Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a math professor at Southern University's New Orleans campus, filed suit against the University, alleging that plaintiff's supervisor engaged in a campaign of harassment that has continued through the filing of this lawsuit. Plaintiff sued the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the supervisor individually under section 1983. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for defendants. Principally at issue on appeal was whether the continuing violation doctrine required consideration of a lengthier period of time in evaluating the merit of plaintiff's claims. Like the Tenth Circuit, the court expressly recognized that the court's post-National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan test for the continuing violation doctrine has long implicitly acknowledged: Morgan overruled the court's prior cases to the extent they held that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply when an employee was or should have been aware earlier of a duty to assert her rights. Therefore, the magistrate judge erred by using this factor to prevent plaintiff from showing a continuing violation that would enable her to support her harassment claim with conduct occurring more than 300 days before she filed her EEOC charge. The court further concluded that Morgan's disclaiming of an "on notice" inquiry should also apply to section 1983 hostile work environment claims; concluded that plaintiff has alleged a continuing course of conduct dating back to her return from leave in 2011; remanded for the magistrate judge to evaluate the full scope of the allegedly harassing conduct; and affirmed the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heath v. Southern University System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the mother of E.M., filed suit alleging a number of procedural and substantive causes of action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the majority of E.M.'s IDEA claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations period and that E.M. failed to administratively exhaust his Rehabilitation Act claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Reyes v. Manor Independent School District" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his employers, he filed suit against them, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on the ADA claim because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the reasons defendants gave for terminating him - a reduction in force - were pretextual. Because the pretext arguments plaintiff raised with respect to the ADA apply equally to the FMLA, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the FMLA claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caldwell v. KHOU-TV" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to death by legal injection, sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to allow review of the district court's rejection of his most recent federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argued that the district court erred by affording deference to the state court's determination of federal law— specifically, by applying the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2253. The court denied the COA, concluding that, even under a de novo standard of review, no jurist of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or conclude that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. View "Ruiz v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, T.M.'s mother, filed suit against the County and others after T.M., a middle school student, was arrested for a fight on school property, taken to a juvenile detention center, and subjected to a strip and cavity search. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the strip and cavity search violated T.M.'s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the County on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court applied the deferential test in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders because the deference given to correctional officials in the adult context applies to correctional officials in the juvenile context as well. Applying Florence, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to make a substantial showing that the Center's search policy is an exaggerated or otherwise irrational response to the problem of Center security. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mabry v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against three officers and the City of Fort Worth, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff's suit stemmed from his arrest after he was video recording a police station from a public sidewalk and refused to identify himself to officers. The district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court concluded that all three officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim because there was no clearly established First Amendment right to record the police at the time of plaintiff's activities. The court explained for the future that First Amendment principles, controlling authority, and persuasive precedent demonstrate that a First Amendment right to record the police does exist, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The court also concluded that Officer Grinalds and Dyess's initial questioning or detention of plaintiff before he was handcuffed was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Therefore, Grinalds and Dyess are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim that they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from detention absent reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that no objectively reasonable person in these officers' position could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff and thus they are not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim that the officers violated his right to be free from warrantless arrest absent probable cause. Finally, Lieutenant Driver is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims where Driver acted objectively reasonably in light of the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to this claim. View "Turner v. Driver" on Justia Law

The court treated plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing En Banc as a Petition for Panel Rehearing and denied the Petition. The court withdrew the prior opinion and substituted this opinion. This interlocutory appeal arose out of a wrongful termination suit filed by plaintiff, a nurse supervisor, against the Medical Center. Plaintiff alleged that the Medical Center discharged her in retaliation for raising age-discrimination complaints. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims for pain and suffering damages and punitive damages because Fifth Circuit precedent bars such recoveries under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Dean v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., required dismissal of plaintiff's pain and suffering and punitive damages claims. The court explained that Dean is not distinguishable from this case and an intervening change in law did not justify setting Dean aside. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Vaughan v. Anderson Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lufkin, his former employer, alleging, inter alia, that the employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for complaining that his direct supervisor racially harassed him. The district court dismissed and refused to grant plaintiff an extension of time to file additional objections to the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, which the district court adopted. The court concluded that plaintiff is entitled to relief because he has demonstrated that his supervisors, motivated by retaliatory animus, took acts intended to cause an adverse employment action, and those acts were a but-for cause of his termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed Lufkin's cross-appeal. View "Fisher v. Lufkin Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants provided him inadequate security and impermissibly delayed medical care. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-protect claims against Chief of Security George Byrnes, Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, Captain Kelly Moore, and Captain Jackie Johnson; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claims of inadequate medical care against Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, and Head Nurse Debra Cowan; and, although the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-protect claims and plaintiff's medically related claims against Administrative Assistant Sheila Spinner, Warden Lance Moore, and Head Nurse Debra Cowan, the dismissal should have been without prejudice because it is not clear that plaintiff amended his complaint with a sufficient understanding of the inadequacies in his original pleading or that he has pleaded his best case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consideration. View "Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Parker County Deputy Sheriffs Hollis and Iglesias, alleging that the deputies arrested him without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted the deputies' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Defendant was arrested for interfering with an officers' duties after he refused to follow the deputies' orders to move his truck. The court explained that Texas courts have found that failure to comply with an officer's instructions under similar circumstances violates Texas Penal Code 38.15 and is not protected speech. In Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., the court has held that failure to comply with a police officer’s instruction to stand back is not protected speech and gives the officer probable cause to arrest under Texas Penal Code 38.15. Therefore, based on this precedent, the court concluded that a reasonable officer could have believed that there was a fair probability that plaintiff violated Texas Penal Code 38.15 by failing to comply with Iglesias' instruction to move the truck. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Childers v. Iglesias" on Justia Law