Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a civil rights action against the City of Lawrence after being sexually assaulted by one of the City’s police officers. The City made a Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment that was silent as to whether that amount was inclusive of Plaintiff’s costs or not. Within the fourteen-day period for acceptance, the City sent an “amended” offer of judgment containing the same language as the first offer but also stating that the offer was inclusive of costs and attorneys’ fees. Before the expiration of the fourteen-day period, Plaintiff purported to accept the unamended version of the offer and informed the City she would be moving separately for fees and costs. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the unamended offer, her purported acceptance, and proof of service with the district court. The district court granted the City’s motion to strike the filing on the ground that Plaintiff’s acceptance was invalid. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the police officer was not acting “under color of state law” in committing the assault on Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s purported acceptance of the City’s original offer was valid and that the offer was unambiguously exclusive of both costs and attorneys’ fees. View "LaPierre v. City of Lawrence" on Justia Law

After he was terminated from his employment Plaintiff sued his former employer and its parent company (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its Massachusetts analog. Plaintiff also alleged a state wrongful discharge claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its assessment that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination; and (2) correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of establishing that his termination implicated a sufficiently important and clearly defined public policy in Massachusetts. View "Murray v. Warren Pumps, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to armed bank robbery and related firearm charges. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of a residence by police. At issue on appeal was whether the police had a reasonable belief that another man, Tommy Smith, lived at and would be present at the residence when they entered the residence in order to execute an arrest warrant for Smith. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it was reasonable for the police to believe that Smith lived at the residence and that he would be there at the time of the police entry. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of individuals and advocacy groups, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Article 68 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico and other laws of the Commonwealth that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. After the lower court dismissed Petitioners’ claims, the United States Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges. All parties subsequently agreed that the Commonwealth’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. The First Circuit agreed and vacated the judgment. On remand, however, the district court did not enter judgment in favor of Petitioners but, instead, issued a memorandum concluding that the Commonwealth’s ban was not unconstitutional because the “right to same-sex marriage” had not been determined to apply in Puerto Rico. Petitioners requested a writ of mandamus requiring the district court to enter judgment in their favor striking down the ban as unconstitutional. Respondents moved for leave to join in Petitioners’ request. The First Circuit granted Petitioners’ petition for writ of mandamus and Respondents’ motion to join in the petition, holding that the district court erred in ruling that the ban is not unconstitutional and directly contradicted the First Circuit’s mandate and compounded its error by failing to enter a final judgment to enable an appeal in ordinary course. View "In re Conde-Vidal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a discrimination and retaliation suit against his Employer, alleging illegal harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not employ the minimum number of employees necessary to qualify as an “employer” under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Employer’s motion for summary judgment, attaching a post-discovery sworn statement in support of his opposition. Employer requested that the district court strike the sworn statement. The district court granted Employer’s motions for summary judgment and to strike Employer’s sworn statement under the sham affidavit doctrine. The district court then sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for filing the sham affidavit after he received repeated warnings in earlier cases not to do so. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) striking Plaintiff’s sworn statement; (2) granting summary judgment to Employer on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that Employer had enough employees to qualify as a covered employer under either the ADA or ADEA; and (3) ordering sanctions. View "Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l HEPA Certificate Corp." on Justia Law

After a jury trial in federal district court, Defendant was convicted of sex trafficking and transporting minors to engage in prostitution. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s argument that the indictment was defective based on its failure to allege facts to support the aiding and abetting charges failed because Defendant could not show plain error and because any error would be harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude evidence from the victim’s cell phone; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for production of classified Department of Children and Families records that would purportedly show that the victim had previously offered men sex in exchange for a place to stay; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Defendant had prostituted and physically abused another woman; (5) the government did not commit misconduct in its closing argument by impermissibly commenting on Defendant’s failure to take the stand; and (6) the district court did not commit plain error in instructing the jury regarding the knowledge requirement of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a). View "United States v. Gemma" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained after a police officer, during the course of a Terry stop, conducted a pat-frisk of a fanny pack that Defendant was wearing. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous, and therefore, the law enforcement officer was justified in touching the fanny pack. View "United States v. Cardona-Vicente" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was allegedly raped and assaulted by an officer of the Fall River Police Department. Plaintiff filed federal civil rights and state law negligence claims against the City of Fall River, Massachusetts, and Daniel Racine, the Fall River Police Chief. The district court dismissed the claims against Racine and the City for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the 42 U.S. 1983 claims against Racine and the City and her negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim against the City. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for holding Racine and the City liable under section 1983 or under the law of negligence in Massachusetts. View "Saldivar v. Racine" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to suppress (1) evidence obtained after a stop and frisk of Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s statement that he was “drug dealer” in answer to the booking officer’s question about his employment. The First Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to suppress the incriminating evidence and comment, holding (1) there was no constitutional violation in the stop and frisk of Defendant; and (2) the booking exception to Miranda applied to the employment question asked of Defendant. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - all minors at the relevant times - were all trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com. Plaintiffs filed suit against Backpage, alleging that Backpage tailored its website to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims on the website, leading to Appellants’ victimization. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage engaged in sex trafficking of minors as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and its Massachusetts counterpart, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and abridgments of intellectual property rights. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the facts alleged here did not state grounds that Plaintiffs were plausibly entitled to relief on their claims. View "Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC" on Justia Law