basement of Trinidad’s mother’s home. The officers breached a sealed door to access the basement, and the dog bit Orellana during the search. Orellana sued the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, claiming a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights due to unreasonable search and seizure.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the officers' motion to dismiss, reasoning that the case was similar enough to Bivens to apply its cause of action. The court also denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that this case presented a new context for Bivens because the officers were part of a specialized federal-state task force operating under a warrant. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court has cautioned against extending Bivens to new contexts, particularly when Congress is better suited to create a cause of action. The court concluded that special factors, including federalism concerns and the existence of alternative remedial procedures, counseled against extending Bivens in this situation. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, denying Orellana a Bivens remedy. View "Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Godec" on Justia Law

Zachary Hebb challenged a municipal ordinance in Asheville, North Carolina, that prohibited the use of amplified sound within 150 feet of a medical clinic during its operating hours. Hebb, who regularly protested outside a Planned Parenthood clinic, argued that the ordinance infringed on his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He preferred using a sound amplifier to communicate his message without yelling. After being cited for violating the ordinance, Hebb filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, nominal damages, and attorneys' fees.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially granted Hebb a preliminary injunction, finding that the ordinance likely violated his First Amendment rights and was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied Asheville's motions to dismiss and later granted Hebb's motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining the ordinance and awarding nominal damages for the due process claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Asheville's motions to dismiss Hebb's First Amendment claim but reversed the summary judgment in Hebb's favor, finding that there were disputed factual and legal questions that warranted further consideration. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and served a significant government interest in protecting patients from harmful noise. However, it concluded that the entry of summary judgment was premature.Regarding Hebb's due process claim, the Fourth Circuit held that the 2021 version of the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to prevent Hebb from using a plastic cone. The court found that the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited and included sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's decision on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "Hebb v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law

Terrence Hammock, a detainee at the Baltimore County Detention Center (BCDC), filed a lawsuit alleging severe violations of his constitutional rights. He claimed that BCDC served him rotten and unsafe food, causing him to get sick multiple times and lose weight. Additionally, Hammock, a practicing Muslim, alleged that he was denied the ability to attend Jum’ah services, a central practice of Islam, throughout his detention from September 2019 to at least March 2022.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Hammock’s claims. The court found that his allegations regarding the food did not meet the standard of a “serious deprivation of a basic human need” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It also held that the denial of Jum’ah services was justified by legitimate penological interests, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied Hammock’s motion for appointed counsel, stating that the case had not yet proceeded to discovery or trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in dismissing Hammock’s claims. The appellate court held that Hammock sufficiently pleaded a claim of deliberate indifference based on the conditions of confinement, specifically the provision of rotten and mice-bitten food. The court also found that Hammock adequately pleaded a First Amendment claim, as the defendants did not present a penological interest to justify the denial of Jum’ah services for the entire period in question. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Hammock’s claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, including the appointment of counsel for Hammock. View "Hammock v. Watts" on Justia Law

Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson Island, Maryland, sought to build an assisted living facility for elderly people with disabilities. The Gibson Island Corporation, a homeowners association, opposed the project, citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting business use of homes without approval. Lussi requested an exemption as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Maryland law, but the Corporation imposed four conditions, which Lussi found unreasonable. Negotiations failed, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the Corporation, finding that Lussi could not show the requested accommodation was necessary for providing equal housing opportunities. The court also dismissed Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims, concluding there was no evidence of adverse actions or discriminatory intent by the Corporation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the necessity element by focusing on the removal of the Corporation's conditions rather than the requested exemption itself. The appellate court held that the exemption was necessary to provide equal housing opportunities for disabled individuals on Gibson Island. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Corporation's conditions, which should be resolved by a jury.Additionally, the appellate court determined that Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims presented jury questions. The court noted evidence suggesting the Corporation's stated reasons for opposing the project might be pretextual and that community hostility towards disabled residents could imply discriminatory intent.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Thomas Sheppheard, Tyler Randall, and Adam Perry, on behalf of minor child J.P., filed a class action lawsuit against the Governor of West Virginia and the Acting Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security. They sought relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging unconstitutional conditions of overcrowding, understaffing, and deferred maintenance in West Virginia's prisons, jails, and juvenile centers. They claimed these conditions amounted to deliberate indifference to their health and safety.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their injuries were traceable to the actions of the Governor or the Secretary, or that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the issues were largely due to funding decisions by the West Virginia legislature, which was not a party to the suit. The court also highlighted that the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not the Governor or the Secretary, had the authority to address the conditions in the facilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show that their injuries were caused by the Governor's or the Secretary's actions. The court also found that the requested relief, such as appropriations and policy changes, could not be granted by the court as it lacked the power to compel the Governor or the Secretary to take such actions. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' injuries were not redressable through the requested judicial intervention. View "Sheppheard v. Morrisey" on Justia Law

