Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting an armed robbery affecting interstate commerce in violation of the Hobbs Act, using a firearm in connection with the robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The First Circuit affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. Appellant argued, inter alia, that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for acquittal on the Hobbs Act charge based on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit granted a certificate of appealability only on the issue of counsel’s failure to move for acquittal on the Hobbs Act charge. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, even assuming that counsel’s failure to move for acquittal on the Hobbs Act charge was deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced thereby. View "Rivera-Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an eye disease. In 2010, Plaintiff’s contract with her employer expired and was not renewed. Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendants. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, concluding (1) Plaintiff was not an Americans with Disabilities Act “qualified individual”; (2) Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodations did not constitute discharge; and (3) Defendants’ decision not to rehire Plaintiff was for a non-discriminatory reason. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants acted for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants failed. View "Velez-Ramirez v. Commonwealth of P.R." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of sexual exploitation of children. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that he was not entitled to raise a “mistake of age” defense and in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in connection with a search of his motel room. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) plainly does not require that a person convicted of violating the statute needs to know the actual age of the minor victim, the limited scienter requirements of section 2251(a) do not violate the over breadth doctrine, and the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for violation of the statute is not grossly disproportionate; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

It is a violation of Massachusetts state law for a handgun-purveyor to transfer to customers any handgun “which does not contain a load indicator or magazine safety disconnect.” When the Attorney General (AG) informed firearms dealers and consumers that Glock, Inc.’s third and fourth generations pistols lacked an adequate load indicator, some dealers and consumers, joined by two advocacy groups, challenged the constitutionality of the load indicator requirement of the Massachusetts regulation. The district court granted the AG’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the dealers and consumers failed to state a claim for relief and that the two advocacy groups lacked standing. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the load indicator requirement was not unconstitutionally vague, and dismissal of the due process claim required dismissal of the consumers’ Second Amendment claim; and (2) the advocacy groups lacked standing to sue. View "Draper v. Healey" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home, arguing that the affidavit a law enforcement officer submitted in support of the application failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide an adequate nexus between Defendant’s drug dealing and his house. Defendant also sought a Franks hearing. The judge concluded that even if the affidavit failed to establish probable cause, the agent obtained the warrant in good faith. The judge also concluded that a Franks hearing was unnecessary. The First Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding (1) law enforcement had probable cause for the search; and (2) Defendant failed to make the requisite showing to get a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 1997, Jaynes befriended 10-year-old Jeffrey in his Massachusetts neighborhood. Jaynes took Jeffrey for rides in Jaynes's Cadillac without his parents' knowledge. On October 1, Jaynes and Sicari picked Jeffrey up in the Cadillac, bought gasoline, duct tape, a large plastic container, lime, and concrete, and traveled to a New Hampshire apartment that Jaynes rented. The next morning, the Cadillac was seen parked at the Great Works River Bridge in Maine. Jaynes was arrested; an inventory search of the Cadillac yielded a driver's license with a picture of Jaynes under a different name and a Manchester address; duct tape; and receipts for a plastic container, lime, and concrete. Following Sicari’s confession, implicating Jaynes, police conducted a warranted search of Jaynes's New Hampshire apartment and found lime, the plastic container's label, and Jeffrey's jersey smelling of gasoline. Jeffrey's body was discovered in the Great Works River, inside a plastic container sealed with duct tape. An autopsy revealed that a gasoline-soaked rag had been held over his nose and mouth. Jaynes was convicted of kidnapping and second-degree murder. State appeals courts rejected his claims that the Commonwealth was required to prove that harm preceding death (not the separately charged abduction) occurred in Massachusetts, and concerning brief closing of the courtroom to the public, although not to Jaynes or his counsel. On unsuccessful appeal from denial of a second motion for a new trial, Jaynes argued that inflammatory evidence of his sexual preferences was improperly admitted, evidence from the searches should have been excluded, and ineffective assistance. The First Circuit affirmed denial of his federal habeas petition, holding that no state court determination was either contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Jaynes v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted in Massachusetts state court in 2005 of the first-degree murder of his cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. He did not testify. The state trial court denied Jenkins's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed. The federal district court denied his habeas petition and granted a certificate of appealability only on the issue of Jenkins's waiver of his right to testify in his own defense. Jenkins argued that his attorney unilaterally decided that he would not testify. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, engaging in deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) because the SJC adjudicated Jenkins's claim on the merits . Because there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing the proper standard and burdens for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right to testify on facts like these, Jenkins is not entitled to habeas relief. His claim depends on too broad a characterization of waiver of federal constitutional rights, not drawn from cases of like circumstances. View "Jenkins v. Bergeron" on Justia Law

R.M. was a 12-year-old middle school student in Lexington, when several students pulled him to the ground and beat him, repeatedly kicking and punching him in the head and stomach. The beating was captured on a video. Principal Flynn discussed the incident with R.M.’s mother, Morgan. He indicated that R.M. had agreed to the beating as part of an initiation into a group and had "delay[ed] the investigation," so that R.M. would not be allowed to participate in an upcoming track meet. Later, R.M. was "pushed, tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways." R.M. had his pants pulled down in front of other students and was pushed into a locker. Morgan emailed Principal Flynn that R.M. did not feel safe at school and was scared to report bullying for fear of retaliation. R.M. missed a significant amount of school due to anxiety attacks. Morgan filed suit, alleging violation of R.M.'s federal substantive due process rights, relying upon a theory once suggested by the Supreme Court that when the state creates a danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal, further agreeing that the conduct did not fall within the scope of Title IX, which is concerned with actions taken "on the basis of sex," and not undifferentiated bullying. View "Morgan v. Town of Lexington" on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law