Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jenkins was convicted in Massachusetts state court in 2005 of the first-degree murder of his cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. He did not testify. The state trial court denied Jenkins's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed. The federal district court denied his habeas petition and granted a certificate of appealability only on the issue of Jenkins's waiver of his right to testify in his own defense. Jenkins argued that his attorney unilaterally decided that he would not testify. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, engaging in deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) because the SJC adjudicated Jenkins's claim on the merits . Because there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing the proper standard and burdens for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right to testify on facts like these, Jenkins is not entitled to habeas relief. His claim depends on too broad a characterization of waiver of federal constitutional rights, not drawn from cases of like circumstances. View "Jenkins v. Bergeron" on Justia Law

R.M. was a 12-year-old middle school student in Lexington, when several students pulled him to the ground and beat him, repeatedly kicking and punching him in the head and stomach. The beating was captured on a video. Principal Flynn discussed the incident with R.M.’s mother, Morgan. He indicated that R.M. had agreed to the beating as part of an initiation into a group and had "delay[ed] the investigation," so that R.M. would not be allowed to participate in an upcoming track meet. Later, R.M. was "pushed, tripped, punched or verbally assaulted while walking in school hallways." R.M. had his pants pulled down in front of other students and was pushed into a locker. Morgan emailed Principal Flynn that R.M. did not feel safe at school and was scared to report bullying for fear of retaliation. R.M. missed a significant amount of school due to anxiety attacks. Morgan filed suit, alleging violation of R.M.'s federal substantive due process rights, relying upon a theory once suggested by the Supreme Court that when the state creates a danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal, further agreeing that the conduct did not fall within the scope of Title IX, which is concerned with actions taken "on the basis of sex," and not undifferentiated bullying. View "Morgan v. Town of Lexington" on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The City of Boston and other Massachusetts communities and state employers, in selecting police officers for promotion to the position of sergeant in 2005 and 2008, adapted a test developed by a Massachusetts state agency. The test was the result of an effort to eliminate the use of race and other improper considerations in decisions involving public employment. Some of the Black and Hispanic applicants who were not selected for promotion filed suit, claiming that the use of the test resulted in an unjustified “disparate impact” in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the test was a valid selection tool and that Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was an alternative valid selection tool available that would have resulted in the promotion of a higher percentage of Black and Hispanic officers. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied correct legal standards and that the record contained sufficient support for the court’s findings. View "Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of sixty months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition and erred in classifying his prior convictions and convictions of a crime of violence for purposes of calculating his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but vacated the remanded for resentencing proceedings, holding (1) there was no unlawful seizure at the time that Defendant contended one occurred, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) was erroneous. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

Michael McLaughlin, James Fitzpatrick, and Bernard Morosco, all of whom worked for a public agency responsible for providing low-income housing, were indicted for knowingly and unlawfully conspiring to defraud the United States and its agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development. McLaughlin pleaded guilty. After a jury trial, Fitzpatrick and Morosco were found guilty as charged. Fitzpatrick and Morosco appealed, raising a number of arguments. The First Circuit affirmed Fitzpatrick’s conviction and sentence, denied as moot Fitzpatrick’s earlier-filed motion asking the Court to stay his sentence pending appeal, and affirmed Morosco’s conviction, holding that Defendants were not entitled to relief on any of their arguments. View "United States v. Morosco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were property owners who privately leased units in Worcester, Massachusetts to students from the College of the Holy Cross. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the City of Worcester engaged in a scheme, through its zoning and code enforcement officials and entities, to selectively enforce the Worcester Zoning Ordinance and state Lodging House Act in order to pressure Holy Cross to make voluntary payments in lieu of property taxes to Worcester. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. View "College Hill Props., LLC v. City of Worcester" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a piece of land with plans to develop the property. In response to the opposition Defendants’ mounted to Plaintiffs’ plan, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law rights. Plaintiffs also alleged First Amendment retaliation claims, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, all with corresponding state-law claims. The district court granted judgment in favor of Defendants due to Plaintiffs’ failure to state any viable claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the allegations put forth by Plaintiffs were insufficient to survive the pleading stage. View "Najas Realty, LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist." on Justia Law

When Carlo Gimenez Bianco (Gimenez) refused to remove his emotional support dog from his condominium unit in violation of the Castillo Condominium Association’s “no pets” bylaw, the Association forced Gimenez to vacate and sell the unit. Gimenez brought a complaint of disability discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which filed a charge of discrimination against the Association. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended decision concluding that the Association had not violated the Fair Housing Act. The Secretary of HUD set aside the ALJ’s recommended decision and found the Association liable for discrimination. On remand, the ALJ issued a recommended decision proposing to award Gimenez $3,000 in emotional distress damages and assessed a $2,000 civil penalty against the Association. The Secretary increased the proposed award of emotional distress damages to $20,000 and increased the civil penalty to $16,000. The First Circuit denied the Association’s petition for review and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for enforcement of his order, holding (1) the Secretary’s final order was supported by substantial evidence in the record; (2) the ALJ did not err in refusing to apply res judicata to pretermit Gimenez’s HUD charge; and (3) the Secretary’s final order was not tainted by procedural error. View "Castillo Condo. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law