The case involves Justin Michael Wolfe, who was convicted of hiring Owen Barber to murder Daniel Petrole in 2001. Barber, the key witness, initially testified against Wolfe, implicating him in the murder-for-hire scheme. Wolfe was sentenced to death, but Barber later recanted his testimony, claiming he was coerced by the Commonwealth of Virginia with threats of the death penalty. Wolfe's conviction was vacated by the district court due to Brady violations and other prosecutorial misconduct, and the Commonwealth was ordered to retry Wolfe or release him.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted Wolfe habeas relief, finding that the Commonwealth had withheld exculpatory evidence and engaged in misconduct. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, but the Commonwealth continued to pursue charges against Wolfe. In a subsequent interview, Commonwealth officials again coerced Barber, leading him to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, making him unavailable as a witness for Wolfe's retrial. Wolfe ultimately pled guilty to avoid the death penalty, receiving a 41-year sentence.Wolfe filed a new habeas petition in the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting claims of vindictive prosecution and due process violations based on the Commonwealth's intimidation of Barber. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely and found that Wolfe failed to present new, reliable evidence of actual innocence under the Schlup standard. Wolfe appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.The Fourth Circuit held that Barber's new declaration, which exculpated Wolfe and explained his previous invocation of the Fifth Amendment due to Commonwealth threats, constituted new, reliable evidence. The court found that Barber's declaration was credible and that no reasonable juror would have convicted Wolfe if they had heard Barber's recantation. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for adjudication of Wolfe's substantive claims. View "Wolfe v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Demmerick Brown, an inmate at Red Onion State Prison in Virginia, violated the prison’s COVID-19 policy by removing his face mask to get a shave at the barber shop. As a result, the prison fined him fifteen dollars, which was deducted from his prison trust account. Brown claimed that he was not provided the necessary forms to present evidence and call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, and his request to postpone the hearing was denied. He was found guilty and fined.Brown sued three prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his case, concluding that Brown lacked a property interest in the money in his prison trust account, and thus, the fine did not trigger due process protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal, holding that inmates do have a property interest in the money in their prison trust accounts, as established in Henderson v. Harmon. The court found that the fifteen-dollar fine deprived Brown of this property interest, and thus, the Due Process Clause was applicable. The court rejected the argument that the fine was de minimis, noting its significance within the prison context.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what process was due and whether any errors in Brown’s disciplinary proceedings were harmless. View "Brown v. Stapleton" on Justia Law

Joel Aaron Burrell, a prisoner, filed a lawsuit against several correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Burrell sought to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows indigent prisoners to file lawsuits without prepaying filing fees. The district court denied his request, citing the three-strike rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which prevents prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis if they have had three prior lawsuits dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The district court identified three such dismissals in Burrell's case history and dismissed his current action when he did not pay the filing fee.Burrell appealed, arguing that two of the prior dismissals should not count as strikes. The first case was dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings. The second case was dismissed after Burrell failed to amend his complaint following a court order that found his initial complaint failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that a dismissal under Younger abstention does not count as a strike because it does not assess the merits of the complaint. Regarding the second case, the court determined that while a failure to amend following a finding of failure to state a claim can count as a strike, it should not be counted if the dismissal occurred after the current lawsuit was filed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the three-strike rule to Burrell's case. Since Burrell had only one valid strike at the time he filed the current lawsuit, the district court's dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Burrell v. Shirley" on Justia Law