Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case were family child care providers who were considered public employees for purposes of the statute authorizing employees in public service to organize for collective bargaining. A majority of the class of such providers as Appellants chose Service Employees International Union, Local 509 as their exclusive agent for bargaining collectively with the Department of Early Education and Care. No provider was required to become a Union member or to contribute money to the Union for any purpose. Appellants declined to join the Union. Appellants subsequently brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the statutory scheme that authorizes the selection of an exclusive bargaining agent to “agree on terms that affect their relationships with their clients and the government.” The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed based on established precedent, holding that Appellants were free from enforced association with the Union. View "D'Agostino v. Baker" on Justia Law

Eurie Stamps, Sr., an innocent, elderly, African-American man, was shot by Paul Duncan, a local police officer, during a SWAT team raid executing a search warrant for drugs and drug-related paraphernalia belonging to two drug dealers thought to reside in Stamps’s home. The co-administrators of Stamps’s estate sued the Town of Framingham and Duncan, arguing that Duncan violated Stamps’s constitutional right against unreasonable seizure when he pointed a loaded semi-automatic rifle at Stamps’s head, with the safety off and a finger on the trigger, even though Stamps was compliant and posed no known threat to the officers. Duncan filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity because the shooting was an accident and not a violation of clearly established law. The district court denied the motion, ruling that a reasonable jury could find that Duncan had violated Stamps’s Fourth Amendment rights and that the law was sufficiently clearly established to put Duncan on notice that his actions were not constitutionally permissible. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Duncan, in the situation at issue, was on notice that his actions could be violative of Stamps’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. View "Stamps v. Town of Framingham" on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiffs brought this action arguing that they were unlawfully removed from the Commonwealth’s active voter registry for having failed to vote in the 2008 election for Resident Commissioner. On interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit held that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) bars Puerto Rico from removing voters from the registry for the office of Resident Commissioners unless they fail to participate in the preceding two general federal elections. On remand, the district court found in favor of Plaintiffs and issued injunctive and declaratory relief from removing otherwise eligible voters from the active election registry unless HAVA's requirements are met. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the National Voter Registration Act does not apply to Puerto Rico and thus does not supersede the Commonwealth’s voter deactivation procedures; (2) HAVA invalidates the deactivation procedures of Article 6.021 of Puerto Rico Act No. 2011 insofar as it applies to voter eligibility for federal elections; and (3) Plaintiffs may bring a private cause of action seeking relief under HAVA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Colon-Marrero v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was terminated from her employment with Puerto Rico’s Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, she filed a federal-court suit alleging that Defendants discriminated against her because of her disability, age, and politics. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged various violations of federal and local law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and then dismissed the remaining claims without explanation. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in every respect, except that the Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, holding (1) the district judge erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but Plaintiff’s section 1983 was time-barred; (2) because Defendants agreed that Plaintiff’s ADA claim should not have been dismissed on failure-to-exhaust grounds, the reversal is dismissed; (3) Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim was correctly dismissed for failure to exhaust; and (4) because the dismissal of the ADA claim is reversed, the judge on remand must reinstate the local-law claims as well. View "Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of P.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the City of Waltham, Massachusetts and several of its officials alleging that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights and alleging various violations of Massachusetts state law. Defendants moved for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims. The district court rejected the immunity defenses of two municipal officials in ruling on this motion. On interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit ruled that the two individual defendants were immune to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim - the only preserved federal claim in the case - failed. After the Court’s decision, the district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims and the court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, holding that Plaintiff’s arguments were unavailing. View "Snyder v. Collura" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action alleging that she was stripped of various job duties and eventually terminated from her job at the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority due to her affiliation with the Popular Democratic Party. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s First Amendment political discrimination claims, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the stripping of Plaintiff’s job functions constituted adverse employment actions, and absent any political discrimination, Plaintiff would have in any event been terminated for nondiscriminatory reasons. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of political discrimination; and (2) a genuine dispute existed as to whether Defendants would have fired Plaintiff regardless of her political affiliation. Remanded. View "Reyes-Orta v. P. R. Highway and Transp. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s late father was formerly employed as a mechanic by the City of Boston. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit on behalf of her father’s estate, alleging that the City and her father’s supervisors discriminated against her father on the basis of race and retaliated against him by terminating his employment. Plaintiff’s federal claims appeared to arise under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding that Plaintiff had not pled facts sufficient to support her section 1983 claim and had failed to timely exhaust the administrative prerequisites necessary to bring suit on her section 1981 claim. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claim, holding that this claim was properly dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); but (2) reversed the dismissal of the section 1981 claim, holding that the district court erred by imposing an administrative exhaustion requirement where none exists. View "Buntin v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

In 2014, Perfect Puppy, Inc. signed a lease to use a City of East Providence building for a “Puppy Sales store.” Less than two months later, the East Providence city council formally passed an ordinance banning dog and cat sales. Perfect Puppy sued East Providence in state court. The case was removed to federal court on federal-question grounds. The district judge granted East Providence summary judgment on all claims except Perfect Puppy’s takings claim. As for any possible facial-takings challenge, the judge concluded that the claim lacked development. Noting that Perfect Puppy had not asked the state for compensation, the judge deemed the as-applied challenge unripe and remanded the suit to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed the judge’s handling of the facial-takings issue and dismissed Perfect Puppy’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to that part of the judge’s order remanding the as-applied claim to state court, holding (1) Perfect Puppy failed to bring a facial-takings challenge; and (2) the lack-of-jurisdiction ground for the remand of the as-applied challenge was colorable, which meant that the First Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the judge’s decision. View "Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. During jury selection for Appellant’s trial, the Massachusetts state prosecutor exercised peremptory challenge to strike three black men age twenty-five or under. The jury convicted Appellant, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. Appellant appealed, arguing that the prosecutor had improperly exercised peremptory challenges against young “men of color.” The appeals court affirmed. Appellant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, determining that the state court’s application of federal law was reasonable. The First Circuit remanded the case, concluding that Appellant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under step one of the framework established in Batson v. Kentucky. After an evidentiary hearing as to steps two and three of Batson, the district court ruled against Appellant on the final step of Batson. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant had not proven that there was racial discrimination during jury selection. View "Sanchez v. Roden" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder. The Massachusetts trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed his conviction. Appellant later filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the Commonwealth failed to disclose a document that was evidence of a possible cooperation agreement between one prosecution witness and the Commonwealth, in violation of his right to due process. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, had the document been timely disclosed to the defense, the there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "Rosario v. Roden" on Justia Law