Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, arguing that the affidavit a law enforcement officer submitted in support of the application failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide an adequate nexus between Defendant’s drug dealing and his house. Defendant also sought a Franks hearing. The judge concluded that even if the affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the agent obtained the warrant in good faith. The judge also concluded that a Franks hearing was unnecessary. The First Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) law enforcement had probable cause for the search; and (2) Defendant failed to make the requisite showing to get a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 1997, Jaynes befriended 10-year-old Jeffrey in his Massachusetts neighborhood. Jaynes took Jeffrey for rides in Jaynes's Cadillac without his parents' knowledge. On October 1, Jaynes and Sicari picked Jeffrey up in the Cadillac, bought gasoline, duct tape, a large plastic container, lime, and concrete, and traveled to a New Hampshire apartment that Jaynes rented. The next morning, the Cadillac was seen parked at the Great Works River Bridge in Maine. Jaynes was arrested; an inventory search of the Cadillac yielded a driver's license with a picture of Jaynes under a different name and a Manchester address; duct tape; and receipts for a plastic container, lime, and concrete. Following Sicari’s confession, implicating Jaynes, police conducted a warranted search of Jaynes's New Hampshire apartment and found lime, the plastic container's label, and Jeffrey's jersey smelling of gasoline. Jeffrey's body was discovered in the Great Works River, inside a plastic container sealed with duct tape. An autopsy revealed that a gasoline-soaked rag had been held over his nose and mouth. Jaynes was convicted of kidnapping and second-degree murder. State appeals courts rejected his claims that the Commonwealth was required to prove that harm preceding death (not the separately charged abduction) occurred in Massachusetts, and concerning brief closing of the courtroom to the public, although not to Jaynes or his counsel. On unsuccessful appeal from denial of a second motion for a new trial, Jaynes argued that inflammatory evidence of his sexual preferences was improperly admitted, evidence from the searches should have been excluded, and ineffective assistance. The First Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, holding that no state court determination was either contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Jaynes v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted in Massachusetts state court in 2005 of the first-degree murder of his cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. He did not testify. The state trial court denied Jenkins's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed. The federal district court denied his habeas petition and granted a certificate of appealability only on the issue of Jenkins's waiver of his right to testify in his own defense. Jenkins argued that his attorney unilaterally decided that he would not testify. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, engaging in deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) because the SJC adjudicated Jenkins's claim on the merits . Because there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing the proper standard and burdens for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right to testify on facts like these, Jenkins is not entitled to habeas relief. His claim depends on too broad a characterization of waiver of federal constitutional rights, not drawn from cases of like circumstances. View "Jenkins v. Bergeron" on Justia Law

R.M. was a 12-year-old middle school student in Lexington, when several students pulled him to the ground and beat him, repeatedly kicking and punching him in the head and stomach. The beating was captured on a video. Principal Flynn discussed the incident with R.M.’s mother, Morgan. He indicated that R.M. had agreed to the beating as part of an initiation into a group and had "delay[ed] the investigation," so that R.M. would not be allowed to participate in an upcoming track meet. Later, R.M. was "pushed, tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways." R.M. had his pants pulled down in front of other students and was pushed into a locker. Morgan emailed Principal Flynn that R.M. did not feel safe at school and was scared to report bullying for fear of retaliation. R.M. missed a significant amount of school due to anxiety attacks. Morgan filed suit, alleging violation of R.M.'s federal substantive due process rights, relying upon a theory once suggested by the Supreme Court that when the state creates a danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal, further agreeing that the conduct did not fall within the scope of Title IX, which is concerned with actions taken "on the basis of sex," and not undifferentiated bullying. View "Morgan v. Town of Lexington" on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The City of Boston and other Massachusetts communities and state employers, in selecting police officers for promotion to the position of sergeant in 2005 and 2008, adapted a test developed by a Massachusetts state agency. The test was the result of an effort to eliminate the use of race and other improper considerations in decisions involving public employment. Some of the Black and Hispanic applicants who were not selected for promotion filed suit, claiming that the use of the test resulted in an unjustified “disparate impact” in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the test was a valid selection tool and that Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was an alternative valid selection tool available that would have resulted in the promotion of a higher percentage of Black and Hispanic officers. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied correct legal standards and that the record contained sufficient support for the court’s findings. View "Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of sixty months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition and erred in classifying his prior convictions and convictions of a crime of violence for purposes of calculating his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but vacated the remanded for resentencing proceedings, holding (1) there was no unlawful seizure at the time that Defendant contended one occurred, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) was erroneous. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

Michael McLaughlin, James Fitzpatrick, and Bernard Morosco, all of whom worked for a public agency responsible for providing low-income housing, were indicted for knowingly and unlawfully conspiring to defraud the United States and its agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development. McLaughlin pleaded guilty. After a jury trial, Fitzpatrick and Morosco were found guilty as charged. Fitzpatrick and Morosco appealed, raising a number of arguments. The First Circuit affirmed Fitzpatrick’s conviction and sentence, denied as moot Fitzpatrick’s earlier-filed motion asking the Court to stay his sentence pending appeal, and affirmed Morosco’s conviction, holding that Defendants were not entitled to relief on any of their arguments. View "United States v. Morosco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were property owners who privately leased units in Worcester, Massachusetts to students from the College of the Holy Cross. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the City of Worcester engaged in a scheme, through its zoning and code enforcement officials and entities, to selectively enforce the Worcester Zoning Ordinance and state Lodging House Act in order to pressure Holy Cross to make voluntary payments in lieu of property taxes to Worcester. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. View "College Hill Props., LLC v. City of Worcester" on Justia Law